FILED SEPTEMBER 10, 2024 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
In the Matter of the Marriage of: ) No. 39558-8-III ) CINDY D. SCINTO, ) ) Appellant, ) ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION and ) ) JOHN P. SCINTO, ) ) Respondent. )
PENNELL, J. — Cindy Valenti, formerly known as Cindy Scinto, appeals an order
dividing the parties’ real property pursuant to a previous remand order from this court.
We affirm. No. 39558-8-III In re Marriage of Scinto
BACKGROUND
Most of the facts pertinent to this appeal are set forth in this court’s prior opinion
and, therefore, need not be repeated here. See In re Marriage of Scinto, No. 37878-1-III,
(Wash. Ct. App. July 28, 2022) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/
378781_unp.pdf. In summary, the parties obtained a legal separation order in 2020. Per
the court’s orders, Ms. Valenti was awarded full interest in the parties’ home, lifetime
maintenance of $2,300 per month, and attorney fees and costs. This amounted to 79.2
percent of the parties’ shared assets. In its oral ruling, the trial court explained “‘a
disproportionate award is necessary in this case’” because of Ms. Valenti’s “‘lack of
earning potential’” due to her “‘extensive medical issues,’” 1 as well as the length of the
parties’ marriage. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 41-42.
Mr. Scinto appealed and we granted partial relief. We affirmed the trial court’s
decisions as to maintenance and attorney fees, but a majority of the court vacated the
property award. The matter was remanded with instructions “for the trial court either
to [(1)] enter particular findings explaining why a patently disproportionate award is fair
and equitable despite alternative options; or, [(2)] better yet, to implement an option that
1 Ms. Valenti apparently suffers from a litany of ailments that impair her quality of life and may shorten her lifespan.
2 No. 39558-8-III In re Marriage of Scinto
satisfies [Ms. Valenti]’s needs and also achieves a fair and equitable division of
property.” Scinto concurrence/majority at 5.
We explained in Scinto that the trial court could equitably divide the parties’
property by awarding the family home to Ms. Valenti, subject to a promissory note
secured by a deed of trust in favor of Mr. Scinto. “The trial court could determine the
amount of the promissory note, its interest rate, and make it payable upon the sale of the
property or [Ms. Valenti]’s death, whichever first occurs.” Id. at 3.
Although our disposition of the property issue was not unanimous, Ms. Valenti did
not seek further review. A mandate issued on September 1, 2022, directing the trial court
to hold further proceedings in accordance with our decision.
On remand, Mr. Scinto urged the trial court to change its property award to a more
even distribution. He suggested the court could force a sale of the home and split the
proceeds; award the home to Ms. Valenti, subject to a promissory note secured by a deed
of trust in favor of Mr. Scinto; or award the home to Mr. Scinto, subject to a life estate in
favor of Ms. Valenti.
Ms. Valenti, by contrast, continued to insist the original award was neither
disproportionate nor unsupported, contrary to this court’s holding. She argued that she
was entitled to an award of the home’s full value as compensation for her spousal
3 No. 39558-8-III In re Marriage of Scinto
maintenance being less than half of Mr. Scinto’s income. Ms. Valenti complained there
would be a “windfall” to Mr. Scinto if he was allowed ownership of the home after she
dies. CP at 73. Ms. Valenti urged the trial court to simply impose the same award as
before, but to “more clearly” make its extant findings. Id. at 71; see id. at 70-72.
During oral argument, the trial court noted it was “leaning toward[] the promissory
note route,” but was “still open-minded.” Rep. of Proc. (RP) (Nov. 4, 2022) at 7. Mr.
Scinto’s attorney explained that her client was amenable to awarding the home to Ms.
Valenti subject to a promissory note, and requested that the amount secured by the note
collect 12 percent interest yearly.
Ms. Valenti’s attorney urged the court not to impose a security interest, and
claimed it would suffice for the court to maintain its property award and simply enter a
clearer memorialization of its previous oral findings. The trial court pointed out that
this court must have already considered the oral findings—which were incorporated by
reference in the written order—and found them lacking. Ms. Valenti’s counsel agreed that
the Scinto lead opinion had considered the oral findings, but speculated that the Scinto
concurrence/majority opinion had not.
4 No. 39558-8-III In re Marriage of Scinto
The trial court proceeded to its oral ruling, explaining it would adopt this court’s
suggestion to award the home to Ms. Valenti subject to a promissory note, calling this
court’s suggestion “fair and helpful.” RP (Nov. 4, 2022) at 23.
The trial court subsequently entered an amended final order, assigning ownership
of the family home to Ms. Valenti, but awarding a security interest to Mr. Scinto, totaling
half the home’s value at trial: $145,000. The court ordered Ms. Valenti to sign
a promissory note evidencing Mr. Scinto’s security interest, and provided that the amount
owed to Mr. Scinto would accrue interest at a rate of six percent annually from the
date of trial. The trial court ruled that Ms. Valenti was not required to make any
installment payments to Mr. Scinto, but that the “total obligation” would become due
upon Ms. Valenti’s death, the sale of the property, or the cessation of Ms. Valenti’s
primary residence in the home. CP at 96; see RP (Nov. 4, 2022) at 23.
The resultant property distribution left Ms. Valenti with 50.4 percent of the parties’
assets, and Mr. Scinto with 49.6 percent of the assets.
Ms. Valenti timely appeals.
5 No. 39558-8-III In re Marriage of Scinto
ANALYSIS
Imposition of security interest
Ms. Valenti challenges the trial court’s imposition of a security interest in favor of
Mr. Scinto, arguing the trial court should have maintained its initial property award. We
disagree.
The majority in our prior opinion rejected the initial property award and provided
the trial court with two options on remand: (1) enter additional findings justifying a
disproportionate award or (2) implement a more fair and equitable division of the
property. Ms. Valenti could have sought review by the Supreme Court of our prior
decision, but did not do so. As a result, the trial court was obliged to follow one of the
mandated options. See Pac. Coast Shredding, LLC v. Port of Vancouver, USA, 14 Wn.
App. 2d 484, 507, 471 P.3d 934 (2020).
We review the question of whether a trial court has complied with the terms of
our mandate for abuse of discretion. Id. The trial court’s actions on remand meet this
standard. To be sure, the trial court was not required to adopt the promissory note option.
But it had full authority to do so. It was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to
select the second of two options identified in the remand order and to grant Mr. Scinto
6 No. 39558-8-III In re Marriage of Scinto
the type of security interest contemplated by the majority in our prior opinion. Ms.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
FILED SEPTEMBER 10, 2024 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
In the Matter of the Marriage of: ) No. 39558-8-III ) CINDY D. SCINTO, ) ) Appellant, ) ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION and ) ) JOHN P. SCINTO, ) ) Respondent. )
PENNELL, J. — Cindy Valenti, formerly known as Cindy Scinto, appeals an order
dividing the parties’ real property pursuant to a previous remand order from this court.
We affirm. No. 39558-8-III In re Marriage of Scinto
BACKGROUND
Most of the facts pertinent to this appeal are set forth in this court’s prior opinion
and, therefore, need not be repeated here. See In re Marriage of Scinto, No. 37878-1-III,
(Wash. Ct. App. July 28, 2022) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/
378781_unp.pdf. In summary, the parties obtained a legal separation order in 2020. Per
the court’s orders, Ms. Valenti was awarded full interest in the parties’ home, lifetime
maintenance of $2,300 per month, and attorney fees and costs. This amounted to 79.2
percent of the parties’ shared assets. In its oral ruling, the trial court explained “‘a
disproportionate award is necessary in this case’” because of Ms. Valenti’s “‘lack of
earning potential’” due to her “‘extensive medical issues,’” 1 as well as the length of the
parties’ marriage. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 41-42.
Mr. Scinto appealed and we granted partial relief. We affirmed the trial court’s
decisions as to maintenance and attorney fees, but a majority of the court vacated the
property award. The matter was remanded with instructions “for the trial court either
to [(1)] enter particular findings explaining why a patently disproportionate award is fair
and equitable despite alternative options; or, [(2)] better yet, to implement an option that
1 Ms. Valenti apparently suffers from a litany of ailments that impair her quality of life and may shorten her lifespan.
2 No. 39558-8-III In re Marriage of Scinto
satisfies [Ms. Valenti]’s needs and also achieves a fair and equitable division of
property.” Scinto concurrence/majority at 5.
We explained in Scinto that the trial court could equitably divide the parties’
property by awarding the family home to Ms. Valenti, subject to a promissory note
secured by a deed of trust in favor of Mr. Scinto. “The trial court could determine the
amount of the promissory note, its interest rate, and make it payable upon the sale of the
property or [Ms. Valenti]’s death, whichever first occurs.” Id. at 3.
Although our disposition of the property issue was not unanimous, Ms. Valenti did
not seek further review. A mandate issued on September 1, 2022, directing the trial court
to hold further proceedings in accordance with our decision.
On remand, Mr. Scinto urged the trial court to change its property award to a more
even distribution. He suggested the court could force a sale of the home and split the
proceeds; award the home to Ms. Valenti, subject to a promissory note secured by a deed
of trust in favor of Mr. Scinto; or award the home to Mr. Scinto, subject to a life estate in
favor of Ms. Valenti.
Ms. Valenti, by contrast, continued to insist the original award was neither
disproportionate nor unsupported, contrary to this court’s holding. She argued that she
was entitled to an award of the home’s full value as compensation for her spousal
3 No. 39558-8-III In re Marriage of Scinto
maintenance being less than half of Mr. Scinto’s income. Ms. Valenti complained there
would be a “windfall” to Mr. Scinto if he was allowed ownership of the home after she
dies. CP at 73. Ms. Valenti urged the trial court to simply impose the same award as
before, but to “more clearly” make its extant findings. Id. at 71; see id. at 70-72.
During oral argument, the trial court noted it was “leaning toward[] the promissory
note route,” but was “still open-minded.” Rep. of Proc. (RP) (Nov. 4, 2022) at 7. Mr.
Scinto’s attorney explained that her client was amenable to awarding the home to Ms.
Valenti subject to a promissory note, and requested that the amount secured by the note
collect 12 percent interest yearly.
Ms. Valenti’s attorney urged the court not to impose a security interest, and
claimed it would suffice for the court to maintain its property award and simply enter a
clearer memorialization of its previous oral findings. The trial court pointed out that
this court must have already considered the oral findings—which were incorporated by
reference in the written order—and found them lacking. Ms. Valenti’s counsel agreed that
the Scinto lead opinion had considered the oral findings, but speculated that the Scinto
concurrence/majority opinion had not.
4 No. 39558-8-III In re Marriage of Scinto
The trial court proceeded to its oral ruling, explaining it would adopt this court’s
suggestion to award the home to Ms. Valenti subject to a promissory note, calling this
court’s suggestion “fair and helpful.” RP (Nov. 4, 2022) at 23.
The trial court subsequently entered an amended final order, assigning ownership
of the family home to Ms. Valenti, but awarding a security interest to Mr. Scinto, totaling
half the home’s value at trial: $145,000. The court ordered Ms. Valenti to sign
a promissory note evidencing Mr. Scinto’s security interest, and provided that the amount
owed to Mr. Scinto would accrue interest at a rate of six percent annually from the
date of trial. The trial court ruled that Ms. Valenti was not required to make any
installment payments to Mr. Scinto, but that the “total obligation” would become due
upon Ms. Valenti’s death, the sale of the property, or the cessation of Ms. Valenti’s
primary residence in the home. CP at 96; see RP (Nov. 4, 2022) at 23.
The resultant property distribution left Ms. Valenti with 50.4 percent of the parties’
assets, and Mr. Scinto with 49.6 percent of the assets.
Ms. Valenti timely appeals.
5 No. 39558-8-III In re Marriage of Scinto
ANALYSIS
Imposition of security interest
Ms. Valenti challenges the trial court’s imposition of a security interest in favor of
Mr. Scinto, arguing the trial court should have maintained its initial property award. We
disagree.
The majority in our prior opinion rejected the initial property award and provided
the trial court with two options on remand: (1) enter additional findings justifying a
disproportionate award or (2) implement a more fair and equitable division of the
property. Ms. Valenti could have sought review by the Supreme Court of our prior
decision, but did not do so. As a result, the trial court was obliged to follow one of the
mandated options. See Pac. Coast Shredding, LLC v. Port of Vancouver, USA, 14 Wn.
App. 2d 484, 507, 471 P.3d 934 (2020).
We review the question of whether a trial court has complied with the terms of
our mandate for abuse of discretion. Id. The trial court’s actions on remand meet this
standard. To be sure, the trial court was not required to adopt the promissory note option.
But it had full authority to do so. It was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to
select the second of two options identified in the remand order and to grant Mr. Scinto
6 No. 39558-8-III In re Marriage of Scinto
the type of security interest contemplated by the majority in our prior opinion. Ms.
Valenti’s challenge to the trial court’s decision to award a security interest fails.
Imposition of interest
Both parties argue the trial court erred in setting the interest that would accrue
to Mr. Scinto in relation to his security interest. Ms. Valenti argues the start date for
accrual of interest should be the date of remand, not the date of trial. Mr. Scinto argues
the interest rate should have been set at 12 percent, rather than 6 percent. Both arguments
fail.
Ms. Valenti’s challenge to the date of accrual fails for lack of supporting
argument. Ms. Valenti asserts it was “arbitrary” of the trial court to set interest to start
accruing from the date of trial. Br. of Appellant at 14. But she fails to develop this claim
with any argument or citation to authority. “‘[W]e are not in the business of inventing
unbriefed arguments for parties sua sponte . . . .’” In re Pers. Restraint of Coats, 173
Wn.2d 123, 138, 267 P.3d 324 (2011) (quoting State v. Studd, 137 Wn.2d 533, 547, 973
P.2d 1049 (1999)). We decline further review of this alleged error. Prostov v. Dep’t of
Licensing, 186 Wn. App. 795, 823, 349 P.3d 874 (2015).
Mr. Scinto’s argument regarding the interest rate fails due to procedural error.
Mr. Scinto did not cross appeal from the trial court’s amended final order. Yet his
7 I ! i No. 39558-8-111 In re Marriage ofScinto
argument, if credited, would necessitate affirmative relief on remand. Without a notice
of appeal, this type of disposition is unavailable here. Naumes, Inc. v. City of Chelan,
184 Wn. App. 927, 934, 339 P.3d 504 (2014). We therefore decline to reach the merits
of Mr. Scinto's claim for relief. See id. at 935.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's amended final order is affirmed. Mr. Scinto's request for attorney
fees is denied. However, under RAP 14.2, he is entitled to costs as the substantially
prevailing party on review, subject to compliance with RAP 14.4.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in
the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
RCW 2.06.040.
Pennell, J.
WE CONCUR:
Cooney, J.
It 8 I