In the Matter of the Marriage of Jorge Barajas and Susana Cano v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: November 6, 2025
• Docket: 13-24-00237-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

NUMBER 13-24-00237-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE OF JORGE BARAJAS AND SUSANA CANO

ON APPEAL FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 7 OF HIDALGO COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Silva, Peña, and West Memorandum Opinion by Justice West

The trial court entered an order related to the division of interpleaded funds.

Appellant Jorge Barajas asserts, among other issues, that there were no pleadings or

motions before the trial court providing authority to enter the order. We agree, reverse,

and remand. I. BACKGROUND

This case originated as a divorce proceeding between Barajas and appellee

Susana Cano. In February 2023, the trial court entered a final divorce decree. Several

months later, Edward D. Jones & Co., LP (Edward Jones) filed an interpleader action

related to funds in its possession belonging to the parties. At a January 8, 2024 status

conference, the parties recited a settlement agreement on the record to evenly split one

of the interpleaded funds, the Defined Benefit Plan. However, Barajas refused to sign an

agreed order comporting with the agreement. At a hearing on Cano’s motion to enter the

agreed order, Barajas asserted that no pleadings or motions were before the court

permitting entry of the order. The trial court rejected Barajas’s argument and entered the

proposed agreed order. Therein, the trial court ordered the equal division of the Defined

Benefit Plan, and that, if a certain $55,000.00 sum specified by the divorce decree (to be

paid by Barajas to Cano) was unpaid by a certain date, such funds shall be paid from

Barajas’s half of the interpleaded funds. This appeal followed. 1

II. DISCUSSION

When one party withdraws consent to a settlement agreement, the trial court

cannot enter a corresponding agreed judgment. Gunter v. Empire Pipeline Corp., 310

S.W.3d 19, 22 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied); Mantas v. Fifth Ct. of Appeals, 925

S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex. 1996). The law does not recognize accelerated enforcement of

settlement agreements. Gunter, 310 S.W.3d at 22; Mantas, 925 S.W.2d at 658. Rather,

the court must be presented with a separate breach of contract claim, which is subject to

the normal rules of pleading and proof. Gunter, 310 S.W.3d at 22; Mantas, 925 S.W.2d

1 Cano did not file a brief.

2 at 658. As a result, when consent is withdrawn, “the only method available for enforcing

a settlement agreement is through summary judgment or trial.” Gunter, 310 S.W.3d at 22

(citing Staley v. Herblin, 188 S.W.3d 334, 336 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied));

see Mantas, 925 S.W.2d at 658. In White v. Davenport, our sister court reversed the trial

court where “the settlement [in an interpleader action] fell apart, [and] the trial court

proceeded to apportion the funds, without re-setting the rival claims for trial or following

summary judgment procedure.” 398 S.W.3d 802, 811 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2012),

review granted, judgment vacated, and remanded by agreement, No. 13-0090, 2013 WL

12501850 (Tex. Feb. 8, 2013). “If a court purports to render an agreed judgment after

consent has been withdrawn, the judgment is void.” Twist v. McAllen Nat’l. Bank, 248

S.W.3d 351, 359–60 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2007, no pet.).

Because Barajas withdrew his consent to the settlement agreement, we find that

the trial court lacked authority to enforce it. Enforcement required a separate breach of

contract action, properly pled and proved. See Gunter, 310 S.W.3d at 22; Mantas, 925

S.W.2d at 658. The record does not include a breach of contract pleading from Cano, and

there was no summary judgment or trial on the merits. See Gunter, 310 S.W.3d at 22;

White 398 S.W.3d at 811. Thus, the trial court’s agreed order is void. See Twist, 248

S.W.3d at 359–60. 2

2 Barajas asserted several other issues we need not address. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. However,

we note that Barajas generally challenges the trial court’s jurisdiction within several of his issues. He argues that, because the trial court’s plenary power in the divorce proceeding expired and Cano filed no post- judgment pleadings or motions, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the agreed order. However, in an interpleader action, courts have jurisdiction to disburse funds upon determining ownership. See Bryant v. United Shortline Inc. Assur. Servs, N.A., 972 S.W.2d 26, 29 (Tex. 1998); Madeksho v. Abraham, Watkins, Nichols & Friend, 112 S.W.3d 679, 686 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (holding interpleader court had jurisdiction post-judgment to award remaining funds in the registry). Thus, we find the trial court has jurisdiction over the Edward Jones funds. 3 III. CONCLUSION

We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

JON WEST Justice

Delivered and filed on the 6th day of November, 2025.