MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED this Memorandum Decision shall not be Oct 18 2018, 7:06 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK Indiana Supreme Court court except for the purpose of establishing Court of Appeals and Tax Court the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Victoria L. Bailey Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Danielle L. Gregory Attorney General of Indiana Marion County Public Defender Agency Robert J. Henke Indianapolis, Indiana Andrea E. Rahman Deputy Attorneys General Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEY FOR GUARDIAN AD LITEM DeDe K. Connor Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Matter of the Termination October 18, 2018 of the Parent-Child Relationship Court of Appeals Case No. of A.L., Mother, and E.L., 18A-JT-1039 Minor Child: Appeal from the A.L., Marion Superior Court The Honorable Appellant-Respondent, Gary Chavers, Judge Pro Tempore v. The Honorable Scott Stowers, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. Indiana Department of Child 49D09-1708-JT-733 Services,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-1039 | October 18, 2018 Page 1 of 19 Appellee-Petitioner,
and Child Advocates, Inc., Appellee-Guardian Ad Litem.
Kirsch, Judge.
[1] A.L. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental
rights to her minor child, E.L. (“Child”). Mother raises the following restated
issue for our review: whether the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental
rights was clearly erroneous because she contends it was not supported by
sufficient evidence.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History [3] Child was born on May 30, 2016. Tr. Vol. II at 7. In July 2016, the Indiana
Department of Child Services (“DCS”) removed Child from Mother’s care
because Mother admitted using marijuana and tested positive for the drug and
had an unstable living situation. Pet’r’s Ex. 1 at 5-6; Tr. Vol. II at 77-78, 104,
117-18. At the time of removal, Mother did not have age-appropriate bedding
for Child and was not utilizing safe sleeping practices with Child. Pet’r’s Ex. 1
at 6. Child was also periodically living with his maternal great aunt, who was
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-1039 | October 18, 2018 Page 2 of 19 not his legal caregiver. Id. At that time, Mother was seventeen years old and
was living with her father on the south side of Indianapolis, Indiana. Tr. Vol. II
at 7, 10. Shortly thereafter, Mother moved in with her aunt and lived with her
for about two years, during the course of the CHINS proceeding. Id. at 9.
When Child was removed, he was placed in kinship placement with a woman
named Nakia Jones. Id. at 103.
[4] On July 19, 2016, DCS filed a petition alleging that Child was a Child in Need
of Services (“CHINS”). Pet’r’s Ex. 1 at 5-7. The juvenile court conducted an
initial hearing the same day and found that there was sufficient evidence to
support the removal of Child. Pet’r’s Ex. 3. At that time, the permanency plan
for Child was reunification with parents. A fact-finding hearing on the CHINS
petition was held on November 21, 2016, and the juvenile court adjudicated
Child to be a CHINS and issued a dispositional decree ordering Mother to
participate in the following services: home-based therapy, home-based case
management, parenting assessment, substance abuse assessment, and random
drug screens. Pet’r’s Ex. 8 at 30-34.
[5] Lindsay Smith was assigned as the family case manager (“FCM Smith”) for
Mother and Child, and FCM Smith ordered referrals for Mother’s supervised
visitation, home-based therapy with parenting education, random drug screens,
and a substance abuse assessment. Tr. Vol. II at 96. Sher’ron Anderson was
assigned as the guardian ad litem (“GAL”) for Child in October 2016. Id. at 68,
76.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-1039 | October 18, 2018 Page 3 of 19 [6] In March 2017, Tracy Cork (“Cork”) was assigned to work with Mother as a
home-based case manager. Cork worked with Mother on employment,
housing, and sobriety issues. Id. at 26. When Cork began working with
Mother, Mother was not employed and did not have stable housing, but told
Cork that she was sober and not using any substances. Id. at 26-27. During the
time that Cork worked with Mother, Mother never created a resume or applied
for jobs. Id. at 32. She told Cork that she was able to get a job at Lucas Oil
Stadium, but never provided Cork with proof of that employment. Id. at 28.
Cork also worked with Mother to try to obtain her GED, but Mother did not
accomplish that goal while working with Cork. Id. at 31. During the time that
Cork worked with Mother, the goal was to meet once a week, but Mother was
not consistent in meeting with Cork, and over the course of six months, she
only met with Cork six times. Id. at 27. Cork closed out her services with
Mother unsuccessfully in September 2017 due to Mother’s inconsistency and
lack of follow through. Id. at 28.
[7] On April 24, 2017, Mother turned eighteen, and a few days later, on April 28,
she gave birth to L.L., Child’s sister. At the time of the birth, both L.L. and
Mother tested positive for THC. Id. at 94; GAL Ex. 1 at 62, GAL Ex. 3 at 66.
On May 2, 2017, DCS filed a CHINS petition as to L.L., which was still
pending at the time Mother’s parental rights were terminated in the present
case.
[8] In May 2017, during a team meeting with her service providers, Mother was on
her cell phone the “whole time; not engaging in the meeting at all.” Tr. Vol. II
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-1039 | October 18, 2018 Page 4 of 19 at 12-13. At this same meeting, Mother was not engaged, “sat on her phone the
whole time, rolled her eyes, slouched, [and] got up and walked away several
times.” Id. at 73.
[9] In May 2017, Velora Anderson (“Anderson”) was assigned to work with
Mother as a home-based therapist. Anderson met with Mother once, but,
thereafter, Mother never met with Anderson again. Anderson attempted to
meet with Mother for home-base therapy approximately four or five more
times, but Mother failed to show up for any of the meetings. Id. at 11. During
one of Anderson’s attempts to meet with Mother, she arrived at Mother’s aunt’s
house for a scheduled meeting and knocked on the door. Id. at 11-12, 18.
Mother did not answer the door and, instead, texted Anderson as Anderson
was pulling out of the driveway to leave and told Anderson that she was too
early. Id. At the end of June 2017, Anderson closed her referral to Mother as
unsuccessful. Id. at 12.
[10] On August 14, 2017, a permanency hearing was held, and at the hearing, the
GAL recommended that the permanency plan be changed to adoption. Id. at
68. She made that recommendation because Mother was not being compliant
with services, was not engaged in any services at the time of the hearing, was
not engaged in parenting time with Child, and “her whereabouts were
unknown for a large portion of time.” Id. The juvenile court ordered that the
Child’s permanency plan be changed to adoption because no service provider
was recommending that the Child be returned to Mother, and Mother had not
been complying with services. Pet’r’s Ex. 11 at 45. However, the juvenile court
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-1039 | October 18, 2018 Page 5 of 19 also ordered that services remain open in order to give Mother the opportunity
to get Child back. Tr. Vol. II at 35.
[11] In the fall of 2017, Carolyn Lee-Carter (“Lee-Carter”) was assigned to work
with Mother as a home-based therapist after Anderson closed her referral with
Mother. Lee-Carter attempted to contact Mother through email, but was
unable to set up any meetings with Mother because Mother stopped responding
to the emails. Id. at 20-21. Because Mother failed to respond, Lee-Carter
closed out her referral as unsuccessful. Id. at 21.
[12] On September 26, 2017, Mother was charged with auto theft, a Level 6 felony,
and the charges were still pending at the time of the termination hearing. A
warrant was issued for Mother’s arrest, and she was arrested at one of the
CHINS hearings. Id. at 112-13.
[13] In December 2017, Erika Lawrence (“Lawrence”) was assigned as Mother’s
home-based case worker and was responsible for supervising Mother’s visits
with Child. While she was assigned to Mother’s case, Lawrence called Mother
at least seven times and went to Mother’s residence twice. Id. at 45-46.
Because Lawrence was unable to ever meet with Mother, she closed out the
referral as unsuccessful in January 2018. Id. at 46.
[14] Katie Ayres (“Ayres”) was assigned to Mother’s case as a home-based therapist
in January 2018. Id. at 91. Ayres’s first scheduled session with Mother was on
January 31, 2018, but Mother did not show up. Id. The meeting was
rescheduled to February 5, 2018, and Mother showed up to that meeting. Id.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-1039 | October 18, 2018 Page 6 of 19 Mother did not show up for the next scheduled session on February 9, 2018, so
the meeting was rescheduled to February 16, 2018, but Mother did not show up
to that appointment either. Id. at 92-93. Mother only showed up to one of the
four sessions that Ayres scheduled with her. Id. at 93. After Mother missed the
session on the February 16, Ayres closed out services as unsuccessful due to
noncompliance. Id. at 93-94.
[15] Brooke McIntosh (“McIntosh”) was assigned to work with Mother as a home-
based case manager and to provide supervised visitation. Id. at 55. The goals
McIntosh established with Mother to work toward were finding a job, obtaining
housing, completing her GED, and connecting her with community resources
and parenting skills. Id. at 56-57. McIntosh had her first meeting with Mother
on February 3, 2018, and the week after that meeting, McIntosh went with
Mother to look at some apartments as possible housing options. Id. at 56.
McIntosh supervised six visitations between Mother and Child, and Mother
engaged well with Child during the visits. Id. at 58. However, Mother failed to
show up for two appointments with McIntosh on March 1 and 5, 2018, and
was unable to attend three visits with Child on February 20 and 22, 2018 and
March 1, 2018. Id. at 56, 58-59. Mother attended six visitations with Child, but
was late to five of those visitations. Id. at 59. Although she was engaged with
Child during most visits, during one visit that occurred at the library, Mother
delayed starting the visit, so she could spend more time working on something
personal on the library computer. Id. at 64.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-1039 | October 18, 2018 Page 7 of 19 [16] On August 21, 2017, DCS filed a petition for the termination of the parent-child
relationship as to Mother and Father.1 A termination hearing was held on
March 8, 2018. About two months before the termination hearing, Mother
moved in with her cousin, where she was still residing at the time of the
termination hearing. Id. at 8-9. At the hearing, Mother testified about her
previous employment at Lucas Oil Stadium and that she had worked there for
two months in the winter of 2017, but she had received “three strikes” for either
being late to work or failing to show up, so she no longer worked there. Id. at
129. At the time of the hearing, Mother was not attending school, GED
classes, or work. Id. at 131. She testified that, during the day, she spent her
time on her phone and taking care of herself and her health problems. Id.
Mother further stated that her health problems did not, however, prevent her
from working or going to school. Id. Mother testified that she did not think
there was anything wrong with smoking marijuana while pregnant and that she
did not see any benefit to the services provided by DCS. Id. at 134-35, 138.
[17] The GAL testified at the hearing that she believed that termination and
adoption was in the best interests of Child. Id. at 69, 76. She stated that she did
not believe Mother was able to properly care for Child because “she really
doesn’t have a bond with [Child],” and “she is not stable, she is from home to
1 Father’s parental rights were terminated by default on January 11, 2018, and he does not participate in this appeal.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-1039 | October 18, 2018 Page 8 of 19 home and there is no way that she can appropriate[ly] care for him and meet all
of his needs.” Id. at 70.
[18] FCM Smith testified that Mother never completed a substance abuse
assessment or any of her services. Id. at 100. FCM Smith stated that Mother
would regularly miss in-home drug screens, which caused the referral to be
suspended, so FCM Smith had to continuously make new referrals for Mother
to do the in-home drug screens. Id. at 109-10. FCM Smith testified that
Mother had not “shown a willingness or ability to participate in services for an
extended period of time” and that, given more time, FCM Smith did not
“believe that [Mother] would be able to participate successfully in those
services.” Id. at 104. FCM Smith also stated that Mother was resentful
towards the involvement of DCS and the various providers. Id. at 122. FCM
Smith testified that she believed that termination was in the Child’s best
interests because Mother has not progressed in her services. Id. at 104-05.
[19] At the time of the hearing, Child was still in kinship placement with Nakia
Jones (“Jones”), and Jones had stated that she wished to adopt Child. Id. at 70,
79, 103. The GAL and FCM Smith testified that Jones would provide Child
with a stable home and would meet his long-term needs. Id. at 69-70, 103-04.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court took the matter under
advisement, and on March 28, 2018, issued an order terminating Mother’s
parental rights to Child. Mother now appeals.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-1039 | October 18, 2018 Page 9 of 19 Discussion and Decision [20] As our Supreme Court has observed, “Decisions to terminate parental rights are
among the most difficult our trial courts are called upon to make. They are also
among the most fact-sensitive—so we review them with great deference to the
trial courts[.]” E.M. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 4 N.E.3d 636, 640 (Ind. 2014).
While the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects
the traditional right of a parent to establish a home and raise her child, and thus
parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law allows for the
termination of those rights when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet her
responsibility as a parent. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 839
N.E.2d 143, 145 (Ind. 2005); In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct. App.
2001), trans. denied. That is, parental rights are not absolute and must be
subordinated to the child’s interests in determining the appropriate disposition
of a petition to terminate the parent-child relationship. In re J.C., 994 N.E.2d
278, 283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). The purpose of terminating parental rights is not
to punish the parent but to protect the child. In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d at 773.
Termination of parental rights is proper where the child’s emotional and
physical development is threatened. Id. The juvenile court need not wait until
the child is irreversibly harmed such that his physical, mental, and social
development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child
relationship. Id.
[21] When reviewing a termination of parental rights case, we will not reweigh the
evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. In re H.L., 915 N.E.2d 145,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-1039 | October 18, 2018 Page 10 of 19 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Instead, we consider only the evidence and
reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment. Id. Moreover,
in deference to the trial court’s unique position to assess the evidence, we will
set aside the court’s judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is
clearly erroneous. Id. at 148-49. A judgment is clearly erroneous only if the
legal conclusions made by the juvenile court are not supported by its findings of
fact, or the conclusions do not support the judgment. In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d
874, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
[22] Where, as here, the juvenile court entered specific findings and conclusions, we
apply a two-tiered standard of review. In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 14 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2008), trans. denied. First, we determine whether the evidence supports the
findings, and second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment.
Id. A finding is clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts or
inferences drawn therefrom that support it. Id. If the evidence and inferences
support the trial court’s decision, we must affirm. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child
Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.
[23] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights may occur, the State is
required to allege and prove, among other things:
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-1039 | October 18, 2018 Page 11 of 19 (ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child.
(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a child in need of services;
(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.
Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). The State’s burden of proof for establishing these
allegations in termination cases “is one of ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” In
re H.L., 915 N.E.2d at 149. Moreover, if the juvenile court finds that the
allegations in a petition described in section 4 of this chapter are true, the court
shall terminate the parent-child relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a).
[24] Mother argues that the juvenile court erred in terminating her parental rights to
Child because insufficient evidence was presented to support the determination.
Specifically, Mother contends that DCS failed to present sufficient evidence
that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in
Child’s removal or the reasons for placement outside of the home would not be
remedied because she asserts that, despite her young age, she was able to obtain
housing for the two months prior to the hearing and was actively looking for
employment at the time of the hearing. She further asserts that, although a
referral for therapy was made by DCS, there was no showing that she was in
need of therapy and that, at the time of the hearing, she was still engaged in Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-1039 | October 18, 2018 Page 12 of 19 services through her second child’s case, and the completion of those services
would remedy the removal in Child’s case. Mother also claims that DCS failed
to prove that the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the well-being of
Child because she was bonded to Child and enjoyed parenting time with him,
was participating in services through the CHINS matter for her second child,
and wanted to reunify with Child. Additionally, Mother alleges that the
juvenile court failed to consider her young age, which should have afforded her
more time to demonstrate that she could parent Child. Mother also maintains
that DCS failed to prove that termination was in the best interests of Child
because she has shown that she has the willingness to provide permanency and
a stable environment for Child and that, despite her young age, she was
working toward having the ability to do so by looking for employment.
Remediation of Conditions
[25] In determining whether there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that
led to a child’s removal and continued placement outside the home would not
be remedied, we engage in a two-step analysis. K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child
Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1231 (Ind. 2013). First, we must ascertain what
conditions led to the child’s placement and retention in foster care, and, second,
we determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions
will not be remedied. Id. In the second step, the trial court must judge a
parent’s fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, taking into
consideration evidence of changed conditions and balancing a parent’s recent
improvements against “‘habitual pattern[s] of conduct to determine whether
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-1039 | October 18, 2018 Page 13 of 19 there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation.’” E.M., 4
N.E.3d at 643 (quoting K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231). Pursuant to this rule,
“trial courts have properly considered evidence of a parent’s prior criminal
history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support,
and lack of adequate housing and employment.” A.F. v. Marion Cnty. Office of
Family & Children, 762 N.E.2d 1244, 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. In
addition, DCS need not provide evidence ruling out all possibilities of change;
rather, it need establish only that there is a reasonable probability the parent’s
behavior will not change. In re Involuntary Termination of Parent-Child
Relationship of Kay L., 867 N.E.2d 236, 242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). “We entrust
that delicate balance to the trial court, which has discretion to weigh a parent’s
prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination.”
E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643. When determining whether the conditions for the
removal would be remedied, the trial court may consider the parent’s response
to the offers of help. A.F., 762 N.E.2d at 1252.
[26] In the present case, Child was removed from Mother’s care because Mother
admitted using marijuana and tested positive for the drug and had an unstable
living situation. Pet’r’s Ex. 1 at 5-6; Tr. Vol. II at 77-78, 104, 117-18. Although
Mother argues that at the time of the hearing she was still engaged in services
through her second child’s CHINS case, and the completion of those services
would remedy the removal in Child’s case, the evidence presented showed that
Mother had a year and a half to demonstrate that she was attempting to
maintain a substance-free lifestyle and to make an effort to provide Child with a
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-1039 | October 18, 2018 Page 14 of 19 stable living situation. The evidence showed that Mother had, in fact, not made
any serious effort to remedy the conditions that resulted in Child’s removal and
continued placement outside of the home.
[27] Mother had not shown the willingness to stop consuming marijuana. Although
she told people that she was sober, when she gave birth to her second child on
April 28, 2017, both Mother and L.L. tested positive for THC. Tr. Vol. II at 27,
38, 94, 100; GAL Ex. 1 at 62, GAL Ex. 3 at 66. Mother also testified that she
does not see anything wrong with consuming marijuana, even while pregnant.
Tr. Vol. II at 134-35. Mother also did not demonstrate that she was able to
provide a stable home for Child. At the time of the hearing, Mother did not
have her own home and was relying on her extended family to provide a place
for her and her children to live. When Child was removed, Mother had been
living with her father, and shortly thereafter, she moved in with her aunt, where
she lived for about two years. However, while she was living with her aunt in
early 2017, Mother also spent some time living with her father and also with
her sister. Id. at 26. The GAL testified that Mother’s “whereabouts were
unknown for a large portion of time” during the CHINS proceedings. Id. at 68.
At the time of the hearing, Mother had moved out of her aunt’s house because
there was not enough room in the home for both her aunt’s children and her
own and was then living with her cousin. Id. at 8-9.
[28] Additionally, the evidence showed that Mother never completed a substance
abuse assessment or any of the services referred to her by DCS. Id. at 100.
Referrals with numerous service providers, including several home-based
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-1039 | October 18, 2018 Page 15 of 19 therapists and home-based case managers, were all closed as unsuccessful. Id.
at 12, 21, 28, 46, 93-94. FCM Smith stated that Mother regularly missed in-
home drug screens, and Mother did not show “a willingness or ability to
participate in services for an extended period of time” and would not
successfully participate in services even if given more time. Id. at 104. Mother
was also resentful towards the involvement of DCS and the various providers
and during one team meeting, Mother spent the whole time on her cell phone,
was not engaged in the meeting, and rolled her eyes and got up and walked
away repeatedly. Id. at 12-13, 73, 122. Further, although Mother engaged well
with Child during the six supervised visitations she attended, she failed to show
up for two other scheduled visitations and was late to five of the six she did
attend. Id. at 58-59. At the time of the hearing, Mother was not attending
school, GED classes, or work and spent her days on her phone and taking care
of herself and her health problems. Id. at 131.
[29] Throughout the case, Mother did not make any serious effort to remedy the
reasons for Child’s removal. She did not attempt to finish her high school
education or maintain a stable job or a stable residence. She consistently
disregarded and disrespected the efforts of DCS service providers. Based on the
evidence presented, we conclude that sufficient evidence was presented to
support the juvenile court’s conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that
the conditions that resulted in removal or the reasons for placement outside the
home would not be remedied. Mother’s arguments to the contrary are merely a
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-1039 | October 18, 2018 Page 16 of 19 request to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. In re H.L., 915 N.E.2d at
149.2
Best Interests
[30] In determining what is in the best interests of the child, a trial court is required
to look at the totality of the evidence. In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2010) (citing In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans.
denied), trans. dismissed. In doing so, the trial court must subordinate the
interests of the parents to those of the child. Id. Termination of a parent-child
relationship is proper where the child’s emotional and physical development is
threatened. Id. (citing In re R.S., 774 N.E.2d 927, 930 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002),
trans. denied). A parent’s historical inability to provide a suitable, stable home
environment along with the parent’s current inability to do so supports a finding
that termination is in the best interests of the child. In re A.P., 981 N.E.2d 75,
82 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). Testimony of the service providers, in addition to
evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, are
sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the
child’s best interests. In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans.
denied.
2 We need not address Mother’s challenge to the juvenile court’s conclusion that there was a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to Child’s well-being because Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written such that, to properly effectuate the termination of parental rights, the juvenile court need only find that one of the three requirements of subsection (b)(2)(B) has been established by clear and convincing evidence. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-1039 | October 18, 2018 Page 17 of 19 [31] Mother asserts that DCS failed to present sufficient evidence that termination
was in the best interests of Child because she had demonstrated that she was
willing and working on being able to provide the permanency and stable
environment that Child needed. The evidence presented at the hearing showed
that Child had been removed from Mother since July of 2016, and there had
been no real progression in the services referred to Mother by DCS. Mother
was not going to school, attempting to obtain her GED, or working at the time
of the hearing. Child’s caregiver, Jones, wanted to adopt Child, and the GAL
and FCM Smith testified that they believed that Jones would provide Child
with a stable home and meet his long-term needs. Tr. Vol. II at 69-70, 103-04.
Additionally, both the GAL and FCM Smith testified that they believed that
termination was in Child’s best interests because Mother had not progressed in
her services and was not able to properly care for Child. Id. at 69, 70, 76, 104-
05.
[32] A trial court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed such that his or
her physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before
terminating the parent-child relationship. In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d at 224.
Additionally, a child’s need for permanency is an important consideration in
determining the best interests of a child. Id. (citing McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Office
of Family & Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)). At the time of
the termination hearing, Child had been removed from Mother’s care for a year
and a half, and Mother had failed to make the changes in her life necessary to
provide Child with a safe and healthy environment. Based upon the totality of
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-1039 | October 18, 2018 Page 18 of 19 the evidence, we conclude that the evidence supported the juvenile court’s
determination that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in Child’s best
interests.
[33] Decisions to terminate parental rights “are among the most difficult our trial
courts are called upon to make” and are very fact sensitive. In re E.M., 4
N.E.3d at 640. We will reverse a termination of parental rights only upon a
showing of “clear error” – that which leaves us with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made. In re A.N.J., 690 N.E.2d 716, 722
(Ind. Ct. App. 1997). Based on the record before us, we cannot say that the
juvenile court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights to Child was clearly
erroneous. We, therefore, affirm the juvenile court’s judgment.
[34] Affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Riley, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-1039 | October 18, 2018 Page 19 of 19