FILED JANUARY 8, 2026 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
In the Matter of the Marriage of: ) No. 40590-7-III ) MERISSA OURADA, ) ) Appellant, ) ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION and ) ) KAMERON OURADA, ) ) Respondent. )
MURPHY, J. — Merissa Frizzell, former known as Merissa Ourada, appeals
from the following superior court orders entered in post-dissolution proceedings:
(1) a May 31, 2024, order on a CR 60 motion to vacate or modify the dissolution
decree, (2) a June 27, 2024, order denying reconsideration of the May 31 order, and
(3) a July 5, 2024, order denying various objections, a motion to make a record, and
request for attorney fees and sanctions.
We remand for the trial court to vacate a January 12, 2024, money
judgment. The trial court is otherwise affirmed. No. 40590-7-III In re Marriage of Ourada
FACTS
Merissa Frizzell and Kameron Ourada were married in 2018 and petitioned
in 2022 for dissolution of their marriage. The final decree dissolving the marriage
was entered March 9, 2023. Frizzell was awarded the family residence and ordered
to make an
[e]qualization payment to [Ourada] of $52,500.00 to be paid within six (6) months of the date of entry of this Final Divorce Order. If this is not paid to [Ourada] on or before the six-month anniversary of the date of entry of this Order, [Ourada] without notice can enter a judgment for said amount. The judgment will then accrue interest from date of entry at a rate of 12% per year.
Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 11.
On August 29, 2023, less than two weeks prior to the deadline to make the
equalization payment, Frizzell filed a voluntary petition for Chapter 13 bankruptcy
protection in United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of
Washington. An 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) notice of automatic stay was thereafter sent to
all of Frizzell’s creditors, including Ourada.
Money judgment and motion to vacate decree of dissolution
On January 12, 2024, Ourada moved in the trial court for entry of a money
judgment against Frizzell for the equalization payment of $52,500. Ourada’s
motion stated that the payment due date passed and Frizzell had not made any
2 No. 40590-7-III In re Marriage of Ourada
payment. Relying on the language in the final decree that judgment could be
entered “without notice,” CP at 11, 15-16, none was given. Ourada neither
disclosed nor referenced Frizzell’s bankruptcy proceedings or the automatic stay.
The trial court entered judgment on January 12, 2024, the same day the motion was
filed.
On February 22, 2024, Ourada moved under CR 60(b)(1), (4), and (11), to
vacate the property and asset divisions in the dissolution decree, alleging Frizzell
never intended to make the equalization payment. In his motion, Ourada further
noted, “the money judgment entered without notice to [Frizzell] on January 12,
2024, should be vacated given [Frizzell]’s bankruptcy.” CP at 40.
Initial order to show cause
On February 27, 2024, the trial court pursuant to CR 60(e)(2) issued an
order to show cause on the motion to vacate, setting a hearing on April 5, 2024.
Frizzell filed a response on March 29, 2024, citing federal case law and asserting:
(1) Ourada knowingly and willfully violated the bankruptcy court’s
automatic stay by seeking entry of the money judgment against
Frizzell;
(2) Ourada violated his duty of candor to the court by failing to disclose
Frizzell’s bankruptcy proceedings when he requested the money
3 No. 40590-7-III In re Marriage of Ourada
judgment;
(3) Ourada again violated the automatic stay with his motion to vacate the
decree;
(4) the trial court does not have jurisdiction to hear Ourada’s motion to
vacate because Ourada seeks property belonging to the bankruptcy
estate;
(5) Ourada deeply misrepresented the law and no law supports his motion
or the trial court’s jurisdiction; and
(6) The court should sanction Ourada and award Frizzell attorney fees.
Frizzell filed a declaration and represented that she fully intended to make
the equalization payment at the time the final decree was entered but later found
herself unable to do so. A declaration from Frizzell’s bankruptcy attorney
confirmed the date and effect of the automatic stay.
Amended order to show cause
On April 2, 2024, Ourada’s counsel e-mailed the trial court judge’s judicial
assistant, indicating a need to continue the April 5 hearing and requesting
additional available dates. The judicial assistant noted the court’s next available
date for a hearing was May 3, 2024, and Ourada’s counsel responded that they
4 No. 40590-7-III In re Marriage of Ourada
would take that date. A legal assistant working for Ourada’s counsel then e-mailed
Frizzell’s counsel about the new hearing date, conveying the following:
We are not calling in the Motion to Vacate . . . as we are requesting a continuance. We have been provided with a date of May 3rd. I have sent the Amended Show Cause Order to the [judicial assistant] for signature by [the court], and I will send that over once it’s signed.
CP at 84. Frizzell’s counsel responded that she did not believe the procedure was
appropriate and objected to “the ex parte submission of orders to [the court]
without notice to me” and “the ex parte request for a continuance without notice to
me.” CP at 84. Ourada’s counsel forwarded the e-mail communication with the
court on a new hearing date to Frizzell’s counsel and responded that a continuance
was necessary to address “the federal issues and caselaw” raised in Frizzell’s
response. CP at 83. Frizzell’s counsel responded:
Thank you for including me on your communication with the Court. That is much appreciated.
Unfortunately, I cannot agree to a continuance. As you are aware, this particular motion is being pursued in violation of the automatic stay in a federal bankruptcy proceeding, and each instance of such pursuit is a separate violation of the stay, for which your client incurs distinct and independent liability. Because the Court does not currently have jurisdiction to consider this motion at all (at the scheduled time or at a future time), I regret that I must insist on a motion for continuance to be made on the record so that we may have an opportunity to respond on the record, after which a decision will be made on the record by the Court.
5 No. 40590-7-III In re Marriage of Ourada
CP at 90.
On April 4, 2024, the trial court signed an “Amended Order” for a show
cause hearing on Ourada’s motion to vacate, with a one-hour hearing set for May 3,
2024, and noted it would also hear argument on the continuance issue at that time.
Id. at 73-74, 94, 108 (some capitalization omitted).
Frizzell filed objections on April 19, 2024, to (1) ex parte action by
Ourada’s counsel, (2) an insufficient record, (3) continuance of the show cause
hearing, (4) issuance of the show cause orders, and (5) improper service. Frizzell
also made a motion to make a record and requested fees and sanctions.
Hearing on motion to vacate
At the May 3, 2024 hearing, the trial court ruled it lacked jurisdiction to
consider and decide the motion to vacate due to the bankruptcy stay, specifically
stating:
[T]he Court is going to deny the motion [to vacate] at this time. But with leave to renote it. So, the Court is technically reserving on the merits, but is ruling that it has no jurisdiction to rule on it at this time. So, it can be renoted once the [bankruptcy] discharge is done.
CP at 231-32. The trial court also addressed its authority to issue an order to show
cause and stated, “Once an attorney contacts the Court by filing a motion [to vacate
a judgment or order], the Court has to note the hearing. It doesn’t have discretion.
6 No. 40590-7-III In re Marriage of Ourada
It’s suggested that the Court would do some kind of gatekeeping and there’s no
discretion under CR 60(e)(2) to do that.” CP at 230-31. The trial court also did not
find “any inappropriate ex parte contact by either side.” CP at 231.
Frizzell’s counsel requested the trial court clarify the basis for issuing the
amended order to show cause. The trial court stated it treated the initial order to
show cause and the subsequent order to show cause as “independent orders.” CP at
233. Even though the second order to show cause was “titled amended, . . . it was a
new show cause motion as far as the Court was concerned.” CP at 233. The trial
court clarified:
The Court did not sign an order continuing the hearing. All the Court did was provide a date and a time where the Court was free to hear any hearing, any motion that was properly noted. And [the amended order to show cause] was noted, and so the Court signed it.
CP at 232. The trial court also indicated it was “not making an award of attorney
fees.” CP at 232.
The trial court entered a written order on May 31, 2024, incorporating its
May 3 oral ruling and specifically stating (1) it did not have jurisdiction to hear the
motion to vacate or modify the dissolution decree at this time, (2) the motion was
being reserved and could be renoted for hearing once the bankruptcy was
discharged, and (3) it was not making an award of attorney fees. The written order
7 No. 40590-7-III In re Marriage of Ourada
did not address Ourada’s request to vacate the January 12, 2024, money judgment
against Frizzell.
Post-hearing motions and orders
On June 7, 2024, Frizzell moved for reconsideration of the May 31 order,
asking the trial court to (1) grant the parties agreed request to vacate the January 12
money judgment, and (2) provide a basis for the decision not to award attorney
fees. On June 27, the court entered an order denying the motion for reconsideration
that included the following findings:.
A. Counsel for Ms. Frizzell argued in her written materials and at the hearing that the Court should deny the motion to vacate or modify the dissolution decree, which the Court did. B. The Court understood Counsel for Ms. Frizzell to argue that as a result of a pending bankruptcy proceeding that the Court did not know about when it entered a show cause order, the Superior Court did not have jurisdiction to consider the disposition of the parties’ assets and debts vis-à-vis each other and should not disturb the underlying dissolution decree. The Court agreed with that contention on the record and its order reflected the acceptance of that argument. C. The Court finds that neither party noted a motion for consideration by the Court of what should happen with the judgment previously entered [on January 12] by Mr. Ourada, and this that question was not part of the order entered by the Court [on May 31]. D. The Court finds that neither party has to date provided any case law on whether the Superior Court can modify in any way the debts and liabilities—including any judgment—between these parties without permission or direction from the bankruptcy court.
8 No. 40590-7-III In re Marriage of Ourada
CP at 295-96. The trial court did not address Frizzell’s request to provide a basis
for the denial of attorney fees.
On July 5, 2024, the trial court entered an order denying Frizzell’s various
objections, a motion to make a record, and request for attorney fees and sanctions.
Frizzell timely appeals.
ANALYSIS
Standard of review
We review jurisdictional questions de novo. Knight v. City of Yelm, 173
Wn.2d 325, 336, 267 P.3d 973 (2011). Rulings on CR 60 motions, issuance of
ex parte orders, and decisions on attorney fee awards are reviewed for a manifest
abuse of discretion. Haley v. Highland, 142 Wn.2d 135, 156, 12 P.3d 119 (2000);
State v. Hotrum, 120 Wn. App. 681, 683, 87 P.3d 766 (2004); Chuong Van Pham v.
Seattle City Light, 159 Wn.2d 527, 538, 151 P.3d 976 (2007).
The trial court’s authority during a bankruptcy stay of proceedings
Frizzell contends the trial court lacked jurisdiction due to the bankruptcy
automatic stay to issue the February 27, 2024, and April 4, 2024, orders to show
cause. Ourada responds that state courts have the authority to hold a hearing to
determine if the stay applies to the proceeding and, under CR 60(e)(2), the trial
court was required to issue a show cause order upon the filing of the motion to
9 No. 40590-7-III In re Marriage of Ourada
vacate and supporting affidavit. Frizzell and Ourada are both correct, in part.
The automatic bankruptcy stay halts judicial proceedings that could affect
the bankruptcy estate’s property, including property divisions within dissolution
actions. 11 U.S.C. 362(a); In re Marriage of Vigil, 162 Wn. App. 242, 246, 255
P.3d 850 (2011). Actions violating the stay are considered void such that “any
action taken in violation of the automatic stay provision would be an error of law.”
Brunetti v. Reed, 70 Wn. App. 180, 184, 852 P.2d 1099 (1993). However, “not
every act taken in connection with a judicial proceeding is considered a violation of
the automatic stay provision.” Id. “A state court has authority to decide whether the
automatic stay applies to its proceedings.” Vigil, 162 Wn. App. at 248; see also
Westlund v. Dep’t of Licensing, 55 Wn. App. 82, 84, 778 P.2d 40 (1989).
Here, Ourada’s February 22, 2024, CR 60 motion sought to vacate “the
property (to include real property) and asset division provisions contained in the
Final Divorce Decree initially entered on March 9, 2023, or modify the division of
assets contained therein,” CP at 39, property that was tied to the bankruptcy estate. 1
CR 60(e) establishes the required procedure when a party requests relief from a
prior judgment or order. Under CR 60(e)(1), the petitioner must file a motion
1 Neither party disputes the trial court’s ultimate determination that it lacked jurisdiction to grant relief on the motion to vacate in light of the bankruptcy stay.
10 No. 40590-7-III In re Marriage of Ourada
identifying the grounds for relief and an affidavit from the petitioner giving the
facts in support of the motion. Ourada based his motion on 3 of the 11 eligible
grounds for relief: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect or
irregularity in obtaining the judgment, (2) fraud, misrepresentation, or other
misconduct, and (3) any other reason justifying relief. CP at 30 (citing
CR 60(b)(1), (4), 11)).
Regarding notice, CR 60(e)(2) states as follows:
Upon the filing of the motion [to vacate] and affidavit, the court shall enter an order fixing the time and place of the hearing thereof and directing all parties to the action or proceeding who may be affected thereby to appear and show cause why the relief asked for should not be granted.
(Emphasis added.) “CR 60(e) requires the court to schedule a show cause hearing
and requires the party seeking relief to provide notice to the opposing party prior to
this future hearing.” In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Ferguson, 170 Wn.2d
916, 932, 246 P.3d 1236 (2011) (citing CR 60(e)(2)-(3)).
In this case, Ourada filed a motion requesting the trial court vacate or
modify the property and asset division provisions in its prior order—the final
dissolution decree—alleging mistake, fraud or misrepresentation, or any other
reason justifying relief. He also filed a declaration in support of his motion.
Ourada therefore made the prima facie showing required under CR 60(e)(2)
11 No. 40590-7-III In re Marriage of Ourada
such that the trial court was required to set a hearing date and issue an order to
show cause. 2
“A state court has authority to decide whether the [bankruptcy] automatic
stay applies to its proceedings.” 3 Vigil, 162 Wn. App. at 248 (citing Lockyer v.
Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 2005)). We hold that the trial court
here had the authority to issue the order to show cause so that it could hear from the
parties and determine whether it had jurisdiction to decide Ourada’s motion to
vacate. 4
2 Frizzell cites case law indicating show cause procedures are discretionary rather than mandatory. The cited case law, however, is not in the context of a motion for relief from prior judgment, nor does the cited case law cite the mandatory language of CR 60(e)(2). Therefore, Frizzell’s cited case law does not control this case. 3 In her reply brief, Frizzell argues that she “raise[s] no issue about the Superior Court’s authority,” and assigns no error to the trial court’s determination it could not consider and decide the motion to vacate while the automatic stay was in place. Appellant’s Reply Br. at 9 (emphasis added). She instead challenges the trial court’s “jurisdiction” to even issue an order to show cause once it learned of the bankruptcy automatic say. Appellant’s Opening Br. at 46 (emphasis added). This argument is answered by Vigil, as referenced above. 4 Ourada argues that the court properly issued the orders to show cause, in part, because his motion to vacate requested relief from an inequitable property and asset distribution and was not an attempt to collect the equalization payment. This argument speaks to the merits of Ourada’s motion and not the court’s ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion. Because the court reserved ruling on the merits of the motion to vacate until there was a bankruptcy discharge, this argument is premature to the issues on review.
12 No. 40590-7-III In re Marriage of Ourada
Issuance of “amended order” to show cause
Frizzell argues the trial court erred by issuing the “Amended Order” to show
cause. CP at 73-74 (some capitalization omitted). Specifically, she contends that
the amended order improperly granted a contested continuance based on ex parte
contact, without giving Frizzell notice or opportunity to be heard. We disagree.
Local Court Rule (LCR) 40 of the Superior Court Rules for Spokane County
proscribes the procedures for assignment of cases and motion practice, including
motion setting and calendaring. See LCR 40(9), (13). After filing a motion, the
moving party “shall contact the judicial assistant of the assigned judge to obtain an
available hearing date for the motion.” LCR 40(13)(A). The moving party “shall
notify the judicial assistant by 12:00 p.m. three (3) days prior to the hearing
confirming that the motion is ready to be heard as scheduled.” LCR 40(9)(E).
“Failure to comply with these requirements may result in a continuance or the
motion being stricken from the calendar, the documents. . . not being considered,
and the imposition of terms.” LCR 40(9)(H). Such administrative communications
are not prohibited ex parte contacts under the Washington Code of Judicial
Conduct. See CJC Rule 2.9(A)(1).
Frizzell argues that the amended order to show cause constituted a
continuance. In support of her argument, she notes that the title of the order
13 No. 40590-7-III In re Marriage of Ourada
contains the term “Amended.” CP at 73 (some capitalization omitted). She also
notes that Ourada’s counsel’s staff, in their e-mail to the trial court’s judicial
assistant, requested a “continuance.” Id. at 78.
The caption “Amended Order” is a misnomer. See Swenson v. Seattle Cent.
Labor Council, 25 Wn.2d 612, 616, 171 P.2d 699 (1946) (“The heading of the
court order is not determinative of its character.”). Ourada, as the moving party,
functionally struck the scheduled hearing date by notifying the court, three days
before the hearing, that he would not be calling in ready for the hearing and
requested a new court date. The court’s judicial assistant provided Ourada with the
court’s availability. Ourada gave notice to Frizzell’s counsel of the new court date.
This conforms with LCR 40. The trial court found no impropriety and no prejudice
in what transpired, treating the orders as independent since the original hearing was
not called in ready. The trial court notified the parties that it was setting aside one
hour for the hearing and it would hear argument from Frizzell’s counsel at that time
on the objections to the hearing date being moved. See CP at 108.
We hold that the issuance of the “amended order” to show cause did not
constitute a continuance and the order was properly issued in accordance with the
local rules.
14 No. 40590-7-III In re Marriage of Ourada
Failure to vacate the money judgment
Frizzell argues that the trial court erred by denying the parties’ requests to
vacate the January 12, 2024, money judgment. We agree.
Under CR 60(b)(5), a party may move to vacate a void judgment.
Additionally, “Washington has followed the rule that a trial court may vacate on its
own motion a judgment which is void on its face.” Krueger Eng’g, Inc. v. Sessums,
26 Wn. App. 721, 723, 615 P.2d 502 (1980) (emphasis added).
Federal bankruptcy law provides the following:
(a) . . . [A] petition filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of [the bankruptcy] title . . . operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of— (1) the commencement or continuation . . . of a judicial . . . action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the [bankruptcy proceeding]; .... (3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate.
11 U.S.C. § 362. “A violation of this ‘stay’ provision is considered a void action.”
Brunetti, 70 Wn. App. at 184 (citing In re Schwartz, 954 F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir.
1992)). “Therefore, any action taken in violation of the automatic stay provision
would be an error of law.” Id.
15 No. 40590-7-III In re Marriage of Ourada
Because entry of the money judgment was made in violation of the
bankruptcy automatic stay, it was a void action. We remand for the trial court to
vacate the January 12, 2024 money judgment.
Denial of Frizzell’s request for attorney fees
Frizzell argues the trial court erred by declining her request for attorney fees.
We disagree.
“We apply a two-part standard of review to a trial court’s award or denial of
attorney fees: (1) we review de novo whether there is a legal basis for awarding
attorney fees by statute, under contract, or in equity and (2) we review a
discretionary decision to award or deny attorney fees and the reasonableness of any
attorney fees award for an abuse of discretion.” Falcon Props., LLC v. Bowfits
1308, LLC, 16 Wn. App. 2d 1, 11, 478 P.3d 134 (2020) (citing Gander v. Yeager,
167 Wn. App. 638, 647, 282 P.3d 1100 (2012)). “Courts may award attorney fees
only when authorized by a contract provision, a statute, or a recognized ground in
equity.” Id. (citing King County v. Vinci Constr. Grands Projets/Parsons
RCI/Frontier-Kemper, JV, 188 Wn.2d 618, 625, 398 P.3d 1093 (2017)). “The
trial court abuses its discretion when its exercise of discretion is manifestly
unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or untenable reasons.” Sw.
Suburban Sewer Dist. v. Fish, 17 Wn. App. 2d 833, 838-39, 488 P.3d 839 (2021).
16 No. 40590-7-III In re Marriage of Ourada
Frizzell relied on four grounds in making her fee request: 1) Ourada violated
the bankruptcy court’s automatic stay, 2) Ourada’s motion for money judgment
and motion to vacate were neither grounded in fact nor warranted by existing
law, and interposed for an improper purpose in violation of CR 11, 3) Ourada
engaged in bad faith and intransigence, and 4) Frizzell was entitled to fees under
RCW 26.09.140 on the basis of her financial need and Ourada’s ability to pay.
Damages for willful bankruptcy stay violations, including attorney fees,
are recoverable under 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) in bankruptcy court. In state court, a
discretionary award of attorney fees in family law matters may be made under
RCW 26.09.140 after consideration of the financial resources of both parties.
“When intransigence is established, the financial resources of the spouse seeking
the award are irrelevant.” In re Marriage of Morrow, 53 Wn. App. 579, 590, 770
P.2d 197 (1989). Here, the trial court did not find intransigence.
Although Ourada’s actions in obtaining the money judgment suggest a
willful violation based on his receipt of the notice of bankruptcy stay, the superior
court does not have authority to award fees under 11 U.S.C. § 362(k). Frizzell may
pursue this in bankruptcy court. The decision of the trial court to not make an
award of attorney fees, given its ruling that it did not have jurisdiction to rule on the
motion to vacate, was not an abuse of discretion.
17 No. 40590-7-III In re Marriage of Ourada
APPELLATE ATTORNEY FEES
Frizzell requests attorney fees on appeal pursuant to RAP 18.1(b),
RCW 26.09.140, CR 11, and on an equitable basis. Ourada requests attorney fees
pursuant to RAP 18.1 and RAP 14.2 due to what he characterizes as bad faith
litigation instituted by Frizzell. We decline to make an award of attorney fees or
costs to either party.
CONCLUSION
We remand for the trial court to vacate the January 12, 2024, money
judgment. The trial court is otherwise affirmed. No attorney fees or costs are
awarded on appeal.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in
the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
RCW 2.06.040.
Murphy, J. WE CONCUR:
____________________________ Lawrence-Berrey, C.J.
____________________________ Cooney, J.