In The Matter Of The Parental Rights To: A.l.c.

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: November 10, 2025
• Docket: 87018-1
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In the Matter of the Dependency of No. 87018-1-I A.L.C., DIVISION ONE

Minor Child. UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MANN, J. — S.M. appeals the termination of her parental rights to A.L.C. She

argues that she did not receive adequate notice of the March 2024 termination trial

dates. We affirm.

I

A.L.C. was born in May 2020 to parents S.M. and J.M.S. 1 In August 2021, the

Department of Children, Youth, and Families (Department) removed A.L.C. from the

care of her mother due to concerns of substance abuse that placed A.L.C. at a risk of

harm.

In October 2021, the trial court found that A.L.C. was dependent under RCW

13.34.060(6)(c). The court ordered S.M. to engage in services, including mental health

1 The termination trial involved both parents. Because S.M. is the only parent who appeals, we

do not discuss J.M.S.’s involvement. No. 87018-1-I/2

assessments, parenting education, and drug and alcohol evaluations and

recommended treatment. Crystal DeLancy, the social worker on the case, met with

S.M. and provided service plans and explained the importance of complying with the

service plans and court orders. Throughout the dependency, S.M. continued to have

chronic substance abuse issues and failed to follow through on treatment. S.M. had

supervised visitation with A.L.C. throughout the dependency but there were issues of

S.M. missing scheduled visits and her behavior at visits.

In July 2023, the Department petitioned for the termination of the parent-child

relationship. The Department served the termination petition and a notice and

summons on S.M. by mailing it to her address on July 26, 2023. The notice and

summons set an initial termination hearing for September 20, 2023 and stated that S.M.

was required to appear at the hearing.

On August 29, 2023, the court assigned S.M. an attorney. At the September

hearing, the court found good cause to continue the hearing. S.M. was not present but

her attorney signed the order as to form.

The court set the contested termination trial for February 2024. S.M.’s attorney

signed this order as to form. Because there was an issue of whether the Indian Child

Welfare Act (ICWA) applied, the court continued the termination hearing to March 18,

2024. Again, S.M.’s attorney signed the order as to form.

The termination trial was held on March 18-19, 2024 and April 10, 2024. S.M.

did not attend the trial in person or by Zoom. S.M.’s attorney appeared and moved the

court to continue the trial because S.M. was not there. The Department opposed,

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arguing that S.M. had been absent from the case for the months leading up to the

hearing. The court denied a continuance.

The court conducted a fact-finding hearing with testimony from several

witnesses. DeLancy testified that she communicated with S.M. during the weeks before

trial. DeLancy testified that S.M. was aware of the trial dates and stated that she would

be there.

The court determined that termination was in A.L.C.’s best interest. The court

reasoned that S.M. was offered several services but failed to meaningful engage in the

services. The court granted the termination petition and entered an order terminating

S.M.’s parental rights to A.L.C.

S.M. appeals.

II

S.M. argues that the trial court erred when it found that S.M. received adequate

notice of the termination trial dates. We disagree. 2

“The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a parent’s right

to the custody, care, and companionship of her children,” which “cannot be abridged

without due process of law.” In re Welfare of Key, 119 Wn.2d 600, 609, 836 P.2d 200

(1992). Due process requires that parents receive “[n]otice, open testimony, time to

prepare and respond to charges, and a meaningful hearing before a competent tribunal

in an orderly proceeding.” In re Dependency of Moseley, 34 Wn. App. 179, 184, 660

2 Citing RAP 2.5(a), the Department asserts that we should not consider this argument for the first

time on appeal. We disagree. In re Dependency of A.M.M., 182 Wn. App. 776, 790 n.8, 332 P.3d 500 (2014) (a claim of a due process right to adequate notice in a termination proceeding may be raised for the first time on appeal).

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P.2d 315 (1983). To ensure proper notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard,

Washington law requires service of the summons and dependency petition. RCW

13.34.070(1)-(2). “Upon the filing of the petition, the petitioner shall issue a summons

. . . to the parents . . . requiring them to appear personally before the court at the time

fixed to hear the petition.” RCW 13.34.070(1). Lastly, in a parental termination trial, to

determine whether the requirements of due process are met, we use the balancing test

set out in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18

(1976): (1) the private interest affected by the proceeding; (2) the risk of erroneous

deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value of

additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the State’s interest. See In re

Dependency of T.R., 108 Wn. App. 149, 154-55, 29 P.3d 1275 (2001).

The parties agree that the first Matthews factor favors S.M. because she has a

fundamental interest in her care and custody of A.L.C. because she is the mother. See

In re Dependency of K.D.S., 176 Wn.2d 644, 652, 294 P.3d 695 (2013) (“Parents have

a fundamental liberty interest in the custody and care of their children.”). S.M. also

concedes that the third factor favors the State because of the Department’s strong

interest in speedy resolution of termination proceedings. In re Welfare of D.E., 196

Wn.2d 92, 108, 469 P.3d 1163 (2020) (the State has an interest in assisting children in

finding their permanent placements as quickly as possible).

Therefore, our analysis turns on the second Matthews factor, which analyzes

“whether the hearing had sufficient procedural safeguards to ensure that the parent had

a full and fair opportunity to defend—i.e., to present evidence, rebut opposing evidence,

and present legal arguments.” In re Welfare of L.R., 180 Wn. App. 717, 725, 324 P.3d

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737 (2014). S.M. argues that this factor weighs in her favor of because she was not

present at trial and could not testify in person or challenge the State’s evidence. We

disagree. S.M. had an attorney present on her behalf who had the opportunity to cross-

examine witnesses and represent her interest throughout the proceedings. S.M.’s

attorney was also present at the continuance hearings and signed the orders as to form.

Additionally, DeLancy testified that she discussed the March trial dates with S.M. S.M.

does not present any authority that the Department was required to formally notify her of

each continuance after she was served with the petition and summons in July 2023.

Because the record establishes that S.M. had notice and the opportunity to be heard

and her attorney was present throughout the trial, her due process rights were not

violated.

We affirm.

WE CONCUR:

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