In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-24-00231-CV
IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE OF JULIE D. LANE AND TROY LANE AND IN THE INTEREST OF T.J.L., B.T.L., B.J.L., AND C.K.L., MINOR CHILDREN
On Appeal from County Court at Law Number 3 Lubbock County, Texas Trial Court No. DC-2023-FM-0418, Honorable Benjamin A. Webb, Presiding
August 11, 2025 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before PARKER and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.
Since the early days of the Republic of Texas, Texas has carefully drawn a line
between the separate and community property of spouses to preserve the distinctions
between and the integrity of the two classes of property. Any judicial divestiture of
separate property would essentially disregard the constitutionally mandated distinction.
At times pertinent to this action, the Texas Constitution has provided:
All property, both real and personal, of a spouse owned or claimed before marriage, and that acquired afterward by gift, devise or descent, shall be the separate property of that spouse . . . . TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15. In interpreting this provision, the Court in Arnold v. Leonard,
114 Tex. 535, 273 S.W. 799 (1925), ruled the Constitution contained the exclusive
definition of separate property and the Legislature could neither alter nor enlarge upon it.
Simply put, the Texas Constitution does not allow a court to divest a spouse of his or her
separate property.
Yet in this case—despite a mediated settlement agreement, a signed divorce
decree, and everyone agreeing that the property in question was separate—the wife
argues husband should be divested of his separate property. The reason? The wife
claims the decree only awarded him separate property if it was physically located in her
household. That argument doesn’t just strain logic; it breaks it.
Appellant, Julie D. Lane, appeals from the trial court’s Enforcement Order in favor
of Appellee, Troy Lane. By her original and reply brief, she maintains (1) the trial court
did not have subject matter jurisdiction to substantively modify the Agreed Decree of
Divorce; (2) alternatively, the trial court erred in finding the Agreed Decree of Divorce was
ambiguous; (3) alternatively, assuming the Agreed Decree of Divorce was ambiguous,
the trial court abused its discretion by substantively changing the division of property
under the guise of interpretation, and (4) the issue of her attorney’s fees should be
remanded to the trial court for reconsideration if this Court reverses the Enforcement
Order. We affirm.
2 THE PROBLEM
This case boils down to a fundamental misreading of the divorce decree—one that
cannot be squared with contract construction principles or the Texas Constitution’s
express prohibition against divesting a spouse of separate property.
Troy and Julie entered into a mediated settlement agreement (MSA), which was
later incorporated into an agreed final decree of divorce.1 The decree awarded Julie
household items and cash in her control, but specifically carved out—“SAVE AND
EXCEPT”—all funds received by Troy from the sale of his separate property interest in
Utility Contractors of America (UCA). Later, in a separate section titled “Confirmation of
Separate Property,” the decree unequivocally stated that all funds from the sale of UCA
were confirmed as Troy’s separate property.
Despite this, Julie now claims she owes Troy nothing—because the money was
not physically in her possession at the time of the decree. In her view, unless she had
the proceeds in a coffee can under the bed, paragraph P-4 (awarding her “all sums of
cash in her possession or subject to her control”) gave her the right to keep them. But
her position not only disregards the plain text of the decree, it renders the earlier “SAVE
AND EXCEPT” clause meaningless.
Under settled Texas law, courts construe judgments and agreed decrees like any
other written contract. McKnight v. Trogdon-McKnight, 132 S.W.3d 126, 130 (Tex. App.—
1 Despite the MSA, the parties disagreed on various issues at a hearing on a motion for entry of
the decree. The trial court ruled “there is no material disagreement regarding terms of the decree that would require arbitration . . . .” Although the decree is entitled “Agreed Decree of Divorce,” it is not signed by the parties and is approved as to form only by their counsel. However, under the title “Appearances,” the decree recites that Julie and Troy both “agreed to the terms.” 3 Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.). Earlier terms control over later conflicting ones, and
all provisions must be harmonized to give meaning to the whole. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
v. Xerox State & Local Sols., Inc., 663 S.W.3d 569, 588 n.89 (Tex. 2023). More
importantly, under Article XVI, Section 15 of the Texas Constitution, courts have no
authority to divest a spouse of separate property. Julie’s interpretation—if adopted—
would do exactly that.
BACKGROUND
The parties married in 2002 and have four children. In December 2020, Troy sold
his business interest in UCA, a company he had an interest in prior to the marriage. He
worked at UCA for over three decades. He received a payment of $1,000,000 and four
other deposits totaling $1,806.494.70. The funds from the sale were deposited in various
accounts and some of the funds were spent. On May 6, 2021, Julie filed for divorce and
withdrew a significant portion of the funds from the parties’ accounts to support her
children. She repaid some but not all of the funds. Pursuant to the MSA dated May 16,
2022, the parties entered into an Agreed Decree of Divorce on December 21, 2022.
The Division of Marital Estate portion of the decree awarded property as follows:
Property to [Julie]
IT IS ORDERED AND DECREED that [Julie] is awarded the following as her sole and separate property and [Troy] is divested of all right, title, interest, and claims in and to that property:
P-1. All household furniture, furnishing, fixtures, goods, art objects, collectibles, appliances, and equipment in the possession of the wife or subject to her sole control, SAVE AND EXCEPT the following items described by [Troy’s] separate property:
***
4 8. All funds received by [Troy] from the sale of his separate property interest in Utility Contractors of America.
P-4. All sums of cash in the possession of wife or subject to her sole control, including funds on deposit, together with accrued but unpaid interest, in banks, savings institutions, or other financial institutions, which accounts stand in [Julie’s] sole name or from which [Julie] has the sole right to withdraw funds or which are subject to [Julie’s] sole control.
*** P-10. The income tax refund from the parties’ 2020 federal income taxes in the amount of $135,077.00.
P-11. The sum of $200,000.00 from [Troy] on or before the date of entry of the Agreed Decree of Divorce.
(Emphasis added).
Under the heading “Property to [Troy],” there was no recitation of the funds
awarded from the sale of UCA as his separate property. However, following the portion
of the decree dividing the marital estate and apportioning liabilities, is the following recital:
Confirmation of Separate Property
IT IS ORDERED AND DECREED that the following described property is confirmed as the separate property of [Troy]:
8. All funds received by [Troy] from the sale of his separate property interest in Utility Contractors of America.
The decree was not appealed and became final.
A few months after the decree was entered, on March 1, 2023, Troy petitioned for
enforcement of the property division alleging Julie had not complied with the terms of the
5 decree by failing to relinquish possession of his separate property.2 He also sought a
money judgment and a clarifying order. Alternatively, he alleged an ambiguity in the
decree due to Julie’s allegation that paragraph P-4 of the decree awarding her “all sums
of cash” invalidated the earlier “SAVE AND EXCEPT” clause in paragraph P-1 which
awarded him all funds from the sale of UCA as his separate property.
Julie countered with her own petition to enforce the property division by contempt
and also sought a money judgment. Among other claims, she alleged Troy had failed to
turn over the 2020 income tax refund of $135,077.00 or pay the $200,000 agreed to in
the decree.
Presented with competing motions for enforcement, the trial court held a hearing.
Julie invoked section 9.007 of the Family Code and argued the trial court was without
jurisdiction to modify or alter the terms of the decree after it became final. The trial court
disagreed and continued with the hearing.
Troy testified during cross-examination that the exact amount of funds was not
specified in the MSA or decree because “[i]t was a known fact” to both he and Julie.3
According to the MSA and the agreed decree, Troy was to receive “all” of the proceeds
from the sale of UCA. When questioned about paragraph P-4 which awarded Julie all
sums of cash in her possession or subject to her control, Troy responded “[s]ave and
except all funds from the sale of my separate property” as provided in paragraph P-1(8).
2Troy also failed to comply with the decree which prompted Julie’s motion for contempt and enforcement.
3 During her testimony, Julie was asked if she knew the amount of money Troy received from the
sale and she responded, “$1 million.” She testified the family had a conversation about it during Thanksgiving and “[she] saw the money in the bank.” 6 Troy acknowledged he had not paid Julie the $200,000 agreed to and claimed he
had not provided the tax refund because it was not in his possession.4 Troy testified he
was “totally willing” to abide by the terms of the MSA and the decree once he received
his funds from the sale of UCA but expressed that Julie was never entitled to all the funds
from the sale of UCA. His motivation for filing the enforcement proceeding was to receive
what remained of his separate property funds.
The sale of UCA was accomplished in five separate payments totaling
$1,806,494.70 as follows:
December 18, 2020 $ 22,600.00 December 30, 2020 $1,000,000.00 December 31, 2020 $ 100,500.00 December 31, 2020 $ 500,409.60 March 22, 2021 $ 132,985.10
Troy presented expert testimony and documentation from Robert Bailes, a certified public
accountant. Bailes testified he tracked the proceeds related to the sale of UCA using a
standard community-out-first methodology. He reviewed the five different deposits which
were deposited in various bank accounts, including a joint account used to pay normal
living expenses.5 He confirmed Julie withdrew some of the funds and repaid some but
not all of the amounts withdrawn. His examination revealed Troy was entitled to
$482,398.53 of the original $1,806,494.70 of his separate property funds from the sale of
4 It was disclosed that Troy’s counsel was in possession of the check and he tendered it to the trial
court.
5 The deposits were provided by an attorney in the firm representing Troy. Bailes conducted his accounting with the assumption they were to be treated as Troy’s separate property from the sale of UCA. Counsel for Julie vehemently objected to any assumptions from an attorney in the firm representing Troy. On appeal, however, she does not present a sufficiency challenge to the amount she was ordered to pay Troy. 7 UCA. Over a lengthy cross-examination, Bailes explained how he reached his
conclusion.
Several months after the hearing, the trial court rendered the enforcement order.
The trial court found it had jurisdiction over the case. Troy was awarded a money
judgment for $482,398.53 as his separate property. The trial court also found Troy failed
to timely deliver to Julie the 2020 income tax refund for $135,077.00 and the $200,000.00
agreed to in the decree. Julie was awarded credits for those amounts and after an offset,
was ordered to pay the remaining balance of $147,321.53 to Troy.
The trial court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. In addition to
findings related to the monetary awards and credits, the trial court found the construction
of the agreed decree was in accordance with the intent of the parties at the time of its
formation. The trial court concluded the decree “contained a patent ambiguity.”
ISSUE ONE—JURISDICTION
Julie maintains that on the face of the record the trial court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to substantively alter the terms of the agreed decree and Troy’s enforcement
action amounted to a collateral attack on a final judgment. She also asserts res judicata
barred relitigation of separate property. We disagree.
A trial court’s ruling on a post-divorce motion for enforcement is reviewed for abuse
of discretion. Douglas v. Douglas, 454 S.W.3d 591, 595 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, no
pet.) (citing Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam)); In re
Manor, No. 07-16-00143-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 2068, at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
March 21, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.). A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts 8 arbitrarily or unreasonably or if it does not analyze or apply the law properly. Iliff v. Iliff,
339 S.W.3d 74, 78 (Tex. 2011). A trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction, however, is
reviewed de novo. Marshall v. Priess, 99 S.W.3d 150, 156 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2002, no pet.). A court that renders a divorce decree retains jurisdiction to clarify
and enforce the property division within that decree. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.002,
9.008; Pearson v. Fillingim, 332 S.W.3d 361, 363 (Tex. 2011). However, section 9.007
of the Family Code provides as follows:
(a) A court may not amend, modify, alter, or change the division of property made or approved in the decree of divorce or annulment. An order to enforce the division is limited to an order to assist in the implementation of or to clarify the prior order and may not alter or change the substantive division of property.
(b) An order under this section that amends, modifies, alters, or changes the actual, substantive division of property made or approved in a final decree of divorce or annulment is beyond the power of the divorce court and is unenforceable.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.007. A trial court may specify more precisely the manner of
effecting the property division previously made as long as the substantive division of
property is not altered or changed. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.006; Marshall, 99 S.W.3d at
156. When the original form of the division of property is not specific enough to be
enforceable by contempt, the trial court may render a clarifying order setting forth the
specific terms to enforce compliance. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.008(b).
ANALYSIS
The agreed decree was entered on December 21, 2022. Troy did not file a post-
decree motion, nor did he appeal the decree. Thus, the trial court’s plenary power expired
9 thirty days later on January 20, 2023. According to Julie, Troy’s first petition for
enforcement filed on March 1, 2023, did not invoke the trial court’s jurisdiction. She
asserts it was an attempt to unlawfully modify the terms of the agreed decree disguised
as an enforcement or clarification action.
Julie asserts Troy’s failure to appeal the decree during the trial court’s period of
plenary power resulted in the decree becoming final and precluded his enforcement
action. However, during the time in which to appeal, Troy believed the MSA and agreed
decree resolved all issues and there was no justiciable controversy regarding the division
of property. A case becomes moot when the controversy ceases to exist. Williams v.
Huff, 52 S.W.3d 171, 184 (Tex. 2001). Not until Julie failed to comply with the provision
of the decree awarding him all funds from the sale of UCA as his separate property, did
Troy pursue a post-divorce enforcement remedy.
At the time of the sale of UCA, the parties were married and the funds were
commingled in joint accounts. Commingling created a presumption the funds were
community property. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.003. Separate property, however, retains
its character despite a series of exchanges if the spouse asserting separate ownership
can overcome the presumption. Kelly v. Kelly, 634 S.W.3d 335, 355 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2021, no pet.). Commingling does not alter the character of separate property
when it can be traced to assist the trial court in accurately determining the interests of
each party. Sloan v. Sloan, No. 02-23-00361-CV, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 7441, at *16–
17 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 17, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.).
According to forensic accounting, at the time the parties entered into the MSA, the
amount of Troy’s separate property funds remaining of the $1,806,494.70 after the parties 10 spent a significant portion was $482,398.53.6 Julie does not present a sufficiency
challenge to that amount or to the separate character of the funds. The community
presumption was rebutted by the parties’ agreement in the MSA and decree that “all”
funds from the sale of UCA belonged to Troy as his separate property. Expert testimony
identified the character of the separate property from the date of inception to the effective
date of the MSA, albeit the exact amount was not fully identified until after Troy filed his
enforcement action. The evidence did not defy resegregation and identification. Kelly,
634 S.W.3d at 335. The delayed accounting of the funds did not alter or change the
character of the property. Here, the trial court’s enforcement order more precisely
specified the manner of carrying out the previously ordered property division and did not
substantively alter the division of the property. McPherren v. McPherren, 967 S.W.2d
485, 490 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1998, no pet.).
Troy’s enforcement action was not a relitigation of the agreed decree. He was not
attempting to collaterally attack the decree by obtaining an order that modified the
property division. He merely sought clarification and enforcement of the agreed-to
property division. The trial court retained jurisdiction to “more precisely specify” the
division of that property. Marshall, 99 S.W.3d at 156. Where, as here, the original form
of the property division was not specific enough to be enforceable by contempt, the court
had authority to clarify the specific terms to enforce compliance with the original division
of property. Riley v. Riley, No. 03-21-00051-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 9543, at *9 (Tex.
App.—Austin Dec. 29, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.).
6 The better practice would have been to specify the exact amount at the time the MSA was
executed, but the parties agreed “all” funds from the sale of UCA were Troy’s separate property and Julie acknowledged that fact during her testimony. 11 Julie maintains the trial court altered the division of property by ignoring the plain
language in paragraph P-4 awarding her “all sums of cash in the possession of wife or
subject to her sole control.” She argues the language in paragraph P-4 controlled over
the “Save and Except” clause in paragraph P-1(8) carving out funds Troy received from
the sale of UCA. She posits that because the language in that clause was not repeated
in paragraph P-4, Troy was not entitled to the funds from the sale of UCA.7 She
disregards the rules of construction applicable to ordinary contracts which apply to an
agreed decree. Murray v. Murray, 276 S.W.3d 138, 144 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008,
pet. dism’d). A reviewing court examines an entire document in an effort to harmonize
and give effect to all provisions so that none will be rendered meaningless. Shultz v.
Franklin Credit Mgmt. Corp., No. 07-96-00396-CV, 1997 Tex. App. LEXIS 2640, at *13
(Tex. App.—Amarillo May 19, 1997, no writ) (mem. op.). No single provision should be
given controlling effect and terms stated earlier in an agreement must be favored over
subsequent terms. Id. In reviewing the language of a divorce decree, a court applies the
general rules applicable to construction of judgments and construes the decree as a
whole to harmonize and give effect to the entirety of the document. Hagen v. Hagen, 282
S.W.3d 899, 901 (Tex. 2009).
In the underlying case, the “Save and Except” clause appears in paragraph P-1(8),
well before paragraph P-4’s award to Julie. Thus, under the rules for contract
construction, the trial court correctly found the “Save and Except” clause to be the
controlling provision. Julie’s interpretation renders the clause meaningless. A review of
7 When Troy was asked whether the “Save and Except” clause was an award of property to him,
Troy’s counsel objected, and the objection was sustained. The court added “Court’s position is that establishes those items as his separate property with the save-and-except language . . . .” “It’s a semantics conclusion.” 12 the entire decree does not create uncertainty or doubt regarding Troy’s entitlement to the
funds from the sale of UCA. The trial court’s order harmonized all provisions involving
the division of property. The position advanced by Julie would require the trial court to
divest Troy of his separate property—an action prohibited by the Texas Constitution. TEX.
CONST. art. XVI, § 15; Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 142 (Tex. 1977). A
trial court’s discretion in dividing property does not extend to taking separate property
from one spouse and awarding it to the other spouse. Hale v. Hale, No. 14-24-00302-
CV, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 297, at *12 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 23, 2025,
no pet.) (mem. op.).
As noted infra, both parties intended the funds from the sale of UCA to be Troy’s
separate property from the time the MSA was executed. Julie freely signed the MSA. It
provided that “all” funds from the sale of UCA were Troy’s separate property. Paragraph
P-4 did not give her control of or a right to possession of those funds. She testified she
knew how much Troy received from the sale of UCA. They discussed it during
Thanksgiving dinner, and she knew the funds were in their bank accounts. Troy testified
the amount of the funds was “a known fact” to both of them. Placement in the decree of
the “Save and Except” clause in a paragraph which awarded Julie household items did
not alter the characterization of Troy’s separate property. The trial court’s enforcement
order did not substantively change or alter the character of the property division; it only
clarified in more specific terms the division previously agreed to by the parties. The order
was limited to assisting in implementation and clarification of the agreed decree and did
not run afoul of section 9.007 of the Family Code.
13 Ultimately, Julie agreed to the division of property awarding Troy “all” funds from
the sale of UCA. Troy’s motion for enforcement was not an attempt to change the
character of any property awarded in the decree. He merely sought clarification and
enforcement of terms previously agreed to by Julie.
The trial court retained jurisdiction to rule on Troy’s motion for enforcement. We
conclude Julie has not demonstrated the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction or
that it abused its discretion in rendering the enforcement order in favor of Troy. Issue one
is overruled.
ISSUE TWO—AMBIGUITY OF AGREED DECREE OF DIVORCE
Alternatively, Julie asserts the trial court erred in concluding the decree contained
a patent ambiguity. Relying on URI, Inc. v. Kleberg Cty., 543 S.W.3d 755, 764 (Tex.
2018), she contends the trial court impermissibly allowed extraneous evidence of the
parties’ intentions to create an ambiguity. We agree the trial court erred in concluding the
decree contained a patent ambiguity but disagree that extrinsic evidence of the parties’
intentions was admitted. Despite the error, Julie was not harmed.
A trial court’s determination that a contract or court decree is ambiguous is a
question of law which we review de novo. Farmers Grp., Inc. v. Geter, 620 S.W.3d 702,
709 (Tex. 2021). Terms are given their plain, ordinary, and generally accepted meaning
unless the document shows the parties used them in a technical or different sense. Id.
(citation omitted). If a decree is unambiguous, a reviewing court must adhere to the literal
language used. Shanks v. Treadway, 110 S.W.3d 444, 447 (Tex. 2003).
14 A judgment or decree is ambiguous only if it is reasonably susceptible to more than
one meaning. A patent ambiguity is evident on the face of the document. URI, Inc., 543
S.W.3d at 765. A latent ambiguity arises when a facially unambiguous document is
applied to the subject matter and an ambiguity appears by reason of some collateral
matter. Id.; Jacobs v. BancPlus Mortg. Corp., No. 07-97-00278-CV, 1998 Tex. App.
LEXIS 2463, at *11 (Tex. App.—Amarillo April 22, 1998, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
Extrinsic evidence may be necessary for interpretation between two possible meanings.
Jacobs, 1998 Tex. App. LEXIS 2463, at *11. But extrinsic evidence cannot be used to
show the intent or motive of the parties. See URI, Inc., 543 S.W.3d at 767. See also
Clear Lake City Water Auth. v. Friendswood Dev. Co. Ltd., 256 S.W.3d 735, 752 n.23
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. dism’d) (providing that unobjected-to parol
evidence is incompetent and has no probative value).
In its first conclusion of law, the trial court recited “[t]he Agreed Final Decree of
Divorce contained a patent ambiguity.” Although the trial court did not specify the
ambiguity, Troy asserts “the ambiguity presents itself when determining who is entitled to
possession of funds from the sale of [UCA] that happen to be in possession of Julie or
subject to her control.” Troy is referring to Paragraphs P-1(8) and P-4. However, neither
of those provisions are subject to multiple reasonable interpretations. The language is
facially unambiguous; rather, the dispute centered on the placement of the “Save and
Except” clause under household items awarded to Julie. She maintains the decree
contains no “award” to Troy of the funds from UCA and asserts the Confirmation of
Separate Property clause is not an award of separate property to Troy. The confirmation
paragraph specifically recites “IT IS ORDERED AND DECREED” that all funds received
15 from the sale of UCA are Troy’s separate property. Such decretal language is the “heart
of the judgment” and grants or denies the relief sought. Anh Phan v. CL Invs., No. 01-
20-00551-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 346, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 20,
2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
Julie’s interpretation ignores the parties’ agreement that all funds from the sale of
UCA were Troy’s separate property. It would also unlawfully divest Troy of his separate
property. She is not entitled to Troy’s separate property by default.
The trial court erred in concluding the placement of the “Save and Except” clause
created an ambiguity. Despite the error, Julie was not harmed. The evidence admitted
at trial was not extrinsic evidence intended to alter or change the terms of the decree.8
Rather, it was evidence related to the competing motions for enforcement of the decree.
See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a)(1) (providing that an error of law does not require reversal
unless it probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment).
Julie further argues the trial court erroneously excluded testimony of her intent at
the time of formation of the MSA which was that she had no obligation to pay Troy
$482,398.53 pursuant to the language in paragraph P-1.9 She did not dispute that Troy’s
interest in UCA predated their marriage but claimed that because he had not determined
the amount of funds from the sale of UCA when they executed the MSA, and because
the “Save and Except” clause was placed in paragraph P-1(8), he should not have been
8 The parol evidence rule prohibits presentation of extrinsic evidence to vary or contradict the terms of an
unambiguous document. Friendswood Dev. Co. v. McDade + Co., 926 S.W.2d 280, 283 (Tex. 1996).
9 Because we found the decree was unambiguous, Julie’s argument that she should have been permitted
to testify regarding her intent would have violated the parol evidence rule. When asked by her counsel of her intent at the time she signed the MSA, counsel for Troy lodged a parol evidence objection which the trial court sustained, and she did not make an offer of proof. 16 awarded that amount in the enforcement order. The evidence admitted at trial was in
furtherance of the motions to enforce. The decree was unambiguous and enforceable as
written. We hold the trial court’s error in concluding the decree contained a patent
ambiguity was harmless. Issue two is overruled.
ISSUE THREE—DID THE TRIAL COURT SUBSTANTIVELY CHANGE DIVISION OF PROPERTY?
Julie asserts, alternatively, and assuming the agreed decree is ambiguous, that
the trial court abused its discretion by substantively changing the division of property
under the guise of interpretation. Because we have determined the decree is not
ambiguous and the trial court did not substantively change the property division, we need
not engage in any alternative analysis. Issue three is rendered moot.
ISSUE FOUR—ATTORNEY’S FEES
Julie requests a remand of the issue of her attorney’s fees for consideration by the
trial court should the enforcement order be reversed. Our disposition of issues one, two,
and three renders the issue of her attorney’s fees moot. Issue four is overruled.
CONCLUSION
The trial court’s Enforcement Order is affirmed.
Alex Yarbrough Justice
Doss, J., concurs in the result.