in the Matter of the Petition for Adoption a Minor Child

Nevada Supreme Court

in the Matter of the Petition for Adoption a Minor Child

DecidedJune 14, 2013

Docket61937

StatusUnpublished

This text of in the Matter of the Petition for Adoption a Minor Child (in the Matter of the Petition for Adoption a Minor Child) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nevada Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

in the Matter of the Petition for Adoption a Minor Child, (Neb. 2013).

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Opinion

however, that we should adopt the approach of federal and other state courts and permit appeals from proposed interveners in order to challenge the order denying intervention, citing, for example, Hodgson v. United Mine Workers of Am., 473 F.2d 118, 127 n.40 (D.C. Cir. 1972), Thrasher v. Bartlett, 424 So. 2d 605, 607-608 (Ala. 1982); Feigin v. Alexa Group, Ltd., 19 P.3d 23, 26 (Colo. 2001); In re Jeffrey M., 37 A.3d 156, 158 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012); Utah Down Syndrome Found., Inc. v. Utah Down Syndrome Ass'n, 293 P.3d 241 (Utah 2012), and Hirshberg v. Coon, 268 P.3d 258, 260 (Wyo. 2012). Respondents have filed a proper person response, in which they urge this court not to overrule our prior precedent. Having considered the parties' responses, we decline appellant's invitation to deem a proposed intervener a "party" under NRAP 3A(a) for purposes of appeal, as doing so would disturb well-settled Nevada precedent clearly defining who is entitled to appeal. Secretary of State v. Burk, 124 Nev. 579, 597, 188 P.3d 1112, 1124 (2008) ("[U]nder the doctrine of stare decisis, [this court] will not overturn [precedent] absent compelling reasons for so doing. Mere disagreement does not suffice." (Internal citations omitted)). Instead, we have explained that a petition for a writ of mandamus is an appropriate means of seeking this court's review of an order denying intervention. Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 122 Nev. 1229, 1234, 147 P.3d 1120, 1124 (2006). Moreover, even if appellant were granted party status to appeal here, the order she is attempting to challenge—a post-decree order denying leave to intervene—is not substantively appealable under NRAP 3A(b)(8) as a special order after final judgment, as it did not affect any rights growing out of the judgment. Gumm v. Mainor, 118 Nev. 912, 918,

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2 (0) I947A

MIDIZVIDDIDDIDIRD 59 P.3d 1220, 1225 (2002). Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal, and we therefore ORDER this appeal DISMISSED.

Hardesty

c)Licir----Tr' Parraguirre

cc: Hon. William B. Gonzalez, District Judge, Family Court Division Sterling Law, LLC Patrick M. Tatiana M. H.M. Eighth District Court Clerk

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however, that we should adopt the approach of federal and other state courts and permit appeals from proposed interveners in order to challenge the order denying intervention, citing, for example, Hodgson v. United Mine Workers of Am., 473 F.2d 118, 127 n.40 (D.C. Cir. 1972), Thrasher v. Bartlett, 424 So. 2d 605, 607-608 (Ala. 1982); Feigin v. Alexa Group, Ltd., 19 P.3d 23, 26 (Colo. 2001); In re Jeffrey M., 37 A.3d 156, 158 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012); Utah Down Syndrome Found., Inc. v. Utah Down Syndrome Ass'n, 293 P.3d 241 (Utah 2012), and Hirshberg v. Coon, 268 P.3d 258, 260 (Wyo. 2012). Respondents have filed a proper person response, in which they urge this court not to overrule our prior precedent. Having considered the parties' responses, we decline appellant's invitation to deem a proposed intervener a "party" under NRAP 3A(a) for purposes of appeal, as doing so would disturb well-settled Nevada precedent clearly defining who is entitled to appeal. Secretary of State v. Burk, 124 Nev. 579, 597, 188 P.3d 1112, 1124 (2008) ("[U]nder the doctrine of stare decisis, [this court] will not overturn [precedent] absent compelling reasons for so doing. Mere disagreement does not suffice." (Internal citations omitted)). Instead, we have explained that a petition for a writ of mandamus is an appropriate means of seeking this court's review of an order denying intervention. Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 122 Nev. 1229, 1234, 147 P.3d 1120, 1124 (2006). Moreover, even if appellant were granted party status to appeal here, the order she is attempting to challenge—a post-decree order denying leave to intervene—is not substantively appealable under NRAP 3A(b)(8) as a special order after final judgment, as it did not affect any rights growing out of the judgment. Gumm v. Mainor, 118 Nev. 912, 918,