FILED
AUGUST 20, 2026
In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
In the Matter of the Marriage of: ) No. 40041-7-III )
YEMISI F. AWOTOYE, )
)
Respondent, )
) UNPUBLISHED OPINION and )
)
FIYINFOLU CYRIL AWOTOYE, )
)
Appellant. )
MURPHY, J. — Fiyinfolu Cyril Awotoye appeals from various trial court orders in this marriage dissolution proceeding. Because the decisions are supported by substantial evidence and fall within the trial court’s broad discretion, we affirm.
FACTS
Fiyinfolu Cyril Awotoye and Yemisi F. Awotoye 1 married in Nigeria in 2008.
Over many years, they lived at times together and other times separately in Nigeria, the United Kingdom and Baltimore, Maryland, before ultimately settling together in Baltimore. The parties share two minor children: T.D.A. and O.A.A.
On September 30, 2019, Yemisi moved alone to Spokane, Washington, for a new job. She visited the children in Baltimore in October 2019, and from mid-November 2019
We hereinafter refer to the parties by their first names as they share a common 1
surname. We intend no disrespect by doing so.
In re Marriage of Awotoye to January 2020. On January 8, 2020, she returned to Spokane with both children. Fiyinfolu remained in Baltimore.
On May 21, 2021, Yemisi petitioned for legal separation in Spokane County Superior Court. The trial court entered a temporary parenting plan and child support order placing the children primarily with Yemisi. Fiyinfolu did not pursue any separate action in Maryland, and appeared through counsel in the Spokane County action on June 15, 2021.
The children’s relationship with Fiyinfolu deteriorated. He moved for the appointment of a guardian ad litem, and the trial court appointed Lindsey Paxton. The court directed Paxton to investigate: (1) why the children were reluctant to communicate with or visit Fiyinfolu, (2) potential interference with parenting, including coercive conduct, by either parent, (3) safety concerns, and (4) any other issues relevant to the children’s relationship with their parents.
Paxton’s 23-page report, based on interviews with the parties, children, and collateral individuals, concluded that the children had “a ruptured relationship” with Fiyinfolu and did not want to talk to or visit with him. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 275. The rupture began before Yemisi petitioned for a legal separation, after Fiyinfolu refused to sign documents permitting Yemisi to buy a house in Spokane and worsened after he tried to prevent a second home purchase around April 2021. Fiyinfolu’s refusal to sign the
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In re Marriage of Awotoye children’s passport applications or agree to summer camp plans were also “serious points of contention for the children.” CP at 275-76. Paxton reported that the children “do not seem to trust [their father] or believe that he has their best interests at heart.” CP at 276.
Paxton noted Yemisi had likely always been the children’s primary attachment figure. She also determined both parents contributed to the children knowing too much about adult conflicts, and that Yemisi could do more to encourage the children to contact their father, but neither parent was found to be actively interfering with parental relationships. Paxton recommended family therapy for Fiyinfolu and the children, individual counseling, and that Fiyinfolu have short, in-person visits with the children.
Trial commenced on the legal separation petition in March 2023. Each party submitted a proposed parenting plan. They also submitted a joint asset and liability list. They did not agree on the date of separation. Yemisi proposed a separation date of September 30, 2019, the date she moved to Spokane. Fiyinfolu proposed a separation date of May 21, 2021, the date Yemisi filed her petition. The separation date was important as it impacted the proposed asset and liability distributions.
Relevant on appeal, Fiyinfolu had two retirement accounts: a 401(k) plan through Achieving the Dream, and a LifeNet profit sharing plan. In the trial management joint report, both parties valued Fiyinfolu’s 401(k) plan at $12,367. Yemisi provided a statement showing Fiyinfolu’s 401(k) plan had a zero balance as of September 30, 2020,
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In re Marriage of Awotoye because Fiyinfolu had withdrawn all funds from the account. Yemisi valued Fiyinfolu’s profit sharing plan at $27,013. Fiyinfolu asserted it had no value. Yemisi provided statements showing Fiyinfolu’s profit sharing plan balance as of December 31, 2022, was $23,876, with a vested balance of $4,775. Also by way of assets, Yemisi had a separate Wells Fargo bank account that both parties valued at $644.57.
In its April 14, 2023, oral ruling, the trial court set the separation date as March 5, 2021, and confirmed Washington as the children’s home state. The court found Fiyinfolu’s strained relationship with the children was due, in part, to his “authoritative parenting style” and his actions regarding Yemisi’s attempted home purchases, the children’s camp attendance, their passport applications, and phone use. CP at 7. The court noted Yemisi acted inappropriately by sharing her frustrations about Fiyinfolu with the children and calling law enforcement to conduct an unnecessary welfare check on T.D.A. while the child was in Baltimore. The trial court determined the parenting plan should be based in Spokane given Yemisi’s role as primary caregiver. The court defined Fiyinfolu’s parental visitation and communication provisions, granting Fiyinfolu monthly visitation in Spokane, with the children visiting him in Baltimore for select holidays and part of the summer school break. Fiyinfolu was required to provide 30 days’ notice for his Spokane visits. The court ordered family counseling (with Fiyinfolu choosing the counselor) and
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In re Marriage of Awotoye individual counseling. The court also ordered that the children continue to attend private school.
Regarding property, the trial court valued the community portion of Fiyinfolu’s LifeNet profit sharing plan at $9,679, and his separate portion at $14,196 (with a total value of $23,875). The court treated his 401(k) account as community property worth $12,367 (noting he had withdrawn the funds). Yemisi was awarded her Wells Fargo account. The court ordered Fiyinfolu to pay Yemisi $30,000 as an equalization payment, such that Fiyinfolu would receive net assets of $83,874 and Yemisi would receive $54,110 after the equalization payment.
On June 12, 2023, the trial court entered written findings, conclusions, and orders consistent with its April 14, 2023, oral ruling. 2 Both parties moved for reconsideration. On October 3, 2023, the court issued orders on reconsideration, adding terms for the equalization payment (90 days, with judgment at 12 percent interest) and declined to revisit asset valuations. It also entered the final amended parenting plan.
Fiyinfolu filed a notice of appeal in the trial court on November 1, 2023, and indicated in the notice that he was appealing from the following: (1) the trial court’s
2 The trial court’s April 14 oral ruling was incorporated by reference in its (1) findings and conclusions about a marriage, CP at 42, and (2) final legal separation order, CP at 47. The trial court also entered a child support order, that no party has appealed from.
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In re Marriage of Awotoye April 14, 2023, oral ruling, (2) the June 12, 2023, final legal separation order, (3) the October 3, 2023, orders on the motions for reconsideration, and (4) the October 3, 2023, amended final parenting plan. Fiyinfolu also attached to his notice of appeal copies of the June 12, 2023, final parenting plan, and an October 2023 amended briefing schedule issued by the trial court regarding the pending motions for reconsideration. Petition to change parenting plan and related motions While this appeal was pending, on March 3, 2025, Yemisi petitioned in the trial court to modify the October 2023 parenting plan. She requested the trial court restrict Fiyinfolu’s parenting time in Maryland until he and the children successfully completed therapy. She asked that family counseling occur in Washington, and that all required phone calls occur in conjunction with counseling. The reason for these requests was due to the ongoing deterioration of the relationship between the children and Fiyinfolu, and safety concerns related to a prior incident where one of the children ran away from Fiyinfolu and another incident where both children refused to get on a connecting flight when traveling to Maryland to see Fiyinfolu. Additionally, while the court had ordered family counseling, Yemisi claimed counseling had been ineffective because Fiyinfolu “selected his acquaintances as counselors.” CP at 351. Yemisi stated the children stopped taking Fiyinfolu’s calls.
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In re Marriage of Awotoye Yemisi also filed a motion for adequate cause and a motion for a temporary family law order and restraining order. She requested Fiyinfolu not be permitted to take the children out of Washington “until such time as the family therapist and children deem it in their best interest following further counseling.” CP at 344 (capitalization omitted). She asked that the 2025 spring vacation visit to Baltimore be suspended pending counseling and getting the children help to “feel comfortable to visit their father in Baltimore.” CP at 345-46 .
Fiyinfolu’s responded that Yemisi’s requests were “cost-prohibitive” and impeded his ability to connect with the children. CP at 361. He argued that being pushed away was not in the children’s best interest and Yemisi had not identified any action taken by him that caused the issues. He claimed he made significant efforts to improve his relationship with his children when they were with him, but any progress made there was undermined as soon as the children returned to Yemisi.
On April 2, 2025, the trial court entered an order requiring compliance with RAP 7.2(e) and temporarily staying the spring break provision of the final parenting plan. The court signed and attached its proposed order on adequate cause and directed the parties to seek permission from this court for formal entry of the order.
While Yemisi’s RAP 7.2(e) motion was pending with this court, she filed a motion at the trial court for a stay of the school and summer schedule provisions within the
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In re Marriage of Awotoye parenting plan. 3 On June 5, 2025, Fiyinfolu filed in this court an emergency motion to reinstate the parenting plan under appeal and prevent further trial court interference. He asked that we reinstate the spring break visitation and all other provisions of the final amended parenting plan under review.
On June 6, 2025, a trial court commissioner issued an order granting Yemisi’s motion for stay with the trial court asserting authority in the interests of justice under PowerCom, Inc. v. Valley Electric Co. of Mt. Vernon, Inc., 29 Wn. App. 2d 506, 540 P.3d 1181 (2024). The commissioner stated it was clear that the children did not want to see Fiyinfolu, and the reasons for this were issues to be resolved at trial. All visits to Baltimore were stayed with the trial court ruling that visitation could occur in Spokane, if the children wished.
Shortly thereafter, a commissioner of this court ruled:
The trial court is empowered to modify a parenting plan if a substantial change in circumstances has occurred and the modification is in the best interests of the children. RCW 26.09.260(1). The trial court had authority to hear and decide the mother’s motion to modify the parenting plan while the appeal was pending, and this court agrees with the mother that authorization [to enter the order granting adequate cause] is appropriate under RAP 7.2(e).
3 Yemisi’s motion to stay provisions of the parenting plan is not part of the record.
Its existence is inferred from the trial court’s order on the motion for stay.
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In re Marriage of Awotoye Comm’r’s Ruling (Jun. 13, 2025) at 6. Further, this court’s commissioner (1) granted Fiyinfolu’s motion for accelerated review, (2) denied Fiyinfolu’s motion to reinstate the final amended parenting plan and his motion to prevent further trial court interference, (3) denied as not properly before this court a request, made in Yemisi’s answer to Fiyinfolu’s motion for RAP 7.2(e), for authorization as to the order on the motion for stay, 4 and (4) denied Yemisi’s various requests for an award of fees as premature.
On July 15, 2025, a trial court commissioner entered an order converting the legal separation order that had been entered on June 12, 2023, to a final divorce order.
On July 16, 2025, the order granting adequate cause to change a parenting plan was formally entered, with the trial court commissioner finding in relevant part:
Modification is in the children’s best interest and is necessary to promote the best interests of the children. There exists detriment in the children’s total present environment, which materially affects their mental and emotional health. The Court cannot determine the cause of the dysfunction between the children and their father. Additionally, temporary modification of the residential schedule is necessary to avoid disruption to the children’s emotional stability while the action is pending, while simultaneously encouraging the children and father to continue efforts toward relationship building. RCW 26.09.197. [Yemisi] has met her burden of presenting
4 Yemisi subsequently moved in this court for RAP 7.2(e) authorization as to the trial court commissioner’s June 6, 2025, order on motion for stay of the school and summer schedule provisions in the parenting plan. On July 3, 2025, a commissioner of this court denied the motion, noting that (1) the June 6 order had already been entered in the trial court, and (2) RAP 7.2(e) governs entry of a trial court decision that changes a decision under review by this court and RAP 7.2(h) would apply to the June 6 order as it expressly authorizes the trial court to enter a stay of a decision under review by this court.
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In re Marriage of Awotoye
facts showing adequate cause to proceed to a full hearing or trial.
RCW 26.09.270, RCW 26.09.260.
CP at 288. Pending a full hearing or trial on modification, the trial court ordered Fiyinfolu’s residential time to occur only in Spokane and ordered therapy between Fiyinfolu and the children to begin promptly with a provider located in Spokane. The trial court granted discretion to Fiyinfolu to attend therapy sessions with the Spokane provider in person or remotely over Zoom. All other provisions of the final amended parenting plan would remain in effect.
On August 18, 2025, a trial court judge denied Fiyinfolu’s motion for revision of the commissioner’s July 16 order granting adequate cause.
As directed by this court, the parties thereafter submitted supplemental briefing addressing the impact of the July 16, 2025, order granting adequate cause on the underlying orders under review.
ANALYSIS
1. Property distribution and equalization payment Fiyinfolu argues the trial court overvalued his retirement accounts and failed to address Yemisi’s incomplete financial disclosures, such that a reduced equalization payment is required. He also challenges the 90-day payment terms and interest.
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In re Marriage of Awotoye A trial court’s division of marital property will not be reversed absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Crosetto, 82 Wn. App. 545, 556, 918 P.2d 954 (1996). This court’s review is limited to determining whether the trial court’s distribution of property was fair and equitable. Id. Under RCW 26.09.080, the trial court must make a “just and equitable” disposition of all property and liabilities after considering the nature and extent of community and separate property, the duration of the marriage, and the economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the property is divided.
“Property valuation is a question of fact and is reviewed for substantial evidence.”
In re Marriage of Porter, 3 Wn.3d 579, 588, 555 P.3d 379 (2024). Evidence is substantial when it is sufficient to persuade a fair-minded, rational person of the truth of the declared premise. In re Marriage of Griswold, 112 Wn. App. 333, 339, 48 P.3d 1018 (2002). An appellate court does not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court, reweigh evidence, or judge credibility. In re Marriage of Rockwell, 141 Wn. App. 235, 242, 170 P.3d 572 (2007). Rather, we review whether substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings of fact and, in turn, whether those findings support the conclusions of law. Id. Even assuming the trial court committed an error in arithmetic, we need not amend the dissolution or equalization payment if the disposition remains just and equitable. RCW 26.09.080; see also In re Marriage of Larson, 178 Wn. App. 133, 138, 313 P.3d 1228 (2013).
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In re Marriage of Awotoye Fiyinfolu argues the trial court overvalued his estate by $18,861.17, based on several errors related to his Achieving the Dream 401(k) plan 5 and his LifeNet Health profit sharing plan. He argues that, based on these errors, the equalization payment to Yemisi should be reduced by $9,430.15.
The trial court explained its rationale in its April 14, 2023, oral ruling when ordering an equalization payment of $30,000 be made to Yemisi. The trial court noted the parties’ property distribution resulted in Fiyinfolu receiving net assets of $113,874 and Yemisi receiving net assets of $23,874. The equalization payment somewhat closed the gap of what the court characterized as a “vast unequal distribution.” CP at 31. After the payment, Fiyinfolu would receive a net asset distribution of $83,874, and Yemisi $53,874.
Even assuming Fiyinfolu’s estate was overvalued by $18,861, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the $30,000 equalization payment. The resulting distribution would have remained just and equitable, as Fiyinfolu would have received net assets of approximately $74,444 and Yemisi approximately $63,304 (reducing Fiyinfolu’s estate and increasing Yemisi’s estate by $9,430).
5 Fiyinfolu refers to his Achieving the Dream account as a “pension.” See Br.
of Appellant at 30-31. However, a statement for this account admitted into evidence indicates the account is a 401(k) plan. See Ex. P39.
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In re Marriage of Awotoye Fiyinfolu also argues the trial court lacked sufficient information about Yemisi’s Wells Fargo bank account balance because Yemisi did not provide bank statements for her Wells Fargo account. Fiyinfolu did not raise this issue at trial, and we decline to consider it for the first time on appeal. RAP 2.5(a).
Additionally, Fiyinfolu contends the trial court erred in assigning terms for the equalization payment. He argues he is entitled to relief from the payment terms due to his financial position and contends reducing his financial burden is in the best interest of the children. “Spouses are entitled to receive their share of the community property within a reasonable time.” In re Marriage of Foley, 84 Wn. App. 839, 844, 930 P.2d 929 (1997), abrogated on other grounds by In re Marriage of Wilcox, 3 Wn.3d 507, 519-24, 553 P.3d 614 (2024). RCW 4.56.110(6) provides for interest of 12 percent on judgments. See RCW 19.52.020(1); see also In re Marriage of Davison, 112 Wn. App. 251, 259, 48 P.3d 358 (2002). The trial court here did not abuse its discretion in employing the standard payment terms for judgments in Washington. 2. Jurisdiction Fiyinfolu claims Yemisi violated Washington’s Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), chapter 26.27 RCW, and the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 (PKPA), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A, by moving the children to Spokane. He thus impliedly challenges the jurisdiction of Washington courts
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In re Marriage of Awotoye to determine child custody. We hold that the trial court properly exercised jurisdiction as Washington is the children’s home state.
Whether a Washington court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed de novo. In re Parentage of Ruff, 168 Wn. App. 109, 115, 275 P.3d 1175 (2012). The UCCJEA provides the exclusive basis upon which a court in Washington may claim jurisdiction over a child custody determination. RCW 26.27.201. The statute defines “home state” as “the state in which a child lived with a parent . . . for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding.” RCW 26.27.021(7). Although Fiyinfolu also referred to the federal PKPA as grounds for challenging jurisdiction, because the PKPA is consistent with Washington’s UCCJEA, we analyze this issue under the UCCJEA. See In re Marriage of Hamilton, 120 Wn. App. 147, 150, 84 P.3d 259 (2004).
Fiyinfolu claims Yemisi deceptively made him believe she and the children would return to Maryland, and if he had known the children would not return, then he would have utilized Maryland courts to address any attempt at relocation. He does not challenge the trial court’s determination that Washington is the home state for the children, however, and instead claims the home state status is void because Yemisi was deceptive.
Here, the trial court found the children resided in Washington since January 2020 and had therefore lived in this state for at least six months before the legal separation
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In re Marriage of Awotoye petition was filed on May 21, 2021. Fiyinfolu does not challenge this finding, and unchallenged findings are verities on appeal. See In re Marriage of Laidlaw, 2 Wn. App. 2d 381, 386, 409 P.3d 1184 (2018). Fiyinfolu did not file any court action in Maryland. If he believed the children were removed from Maryland without his permission, then his remedy was to file an action in Maryland. He did not do so, and Maryland no longer qualifies as a home state. See Hamilton, 120 Wn. App. 147 at 157-58.
Given that the children resided in Washington for over a year at the time Yemisi petitioned for legal separation, the trial court correctly determined that it had home state jurisdiction over the children under the UCCJEA. 3. Residential provisions of the parenting plan Fiyinfolu challenges the residential provisions of the parenting plan, arguing that placing the children with him in Baltimore would be in their best interests.
This court reviews a trial court’s parenting plan for abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Katare, 175 Wn.2d 23, 35, 283 P.3d 546 (2012). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds. In re Marriage of McDole, 122 Wn.2d 604, 610, 859 P.2d 1239 (1993) (per curiam). “On review, this court accords the trial court great deference.” In re Parentage of J.H., 112 Wn. App. 486, 492, 49 P.3d 154 (2002) (citing In re Dependency of A.W., 53 Wn. App. 22, 31, 765 P.2d 307 (1988)); see also In re Parentage of Jannot, 110 Wn. App. 16,
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In re Marriage of Awotoye 19-22, 37 P.3d 1265 (2002), aff’d, 149 Wn.2d 123, 65 P.3d 664 (2003). This court upholds a trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by substantial evidence. J.H., 112 Wn. App. at 492 (citing Chapman v. Perera, 41 Wn. App. 444, 449, 704 P.2d 1224 (1985)). The trial court’s credibility findings are not subject to review. In re Marriage of DewBerry, 115 Wn. App. 351, 362, 62 P.3d 525 (2003).
We review a trial court’s rulings regarding the placement of children for abuse of discretion. J.H., 112 Wn. App. at 492. The trial court “must make a residential placement decision in the best interests of the child and only after considering the factors found in RCW 26.09.187(3).” Id. at 492-93. “The ‘best interests of the child’ control when determining who will parent a child daily.” Id. at 493 (quoting In re Parentage of Schroeder, 106 Wn. App. 343, 349, 22 P.3d 1280 (2001)). RCW 26.09.187(3)(a) lists the seven factors a trial court must consider when establishing residential provisions for children, with the “relative strength, nature, and stability of the child’s relationship with each parent” being given the given the “greatest weight.” The parenting plan’s residential schedule “must be based on the statutory factors and the circumstances of the parties as they exist at the time of trial.” In re Marriage of Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d 39, 56, 940 P.2d 1362 (1997).
Here, the trial court considered three days of testimony, including the recommendations of a guardian ad litem, heard the parties’ challenges to each other’s
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In re Marriage of Awotoye credibility, and ultimately issued a lengthy oral ruling that was incorporated by reference into the written findings and conclusions about a marriage as well as the final legal separation order. The trial court during the April 14 oral ruling listed reasons for its finding that Fiyinfolu had a “strained and ruptured relationship with the children.” CP at 7. The trial court further listed reasons why Yemisi “has been the children’s primary care provider even before she came [to Spokane] in January of 2020.” CP at 11-12. The children expressed a clear preference to live with Yemisi. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in placing the children primarily with Yemisi.
Fiyinfolu argues the children should have been placed with him because Yemisi fosters conflict and is emotionally unstable, she has failed to care for the children’s emotional and physical health, there is greater familial support in Baltimore, and Fiyinfolu bears an unfair financial burden as to the cost of travel. None of these challenges succeed. Fiyinfolu’s arguments challenge Yemisi’s credibility or raise issues not raised with the trial court. We do not reweigh credibility determinations of the trial court or consider new evidence on appeal.
Fiyinfolu argues the requirement that he give 30 days’ notice of his intent to visit the children places an undue restriction on his parental rights and he should only be required to give 48-hours’ notice. We disagree. “For any child, residential provisions may contain any reasonable terms or conditions that facilitate the orderly and meaningful
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In re Marriage of Awotoye exercise of residential time by a parent.” RCW 26.09.187(3)(c). In its order on Fiyinfolu’s motion for reconsideration, the trial court found “due to the high-conflict nature of the co-parenting relationship, it is not in the children’s best interest to shorten the notice period for Spokane visits.” CP at 243. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in setting a reasonable condition to facilitate Fiyinfolu’s exercise of residential time with the children.
Fiyinfolu argues the trial court’s communication provisions hinder his ability to maintain a parental bond. He says his weekly call when the children are in Yemisi’s care is insufficient considering Yemisi has daily calls when the children are with him. The trial court ordered that Fiyinfolu “shall have mandatory video chats with the children every Thursday . . . for up to 15 minutes each. . . . Children may contact Father more frequently if they desire.” CP at 249. The trial court exercised its discretion to impose a reasonable condition on the parties’ parenting time. The trial court did not prevent the children from contacting Fiyinfolu more frequently. Rather, it imposed a minimum. Fiyinfolu cites no authority mandating that parents must have equal communication time with their children.
Fiyinfolu argues Yemisi shares too much information with the children, and she should have been ordered to attend co-parenting classes and behavioral rehabilitation. He also argues the children’s counselors should have been ordered to address the detrimental
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In re Marriage of Awotoye effects Yemisi has had on them. Finally, he says that he needs clarification that he can pay his share of the children’s healthcare costs (including their therapy) through his health savings account (HSA). Fiyinfolu did not raise these arguments in the trial court, nor has he indicated here how the trial court abused its discretion. See RAP 2.5. We decline to consider these arguments. 4. Record support of findings of fact from the April 14, 2023 oral ruling Fiyinfolu contends the record does not support numerous findings of fact the trial court made in its oral ruling on April 14, 2023. He challenges the court’s rulings regarding (1) the children’s camp attendance, (2) Yemisi’s attempts to purchase a home, (3) the nature of the demand letter he sent to Yemisi’s brother, (4) the children’s access to phones while in his care, (5) issues related to counseling, (6) his parenting style, (7) Yemisi’s location during Thanksgiving 2019, (8) his discovery of Yemisi’s loan to her brother, (9) the children’s need to attend private school, and (10) whether he cashed in community assets without Yemisi’s knowledge. He also argues the trial court failed to properly incorporate its oral rulings into the parenting plan.
An oral decision of a trial court “is no more than a verbal expression of [the court’s] informal opinion at that time. It is necessarily subject to further study and consideration, and may be altered, modified, or completely abandoned. It has no final or binding effect, unless formally incorporated into the findings, conclusions, and
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In re Marriage of Awotoye judgment.” Ferree v. Doric Co., 62 Wn.2d 561, 566-67, 383 P.2d 900 (1963) (emphasis added).
As an initial matter, Fiyinfolu’s argument that the trial court failed to incorporate the April 14, 2023, oral ruling into the parenting plan is misleading. The court did not expressly incorporate its oral ruling into the final parenting plan, but the court did expressly incorporate the oral ruling by reference into its findings and conclusions about a marriage, CP at 42, and the final legal separation order, CP at 47. Because the parenting plan and child support order flowed from those findings, conclusions, and judgment, Fiyinfolu’s argument here fails.
Fiyinfolu’s challenges to the court’s findings in its oral ruling likewise fail. Rather than argue that the record does not contain substantial evidence in support the trial court’s findings, Fiyinfolu argues his own testimony and evidence contradict the court’s findings. Fiyinfolu’s contrary narrative—that he merely requested documentation for the house purchase, that the demand letter was a legitimate protective measure, that phone management was appropriate parental authority, that counseling delays were Yemisi’s responsibility, that the documents were found during routine cleanup, and that the private school provision lacked support—presents a competing view of the evidence. The trial court was entitled to reject it. We do not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for the trial court’s credibility determinations. DewBerry, 115 Wn. App. at 362.
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In re Marriage of Awotoye 5. Alleged misrepresentations made at trial Fiyinfolu argues the trial court erred by failing to address misrepresentations made by Yemisi, pursuant to the perjury and interference with official proceedings statute, chapter 9A.72 RCW. He argues Yemisi misrepresented (1) information about the failed home purchases, (2) the circumstances regarding when Yemisi called police to perform a wellness check on the children when they were in his care, and (3) a trip Fiyinfolu made to Spokane after O.A.A. suffered an injury due to an accident at home, in which Yemisi argued Fiyinfolu unreasonably delayed visiting O.A.A.
We decline to consider Fiyinfolu’s arguments. Fiyinfolu cites to the criminal statutes on perjury and false swearing, but this is not a criminal proceeding and his references are inapt. Rather than perjury, we interpret Fiyinfolu’s arguments as challenges to the trial court’s credibility determinations, which are not reviewable by this court. See DewBerry, 115 Wn. App. at 362. As to the wellness check called in by Yemisi, Fiyinfolu lacks any basis to challenge the trial court’s determinations, as the trial court agreed with Fiyinfolu that this was “inappropriate.” CP at 9. The trial court made no findings as to Fiyinfolu’s actions in the context of O.A.A.’s injury. We decline review of Fiyinfolu’s arguments on these issues.
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In re Marriage of Awotoye 6. Motion to stay and motion for adequate cause Fiyinfolu contends the trial court erred in granting two postjudgment motions while his appeal of the final amended parenting plan was pending. These include: (1) Yemisi’s motion for a finding of adequate cause to modify the parenting plan, and (2) Yemisi’s motion to stay certain provisions of the final amended parenting plan. He argues the resulting changes to the parenting plan are unjust and the trial court lacked authority to grant the motion to stay. Yemisi responds that the trial court correctly found adequate cause and had authority to enter a stay. As explained below, however, neither order is properly before us on appeal. We therefore decline to reach the parties’ substantive arguments.
Order on motion for adequate cause The Rules of Appellate Procedure govern our review of decisions on postjudgment motions:
The decision granting or denying a postjudgment motion may be subject to review. Except as provided in rule 2.4, a party may only obtain review of the decision on the postjudgment motion by initiating a separate review in the manner and within the time provided by these rules. If review of a postjudgment motion is accepted while the appellate court is reviewing another decision in the same case, the appellate court may on its own initiative or on motion of a party consolidate the separate reviews as provided in rule 3.3(b).
RAP 7.2(e) (emphasis added).
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In re Marriage of Awotoye A party seeking review of a trial court postjudgment decision entered under RAP 7.2 “must initiate a separate review of the decision by timely filing a notice of appeal or notice for discretionary review,” subject to limited exceptions under other provisions not applicable here. RAP 5.1(f).
Here, after a commissioner of this court granted permission under RAP 7.2(e), and the trial court entered its order on the motion for adequate cause, neither party initiated a separate review of the order on adequate cause. 6 Although the parties submitted supplemental briefing as directed by our commissioner, no party initiated a separate review of the adequate cause order. Accordingly, the trial court’s order granting the motion for adequate cause is not on review before this court.
Order granting motion to stay The trial court’s June 6, 2025, order granting the stay was not entered pursuant to RAP 7.2(e). Instead, the court relied on its inherent authority to stay proceedings in the interests of justice. Regardless of the merits of that ruling, review of a stay order
6 On August 18, 2025, a superior court judge denied Fiyinfolu’s motion for revision of the order on adequate cause. He then had until September 17, 2025, to seek review by this court of the adequate cause order. When our commissioner in June 2025 called for supplemental briefing on the impact of the adequate cause order on the October 3, 2023, amended parenting plan, the parties were reminded that a separate review of the adequate cause order must be initiated before this court could address the merits of the order, and the parties were directed to limit their supplemental briefing to the order’s impact on the amended parenting plan. See Comm’r’s Ruling at 12.
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In re Marriage of Awotoye is governed by Title 2 of the appellate rules. Under RAP 2.4(a), this court reviews decisions “designated in the notice of appeal,” or “notice for discretionary review,” subject to certain exceptions. One such exception provides:
The appellate court will review a trial court order or ruling not designated in the notice, including an appealable order, if (1) the order or ruling prejudicially affects the decision designated in the notice, and (2) the order is entered, or the ruling is made, before the appellate court accepts review.
RAP 2.4(b) (emphasis added).
“The appellate court “accepts review” of a trial court decision upon the timely filing in the trial court of a notice of appeal from a decision which is reviewable as a matter of right.” RAP 6.1. On November 1, 2023, Fiyinfolu’s filed a timely notice of appeal from the trial court’s (1) October 2023 amended parenting plan and (2) an order denying his motion for reconsideration of various final orders entered in June 2023. The trial court did not enter the stay order until June 6, 2025—well after review was accepted. Neither party initiated a separate review of the trial court’s stay order. 7 Therefore, the exception in RAP 2.4(b) does not apply, and any review of the stay order is not properly before this court.
7 It is not clear that the trial court’s order would have been appealable as a matter of right under RAP 2.2. The order granted a stay pending trial on the matter, and thus likely was subject to RAP 2.3 as an order subject to discretionary review. Regardless, neither party initiated a timely review of the order.
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In re Marriage of Awotoye APPELLATE ATTORNEY FEES
Both parties request attorney fees on appeal under RAP 18.1 and RCW 26.09.140.
Yemisi also seeks fees based on a frivolous appeal and Fiyinfolu’s intransigence. We deny all requests.
A party requesting an award of fees or expenses under RAP 18.1 must devote a section of their opening brief to the request. RAP 18.1(b). When a statute mandates consideration of financial resources of one or more of the parties before an award is made, each party must file a financial affidavit no later than 10 days before the case is set for consideration on the merits. RAP 18.1(c).
Under RCW 26.09.140, the appellant court may award fees after considering the parties’ financial circumstances. In re Marriage of Rideout, 150 Wn.2d 337, 357, 77 P.3d 1174 (2003). The court balances one party’s need against the other’s ability to pay. In re Marriage of Coons, 53 Wn. App. 721, 722, 770 P.2d 653 (1989) (citing In re Marriage of Young, 44 Wn. App. 533, 538, 723 P.2d 12 (1986)).
Fiyinfolu failed to request fees in his opening brief. He instead included a short request in his reply brief. Fiyinfolu also did not file a financial affidavit. He has not complied with RAP 18.1 or RCW 26.09.140. We deny his request for an award of fees.
Yemisi’s request relies on trial court financial documents that do not satisfy the requirements of RAP 18.1(c). Moreover, she did not file an affidavit within 10 days
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In re Marriage of Awotoye before the date this case was set for consideration.
Yemisi alternatively requests fees based on Fiyinfolu’s intransigence.
Intransigence is an equitable basis for an award when a party engages in foot-dragging, obstruction, or other conduct that needlessly increases litigation costs. In re Marriage of Chandola, 180 Wn.2d 632, 656-57, 327 P.3d 644 (2014); In re Marriage of Mattson, 95 Wn. App. 592, 605-06, 976 P.2d 157 (1999). Although Fiyinfolu has been highly litigious and the trial court previously found intransigence in other contexts, his conduct here does not rise to the level warranting an award of fees on appeal. We deny Yemisi’s request for an award of fees.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
Murphy, J.
WE CONCUR:
Staab, C.J. Hill, J.