In the Matter of the Seizure of Weapons Belonging to Michael Crane

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: December 13, 2024
• Docket: A-0980-23
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0980-23

IN THE MATTER OF THE SEIZURE OF WEAPONS BELONGING TO MICHAEL CRANE. _____________________________

Submitted December 3, 2024 – Decided December 13, 2024

Before Judges Smith and Chase.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Bergen County, Docket No. FO-02-0326-21.

FWKD LAW, attorneys for appellant (Tamra D. Katcher, of counsel and on the brief).

Mark Musella, Bergen County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Megan B. Kilzy and William P. Miller, Assistant Prosecutors, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Michael Crane appeals from an October 5, 2023 Law Division order

denying his motion to re-open forfeiture proceedings. We affirm. In November 2020, J.C.1 filed an application for a criminal complaint

against Michael Crane in Englewood Municipal Court. Ct. R. 3:2-1(a)(2).

Probable cause to issue the complaint was found and Crane was charged with

third-degree criminal restraint, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-2b, and petty-disorderly-persons

harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c). At the same time, J.C. also obtained a

temporary restraining order ("TRO") against Crane. The TRO authorized police

to seize appellant's firearms purchaser identification card ("FPIC") and firearms.

Subsequently the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office ("BCPO") amended

the criminal restraint charge to disorderly persons false imprisonment, N.J.S.A.

2C:13-3, and remanded both charges to Englewood Municipal Court. While the

complaint was pending, the BCPO moved in Superior Court for the forfeiture of

Crane's FPIC and the seized weapons under N.J.S.A 2C:25-21(d)(3) and 2C:58-

3C.

On June 4, 2021, by way of a consent order, the parties agreed that the

motion for forfeiture would be dismissed without prejudice (pending the

resolution of the municipal complaint); the seized firearms would remain in the

possession of police "until this matter was reopened"; and that the weapons

would automatically forfeit to the State unless appellant filed a motion to return

1 We use initials to protect the privacy of the individual. A-0980-23 2 the weapons "within one year from the date of this order; or within sixty days

of the disposition of his pending Englewood City Municipal Court matter[,]

whichever is sooner[.]" (Emphasis in original). Additionally, the consent order

stated that "should defendant fail to re-institute the weapons matter as specified

above, the weapons and property described herein shall be deemed forfeited . . . ,

and all right title and interest in the weapons and property shall automatically

vest in the [BCPO]. . . ." The consent order also allowed the weapons to be

destroyed. Crane signed the consent order, as did his attorney, the assistant

prosecutor, and the court.

With respect to the complaint, in municipal court, Crane was found not

guilty of harassment and guilty of false imprisonment. Crane filed a de novo

appeal, and on June 7, 2023, the Law Division found Crane not guilty of false

imprisonment.

Subsequently, over two years after the consent order was filed, Crane,

represented by new counsel, filed a motion to reopen the forfeiture proceedings

in Superior Court. In support of the motion, Crane acknowledged that the

motion was well out-of-time but faulted prior counsel, who handled the

municipal trial, for failing to move to extend the deadline. Crane's new counsel

also represented that Crane did not advise her of the existence of the consent

A-0980-23 3 order until after the Law Division acquitted him of false imprisonment. Crane

argued that the forfeiture affected his future ability to obtain firearm permits

under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(8), which states "any person whose firearm is seized

pursuant to [a TRO] and whose firearm has not been returned" is prohibited from

obtaining an FPIC or handgun purchase permit.

At the hearing, the State represented that the firearms had, as authorized

by the consent order's terms, been destroyed after one year. The State also

argued that Crane's motion should be denied as out-of-time and moot. On

October 5, 2023, the trial court denied Crane's motion, finding it untimely and

barred by the consent order's terms.

This appeal followed. Crane argues that the trial court erred by denying

his motion to reinstate the forfeiture action on procedural grounds. Crane also

posits the court's determination was contrary to the interests of justice.

Our state has a strong public policy in favor of settlements. Brundage v.

Estate of Carambio, 195 N.J. 575, 601 (2008). Essentially, a settlement

agreement is a contract. Nolan by Nolan v. Lee Ho, 120 N.J. 465, 472 (1990)

(citing Pascarella v. Bruck, 190 N.J. Super. 118, 124 (App. Div. 1983)). "As a

general rule, courts should enforce contracts as the parties intended." Pacifico

v. Pacifico, 190 N.J. 258, 266 (2007) (citations omitted). Yet, "a demonstration

A-0980-23 4 of 'fraud or other compelling circumstances,'" can invalidate a settlement

agreement. Pascarella, 190 N.J. Super. at 125 (quoting Honeywell v. Bubb, 130

N.J. Super. 130, 136 (App. Div. 1974)). Moreover, "any action which would

have the effect of vitiating the provisions of a particular settlement agreement

and the concomitant effect of undermining public confidence in the settlement

process in general, should not be countenanced." Impink ex rel. Baldi v. Reynes,

369 N.J. Super. 553, 564 (App. Div. 2007). Our courts have long considered

that the parties to a lawsuit are the ones that are in the best position to determine

how to resolve a contested matter "in a way which is least disadvantageous to

everyone." Brundage 195 N.J. at 601.

Here, there is no evidence of any fraud or other compelling circumstances

to warrant vacation of the settlement nor is there any evidence that the terms and

conditions of the settlement were unclear or ambiguous. In sum, a binding

settlement was reached, which was embodied in the written agreement entered

by the parties. The trial court did not err in enforcing it.

Affirmed.

A-0980-23 5