FILED JUNE 11, 2026 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
In re Parentage of ) ) No. 40024-7-III H.P.H. ) (Consol. with ) No. 40828-1-III) ) ) ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
STAAB, C.J. — This consolidated appeal arises from two related trial court rulings
governing the parenting plan for H.P.H. between Kallee Knudson and David Hoodenpyl.
After Knudson’s incarceration, the superior court entered a modified parenting plan
granting Hoodenpyl sole decision-making authority and limiting Knudson’s contact with
the child to two monitored telephone calls per week.
Knudson argues the court abused its discretion by relying primarily on her
criminal convictions and incarceration rather than the statutory criteria in RCW
26.09.191, by entering unsupported findings, and by failing to identify specific harm to
H.P.H. or explain how the restrictions imposed were reasonably calculated to address any
such harm. No. 40024-7-III (consol. w/ 40828-1-III) In re the Parenting & Support of H.P.H.
Knudson also appeals the trial court’s denial of her subsequent petition for
modification based on uncontroverted evidence that Hoodenpyl repeatedly failed to
comply with the court-ordered telephone call provisions. We agree with Knudson on
both issues and reverse.
BACKGROUND
Kallee Knudson and David Hoodenpyl are the parents of H.P.H. After the parties
separated, a parenting plan was entered in 2017 naming Knudson as H.P.H’s custodian,
with joint decision-making authority between the parents. Under that plan, Hoodenpyl
was granted residential time with H.P.H. every other weekend, certain holidays, and
several weeks during the summer.
Knudson was later arrested and charged with 13 criminal offenses, including first
degree attempted murder, first degree attempted assault, first degree attempted
kidnapping, and two counts of criminal solicitation to commit assault for offering two
people money to break into a woman’s home, tie her up, sedate her, and take her phone.
State v. Knudson, No. 38799-2-III, slip op. at 7, 14 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2024)
(unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/387992_unp.pdf. A jury later
found Knudson guilty on all charges except attempted murder, and she was sentenced to
20 years in prison.
In April 2023, Knudson petitioned the court for a major modification to the
parenting plan, recognizing that her incarceration created a change in circumstances. She
2 No. 40024-7-III (consol. w/ 40828-1-III) In re the Parenting & Support of H.P.H.
requested that Hoodenpyl be named H.P.H.’s custodian but sought joint decision-making
authority. She requested monthly weekend visitation in the corrections center,
participation in family visitation events including a Mother’s Day event, daily telephone
contact, and weekly video visits.
In response, Hoodenpyl filed his own proposed parenting plan. He requested the
court name him H.P.H.’s custodian, grant him sole decision-making authority, and limit
Knudson’s contact with H.P.H. to two telephone calls per week monitored by him. He
asserted such limitations were warranted because Knudson assaulted someone and her
20-year prison sentence might harm H.P.H.’s best interests.
In June 2023, the court entered an agreed order finding adequate cause to change
the parenting plan. The parties later submitted declarations supporting their respective
parenting plans.
The court then issued a letter decision indicating that it agreed “entirely” with
Hoodenpyl’s position and proposed parenting plan. The court entered Hoodenpyl’s
proposed parenting plan, granting Hoodenpyl sole decision-making authority and limiting
Knudson’s contact with H.P.H. to two telephone calls per week monitored by Hoodenpyl.
The parenting plan incorporated the letter decision as additional findings. The court did
not enter the mandatory form “Final Order and Findings on Petition to Change a
Parenting Plan or Custody Order.”
3 No. 40024-7-III (consol. w/ 40828-1-III) In re the Parenting & Support of H.P.H.
Knudson filed a pro se motion for reconsideration, arguing the trial court failed to
make express findings identifying and addressing harm to H.P.H. The court denied
reconsideration and Knudson timely appealed.
After filing her notice of appeal, the trial court granted Knudson’s request to
subpoena the Washington State Corrections Center for Women to obtain the prison
records of all her calls with Hoodenpyl. Knudson then moved to modify the parenting
plan and sought an order to hold Hoodenpyl in contempt based on Hoodenpyl’s
interference with Knudson’s telephone contact with H.P.H. In Knudson’s memorandum,
her attorney alleged that Hoodenpyl deliberately violated the parenting plan by rejecting
or interrupting Knudson’s calls to H.P.H., sent threatening and harassing messages to
Knudson, and that since January 2024, Hoodenpyl refused to allow Knudson to have any
contact with H.P.H. Knudson also submitted supportive exhibits containing the prison
call logs and recordings of calls with Hoodenpyl.
Following a hearing on adequate cause, the court determined that Knudson failed
to demonstrate adequate cause to modify the parenting plan. The court also declined to
hold Hoodenpyl in contempt. Knudson timely appealed those orders as well.
We subsequently consolidated both appeals on Knudson’s motion.
Post-appeal developments
Following her second appeal, Knudson alleged that Hoodenpyl continued to refuse
to follow the court’s order. As a result, Knudson filed another motion for contempt.
4 No. 40024-7-III (consol. w/ 40828-1-III) In re the Parenting & Support of H.P.H.
While the consolidated appeal was pending, Hoodenpyl moved to Florida with
H.P.H. without a court order and with knowledge of an upcoming court review hearing.
After Knudson filed her opening brief, the trial court entered findings and conclusions
holding Hoodenpyl in contempt. However, the court also entered a temporary order and
parenting plan allowing Hoodenpyl’s relocation to Florida and setting a schedule for
Knudson’s two weekly calls with H.P.H. pending the outcome of this appeal.
ANALYSIS
1. MODIFICATION OF PARENTING PLAN
Knudson contends the trial court abused its discretion by restricting her decision-
making authority and contact with H.P.H. without satisfying former RCW 26.09.191
(2021). She argues the trial court relied on her criminal convictions and incarceration
rather than the statutory criteria, adopted conclusory findings unsupported by substantial
evidence, failed to identify specific harm to H.P.H., and failed to explain how the
restrictions imposed were reasonably calculated to address any identified harm.
We conclude the trial court abused its discretion because (1) its letter decision did
not contain or reference any of the required statutory criteria, (2) it entered an assault
finding that is not supported by the record and did not comply with the statutory
screening requirement, and (3) its remaining findings are insufficient to permit
meaningful review or are otherwise unsupported.
5 No. 40024-7-III (consol. w/ 40828-1-III) In re the Parenting & Support of H.P.H.
A. Additional background
The trial court entered the following findings as the reasons for its mandatory
limitations under former RCW 26.09.191(2)(a) (2021):
Neglect - Kallee Ann Knudson substantially refused to perform her parenting duties for [H.P.H.]
Assault - Kallee Ann Knudson (or someone living in that parent’s home) has assaulted or sexually assaulted someone causing grievous physical harm, causing fear of such harm, or resulting in a pregnancy.
Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 187, 191.
The trial court entered the following findings as the reasons for its discretionary
limitations under former RCW 26.09.191(3) (2021):
Neglect - Kallee Ann Knudson neglected her parental duties toward [H.P.H.]
Emotional or physical problem - Kallee Ann Knudson has a long-term emotional or physical problem that gets in the way of her ability to parent.
Abusive use of conflict – Kallee Ann Knudson uses conflict in a way that may cause serious damage to the psychological development of [H.P.H.]
CP at 188, 191.
The court also incorporated its letter decision as additional findings in support of
the modified parenting plan. In the letter, the court found:
Ms. Knudson, through her criminal behavior, has voluntarily absented herself from HPH’s life. Ms. Knudson’s criminal behavior was conducted without considering what potential impact that conduct would inflict upon HPH’s emotional and psychological development. In order to grant Ms. Knudson’s request the Court would essentially have to ignore the underling facts which resulted in Ms. Knudson’s incarceration and pretend
6 No. 40024-7-III (consol. w/ 40828-1-III) In re the Parenting & Support of H.P.H.
that HPH was not victimized by her mother’s actions. The Court is unwilling to do that.
CP at 194.
B. Standards of review
In Washington, “the best interests of the child shall be the standard by which the
court determines and allocates the parties’ parental responsibilities.” RCW 26.09.002. In
crafting and ordering a permanent parenting plan, the trial court exercises broad
discretion. In re Marriage of Kovacs, 121 Wn.2d 795, 801, 854 P.2d 629 (1993). “We
review a [trial court’s] parenting plan [decisions] for a manifest abuse of discretion.” In
re Marriage of Black, 188 Wn.2d 114, 127, 392 P.3d 1041 (2017). A manifest abuse of
discretion occurs when the trial court’s “ʻdecision is manifestly unreasonable or based on
untenable grounds or untenable reasons.’” In re Marriage of Chandola, 180 Wn.2d 632,
642, 327 P.3d 644 (2014) (quoting In re Marriage of Katare, 175 Wn.2d 23, 35, 283 P.3d
546 (2012)). “A decision is manifestly unreasonable if, based on the facts and the
applicable legal standard, the decision is outside the range of acceptable choices.” In re
Parentage of Schroeder, 106 Wn. App. 343, 349, 22 P.3d 1280 (2001).
In addition, we review whether the trial court’s “findings are supported by
substantial evidence and whether those findings support the conclusions of law.” In re
Marriage of Akon, 160 Wn. App. 48, 57, 248 P.3d 94 (2011). “Substantial evidence is
7 No. 40024-7-III (consol. w/ 40828-1-III) In re the Parenting & Support of H.P.H.
the quantum of evidence sufficient to persuade a rational, fair-minded person the premise
is true.” Id.
“Generally, where findings are required, they must be sufficiently specific to
permit meaningful review.” In re LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d 196, 218, 728 P.2d 138 (1986).
“While the degree of particularity required in findings of fact depends on the
circumstances of the particular case, they should at least be sufficient to indicate the
factual bases for the ultimate conclusions.” Id.
C. Legal principles
RCW 26.09.260 sets forth the procedures and criteria for modifying a parenting
plan” and contains varying standards depending on the parties’ circumstances and the
kind of modification requested. In re the Custody of Halls, 126 Wn. App. 599, 606, 109
P.3d 15 (2005); see RCW 26.09.260. “These procedures and criteria limit a court’s range
of discretion.” Halls, 126 Wn. App. at 606. Thus, “a court abuses its discretion if it fails
to follow the statutory procedures or modifies a parenting plan for reasons other than the
statutory criteria.” Id.
Under former RCW 26.09.191(2)(a) (2021), a court was required to set restrictions
on a parent’s residential schedule if it found that parent engaged in: “(ii) physical, sexual,
or a pattern of emotional abuse of a child; or (iii) a history of acts of domestic violence . . .
or an assault or sexual assault that causes grievous bodily harm or the fear of such harm or
that results in a pregnancy.”
8 No. 40024-7-III (consol. w/ 40828-1-III) In re the Parenting & Support of H.P.H.
Under former RCW 26.09.191(3) (2021), a court had discretion to set restrictions
on a parent’s decision-making authority if it found any of the following factors:
(a) A parent’s neglect or substantial nonperformance of parenting functions;
(b) A long-term emotional or physical impairment which interferes with the parent’s performance of parenting functions as defined in RCW 26.09.004;1 .... (e) The abusive use of conflict by the parent which creates the danger of serious damage to the child’s psychological development. Abusive use of conflict includes, but is not limited to, abusive litigation as defined in RCW 26.51.020. If the court finds a parent has engaged in abusive litigation, the
1 RCW 26.09.004 defines “parenting functions” as: those aspects of the parent-child relationship in which the parent makes decisions and performs functions necessary for the care and growth of the child. Parenting functions include: (a) Maintaining a loving, stable, consistent, and nurturing relationship with the child; (b) Attending to the daily needs of the child, such as feeding, clothing, physical care and grooming, supervision, health care, and day care, and engaging in other activities which are appropriate to the developmental level of the child and that are within the social and economic circumstances of the particular family; (c) Attending to adequate education for the child, including remedial or other education essential to the best interests of the child; (d) Assisting the child in developing and maintaining appropriate interpersonal relationships; (e) Exercising appropriate judgment regarding the child’s welfare, consistent with the child’s developmental level and the family's social and economic circumstances; and (f) Providing for the financial support of the child.
9 No. 40024-7-III (consol. w/ 40828-1-III) In re the Parenting & Support of H.P.H.
court may impose any restrictions or remedies set forth in chapter 26.51 RCW in addition to including a finding in the parenting plan. Litigation that is aggressive or improper but that does not meet the definition of abusive litigation shall not constitute a basis for a finding under this section. A report made in good faith to law enforcement, a medical professional, or child protective services of sexual, physical, or mental abuse of a child shall not constitute a basis for a finding of abusive use of conflict; .... (g) Such other factors or conduct as the court expressly finds adverse to the best interests of the child.
Any limitations or restrictions imposed under RCW 26.09.191 “must be
reasonably calculated to address the identified harm.” Katare v. Katare, 125 Wn. App.
813, 826, 105 P.3d 44 (2004).
D. Application
Knudson challenges each of the trial court’s findings in support of the limitations
and restrictions imposed. We address each challenge in turn.
i. The trial court’s letter decision
Knudson argues the trial court did not comply with the statutory requirements
governing parenting plan restrictions because the letter decision, and the court’s reliance
on her criminal convictions and incarceration, were insufficient to support the limitations
imposed. We agree.
It is an abuse of discretion for the trial court to modify a parenting plan for reasons
other than the statutory criteria. Halls, 126 Wn. App. at 606.
10 No. 40024-7-III (consol. w/ 40828-1-III) In re the Parenting & Support of H.P.H.
Although the trial court could consider Knudson’s incarceration and non-
assaultive criminal conduct as part of the overall circumstances when evaluating whether
statutory limiting factors applied, those considerations alone are not factors listed in
former RCW 26.09.191(2)(a) or (3) (2021). And while former RCW 26.09.191(3)(g)
(2021) permitted the trial court to impose limitations based on other conduct, such as
criminal conduct, the statute required the court to “expressly” find the conduct “adverse
to the best interests of the child.” The trial court’s letter does not reflect such an express
best interests finding or otherwise connect the criminal conduct or incarceration to
another statutory factor. The trial court therefore abused its discretion to the extent it
imposed limitations based on the rationale stated in its letter decision.
ii. Assault finding and failure to order screening
Knudson argues the trial court’s assault findings are unsupported by substantial
evidence.
Knudson was convicted of attempted assault and solicitation of another to commit
assault, among her other convictions. Those convictions do not establish that Knudson
“has assaulted or sexually assaulted someone causing grievous physical harm [or]
causing fear of such harm,” as the court found. CP at 187. Nor do Knudson’s
convictions constitute “assault” within the plain language of former RCW
26.09.191(2)(a)(ii) (2021). Accordingly, substantial evidence does not support the
assault finding.
11 No. 40024-7-III (consol. w/ 40828-1-III) In re the Parenting & Support of H.P.H.
Relatedly, Knudson argues that the trial court failed to comply with former RCW
26.09.191(4) (2021) by failing to order a screening of both parties after making a finding
of assault. We agree.
Former RCW 26.09.191(4) (2021) required that, “[i]n cases involving allegations
of limiting factors under subsection (2)(a)(ii) and (iii) of this section, both parties shall be
screened to determine the appropriateness of a comprehensive assessment regarding the
impact of the limiting factor on the child and the parties.”
Here, the trial court made its assault finding under former RCW
26.09.191(2)(a)(iii) without ordering a screening of the parties. Thus, the trial court
abused its discretion by failing to comply with former RCW 26.09.191(4) (2021). See
Halls, 126 Wn. App. at 606.
iii. Remaining findings
Knudson argues the trial court’s remaining findings are unsupported by substantial
evidence. For several reasons, we conclude that the findings are insufficient for appellate
review.
First, the trial court’s neglect findings are insufficient. The court found both that
Knudson “substantially refused to perform her parenting duties” and “neglected her
parental duties” toward H.P.H. but did not identify what facts supported either finding.
CP at 187-88. Without findings identifying which parenting duties were refused or
12 No. 40024-7-III (consol. w/ 40828-1-III) In re the Parenting & Support of H.P.H.
neglected and what evidence supports those findings, we cannot meaningfully review
whether the neglect findings are supported by substantial evidence.
The trial court’s “emotional or physical problem” finding suffers from a similar
defect. The trial court found Knudson has a “long-term” emotional or physical problem
that interferes with her ability to parent, but it did not identify the nature of the problem,
why it was long term, or what parenting functions (as defined in former RCW 26.09.004
(2021)) it interfered with. As written, the court’s finding is insufficient for our review.
Finally, the court’s abusive use of conflict finding is likewise insufficient. The
court did not specify what conduct constituted abusive use of conflict or how it created a
danger of serious damage to H.P.H.’s psychological development. As entered, the
finding largely parrots the first sentence of former RCW 26.09.191(3)(e) without
identifying specific conduct.
Hoodenpyl argued in his declaration that Knudson “abuses the legal system to get
what she wants” and engages in “abusive use of conflict.” CP at 118. In support of his
claim, Hoodenpyl pointed to: (1) four antiharassment protection orders Knudson sought
against him in 2016 and 2017, (2) a lawsuit Knudson filed against Central Washington
University under the public records act, ch. 42.56 RCW, (3) the protection order obtained
by the victim in Knudson’s criminal case, and (4) a domestic violence protection order
Knudson sought against the victim’s husband.
13 No. 40024-7-III (consol. w/ 40828-1-III) In re the Parenting & Support of H.P.H.
To the extent the trial court relied on these instances of litigation as the basis for
its finding of abusive use of conflict, its finding is still insufficient. Abusive use of
conflict can include abusive litigation. Former RCW 26.09.191(3)(e) (2021). But the
trial court did not specify whether its abusive use of conflict finding was based on
abusive litigation by Knudson, and if so, which definition of “abusive litigation” applied
based on the evidence under RCW 26.51.020(1). Plainly, the trial court could not have
found “abusive litigation” because that would require a finding that Knudson committed
domestic violence against Hoodenpyl. See former RCW 26.51.020(1)(a)(ii) (definition of
“abusive litigation” requires a litigating party to have been found by a court to have
committed violence against the other party). The trial court made no such domestic
violence finding. As a result, this finding is insufficient for our review.
All considered, each of the trial court’s findings was insufficient for our review or
not supported by substantial evidence.
iv. Failure to make findings related to harm
Finally, Knudson argues the trial court failed to identify harm to H.P.H. and failed
to explain how the restrictions imposed were reasonably calculated to address any such
harm. We agree in part.
“Any limitations or restrictions imposed must be reasonably calculated to address
the identified harm.” Katare, 125 Wn. App. at 826.
14 No. 40024-7-III (consol. w/ 40828-1-III) In re the Parenting & Support of H.P.H.
Here, the letter decision frames the court’s rationale in terms of Knudson’s
criminal behavior and incarceration rather than identifying a harm to H.P.H. caused by
continued contact with Knudson. And while the parenting plan lists statutory labels of
harm (neglect, assault, emotional or physical problem, and abusive use of conflict), the
court did not make findings explaining (1) what specific harms to H.P.H. those factors
reflected and (2) how the particular restrictions that were imposed—eliminating in-person
visits, denying decision-making authority, and limiting contact to two monitored calls per
week—were tailored to address those harms.
v. Remedy
Where a trial court abuses its discretion in crafting a parenting plan, the remedy is
generally to reverse and remand for further proceedings. See, e.g., In re Marriage of
Watson, 132 Wn. App. 222, 236-39, 130 P.3d 915 (2006); Halls, 126 Wn. App. at 611-
12.
Having concluded the trial court abused its discretion, we reverse the entry of the
final parenting plan and remand for further modification proceedings.
2. KNUDSON’S SUBSEQUENT PETITION TO MODIFY BASED ON CONTEMPT
Knudson contends the trial court abused its discretion by declining to hold a full
hearing on her petition to modify the parenting plan. She argues she presented specific,
documented factual allegations showing Hoodenpyl repeatedly failed to facilitate the
court-ordered calls with H.P.H., which, if proved, would establish a substantial change in
15 No. 40024-7-III (consol. w/ 40828-1-III) In re the Parenting & Support of H.P.H.
circumstances and detriment to the parent-child relationship sufficient to warrant
modification. By refusing to find adequate cause and declining to set a hearing, Knudson
asserts the trial court abused its discretion. We agree.
After she filed her initial notice of appeal, Knudson moved to modify the parenting
plan and sought an order holding Hoodenpyl in contempt based on Hoodenpyl’s alleged
interference with Knudson’s telephone contact with H.P.H.
In support, Knudson’s counsel alleged in her declaration that Hoodenpyl
deliberately violated the parenting plan by rejecting or interrupting a majority of
Knudson’s calls to H.P.H., sent threatening and harassing messages to Knudson, and that
since January 2024 Hoodenpyl refused to allow Knudson to have any contact with H.P.H.
She submitted a series of supportive exhibits, including DOC2 call logs and recordings
documenting the allegations. Among the exhibits was a recorded phone call in which
Hoodenpyl tells Knudson that H.P.H. “hasn’t wanted to answer the phone lately.”
Exhibit C. Knudson responded, explaining that Hoodenpyl was required to follow the
parenting plan, to which Hoodenpyl replied, “I really don’t care. I have no problem
going to court to tell and being like I’m not going to force [H.P.H.] to answer the phone.”
Exhibit C.
2 Department of Corrections.
16 No. 40024-7-III (consol. w/ 40828-1-III) In re the Parenting & Support of H.P.H.
Knudson sought a modification of the residential schedule under former RCW
26.09.260(1), (2), and (5)(a) (2009) requesting: joint-decision authority making with
Hoodenpyl; an in-person visit on Mother’s Day and additional in-person visits during the
year; four parent-child events hosted by DOC; at least one unmonitored video visit and
five unmonitored phone calls per week; and permission for H.P.H. to communicate with
Knudson through the DOC portal by sending messages, pictures, and videos. In support,
she alleged a substantial change in circumstances, that her requested modification was in
H.P.H.’s best interests, and that H.P.H.’s present environment was detrimental to her
physical, mental, or emotional health because Hoodenpyl’s conduct was preventing
communication and undermining the parent-child bond.
Hoodenpyl opposed the motion, arguing that Knudson failed to meet the standards
for modification under RCW 26.09.260 because she did not show (1) a substantial change
in circumstances, (2) that the benefit of change outweighed the detriment of disruption,
(3) that Hoodenpyl had been held in contempt twice in the last three years as required for
certain modifications, and (4) parental alienation.
Following an adequate cause hearing, the trial court determined Knudson failed to
demonstrate adequate cause to modify the parenting plan and declined to hold Hoodenpyl
in contempt. Although the court acknowledged Hoodenpyl had not complied with the
parenting plan, it stated only that “we need the court order complied with.” See 2RP at
17 No. 40024-7-III (consol. w/ 40828-1-III) In re the Parenting & Support of H.P.H.
55-56. The court made no oral or written findings explaining its denial of adequate
cause.
B. Standard of review and legal principles
We review a trial court’s adequate cause determination for an abuse of discretion.
See In re Parentage of Jannot, 149 Wn.2d 123, 126, 65 P.3d 664 (2003). Because
changes in residence are highly disruptive to children, we employ a strong presumption
against modification of a parenting plan. Halls, 126 Wn. App. at 607.
“Parenting plan modifications require a two-step process set out in RCW
26.09.260 and .270. First, a party moving to modify a parenting plan must produce an
affidavit showing adequate cause for modification before the court will permit a full
hearing on the matter.” In re Marriage of Zigler & Sidwell, 154 Wn. App. 803, 809, 226
P.3d 202 (2010). “This threshold determination requires [the] petitioner to set forth
specific factual allegations, which if proven would permit [the] court to modify the plan
under RCW 26.09.260.” Bower v. Reich, 89 Wn. App. 9, 14, 964 P.2d 359 (1997).
Under former RCW 26.09.260(1) (2009), the trial court lacked authority to modify
a parenting plan unless it found, “upon the basis of facts that have arisen since the prior
decree or plan or that were unknown to the court at the time of the prior decree or plan,
that a substantial change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or the nonmoving
party and that the modification is in the best interest of the child and is necessary to serve
the best interests of the child.” In applying those standards, a court was required to
18 No. 40024-7-III (consol. w/ 40828-1-III) In re the Parenting & Support of H.P.H.
maintain the residential schedule in the parenting plan unless “[t]he child’s present
environment is detrimental to the child’s physical, mental, or emotional health and the
harm likely to be caused by a change of environment is outweighed by the advantage of a
change to the child.” Former RCW 26.09.260(2)(c) (2009).
Separately, under former RCW 26.09.260(5) (2009), the trial court was permitted
to order adjustments to the residential aspects of the parenting plan “upon a showing of a
substantial change in circumstances of either parent or of the child . . . if the proposed
modification is only a minor modification in the residential schedule that does not change
the residence the child is scheduled to reside in the majority of the time and: (a) Does not
exceed twenty-four full days in a calendar year.”
A substantial change of circumstances must be “grounded upon facts occurring
since entry of the prior . . . plan or were unknown to the superior court at the time it
entered that prior . . . plan.” In re Marriage of Hoseth, 115 Wn. App. 563, 570, 63 P.3d
164 (2003). “The information considered in deciding whether a hearing is warranted
should be [information] that was not considered in the original parenting plan.” Jannot,
110 Wn. App. at 25.
“An effort by one parent to terminate the other parent’s relationship with a child
can be considered detrimental to the child, and modification based on such behavior is
appropriate.” Velickoff v. Velickoff, 95 Wn. App. 346, 355, 968 P.2d 20 (1998). In
Velickoff, this court affirmed a trial court’s decision to modify a parenting plan under
19 No. 40024-7-III (consol. w/ 40828-1-III) In re the Parenting & Support of H.P.H.
RCW 26.09.260(2)(c) after one parent interfered with the other parent’s court ordered
phone calls. 95 Wn. App. at 358.
If adequate cause is shown, the court will then move to the second step: a full
hearing on the petition. Zigler, 154 Wn. App. at 809.
Where a trial court abuses its discretion by finding there is not adequate cause to
hold a hearing on a parent’s petition to modify a parenting plan, we generally will reverse
and remand. See In re Marriage of MacLaren, 8 Wn. App. 2d 751, 777-78, 440 P.3d
1055 (2019).
C. Application
Knudson’s argument concerns the first step of the analysis. We conclude the trial
court abused its discretion by failing to find adequate cause because Knudson presented
specific, documented factual allegations that, if proved, would permit the court to modify
the parenting plan under RCW 26.09.260.
Knudson submitted call logs and recordings from DOC demonstrating Hoodenpyl
repeatedly refused to accept or facilitate her court-ordered calls with H.P.H. She also
provided a recorded call in which Hoodenpyl stated he did not care what the court order
required and he would not force H.P.H. to answer. These allegations concern conduct
occurring after entry of the August 2023 parenting plan and thus were unknown to the
court at the time it entered the prior plan.
20 No. 40024-7-III (consol. w/ 40828-1-III) In re the Parenting & Support of H.P.H.
If proved, Hoodenpyl’s repeated refusal to comply with the court-ordered
communication provisions would constitute a substantial change in circumstances and
could support modification to protect the parent-child relationship and serve H.P.H.’s
best interests. See Velickoff, 95 Wn. App. at 355. Yet despite acknowledging that
Hoodenpyl had not complied with the parenting plan, the trial court denied adequate
cause without explaining why Knudson’s documented allegations were insufficient to
warrant a full hearing.
Because Knudson met the threshold burden of alleging specific facts that, if
proved, would permit modification under RCW 26.09.260, the trial court abused its
discretion in denying adequate cause. We therefore reverse and remand for the trial court
to hold a hearing on Knudson’s petition.
3. ATTORNEY FEES
Knudson requests attorney fees under RCW 26.09.140 and RAP 18.1(a). RCW
26.09.140 provides the court discretion to award fees and costs to either party in a
dissolution proceeding “after considering the financial resources of both parties.”
However, this statute presupposes a marital relationship as a condition for the right to an
award of attorney fees under the statute. See State ex rel. Davis v. Superior Ct. for King
County, 200 Wash. 670, 672, 94 P.2d 478 (1939).
21 No. 40024-7-III (consol. w/ 40828-1-III) In re the Parenting & Support of H.P.H.
Knudson’s case does not stem from a dissolution proceeding as Knudson and
Hoodenpyl were never married. Thus, we do not have authority to award fees under this
statute, and we deny Knudson’s request for attorney fees.
Reversed and remanded.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
RCW 2.06.040.
_________________________________ Staab, C.J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________________ Hill, J.
_________________________________ Cooney, J.