Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before Dec 23 2014, 10:27 am any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SERVICES:
JOANN M. PRICE GREGORY F. ZOELLER Merrillville, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
ROBERT J. HENKE Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
DAVID DICKMEYER Certified Legal Intern
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE LAKE COUNTY COURT APPOINTED SPECIAL ADVOCATE:
DONALD W. WRUCK Wruck Paupore PC Dyer, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
IN THE MATTER OF THE TERMINATION OF ) THE PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP OF: ) M.B., S.B., and C.B., Minor Children, ) ) and ) ) L.B., Mother, ) ) Appellant-Respondent, ) ) vs. ) No. 45A03-1406-JT-193 ) INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD ) SERVICES, and LAKE COUNTY COURT ) APPOINTED SPECIAL ADVOCATE, ) ) Appellees-Petitioners. )
APPEAL FROM THE LAKE SUPERIOR COURT The Honorable Thomas P. Stefaniak, Jr., Judge Cause Nos. 45D06-1309-JT-214, 45D06-1309-JT-215, 45D06-1309-JT-216
December 23, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BROWN, Judge
L.B. (“Mother”) appeals the involuntary termination of her parental rights to her
children, M.B., S.B., and C.B. (collectively, the “Children”). Mother raises one issue,
which we revise and restate as whether the evidence is sufficient to support the termination
of her parental rights. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Mother is the biological mother of M.B., born October 10, 2006, S.B., born March
9, 2008, and C.B., born September 15, 2010.1 Mother has abused drugs for most of her life
and has a criminal history related to her drug usage, including convictions in 2003 for theft
and forgery, convictions in 2004 for false informing and conversion, a conviction in 2005
for forgery, and a conviction in 2007 for false informing. The Indiana Department of Child
1 She also has a fourth child who lives with his maternal grandmother, who serves as the child’s legal guardian. The child began living with his maternal grandmother in 2004 when Mother became incarcerated. This child is not a party to this appeal.
2 Services (“DCS”) has a history of interaction with Mother and the father of the Children
(“Father”).2 In October 2007, Father was arrested in a drug house with M.B. in his arms.
As a result, M.B. was placed in Mother’s care. In May 2010, Mother became involved
with DCS after an investigation revealed the presence of drugs, including opiates, cocaine,
methadone, and benzoate, in her system. At the time, Mother was pregnant with C.B.
On June 1, 2010, DCS filed a petition alleging that M.B. and S.B. were children in
need of services (“CHINS”), in which DCS alleged that Mother and Father smoked crack
in the home while M.B. and S.B. were present; Mother worked as a prostitute at a truck
stop; Mother, who at the time was participating in a methadone treatment program,
admitted to using heroin and cocaine; and Mother was living in a motel room in Gary,
Indiana, without functioning lights and very little food. On the same day, Mother admitted
the material allegations contained in the CHINS petition. The court declared that M.B. and
S.B. were CHINS and granted a temporary wardship to DCS.
On August 8, 2010 the court issued a dispositional decree, which incorporated the
services recommended by the predispositional report, including a substance abuse
evaluation, random drug screens, a parenting assessment and parenting classes, individual
counseling, and supervised visitation. Mother’s fourth child, C.B., was born on September
15, 2010, while M.B. and S.B. were cared for by their maternal grandmother. Mother and
Father produced clean drug screens, which resulted in the
2 The court also terminated the parental rights of Father, but he is not participating in this appeal. We therefore limit our recitation of the facts to those facts pertinent solely to Mother’s appeal of the termination of her parental rights to the Children.
3 Children’s reunification with Mother, and, on April 25, 2011, the court dismissed the
wardship.
In July 2012, DCS investigated Mother after receiving a new report that Mother,
who was still using methadone, had relapsed on cocaine and heroin. At the time of DCS’s
involvement, Mother was living at her grandmother’s house. On July 27, 2012, the
Children were removed from Mother’s care and placed in foster care. On July 31, 2012,
DCS again filed CHINS petitions alleging that Mother “uses crack and heroin, and gets
paranoid while using drugs, and will use drugs in front of the children,” that Mother “tested
positive for cocaine and methadone,” and that the Children “were removed because of the
parent’s drug use and the children’s tender ages and placed in foster care.” DCS Exhibit J
at 2. The petition also alleged that the Children, at times, were out past midnight at truck
stops and that Mother obtained crack from “driver’s [sic] at the truckshop.” Id. The
petition alleged that M.B. expressed statements suggesting consideration of suicide and
self-harm, of which Mother was unaware, was able to describe crack’s appearance, and
explained that the Children have witnessed Mother smoke crack. On the same day, Mother
admitted to the material allegations in the petition, and the court declared the Children were
CHINS.
On August 31, 2012, the court entered a dispositional decree, which incorporated
the services recommended in the predispositional report3 and required Mother’s
3 The predispositional report also noted that referrals to several counseling facilities, which provided drug and alcohol evaluations and treatment, family and group counseling, parenting assessment and parental counseling, individual counseling for M.B., and random drug screens for Mother, had been made on August 1, 2012 for Mother and the Children, but because Mother and the Children had scabies DCS services could not begin.
4 cooperation with all court-ordered services, compliance with the results of a substance
abuse evaluation, recommendations of a parenting assessment and random drug screens,
and participation in group counseling, home-based counseling, and supervised visitation.4
The decree also required Mother to keep her appointments with service providers, remain
in the county, and secure and maintain a stable source of income and housing. The services
were recommended to ensure that Mother “refrain from using drugs” and that she “provide
safe and stable housing” for the Children. DCS Exhibit S at 11. At the time of the
dispositional decree, the Children’s permanency plan was reunification.
On November 13, 2012, the court granted DCS’s motion to suspend Mother’s
visitation and required Mother’s participation in an inpatient drug program. A Review
Hearing Order, dated December 19, 2012, required DCS to make a referral for Mother at
an inpatient substance abuse program and Mother was given sixty days to enter an inpatient
rehabilitation program. The Review Hearing Order adopted the statements in a DCS report,
which noted that Mother had not availed herself of the services provided by DCS.
Shavonne Smith, the Children’s Family Case Manager at the time, (“FCM Smith”)
attempted to place Mother in an inpatient rehabilitation program. FCM Smith printed
information and provided telephone numbers, Mother “wanted to go Haymarket” treatment
center in Chicago, but FCM Smith “found out later that [Mother] had never” gone to
inpatient rehabilitation. Transcript at 163. Mother never pursued treatment at Haymarket
because she “let the drugs take over.” Id. at 27.
4 The dispositional decree made the Children wards of DCS as of July 31, 2012.
5 In March 2013, Mother moved to Pennsylvania but did not inform FCM Smith or
anyone else of the move. After her visitation was stopped, DCS had minimal contact with
her because Mother had gone to “Pennsylvania, to try to – just get away from the area
more. This is the area, that people, places, and things change it.” Id. at 25. A Review
Hearing Order, dated April 1, 2013, modified the Children’s permanency plan to
termination of parental rights and adoption and discontinued all services to Mother. The
Review Hearing Order adopted the statements in a DCS report, which observed that Mother
was noncompliant with all court-ordered services, that DCS was unaware of Mother’s
whereabouts, that DCS was unable to contact Mother, and that DCS recommended
adoption instead of reunification. Mother did not “get into in an inpatient [drug treatment
program] as [she was] ordered.” Id. at 168.
In the middle of June 2013, FCM Smith learned that Mother had moved to
Pennsylvania. Mother informed FCM Smith that she had begun to participate in services
at Rainbow Recovery, and FCM Smith sent a referral for an interstate compact placement
on Children (“ICPC”). The ICPC was denied in November 2013 because no background
clearance was ever completed for Mother, a Pennsylvania worker, after three unsuccessful
attempts, was unable to contact her, and “because [Mother] got arrested.” Id. at 28. From
March 2013 through December 2013 Mother was in Pennsylvania, where she participated
in, but did not complete, a methadone management program at Rainbow Recovery instead
of inpatient rehabilitation as required by the December 19, 2012 Review Hearing Order.
Ultimately, Mother did not complete either an inpatient or an outpatient treatment program
to address her substance abuse issues.
6 On September 13, 2013, DCS filed its petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights.
Mother returned from Pennsylvania for the initial termination hearing on December 11,
2013, and there was an outstanding warrant for her arrest. She again returned to Indiana
in January 2014 to attend to an outstanding warrant for a theft charge that occurred around
2011, and her family, at Mother’s request, “called the bail bondsman and had him come
get [her].” Id. at 71. As a result, Mother became incarcerated in the Porter County Jail on
January 3, 2014 on a theft conviction, for which she was to be released from jail on June
27, 2014, followed by a year of probation. She also had a pending case for trespass. While
incarcerated, Mother participated in a C.D.A. program at the Porter County Jail to continue
her drug treatment.
On April 16, 2014, the court held an evidentiary hearing on DCS’s termination
petition. Mother was present at the hearing and testified to facts consistent with the
foregoing. She testified that she was thirty-seven years old, had been using drugs since
she was thirteen, began to use cocaine and heroin when she was twenty-five, and had
undergone seven years of methadone treatment prior to December 2013, but, at the time of
the hearing, she was “not on methadone.” Id. at 13. Mother admitted that she was not
compliant with the services required under the dispositional decree from July 2012 through
December 2012. She indicated that she participated in the parenting assessment and the
substance abuse evaluation, and understood that her drug use along with positive drug
screens for cocaine and methadone, coupled with difficulty obtaining transportation,
affected her ability to participate in supervised visitation. She also knew that her
visitations were stopped on November 7, 2012 because of her positive drug screen. While
7 in Pennsylvania, Mother testified that she “stayed clean” and gained a significant amount
of weight as a result of her sobriety. Id. at 27.
Regarding her housing situation, the Children’s best interests, and plans following
her release from the Porter County Jail, Mother stated that the last time she had lived in
housing that was her own and not with family members was when she lived in New
Chicago, which occurred sometime around the previous CHINS case that involved M.B.
and S.B. Under questioning by an attorney for the Court Appointed Special Advocate
(“CASA”), Mother stated that it had been “[a]bout two years” since she had last seen the
Children. Id. at 44. She also testified that “stability” is the best thing for the Children but,
regarding whether the Children’s current placements provided stability, stated “I’m not
going to comment on that.” Id. at 45. Mother explained that after her release from jail, her
plans for housing involved a friend “who has signed up to get me an apartment and he’s
basically going to have everything set up for me, because I have the probation going on
and I cannot live at my grandmother’s house” because her “uncle is on parole.” Id. at 46.
Mother acknowledged that, as of the hearing date, she did not have an apartment or a place
to live but testified that “[b]efore June 27th” she would have a place to live. Id. She further
acknowledged that, as of the hearing date, she had no source of income to pay for an
apartment. When asked by the CASA attorney, “[d]o you not see why people would be
concerned over that plan,” Mother responded, “I totally understand.” Id. at 74.
Naomi Knoerzer, clinical director at Crown Counseling, conducted a parenting
assessment on Mother on October 19, 2012, and she testified to her impression of Mother
as follows: “I was quite disturbed . . . because . . . she was sweating profusely” and “had to
8 stand by a window, eventually we got her a fan, she had to leave the meeting several times
and use the restroom,” and, at one point, Mother came “out and spray[ed] air freshener
throughout out [sic] lobby, saying that someone had vomited, when there was no such event
that had happened.” Id. at 81-82. Knoerzer added that she “believe[d] that [Mother] was
hallucinating off of what she was taking, or that she, herself had been ill and was trying to
cover that up.” Id. Regarding Mother’s parenting assessment, Knoerzer explained:
I was able to complete the majority of it, a few assessments she did not complete, but most of the inventories came back that she was considered very high risk for child abuse and neglect, due to have [sic] low levels of empathy endorsing corporal punishment, having difficulty understanding appropriate child development and reversing parent/child roles, indicating that she gets her emotional fulfillment through her children, rather than her providing emotional fulfillment.
Id.
FCM Stephens stated that the Children had been in foster care since July 27, 2012.
She indicated that, at the time of the termination hearing, Mother was not in a better
position to reunify with the Children and, in response to questioning about whether Mother
had remedied the conditions resulting in removal, testified:
I believe she is trying, but I do not think that they are remedied. You still have outstanding legal issues that are pending. Right now, due to her incarceration, she does not have access to illegal substances, but . . . I cannot say that [the conditions] are remedied. I don’t have any documentation or proof that they have been remedied.
Id. at 115-116.
FCM Stephens explained that the Children have had “extensive mental health issues
due to the traumatic experiences that they’ve had while in [Mother’s] care.” Id. at 116-117
She stated that M.B. has been “diagnosed with mood disorder, oppositional defiant disorder
9 . . . has been placed in Michiana behavioral health, [and] was on his way to a residential
facility at age seven.” Id. She also stated that S.B. had “huge boundary issues, doesn’t
know a stranger from a person that is close to [her].” Id. She further testified as to her
belief that continuing the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the Children’s well-
being, and that following Mother’s release from jail she would not consider placing the
Children with Mother because Mother would need about a year or two of additional
services, and because she lacked any reasonable certainty that Mother would not relapse.
Mary Edwards, a family consultant at Kidspeace, explained that C.B., has not
“really been exposed to [Mother]” but “needs ongoing . . . services to make sure that [C.B.]
has developed mentally” which includes speech therapy, and that C.B., in an angry
outburst, threw a chair while at school. Id. at 182-183. Edwards stated her belief that
termination of the parent-child relationship was in the Children’s best interest. Edwards
also testified that the Children “are doing so well currently, they’ve made [] tremendous
progress. I’m very impressed with the progress that they’ve made.” Id. at 181.
R.F., foster parent to M.B., stated that he is ready to adopt M.B. and that M.B. is
“excited about staying with us and being a forever home.” Id. at 188. K.R., the foster
mother for S.B. and C.B., indicated that she was willing to adopt them if the court
terminated the parent-child relationship, that S.B. and C.B. “need a stable place where they
know what’s going to happen, people who love them, and where they feel safe,” and that
she felt adoption into her home could provide a stable, loving environment for the two
children. Id. at 192.
10 On April 17, 2014, the court issued an order terminating Mother’s parental rights to
her Children. The court’s order stated in part that Mother was currently incarcerated on a
theft charge, that Mother’s family had a history with DCS dating back to 2007, and that
Mother had a long history of substance abuse. The court further found that Mother lacked
stable housing, income, and had failed to address her substance abuse issues. The order
also found that because of Mother’s incarceration she “does not have access to drugs” but
“admitted Methodone [sic] use which is progress from her past lifestyle, but not complete
sobriety.” Appellant’s Appendix at ii. Consequently, the court concluded that “[t]here is
a reasonable probability the conditions resulting in removal . . . will not be remedied in
that: The children became wards . . . due to [Mother’s drug abuse]. [Mother has] a long
history with substance abuse.” Id. at i-ii. The court’s order further concluded that Mother
is unlikely “to ever be in a position to properly parent these children due to [Mother’s]
pattern and history of drug usage,” and that Mother has not “completed services or
addressed [her] drug usage.” Id. at iv. The court also concluded that continuing the parent-
child relationship posed a threat to the Children’s well-being, stating that Mother’s “recent
strides to remain drug free are commendable, but there still remains [sic] many problems
that [Mother] faces, namely; bonding issues with all three children, stability in housing,
stability with financing, and no present ability to parent the children from jail,” and that
termination was in the Children’s best interest. Id.
DISCUSSION
The issue is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the termination of Mother’s
parental rights. In accordance with Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(c), the trial court’s judgment
11 contains specific findings of fact and conclusions thereon. We do not reweigh the evidence
or determine the credibility of witnesses, but consider only the evidence that supports the
judgment and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. In re E.M., 4
N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014). We confine our review to two steps: whether the evidence
clearly and convincingly supports the findings, and then whether the findings clearly and
convincingly support the judgment. Id.
We note that this court has long had a highly deferential standard of review in cases
concerning the termination of parental rights. See In re K.S., 750 N.E.2d 832, 836 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2001). Although parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law
provides for the termination of these rights when parents are unable or unwilling to meet
their parental responsibilities. In re R.H., 892 N.E.2d 144, 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). “The
traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” In re M.B., 666 N.E.2d 73, 76
(Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. The purpose of terminating parental rights is not to
punish parents, but to protect their children. In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 880 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2004). To that end, a trial court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed
before terminating the parent-child relationship. McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Office of
Family & Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
In order to terminate a parent-child relationship, DCS is required to allege and
prove, among other things:
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
12 (i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child.
(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a child in need of services;
(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.
Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). The State must provide clear and convincing proof of these
allegations. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-1261 (Ind. 2009), reh’g denied. If the court
finds the allegations in the petition are true, it must terminate the parent-child relationship.
Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8.
A. Remedy of Conditions
We note that the involuntary termination statute is written in the disjunctive and
requires proof of only one of the circumstances listed in Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B).
Because we find it to be dispositive under the facts of this case, we limit our review to
whether DCS established that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions
resulting in the removal or reasons for placement of the Children outside the home will not
be remedied. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(i).
In making such a determination, the court must judge a parent’s fitness to care for
his or her child at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence
of changed conditions. In re N.Q., 996 N.E.2d 385, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Due to the
13 permanent effect of termination, the trial court also must evaluate the parent’s habitual
patterns of conduct to determine the probability of future neglect or deprivation of the child.
Id. “The statute does not simply focus on the initial basis for a child’s removal for purposes
of determining whether a parent’s rights should be terminated, ‘but also those bases
resulting in the continued placement outside the home.’” Id. (quoting In re A.I., 825
N.E.2d 798, 806 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied). A court may properly consider
evidence of a parent’s prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect,
failure to provide support, and lack of adequate housing and employment. Id. “The burden
for DCS is to establish ‘only that there is a reasonable probability that the parent’s behavior
will not change.’” Id. (quoting In re Kay L., 867 N.E.2d 236, 242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)).
A trial court may also properly consider the services offered to the parent by a local DCS
office and the parent’s response to those services as evidence of whether conditions will
be remedied. A.F. v. Marion Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 762 N.E.2d 1244, 1252
(Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied.
Mother contends that although she “was unable to complete court ordered services
established for reunification with her Children after their 2012 removal, [she] was able to
accomplish the goal of the case plan by securing and maintaining sobriety,” and points to
evidence that she participated in the Rainbow Recovery Program; produced negative drug
screens; was sober at the time of the hearing; and, while incarcerated, “voluntarily
participated in substance abuse courses . . . .” Appellant’s Brief at 8. She asserts that the
court erred when it “failed to infer that the proactive behavior” taken by Mother, which
included “taking accountability for her past . . . significantly reduced the likelihood or even
14 probability that the Children would again be removed from Mother’s care.” Id. at 11. DCS
maintains that Mother’s arguments are “simply a challenge to the weight the juvenile court
afforded the evidence at the termination hearing,” which amounts to an invitation “to
reweigh the evidence.” DCS’s Brief at 24. DCS argues that Mother’s prolonged use of
illegal drugs, punctuated by brief periods of sobriety, along with her prior history with DCS
and the fact she “did not inform DCS” about her move to Pennsylvania during her
Children’s CHINS case suggests that “the juvenile court did not err in concluding that
Mother would not likely remedy [the conditions leading to removal].” Id. at 25-26.
Although Mother testified she was not on methadone at the hearing and had sought
treatment for her addictions at Rainbow Recovery and the C.D.A. program in the Porter
County Jail, we observe that Mother was ordered to participate in inpatient rehabilitation
but instead chose to leave the State and pursue treatment on her own. Mother
acknowledged that she did not complete the program, which was a methadone management
program rather than inpatient rehabilitation, as required by court order. Of the services
required under the dispositional decree, Mother participated in only the substance abuse
assessment and the parenting assessment, and the court heard evidence regarding Mother’s
pattern of sobriety and drug relapse. Moreover, the results of Mother’s parenting
assessment revealed that she was “considered very high risk for child abuse and neglect.”
Transcript at 82. FCM Stephens added that “[d]ue to the very poor prognosis of the
parenting, I would believe that parenting [education] would be essential before we could
even move forward [to reunification].” Id. at 109.
15 Mother also has a prior history with DCS and has moved around frequently, often
living with family members, and she stated that the last time she maintained housing that
was her own was sometime in 2010 when she was living in New Chicago. In her testimony
regarding her post-incarceration plans for housing and employment, she acknowledged that
she “totally underst[ood]” why those plans would be a cause for concern. Id. at 74.
Additionally, Mother also had a pending a case for trespass to address after her release
from the Porter County Jail on the theft charge. To the extent that Mother presented
testimony indicating she had produced a clean drug screen on November 8, 2013 and was
not using methadone at the time of the hearing, we note that after January 3, 2014, Mother
was incarcerated in the Porter County Jail where drugs were not available to her.
Testimony at the termination hearing revealed that Mother had not fully complied with all
of the services required by the dispositional decree, had not secured stable housing, income,
or employment, and has a historical pattern of drug relapses.
Based upon the record, we conclude that clear and convincing evidence supported
the court’s determination that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions leading
to the Children’s removal would not be remedied. See In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225,
1234 (Ind. 2013) (finding that where a parent with a history of substance abuse, who
maintained sobriety while incarcerated “where she would have not had access to any illegal
substances, nor be subjected to the type of stressors – namely the responsibility of
maintaining a household and raising three young and active children” that might trigger a
relapse, the trial court was within its discretion to disregard remedial efforts made by the
parent shortly before a termination hearing and to give more weight to prior conduct).
16 B. Best Interests and Satisfactory Plan
We next consider Mother’s assertion that DCS failed to prove that termination of
her parental rights was in the Children’s best interests and that DCS lacked a satisfactory
plan for the Children’s care and treatment. In determining what is in the best interests of
a child, the trial court is required to look beyond the factors identified by the DCS and look
to the totality of the evidence. McBride, 798 N.E.2d at 203. In so doing, the court must
subordinate the interests of the parent to those of the child. Id. The court need not wait
until a child is irreversibly harmed before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id.
Moreover, the recommendations by both the case manager and child advocate to terminate
parental rights, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be
remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in a
child’s best interests. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t. of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158-1159
(Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. “[A]doption is a ‘satisfactory plan’ for the care and
treatment of a child under the termination of parental rights statute.” See In re B.M., 913
N.E.2d 1283, 1287 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting In re A.N.J., 690 N.E.2d 716, 722 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1997)). A satisfactory plan “need not be detailed, so long as it offers a general
sense of the direction in which the child will be going after the parent-child relationship is
terminated.” In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied.
Mother asserts that termination is not in the Children’s best interests because the
“children’s ages are such that permanent separation from Mother could result in irreparable
harm to the children; especially if the children are not afforded the opportunity to enjoy
life with a clean and sober mother.” Appellant’s Brief at 13. She maintains that terminating
17 the parent-child relationship does not serve the Children’s best interests because adoption
“among two or more foster homes” would “threaten[] the sibling relationship” and the “trial
court had nothing before it that would ensure that siblings would maintain contact with one
another.” Id. at 14. DCS maintains that testimony at the hearing demonstrated that the
traumatic experiences inflicted upon the Children because of Mother’s issues, coupled with
the stability the Children have experienced in their placements with foster parents, who are
each willing to adopt the Children, demonstrates that termination is in the Children’s best
interest.
The record reveals that the Children suffer from serious issues related to Mother’s
lifestyle and troubles that have left them traumatized. The court heard testimony that M.B.
has been “diagnosed with mood disorder, oppositional defiant disorder . . . has been placed
in Michiana behavioral health, [and] was on his way to a residential facility at age seven.”
Transcript at 117. S.B. had “huge boundary issues, doesn’t know a stranger from a person
that is close to [her].” Id. Regarding C.B., family consultant Edwards explained that he
has not “really been exposed to [Mother]” and “needs ongoing services to make sure that
[C.B.] has developed mentally . . . .” Id. at 183. Moreover, Edwards testified that the
Children “are doing so well currently, they’ve made [] tremendous progress” and she was
“very impressed with the progress that they’ve made” in their placements. Id. at 181.
Edwards also testified that termination was in the Children’s best interest. FCM Stephens
indicated that termination and adoption was in the Children’s best interests. Testimony
also revealed that Mother had not remedied the conditions leading to removal. The two
adoptive homes are separate, as Mother points out in her brief, but the Children have
18 experienced greater stability in foster care and the foster parents have indicated that they
are willing to adopt.
Based on the totality of the evidence, we conclude that the court’s determination
that termination was in the Children’s best interests is supported by clear and convincing
evidence. See In re J.C., 994 N.E.2d 278, 290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (observing that
“[r]ecommendations of the case manager . . . in addition to evidence the conditions
resulting in removal will not be remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing
evidence that termination is in the child’s best interests”), reh’g denied. The record also
reveals that sufficient evidence supported the court’s conclusion that adoption into two
separate homes by the foster parents is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the
Children. See A.J. v. Marion Cnty. Office of Family and Children, 881 N.E.2d 706, 719
(Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (concluding that, in light of the evidence, the plan set forth by the
MCDCS in the case for the adoption of the children, albeit in different homes, was not
unsatisfactory), trans. denied.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that the trial court’s judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights
related to her Children is supported by clear and convincing evidence. We find no error
and affirm.
Affirmed.
BARNES, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.