In the Matter of the Marriage of Chukwuemeka Carl Runyon and Bianca Bazile Runyon and in the Interest of C.R., a Child v. the State of Texas

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals, 10th District (Waco)
• Decided: April 16, 2026
• Docket: 10-25-00066-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas

10-25-00066-CV

In the Matter of the Marriage of Chukwuemeka Carl Runyon and Bianca Bazile Runyon and In the Interest of C.R., a Child

On appeal from the 85th District Court of Brazos County, Texas Judge Wendy Wood Hencerling, presiding Trial Court Cause No. 23-002149-CVD-85

JUSTICE SMITH delivered the opinion of the Court.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Chukwuemeka Carl Runyon appeals from the trial court’s

Final Decree of Divorce, challenging in three issues the division of the

community estate, the order regarding the child’s residence, and the child

support award. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Appellant and Appellee, Bianca Bazile Runyon, were married in 2021.

The parties have one child, C.A.R., who was born just over a month before

Appellant filed his August 7, 2023 petition for divorce. After a bench trial, the court signed the Final Decree of Divorce on February 25, 2025. The trial court

granted the parties a divorce, divided the community property, and appointed

Appellant and Appellee joint managing conservators of C.A.R., with Appellee

having the right to determine the child’s primary residence. The decree

includes orders for possession and access, specifying a residency restriction to

Brazos County or within 50 miles of Orlando, Florida, and an order for

Appellant to pay child support in the amount of $1,840 per month. Appellant

timely filed this appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Most of the appealable issues in a family law case, including the issues

in this case, are evaluated against an abuse of discretion standard. See

Bradshaw v. Bradshaw, 555 S.W.3d 539, 543 (Tex. 2018) (trial court’s division

of property is reviewed for abuse of discretion); Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 74, 78

(Tex. 2011) (held that a trial court has discretion to set child support within

the parameters provided by the Texas Family Code); Patterson v. Brist, 236

S.W.3d 238, 242 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. dism’d) (applying

abuse of discretion standard in reviewing trial court’s determination that

father should have right to designate child’s primary residence).

A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily and unreasonably

or without reference to any guiding principles. Downer v. Aquamarine

In re Marriage of Runyon Page 2 Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985). In determining whether

the trial court abused its discretion, we engage in a two-pronged inquiry: (1)

whether the trial court had sufficient evidence upon which to exercise its

discretion, and (2) whether the trial court erred in its application of that

discretion. Boyd v. Boyd, 131 S.W.3d 605, 611 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004,

no pet.). When we review a family law case under the abuse of discretion

standard, legal and factual challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence do not

constitute independent grounds of error but are relevant factors in

determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. Matter of Marriage

of Williams, 646 S.W.3d 542, 545 (Tex. 2022) (per curiam).

The trial court occupies a superior position to “observe the demeanor and

personalities of the witnesses.” Echols v. Olivarez, 85 S.W.3d 475, 477 (Tex.

App.—Austin 2002, no pet.). Therefore, an appellate court must afford great

deference to the factfinder on issues of credibility and demeanor because the

child’s and parents’ behavior, experiences, and circumstances are conveyed

through words, emotions, and facial expressions that are not reflected in the

record. See Chavez v. Chavez, 148 S.W.3d 449, 458 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004,

no pet).

In re Marriage of Runyon Page 3 DIVISION OF PROPERTY

In his first issue, Appellant asserts that the trial court abused its

discretion in awarding Appellee a disproportionate share of the community

estate. He contends that the award of $47,990, secured by a certificate of

deposit in the same amount, and payable in monthly installments of $1,000,

should not stand because Appellee did not plead for the equitable judgment or

the lien to secure it. We disagree.

Appellee’s pleadings alleged that she possesses a legal or equitable

community interest in the properties at issue. This allegation, considered in

conjunction with Appellee’s prayer requesting a division of the parties’

community property and all other relief to which she may be justly entitled,

provides sufficient pleading support for the judgment. See Poulter v. Poulter,

565 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tyler 1978, no writ). In divorce

proceedings, the trial court possesses authority to construe the parties’

pleadings concerning property division more liberally than in other civil cases.

Chavez v. Chavez, 269 S.W.3d 763, 766 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.).

Construed in this manner, Appellee’s pleadings adequately support the

judgment.

Appellant also argues within his first issue that there is no reasonable

basis supporting the trial court’s equitable judgment, that is, the award of

In re Marriage of Runyon Page 4 $47,990 to Appellee. He contends the record does not justify awarding Appellee

a disproportionate share of the community estate.

A trial court must affect a just and right division of the community

estate. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.001. Although the division must be equitable,

the trial court is not required to divide community property equally. O’Carolan

v. Hopper, 71 S.W.3d 529, 532 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.). The trial

court possesses wide discretion in dividing the property, but there must be

some reasonable basis for an unequal division. Id. In exercising this

discretion, the trial court may consider numerous factors, including the parties’

respective earning capacities, abilities, education, business opportunities,

physical condition, financial condition and obligations, age, size of separate

estates, nature of the property, and the benefits that the spouse who did not

cause the dissolution of the marriage would have enjoyed had the marriage

continued. Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 699 (Tex. 1981).

“A determination of whether the property division decreed in a divorce

constitutes an abuse of discretion presents a legal rather than a factual

question for appellate review.” Mann v. Mann, 607 S.W.2d 243, 244 (Tex.

1980). We presume on appeal that the trial court properly exercised its

discretion in dividing marital property, and the Appellant bears the burden of

demonstrating from the record that the division was so disproportionate as to

In re Marriage of Runyon Page 5 be manifestly unjust and unfair and thus constitute an abuse of discretion.

Willis v. Willis, 533 S.W.3d 547, 551 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no

pet.); Grossnickle v. Grossnickle, 935 S.W.2d 830, 836 (Tex. App.—Texarkana

1996, writ denied).

In evaluating this complaint, we review the record by applying the Murff

factors to the facts specific to this case. See Murff, 615 S.W.2d at 699. The

record establishes that Appellant, an anesthesiologist, possesses significantly

greater income and earning capacity than Appellee, a nurse. During the

marriage, Appellant’s adjusted gross income was $506,155.00 in 2023 and

$436,683.00 in 2022. By contrast, Appellee earned less than $50,000.00 in

2023. These facts demonstrate a substantial disparity between the parties in

income, earning capacity, business opportunities, and education—factors that

amply support the trial court’s disproportionate division of the community

estate. Appellant did not meet his burden to establish an abuse of discretion.

Willis, 533 S.W.3d at 551. Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s first issue.

GEOGRAPHIC RESTRICTION

In his second issue, Appellant contends the trial court erred in

permitting Appellee to relocate with the parties’ child to Orlando, Florida. He

argues that allowing the child to move to Florida will have a detrimental effect

on his ability to have frequent and continuing contact with the child and will

In re Marriage of Runyon Page 6 diminish his ability to be a consistently present figure and share in the rights

and duties of raising the child.

The Legislature has declared that "the best interest of the child shall

always be the primary consideration of the court in determining the issues of

conservatorship and possession of and access to the child." TEX. FAM. CODE

ANN. § 153.002. A trial court’s determination of what serves the child’s best

interest, including the establishment of terms and conditions of

conservatorship, is a discretionary function. MacCallum v. MacCallum, 801

S.W.2d 579, 582 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1990, writ denied).

Once the trial court appoints joint managing conservators and

designates the parent who has the exclusive right to determine the primary

residence of the child, it then has the discretion to either establish a geographic

area where the child may reside or specify that there are no geographic

restrictions. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.134(b)(1). The Texas Family Code

does not enumerate specific factors for the trial court to consider when

determining whether a geographic restriction serves the child’s best interest.

However, in Lenz, the Texas Supreme Court identified the following factors in

applying the best-interest standard in the relocation context: (1) the reasons

for and against the move; (2) the effect on extended family relationships; (3)

the effect on visitation and communication with the noncustodial parent, and

In re Marriage of Runyon Page 7 that parent’s ability to maintain full and continuous relationships with the

child; (4) the possibility of a visitation schedule allowing the continuation of

meaningful relationships between the noncustodial parent and the child; (5)

the nature of the child’s existing contacts with both parents, and (6) the child’s

age, community ties, health, and educational needs. Lenz v. Lenz, 79 S.W.3d

10, 15-16 (Tex. 2002). Although Lenz involved a modification proceeding, these

factors apply equally to appeals challenging a trial court’s geographic-

restriction determination in an original divorce decree. See Morgan v. Morgan,

254 S.W.3d 485, 488 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2008, no pet.).

Further, trial courts must consider the public policies identified in

Family Code Section 153.001(a), which include assuring frequent and

continuing contact with parents who have demonstrated the ability to act in

the child’s best interest, determining who can provide a safe, stable, and

nonviolent environment for the child, and encouraging parents to share in the

rights and duties of raising their child. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.001(a);

Lenz, 79 S.W.3d at 14; In re Marriage of Featherston, 675 S.W.3d 330, 337 (Tex.

App.—Amarillo 2023, no pet.).

In this case, the factors identified in Lenz weigh in favor of permitting

Appellee to relocate with the parties’ child to Florida. Both parties have

extended family residing in Florida, with their respective families located

In re Marriage of Runyon Page 8 within approximately one hour of one another. Appellee’s mother,

grandfather, grandmother, brothers, and cousins all reside in Florida, and the

evidence established that Appellee has a close-knit family. Appellant’s family

likewise resides in Florida, including his mother, sister, and nephew. Notably,

neither party is originally from Texas; Appellee followed Appellant to Texas in

2021 after he completed his medical residency in San Antonio and began

working in College Station. Both parties acknowledged that they lack any

support system in Texas, whereas each has significant family support in

Florida. Appellee’s family testified that they would provide whatever

assistance Appellee needed for herself and the child if they resided in Florida,

including financial support and housing.

Appellee received a job offer in Florida that would permit her to work in

the field in which she obtained her degree, earn more than she had in any

previous position, and enjoy hours more conducive to raising her son. This

improved financial situation would result in benefits to the parties’ child.

The evidence at trial established that Appellant travels to Florida at

least once per month, and sometimes twice per month. This travel pattern

demonstrates that Appellant could continue to maintain a meaningful

relationship with his son following Appellee’s relocation. Further, the decree

provides that, until the child reaches three years of age, Appellant has the

In re Marriage of Runyon Page 9 superior right of possession when Appellant is in Orlando. Moreover,

Appellant possesses the ability to relocate to Florida to be near his child.

Finally, the evidence at trial revealed that although Appellant was, pursuant

to temporary orders, entitled to possession of the child every Monday,

Wednesday, and Friday between 4:00 p.m. and 7:30 p.m., he failed to exercise

all his periods of possession, despite there being such limited opportunities.

In sum, the record contains ample evidence supporting the trial court’s

determination that relocation to Florida serves the best interest of the child.

The parties’ extensive family support system in Florida, Appellee’s improved

employment and financial prospects, Appellant’s demonstrated ability and

willingness to travel to Florida regularly, and his capacity to relocate there

himself all weigh in favor of permitting the move. Accordingly, the trial court

did not abuse its discretion in allowing Appellee to relocate with the parties’

child to Florida. See Lenz, 79 S.W.3d at 14-16. We overrule Appellant’s second

issue.

CHILD SUPPORT CREDIT FOR TRAVEL EXPENSES

In his third issue, Appellant contends that the trial court erred by failing

to award him a child support credit for travel expenses after permitting

Appellee to relocate with the child to Florida. Appellant argues that the trial

In re Marriage of Runyon Page 10 court’s orders placed the travel responsibilities, including all travel expenses,

solely upon him while also requiring him to pay maximum guideline support.

A trial court has discretion to set child support within the parameters

provided by the Texas Family Code. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 154.121-.123;

Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 860 S.W.2d 414, 415 (Tex. 1993). Section 154.123(a)

provides that the court may order child support payments in an amount other

than that established by the guidelines if the evidence rebuts the presumption

that application of the guidelines serves the child’s best interest and justifies

a variance therefrom. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.123(a).

Among the factors a trial court may consider in determining whether

application of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate is the cost of

travel necessary to exercise possession of and access to a child. Id.

§ 154.123(b)(14). When considering how to allocate travel expenses, the trial

court should consider the parties’ financial situations to ensure that the travel

expenses are not so great that they would prevent the proper support of the

child by either party. In re N.T.P., 402 S.W.3d 13, 22 (Tex. App.—San Antonio

2012, no pet.). Texas courts have recognized that significant travel expenses

incurred by a noncustodial parent may warrant a downward departure from

guideline child support. See In re J.M.C., No. 02-09-00292-CV, 2010 WL

2889671, at *7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 22, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.)

In re Marriage of Runyon Page 11 (holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in reducing child support below

guidelines where father incurred expenses to visit child in Romania); In re

S.C.S., 201 S.W.3d 882, 888–89 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2006, no pet.) (holding

trial court did not err in reducing child support in modification proceeding

where mother’s relocation increased father’s travel costs).

Here, the trial court permitted Appellee to relocate the child from Texas

to Florida while ordering Appellant to pay child support conforming to the

statutory guidelines. The court further ordered that all of Appellant’s visits

with the child occur in Orlando, Florida until the child reaches three years of

age. While in Florida, Appellant has full access to his son. Because his family

lives there, Appellant has regularly traveled to Florida once or twice a month

since moving to College Station.

Although the trial court’s order places the entire burden of travel upon

Appellant, his income is far greater than Appellee’s. Furthermore, Appellant

presented no evidence of travel expenses he will incur in exercising his

visitation rights. See In re A.M., No. 04-16-00335-CV, 2017 WL 1337648, at *3

(Tex. App.—San Antonio April 12, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that

without evidence of expected travel expenses, record contained no evidence

that the cost of travel would be so great that it would prevent appellant from

properly supporting child). Appellant has not shown that the trial court’s

In re Marriage of Runyon Page 12 failure to provide a travel credit would interfere with his ability to support the

child or that it was otherwise not in the child’s best interest. Thus, Appellant

has not rebutted the presumption that application of the child support

guidelines is in the best interest of the child and has not presented evidence

justifying a variance from the guidelines. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 154.123(a). Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion by not awarding Appellant a child support credit for travel expenses.

Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s third issue.

CONCLUSION

Having overruled each of Appellant’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s

STEVE SMITH Justice

OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: April 16, 2026 Before Chief Justice Johnson, Justice Smith, and Justice Harris Affirmed CV06

In re Marriage of Runyon Page 13