MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Dec 21 2015, 6:28 am Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE MOTHER Gregory F. Zoeller Leanna Weissmann Attorney General of Indiana Lawrenceburg, Indiana Robert J. Henke ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT David E. Corey FATHER Deputy Attorneys General Jeffrey E. Stratman Indianapolis, Indiana Aurora, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Matter of the Termination December 21, 2015 of the Parent-Child Relationship Court of Appeals Case No. of: B.W., Minor Child 21A05-1505-JT-511 Appeal from the Fayette Circuit Court B.F., Father, and W.W., Mother, Appellants-Respondents, The Honorable Jack A. Tandy, Senior Judge v. The Honorable Beth A. Butsch, Judge The Indiana Department of Child Trial Court Cause No. Services, 21C01-1412-JT-324 Appellee-Petitioner.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 21A05-1505-JT-511 | December 21, 2015 Page 1 of 18 Brown, Judge.
[1] W.W. (“Mother”) and B.F. (“Father”) appeal the involuntary termination of
their parental rights with respect to their son B.W. Mother and Father raise one
issue, which we revise and restate as whether the evidence is sufficient to
support the termination of their parental rights. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On July 30, 2003, B.W. was born. On May 20, 2011, Father pled guilty to
dealing in a narcotic drug as a class B felony and being an habitual offender.
On June 17, 2011, the trial court sentenced Father to the Department of
Correction (“DOC”) for twelve and one-half years, enhanced by ten years for
his status as an habitual offender, for an aggregate sentence of twenty-two and
one-half years. In 2012, Mother was convicted of possession of a controlled
substance.1
[3] In June 2013, DCS received reports alleging a lack of supervision of B.W., that
Mother was using drugs, and that B.W. was a victim/perpetrator of sex abuse.
Kathy Hobson, a DCS family case manager supervisor, went to the home and
“found that the allegations were true.” Transcript at 46.
1 At the December 3, 2014 hearing, Mother was asked when she was convicted of possession of a controlled substance, and she replied: “Um, just about two years ago I think.” Transcript at 18. The record does not reveal Mother’s sentence for her conviction.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 21A05-1505-JT-511 | December 21, 2015 Page 2 of 18 [4] On July 12, 2013, DCS filed a verified petition alleging that B.W. was a child in
need of services (“CHINS”). DCS alleged that B.W. had exhibited sexually
maladaptive behaviors including anally penetrating his five-year-old cousin and
performing fellatio on him. DCS also alleged that B.W. started fires in his
home and that Mother’s ability to care for and manage B.W.’s behavior was
impaired by her drug use.
[5] On July 16, 2013, the court entered an Order on Initial/Detention Hearing.
The court found that Father denied the allegations and that Mother admitted
the allegations. The court appointed an attorney for Father and ordered that
the detention of B.W. was authorized or necessary to protect him and that it
was in his best interests to remove him from the home environment. On
August 14, 2013, the court entered an Order on Admission in which it found
that both parents admitted the allegation that B.W. was a CHINS.
[6] On September 6, 2013, the court entered an Order of Participation and a
Dispositional Order. The court found that Mother and Father admitted that
B.W. had exhibited sexually maladaptive behaviors including anally
penetrating his five-year-old cousin and performing fellatio on him. The court
also found that B.W. was a CHINS because he started fires in his home and
Mother’s ability to care for and manage his behavior was impaired by her drug
abuse. The court ordered Mother to contact the case manager every week,
allow the family case manager to make announced and unannounced visits to
the home, enroll in recommended services, keep all appointments, not use
controlled substances, complete a substance abuse assessment and follow all
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 21A05-1505-JT-511 | December 21, 2015 Page 3 of 18 treatment recommendations, submit to random drug screens, and maintain
suitable, safe, and stable housing. At some point, Mother moved to Richmond
despite service providers discouraging her from moving away from her support
and family in Fayette County.
[7] On December 30, 2013, the court entered an Order on Periodic Case Review
finding that Mother and Father were incarcerated. On March 21, 2014, the
court entered an Order on Periodic Case Review in which the court found that
Mother had not enhanced her ability to fulfill her parental obligations.
[8] On June 30, 2014, the court entered an Order Approving Permanency Plan in
which it found that Mother failed to participate in outpatient substance abuse
treatment on three occasions, declined inpatient treatment, and tested positive
for hydromorphone, morphine, Alprazolam, and hydrocodone. The court
found that Father remained incarcerated and was unable to fulfill parental
obligations, and appointed counsel for Mother. On September 10, 2014, the
court entered an Order on Periodic Case Review finding that the projected date
for B.W.’s adoption was March 2015.
[9] On October 24, 2014, Family Case Manager (FCM) Melissa Sparks, drove to
Richmond to pick up Mother, who did not have an automobile, to take her to
Connersville for a family team meeting to discuss visitations and services, but
Mother did not answer the door at 8:15 a.m. and later said that her alarm did
not go off and she had overslept. On November 21, 2014, Mother called Sparks
and said that she wanted to meet with her the following Monday. Sparks told
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 21A05-1505-JT-511 | December 21, 2015 Page 4 of 18 her that she was more than willing to do that; however, Mother then failed to
contact her. Meanwhile, in September 2014, Mother completed treatment at
Tara Treatment Centers, but she did not follow through with the recommended
services including outpatient substance abuse treatment, individual therapy,
attendance at A.A. meetings, and maintaining contact with a sponsor.
[10] On December 3, 2014, the court held a review hearing. At the hearing, Sparks
testified that Mother completed treatment at Tara Treatment Center in October
2014, but did not consistently stay in contact with her, and that B.W. attempted
to call Mother twice and was unable to contact her. Melanie Bailey, the court
appointed special advocate (CASA), testified that she recommended that B.W.
stay in his current placement, that B.W. loves Mother, that Mother “has refused
services offered to her from Centerstone,” and that she refused “life skills, basic
skills . . . .” Id. at 22.
[11] On December 4, 2014, DCS filed a Verified Petition for Involuntary
Termination of Parental Rights. On December 17, 2014, the court held an
initial hearing and appointed counsel for Mother and Father.
[12] Meanwhile, on December 11, 2014, DCS filed a Motion to Modify
Dispositional Decree requesting that a change in the permanency plan to
adoption was appropriate, and that cessation of DCS provided services was
appropriate because Mother and Father had not complied with them and/or
failed to benefit from the services. On January 14, 2015, the court held a
hearing on DCS’s motion and granted it by approving the change of the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 21A05-1505-JT-511 | December 21, 2015 Page 5 of 18 permanency plan to adoption and approving DCS’s request that services to
parents cease. The court also stated:
[I]f I guess at some point [Mother] makes a specific request if she wants services and is willing to follow through then I would certainly look at that and consider that. I’m just saying I don’t see this as a permanent order but she needs to step up to the plate and do something if she’s serious about it.
Id. at 38. Despite the order, Sparks still attempted to stop by and contact
Mother once or twice a month.
[13] On April 1, 2015, the court held a hearing. Hobson, the family case manager
supervisor, and Sparks testified. Hobson testified that Mother never completely
agreed that she had a substance abuse problem. When asked what she meant,
Hobson stated:
Um, [Mother] makes lots of um, to make excuses um, she’s not using, she is using, she’s using a legal prescription or it’s not . . . it’s been a constant battle throughout the case of [Mother] struggling with addiction. We’ve made multiple referrals to get [Mother] the help that she needs throughout all the different case managers. Each different case managers tried to assist [Mother] getting off drugs and I believe today she’s under the influence still.
Id. at 51.
[14] Megan Jackson, an employee at Centerstone and the liaison to DCS, testified
that Mother completed a substance assessment and had referrals for a substance
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 21A05-1505-JT-511 | December 21, 2015 Page 6 of 18 use group, but she was ultimately removed for non-attendance. She also
testified that she had a referral for supervised visitation, but she was unable to
schedule those with Mother because she was not able to contact her via
telephone. Jackson testified that Mother’s first intake was on January 14, 2014,
but that group sessions did not begin until March 17, 2014, because she had
difficulty contacting Mother, and that Mother cancelled or failed to show for
appointments in March, April, June, and July 2014. According to Jackson,
Mother’s group therapist removed her from the group based on “non-
attendance and non-investment” in April 2014, Mother was later readmitted to
the group, and she subsequently cancelled or failed to show for appointments.
Id. at 95.
[15] Sparks testified that she was assigned the case in August 2014, that she made
referrals for detox services, substance abuse treatment, home-based case
management and therapy, and supervised visitation, and that:
[Mother] has not been compliant with the services insofar as um, she will start and stop a lot of the services that were ordered um, she will state that she wants to do the services and referrals will be made for those services but then um, [Mother] will only meet a couple of times and then be [un]able to be contacted or will not show up for services.
Id. at 56. According to Sparks, Mother ultimately completed inpatient
treatment at Tara, but did not follow through with any of the recommended
services, including outpatient substance abuse treatment, individual therapy,
attendance at A.A. meetings, and maintaining contact with a sponsor. In
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 21A05-1505-JT-511 | December 21, 2015 Page 7 of 18 October or November 2014, Mother attended two sessions at Meridian, a
service provider, but Sparks received an email in January 2015 from Meridian
indicating that they had not been able to contact Mother and that they were
going to have to “close that out because they had not met with her . . . .” Id. at
72. Sparks also stated that Mother was inconsistent with staying in contact
with any of the service providers or the family case managers, following
through with goals, and making phone calls to B.W. She further testified that
Mother failed to contact her on a weekly basis as required by the dispositional
order, and that Sparks would call and leave messages, but Mother would not
return the calls.
[16] With respect to suitable housing, Sparks testified that she went to the address
Mother provided as her current home several times each month and twice a
month since December 2014 and knocked on the door, but no one answered,
and that Mother has not enhanced her ability to parent B.W. because of her
lack of consistency and her inability to follow through with services and stay in
contact with DCS.
[17] With respect to Father, Sparks testified that Father expressed an interest in
B.W., but due to his incarceration he realizes that he will not be able to provide
for him. She testified that she had not been able to provide direct services to
Father because of his incarceration, and that his scheduled release date is 2023,
at which time B.W. will be an adult.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 21A05-1505-JT-511 | December 21, 2015 Page 8 of 18 [18] The court appointed special advocate (CASA), Melanie Bailey, testified that
Mother had not been cooperative and did not respond to her texts or calls.
Bailey suggested to Mother that she write a letter to B.W., but Mother did not
do so. Bailey testified that she agreed that adoption was in B.W.’s best interest
because he has improved, now has self-esteem, and has bonded with his foster
family. On cross-examination, she stated that she believed that Mother wants
to reunite with B.W. but Mother did not do anything in a committed way.
[19] DCS presented evidence that Mother tested positive for opiates, including
hydromorphone and morphine, in March 2014, opiates, including
hydrocodone, in June 2014, and THC in December 2014.
[20] Father testified that he had not seen B.W. since 2010, that his scheduled release
date is 2023, and that he participated in services made available to him at the
DOC.
[21] Mother testified that she previously admitted that B.W. was a CHINS in part
because of her illegal drug use, that she cancelled multiple appointments with
Centerstone, that she was experiencing “really bad anxiety about everything”
and could not cope, and that Jackson said that she “would set something up”
but never did. Id. at 145. When asked whether she stopped using illegal
substances, Mother answered: “Um, I had a really bad problem and I did work
on it. I did go to rehab and I think it was detox and um, I have been going to
narcotic anonymous classes when I can. I’ve done them over the Internet um, I
am doing better than I have in a very long time so um . . . .” Id. at 147. She
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 21A05-1505-JT-511 | December 21, 2015 Page 9 of 18 testified that she moved to Richmond for a fresh start with new people, and that
she called Sparks every week or more than once a week, but her anxiety and
depression became so bad that she “couldn’t just beg her anymore.” Id. at 153.
[22] According to the combined testimony of Sparks, B.W.’s therapist, and the foster
mother, B.W. was initially defiant, and while at the time of the April 2015
hearing, he refused to discuss the sexually maladaptive behavior, he was doing
well generally, had improved, and felt safe in the foster family home.
[23] On April 28, 2015, the court entered an order terminating Father and Mother’s
parental rights, making detailed findings of fact, and concluding that there is a
reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in B.W.’s removal will not
be remedied, or that continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat
to the well-being of B.W., that termination is in B.W.’s best interests, and that
adoption is a satisfactory plan for him.
Discussion
[24] The issue is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the termination of
Mother and Father’s parental rights. In order to terminate a parent-child
relationship, DCS is required to allege and prove, among other things:
(A) that one (1) of the following is true: (i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least six (6) months under a dispositional decree. (ii) A court has entered a finding under IC 31-34-21-5.6 that reasonable efforts for family preservation or reunification are not required, including a description of
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 21A05-1505-JT-511 | December 21, 2015 Page 10 of 18 the court’s finding, the date of the finding, and the manner in which the finding was made. (iii) The child has been removed from the parent and has been under the supervision of a local office or probation department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning with the date the child is removed from the home as a result of the child being alleged to be a child in need of services or a delinquent child; (B) that one (1) of the following is true: (i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied. (ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well- being of the child. (iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a child in need of services; (C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and (D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.
Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). If the court finds that the allegations in a petition
described in Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4 are true, the court shall terminate the parent-
child relationship. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a).
[25] The State’s burden of proof for establishing the allegations in termination cases
“is one of ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-
1261 (Ind. 2009) (quoting Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2), reh’g denied. This is “a
‘heightened burden of proof’ reflecting termination’s ‘serious social Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 21A05-1505-JT-511 | December 21, 2015 Page 11 of 18 consequences.’” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014) (quoting In re G.Y.,
904 N.E.2d at 1260-1261, 1260 n.1). “But weighing the evidence under that
heightened standard is the trial court’s prerogative—in contrast to our well-
settled, highly deferential standard of review.” Id. “We do not reweigh the
evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses, but consider only the
evidence that supports the judgment and the reasonable inferences to be drawn
from the evidence.” Id. (quoting Egly v. Blackford Cnty. Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 592
N.E.2d 1232, 1235 (Ind. 1992)). “We confine our review to two steps: whether
the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings, and then whether
the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment.” Id.
[26] “Reviewing whether the evidence ‘clearly and convincingly’ supports the
findings, or the findings ‘clearly and convincingly’ support the judgment, is not
a license to reweigh the evidence.” Id. “[W]e do not independently determine
whether that heightened standard is met, as we would under the ‘constitutional
harmless error standard,’ which requires the reviewing court itself to ‘be
sufficiently confident to declare the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’”
Id. (quoting Harden v. State, 576 N.E.2d 590, 593 (Ind. 1991) (citing Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824 (1967), reh’g denied). “Our review must
‘give “due regard” to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the credibility of the
witnesses firsthand,’ and ‘not set aside [its] findings or judgment unless clearly
erroneous.’” Id. (quoting K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., Dearborn Cnty. Office,
989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (Ind. 2013) (citing Ind. Trial Rule 52(A)).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 21A05-1505-JT-511 | December 21, 2015 Page 12 of 18 A. Remedy of Conditions
[27] We note that the involuntary termination statute is written in the disjunctive
and requires proof of only one of the circumstances listed in Ind. Code § 31-35-
2-4(b)(2)(B). Because we find it to be dispositive under the facts of this case, we
limit our review to whether DCS established that there was a reasonable
probability that the conditions resulting in the removal or reasons for placement
of B.W. outside the home will not be remedied. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-
4(b)(2)(B)(i).
[28] In making such a determination, the court must judge a parent’s fitness to care
for his or her child at the time of the termination hearing, taking into
consideration evidence of changed conditions. In re N.Q., 996 N.E.2d 385, 392
(Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Due to the permanent effect of termination, the trial court
also must evaluate the parent’s habitual patterns of conduct to determine the
probability of future neglect or deprivation of the child. Id. “The statute does
not simply focus on the initial basis for a child’s removal for purposes of
determining whether a parent’s rights should be terminated, but also those bases
resulting in the continued placement outside the home.” Id. (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). A court may properly consider evidence of
a parent’s prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect,
failure to provide support, and lack of adequate housing and employment. Id.
A trial court can reasonably consider the services offered by DCS to the parent
and the parent’s response to those services. Id. Further, where there are only
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 21A05-1505-JT-511 | December 21, 2015 Page 13 of 18 temporary improvements and the pattern of conduct shows no overall progress,
the court might reasonably find that under the circumstances, the problematic
situation will not improve. Id.
[29] Mother and Father argue that DCS presented insufficient evidence to support a
reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in removal will not be
remedied. Mother admits that she did not have a “swift path to recovery and
made some missteps along the way,” but she was combatting her drug
addiction. Mother’s Brief at 18. She asserts that “she did test positive for pot,
but compared to an opiate addiction, the use of just marijuana shows major
progress toward becoming drug free.” Id. at 19. She points to her December
2014 negative test for opiates following her inpatient therapy.
[30] Father argues that, although he is not currently scheduled to be released until
2023, he is making efforts to reduce, modify, or reverse his sentence through
petitions for post-conviction relief or sentence modification. Without citation
to the record or authority, he asserts that it is not uncommon for incarcerated
defendants to receive early release to parole or a reduction in time, especially
when the inmate is actively participating in services and programs offered by
the DOC.
[31] DCS states that Mother and Father do not specifically challenge any of the
court’s findings of fact, that Mother’s argument continues to minimize her
substance abuse issues, and that the trial court’s conclusion that Mother and
Father would not likely remedy their conditions is not clearly erroneous.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 21A05-1505-JT-511 | December 21, 2015 Page 14 of 18 [32] The record reveals that Mother admitted that B.W. was a CHINS in part
because of her illegal drug use. Since the September 6, 2013 order requiring
that she not use controlled substances, in March 2014 Mother tested positive for
opiates, including hydromorphone and morphine, in June 2014 for opiates,
including hydrocodone, and for THC in December 2014. She did not follow
through with any of the services recommended after completing inpatient.
Sparks testified that Mother had not enhanced her ability to parent B.W.
because of her lack of consistency and her inability to follow through with
services. The record also reveals that Father’s scheduled release date is 2023,
when B.W. will be an adult.
[33] Based upon the court’s findings and the record as set forth in part above, we
conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court’s
determination that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions
leading to B.W.’s removal would not be remedied.
B. Best Interests
[34] We next consider Mother and Father’s assertion that DCS did not present clear
and convincing evidence that termination was in B.W.’s best interests. They
state that DCS failed to show the current arrangement is detrimental to B.W.
beyond the generally accepted notion that children are better off in a stable and
permanent environment. DCS maintains that the totality of the evidence
including the testimony of FCM Sparks and CASA Bailey support the trial
court’s conclusion.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 21A05-1505-JT-511 | December 21, 2015 Page 15 of 18 [35] We are mindful that in determining what is in the best interests of a child, the
trial court is required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and to the
totality of the evidence. McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 798
N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). In so doing, the court must subordinate
the interests of the parent to those of the child. Id. The court need not wait
until a child is irreversibly harmed before terminating the parent-child
relationship. Id. Children have a paramount need for permanency which the
Indiana Supreme Court has called a central consideration in determining the
child’s best interests. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 647-648. However, “focusing on
permanency, standing alone, would impermissibly invert the best-interests
inquiry . . . .” Id. at 648. This court has previously held that the
recommendation by both the case manager and child advocate to terminate
parental rights, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal
will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that
termination is in the child’s best interests. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 987
N.E.2d 1150, 1158-1159 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. This court has
previously recognized that “[i]ndividuals who pursue criminal activity run the
risk of being denied the opportunity to develop positive and meaningful
relationships with their children.” Castro v. State Office of Family & Children, 842
N.E.2d 367, 374 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied.
[36] To the extent Father cites In re G.Y., the Indiana Supreme Court issued that
decision in April 2009, concluding that termination of a mother’s parental
rights was not in the child’s best interests where mother made a good-faith
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 21A05-1505-JT-511 | December 21, 2015 Page 16 of 18 effort to complete the required services available to her in prison, obtained
suitable housing and gainful employment upon her release, and maintained a
consistent and positive relationship with the child. 904 N.E.2d at 1263-1264.
The Court observed that mother had delivered cocaine to a police informant a
year before the child’s birth and that there were no allegations that mother
engaged in any criminal behavior during the child’s life. Id. at 1258. Further,
the Court stated that, at oral argument, mother’s counsel confirmed that her
projected release date was June 2009 and maybe as early as May. Id. at 1262-
1263. Unlike the parent in G.Y., Father committed his offense after B.W.’s
birth, has not seen B.W. since 2010, and his scheduled release date is in 2023
[37] The record reveals that, while Mother completed inpatient treatment, she did
not follow through with any of the services recommended by the service
providers. Sparks testified that Mother had not been compliant and failed to
follow through with services or keep appointments or maintain contact with
DCS. She also testified that Mother had not enhanced her ability to parent
B.W. CASA Bailey testified that Mother had not been cooperative and that
adoption was in B.W.’s best interests.
[38] Based on the totality of the evidence and in light of our deferential standard of
review, we conclude that the court’s determination that termination is in B.W.’s
best interests is supported by clear and convincing evidence. See In re J.C., 994
N.E.2d 278, 290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (observing that “[r]ecommendations of
the case manager . . . in addition to evidence the conditions resulting in removal
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 21A05-1505-JT-511 | December 21, 2015 Page 17 of 18 will not be remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence
that termination is in the child’s best interests”), reh’g denied; In re A.I., 825
N.E.2d 798, 811 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (testimony of court appointed advocate
and family case manager, coupled with evidence that conditions resulting in
continued placement outside the home will not be remedied, is sufficient to
prove by clear and convincing evidence termination is in child’s best interests),
trans. denied. See also In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 649 (holding that incarceration
alone cannot justify “tolling” a child-welfare case and concluding that, because
the trial court could reasonably have reached either conclusion, our deferential
standard of review is dispositive and it was not clearly erroneous for the trial
court to conclude that, after three and a half years, Father’s efforts simply came
too late, and that the children needed permanency even more than they needed
a final effort at family preservation).
Conclusion
[39] We conclude that the trial court’s judgment terminating the parental rights of
Father and Mother is supported by clear and convincing evidence. We find no
error and affirm.
[40] Affirmed.
Kirsch, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 21A05-1505-JT-511 | December 21, 2015 Page 18 of 18