FILED NOVEMBER 6, 2025 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
In the matter of the Personal Restraint of ) No. 40968-6-III ) YILMAR MARTINEZ-GONZALEZ, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) Petitioner. ) )
FEARING, J. —In this personal restraint petition (PRP) proceeding, Yilmar
Martinez-Gonzalez seeks relief from the superior court’s failure to decide his GR 39
petition to waive two legal financial obligations (LFOs). He filed the petition to waive
the LFOs in December 2024 based on recent statutory amendments, but the superior court
has not decided the motion. He now asks this court to waive his LFOs or remand to the
superior court to decide his December 2024 petition. The State concedes that Martinez-
Gonzales is eligible for waivers and, therefore, does not object to the relief he requests.
We direct the superior court to decide Martinez-Gonzales’s petition to waive his LFOs.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Yilmar Martinez-Gonzales’s May 2023 judgment and sentence, in State v.
Martinez-Gonzalez, Douglas County Superior Court cause number 21-1-00138-09,
ordered him to serve a term of confinement and pay two LFOs:
(1) A $100 DNA collection fee; and
(2) A $500 crime victim penalty assessment. No. 40968-6-III In re Personal Restraint of Martinez-Gonzalez
Martinez-Gonzales did not appeal the judgment and sentence.
After the time for appealing Yilmar Martinez-Gonzales’s judgment and sentence
had expired, the legislature eliminated the previously mandated DNA collection fee.
RCW 7.68.035(4). The legislature also prohibited a court from imposing the $500 victim
penalty assessment on an indigent defendant. RCW 7.68.035(1). The legislature now
requires the sentencing court, on the defendant’s motion, to waive any DNA collection
fee imposed before July 1, 2023, and to waive any crime victim penalty assessment
imposed on an indigent defendant before July 1, 2023. RCW 7.68.035(1) (4);
RCW 3.43.7541(2); RCW 7.68.035(5)(b).
Yilmar Martinez-Gonzales petitioned to waive his LFOs in December 2024 based
on the legislature’s amendments. He completed a GR 39 form petition, which asked the
court to waive the DNA collection fee and to also waive the crime victim penalty
assessment based on his inability to pay because of his indigent status. He mailed the
petition, a GR 39 form proposed order, and a declaration of mailing upon the county
prosecutor to the Douglas County Superior Court clerk. Martinez-Gonzales also enclosed
undisputed affidavits that he is indigent and presently earns $102 per month. The
superior court clerk filed the documents on December 4, 2024.
The superior court has yet to address Yilmar Martinez-Gonzales’s petition.
2 No. 40968-6-III In re Personal Restraint of Martinez-Gonzalez
LEGAL ISSUES
Yilmar Martinez-Gonzales contends that this court should decide the merits of his
PRP claim and either waive his LFOs or remand to the superior court to decide the merits
to waive his LFOs. He argues that he has satisfied all threshold standards for considering
the merits of a PRP regardless of which standard applies. And he maintains that the
superior court violated the law by failing to consider his properly filed petition to waive
LFOs.
The State does not address which threshold standard applies. The State instead
addresses the merits of Martinez-Gonzales’s PRP. It concedes that Martinez-Gonzales
“is currently eligible for waiver of both fees, so the State has no objection to Petitioner’s
request” for relief. Response to PRP at 4 (May 9, 2025). The State asks the court to find
Martinez-Gonzales indigent and waive his LFOs. Response to PRP at 4 (May 9, 2025).
Martinez-Gonzales’s PRP presents three issues:
1. Which prima facie threshold burden applies to Martinez-Gonzales’s PRP?
2. Does Martinez-Gonzales satisfy the applicable threshold burden?
3. If Martinez-Gonzales is entitled to relief, what is the proper remedy?
3 No. 40968-6-III In re Personal Restraint of Martinez-Gonzalez
LEGAL ANALYSIS
1. Martinez-Gonzales must satisfy the threshold standard for unlawful restraint under RAP 16.4.
To protect the finality of appealable judicial decisions, a personal restraint
petitioner must satisfy a threshold, prima facie burden before the court will consider the
merits of the PRP’s substantive claim. In re Personal Restraint of Grantham, 168 Wn.2d
204, 211, 227 P.3d 285 (2010). A petitioner who claims that a constitutional error has
occurred first must demonstrate that the error actually and substantially prejudiced him.
In re Personal Restraint of Grantham, 168 Wn.2d 204, 211 (2010). A petitioner who
claims nonconstitutional error first must show that the claimed error constitutes a
fundamental defect that inherently results in a miscarriage of justice. In re Personal
Restraint of Grantham, 168 Wn.2d 204, 211 (2010). And a petitioner who has had no
prior opportunity for judicial review of a claimed error need show only that he is
restrained under RAP 16.4(b) and that the restraint is unlawful under RAP 16.4(c). In re
Personal Restraint of Grantham, 168 Wn.2d 204, 212-13 (2010).
Yilmar Martinez-Gonzales must show that he is restrained under RAP 16.4(b) and
that the restraint is unlawful under RAP 16.4(c) because he seeks relief from inaction —
not an appealable judicial decision — and he has no other avenue for judicial review.
The superior court’s inaction occurred after the time to appeal Martinez-Gonzales’s
4 No. 40968-6-III In re Personal Restraint of Martinez-Gonzalez
judgment and sentence had expired. And the inaction cannot be appealed because the
court did not enter a written decision.
2. Martinez-Gonzales is under unlawful restraint.
The court will grant appropriate relief to a personal restraint petitioner if (1) the
petitioner is under a restraint; and (2) the restraint is unlawful for one or more of the
reasons defined in RAP 16.4(c). RAP 16.4(a). A petitioner is under “restraint” if, for
instance, they are confined or have limited freedom because of a decision in a criminal
case. RAP 16.4(b).
Yilmar Martinez-Gonzales argues he is under restraint because he is presently
confined. While it is true that Martinez-Gonzales is confined, confinement is not the
restraint that Martinez-Gonzales contends is unlawful. Martinez-Gonzales instead claims
the superior court’s failure to act on his petition to waive his LFOs is unlawful. The
LFOs that Martinez-Gonzales has petitioned the court to waive are part of his judgment
and sentence. And those LFOs continue to limit Martinez-Gonzales’s freedom because
he is obligated to pay them until the superior court acts on his petition to waive them. He
is, therefore, under the restraint of LFOs.
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FILED NOVEMBER 6, 2025 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
In the matter of the Personal Restraint of ) No. 40968-6-III ) YILMAR MARTINEZ-GONZALEZ, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) Petitioner. ) )
FEARING, J. —In this personal restraint petition (PRP) proceeding, Yilmar
Martinez-Gonzalez seeks relief from the superior court’s failure to decide his GR 39
petition to waive two legal financial obligations (LFOs). He filed the petition to waive
the LFOs in December 2024 based on recent statutory amendments, but the superior court
has not decided the motion. He now asks this court to waive his LFOs or remand to the
superior court to decide his December 2024 petition. The State concedes that Martinez-
Gonzales is eligible for waivers and, therefore, does not object to the relief he requests.
We direct the superior court to decide Martinez-Gonzales’s petition to waive his LFOs.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Yilmar Martinez-Gonzales’s May 2023 judgment and sentence, in State v.
Martinez-Gonzalez, Douglas County Superior Court cause number 21-1-00138-09,
ordered him to serve a term of confinement and pay two LFOs:
(1) A $100 DNA collection fee; and
(2) A $500 crime victim penalty assessment. No. 40968-6-III In re Personal Restraint of Martinez-Gonzalez
Martinez-Gonzales did not appeal the judgment and sentence.
After the time for appealing Yilmar Martinez-Gonzales’s judgment and sentence
had expired, the legislature eliminated the previously mandated DNA collection fee.
RCW 7.68.035(4). The legislature also prohibited a court from imposing the $500 victim
penalty assessment on an indigent defendant. RCW 7.68.035(1). The legislature now
requires the sentencing court, on the defendant’s motion, to waive any DNA collection
fee imposed before July 1, 2023, and to waive any crime victim penalty assessment
imposed on an indigent defendant before July 1, 2023. RCW 7.68.035(1) (4);
RCW 3.43.7541(2); RCW 7.68.035(5)(b).
Yilmar Martinez-Gonzales petitioned to waive his LFOs in December 2024 based
on the legislature’s amendments. He completed a GR 39 form petition, which asked the
court to waive the DNA collection fee and to also waive the crime victim penalty
assessment based on his inability to pay because of his indigent status. He mailed the
petition, a GR 39 form proposed order, and a declaration of mailing upon the county
prosecutor to the Douglas County Superior Court clerk. Martinez-Gonzales also enclosed
undisputed affidavits that he is indigent and presently earns $102 per month. The
superior court clerk filed the documents on December 4, 2024.
The superior court has yet to address Yilmar Martinez-Gonzales’s petition.
2 No. 40968-6-III In re Personal Restraint of Martinez-Gonzalez
LEGAL ISSUES
Yilmar Martinez-Gonzales contends that this court should decide the merits of his
PRP claim and either waive his LFOs or remand to the superior court to decide the merits
to waive his LFOs. He argues that he has satisfied all threshold standards for considering
the merits of a PRP regardless of which standard applies. And he maintains that the
superior court violated the law by failing to consider his properly filed petition to waive
LFOs.
The State does not address which threshold standard applies. The State instead
addresses the merits of Martinez-Gonzales’s PRP. It concedes that Martinez-Gonzales
“is currently eligible for waiver of both fees, so the State has no objection to Petitioner’s
request” for relief. Response to PRP at 4 (May 9, 2025). The State asks the court to find
Martinez-Gonzales indigent and waive his LFOs. Response to PRP at 4 (May 9, 2025).
Martinez-Gonzales’s PRP presents three issues:
1. Which prima facie threshold burden applies to Martinez-Gonzales’s PRP?
2. Does Martinez-Gonzales satisfy the applicable threshold burden?
3. If Martinez-Gonzales is entitled to relief, what is the proper remedy?
3 No. 40968-6-III In re Personal Restraint of Martinez-Gonzalez
LEGAL ANALYSIS
1. Martinez-Gonzales must satisfy the threshold standard for unlawful restraint under RAP 16.4.
To protect the finality of appealable judicial decisions, a personal restraint
petitioner must satisfy a threshold, prima facie burden before the court will consider the
merits of the PRP’s substantive claim. In re Personal Restraint of Grantham, 168 Wn.2d
204, 211, 227 P.3d 285 (2010). A petitioner who claims that a constitutional error has
occurred first must demonstrate that the error actually and substantially prejudiced him.
In re Personal Restraint of Grantham, 168 Wn.2d 204, 211 (2010). A petitioner who
claims nonconstitutional error first must show that the claimed error constitutes a
fundamental defect that inherently results in a miscarriage of justice. In re Personal
Restraint of Grantham, 168 Wn.2d 204, 211 (2010). And a petitioner who has had no
prior opportunity for judicial review of a claimed error need show only that he is
restrained under RAP 16.4(b) and that the restraint is unlawful under RAP 16.4(c). In re
Personal Restraint of Grantham, 168 Wn.2d 204, 212-13 (2010).
Yilmar Martinez-Gonzales must show that he is restrained under RAP 16.4(b) and
that the restraint is unlawful under RAP 16.4(c) because he seeks relief from inaction —
not an appealable judicial decision — and he has no other avenue for judicial review.
The superior court’s inaction occurred after the time to appeal Martinez-Gonzales’s
4 No. 40968-6-III In re Personal Restraint of Martinez-Gonzalez
judgment and sentence had expired. And the inaction cannot be appealed because the
court did not enter a written decision.
2. Martinez-Gonzales is under unlawful restraint.
The court will grant appropriate relief to a personal restraint petitioner if (1) the
petitioner is under a restraint; and (2) the restraint is unlawful for one or more of the
reasons defined in RAP 16.4(c). RAP 16.4(a). A petitioner is under “restraint” if, for
instance, they are confined or have limited freedom because of a decision in a criminal
case. RAP 16.4(b).
Yilmar Martinez-Gonzales argues he is under restraint because he is presently
confined. While it is true that Martinez-Gonzales is confined, confinement is not the
restraint that Martinez-Gonzales contends is unlawful. Martinez-Gonzales instead claims
the superior court’s failure to act on his petition to waive his LFOs is unlawful. The
LFOs that Martinez-Gonzales has petitioned the court to waive are part of his judgment
and sentence. And those LFOs continue to limit Martinez-Gonzales’s freedom because
he is obligated to pay them until the superior court acts on his petition to waive them. He
is, therefore, under the restraint of LFOs.
Restraint is “unlawful” for one or more of the seven reasons listed in RAP 16.4(c).
RAP 16.4(a). Martinez-Gonzales contends his restraints — that is, his LFOs — are
5 No. 40968-6-III In re Personal Restraint of Martinez-Gonzalez
unlawful for the reasons stated in RAP 16.4(c)(2) and (6). He satisfies RAP 16.4(c)(6)’s
standard for unlawful restraint.
Under RAP 16.4(c)(6), restraint is unlawful if the manner of the petitioner’s
restraint violates state law, including court rules. See State ex rel. Ralston v. Department
of Licenses, 60 Wn.2d 535, 542, 374 P.2d 571 (1962). Martinez-Gonzales contends that
the superior court violated GR 39(e) by failing to consider his petition to waive his LFOs
and GR 39(f) by failing to either set his petition for hearing or consider the petition ex
parte.
GR 39(e) states that all mailed petitions to waive LFOs “shall be presented to a
judicial officer for consideration in a timely manner.” GR 39(f) permits the court to
either set the petition for hearing or consider the petition ex parte. It is undisputed that
the superior court did not consider Yilmar Martinez-Gonzales’s petition to waive his
LFOs at a hearing or ex parte even though Martinez-Gonzales mailed the petition and the
clerk filed it. The petition to waive LFOs requests that the superior court waive the DNA
collection fee and the crime victim penalty assessment in accordance with the
legislature’s amendments to LFO statutes. These amendments no longer authorize the
LFOs that Martinez-Gonzales is required to pay; the amendments further mandate the
superior court to waive the LFOs on a defendant’s motion. RCW 43.43.7541(2); RCW
7.68.035(5)(b).
6 No. 40968-6-III In re Personal Restraint of Martinez-Gonzalez
Under the circumstances of this case, the superior court’s failure to consider
Martinez-Gonzales’s petition to waive his LFOs in violation of GR 39 unlawfully
restrains Yilmar Martinez-Gonzales from being freed from these obligations, which are
no longer statutorily authorized. Martinez-Gonzales is under unlawful restraint and
entitled to relief.
3. The superior court will consider Martinez-Gonzales’s petition to waive LFOs.
Because Yilmar Martinez-Gonzales has demonstrated that he is under unlawful
restraint, he is entitled to appropriate relief. He asks this court to either waive the LFOs
or remand to the superior court to consider his petition to waive LFOs on its merits.
Meanwhile, the State urges the court to find Martinez-Gonzales indigent and waive his
LFOs. Martinez-Gonzales’s petition to waive his LFOs is not before this court. It is in
the superior court. The superior court must decide Martinez-Gonzales’s petition to waive
his LFOs.
CONCLUSION
Martinez-Gonzales’s PRP is granted. The superior court shall consider and decide
Martinez-Gonzales’s December 4, 2024, petition re: legal financial obligations.
7 No. 40968-6-III In re Personal Restraint of Martinez-Gonzalez
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
RCW 2.06.040.
_________________________________ Fearing, J.
WE CONCUR:
______________________________ Murphy, J.
_____________________________ Lawrence-Berrey, C.J.