In the Matter of the Marriage of: Charletta D. Morris & Michael Scott Morris

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: April 14, 2026
• Docket: 40978-3
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

FILED April 14, 2026 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE

In the Matter of the Marriage of: ) No. 40978-3-III ) CHARLETTA D. MORRIS, ) ) Appellant, ) ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION and ) ) MICHAEL SCOTT MORRIS, ) ) Respondent. )

LAWRENCE-BERREY, J. — A Washington court granted Charletta Morris and

Michael Morris a divorce. Both had Public Employees Retirement System (PERS)

accounts in Nevada. Nevada law allows the nonemployee spouse to move for immediate

payment of their portion of the employee spouse’s retirement benefits if the employee

spouse is eligible to retire but has not yet done so. Charletta so moved in Nevada, and the

Nevada court granted her motion. Michael sought an injunction from the Washington

court to prevent Charletta from enforcing the Nevada order. The Washington court

granted Michael’s request. In doing so, it determined that Charletta had impermissibly

modified its decree by materially altering the property division. No. 40978-3-III Marriage of Morris

Charletta argues (1) the Nevada court had jurisdiction to enter its order, (2) the

Nevada order is entitled to full faith and credit, and (3) the Washington court erred by

entering the injunction. We agree with these arguments, but this does not end the matter.

Charletta also argues that the Washington court erred in finding that the Nevada

order materially altered the parties’ property division. We disagree. The Nevada order

would require Michael, himself, to make monthly payments to Charletta for her portion

of his retirement until he retires. These monthly payments would materially alter his cash

flow. Although we conclude that the Washington court erred by enjoining Charletta from

enforcing the Nevada order, we do not preclude the Washington court from considering

whether to modify the property division.

FACTS

In October 2021, the parties ended their long-term marriage in a mediation that

settled most issues. At the time, Charletta had already retired and Michael was still

working. The parties agreed to divide all assets 60/40 in Charletta’s favor, except for

their Nevada pension plans, referred to as their Nevada PERS, which they agreed to split

50/50.

The trial court entered the parties’ CR 2A agreement on January 10, 2022. The

parties then tried the remaining issues, and the court awarded Michael real property in

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Nevada and ordered him to make monthly payments to Charletta to effectuate the agreed

60/40 property split. Although Michael had planned on retiring at age 60, his earliest

retirement age, the monthly payments of $3,371 to Charletta required him to continue

working to recover from the disproportionate division of property. The court entered the

final divorce decree on February 3, 2022.

As to the Nevada PERS accounts, the court entered reciprocal orders for how

those accounts would be divided. The order awarding Charletta 50 percent of Michael’s

Nevada PERS reads:

[Charletta is awarded] 50% of marital (community portion) of [Michael]’s Nevada PERS retirement interests. The marital (community) portion is defined as those interests acquired after marriage and prior to the separation of the parties. The wife’s segregated 50% interest in the martial [sic] portion of this retirement shall be awarded to her through a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO). The parties have agreed to retain attorney Peter Svennungsen to draft this QDRO and have it provided to the Nevada PERS plan administrator for processing. The parties shall equally share in the cost of Mr. Svennungsen.

Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 3.

Mr. Svennungsen declined to draft the QDROs, advising the parties to retain a

Nevada attorney familiar with dividing a Nevada PERS. The parties opened a

miscellaneous proceeding in Nevada, and, in 2024, the Nevada court entered appropriate

QDRO orders. The order expressly reserved to the Nevada court “jurisdiction to enter

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such further orders as are necessary to enforce the award of benefits . . . in accordance

with the provisions of Nevada case and statutory law.” CP at 34.1

In July 2024, Charletta moved for an order directing Michael to begin paying her

the portion of his Nevada PERS account awarded to her. At the time, Michael was still

working. Charletta supported her motion by citing to Henson 2 for the proposition that the

nonemployee spouse may file a motion in the district court requesting payment of their

portion of the employee spouse’s pension benefits if the employee spouse has reached

retirement age but is still working.

Michael opposed Charletta’s motion. He argued that granting the motion would

exceed the court’s jurisdiction because it would modify the divorce decree’s property

division. He further argued that a Washington court is “the only Court with jurisdiction

to make the order.” CP at 51.

Charletta replied by arguing that the Washington divorce decree had been

domesticated in Nevada, after which Nevada law treats it as though it were a judgment of

1 The order further stated, “[I]n the event of a conflict between this Order and the Final Divorce Order, the terms of this Order shall prevail.” CP at 34 (emphasis omitted). Neither party called our attention to this language, and neither party has addressed whether this language violates the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution. 2 Henson v. Henson, 130 Nev. 814, 334 P.3d 933 (2014).

4 No. 40978-3-III Marriage of Morris

a Nevada court. She also argued that she did not seek to modify the decree but merely to

enforce it.

In September 2024, Michael filed a motion in Washington to enforce the final

divorce decree. In his motion, he argued that Charletta’s request in the Nevada court for

him to pay her portion of his Nevada PERS before he retired was inconsistent with the

divorce decree’s QDRO provisions and the 60/40 property split. Michael asked the

Washington court to order Charletta to withdraw her motion in Nevada.

In early October, before the Washington court could hear Michael’s motion, the

Nevada court heard argument. During the hearing, Michael’s attorney attempted to

address the parties’ 60/40 property split, Michael’s current “over $3,000 a month”

equalization payment to Charletta, and how requiring Michael to additionally pay

Charletta her portion of his Nevada PERS would be inconsistent with the divorce decree.

CP at 107. Charletta’s attorney objected to the argument because it was based, in part, on

Michael’s late-filed declaration.

The court granted Charletta’s Henson motion, requiring Michael to pay Charletta

her portion of his Nevada PERS even though he had yet to retire. In granting the motion,

the Nevada court explained:

5 No. 40978-3-III Marriage of Morris

[A]n order that is domesticated here in Nevada will receive full faith and credit as to enforcement of the order. That is a common principle of comity between the states. [The] Court finds there is no conflict of law. [The] Court . . . finds no jurisdictional issues or problems with this motion. A Nevada order or Nevada QDRO is governed by Nevada laws and regulations . . . . A Nevada QDRO, obviously, can be enforced in Nevada. A Nevada court, on behalf of the state of Washington court, can enforce the Washington court decree.

CP at 110. The court then addressed Michael’s late-filed declaration. It declined to

strike the declaration but acknowledged it had not read the declaration and it formed no

basis in the court’s decision.

In late October 2024, the Washington court heard Michael’s motion. The court

took the matter under advisement, and, in early January 2025, it issued its letter decision

granting Michael’s request. In its decision, the court reasoned:

Under Full Faith and Credit principles, a Washington court has jurisdiction to settle the parties’ personal interests in property located out of the state. . . . In this case, the role of the State of Nevada is to effectuate the Washington order settling [the parties’] interests in their respective Nevada pensions.

There is nothing in the Divorce Decree that specifies when Ms. Morris is to begin receiving her portion of Mr. Morris’s PERS. . . . The remedy for determining the start date of her payments . . . is to move for clarification in the State of Washington.

In the State of Washington[,] interests in various state retirement plans can be “split.” When a plan interest is “split” pursuant to the divorce decree, the Washington State Department of Retirement Systems (DRS) “splits” the retirement account into two separate accounts. . . . [T]his “split” allows

6 No. 40978-3-III Marriage of Morris

the non-employee ex-spouse to receive their share of the retirement benefits even if the employee ex-spouse is still working. Payment of these retirements [sic] benefits comes from the State of Washington, not the still working ex-spouse. . . .

In contrast, in Nevada, pursuant to [Henson], a nonemployee spouse can file a motion in the Nevada District Court requesting immediate payment of his/her portion of the employee spouse’s pension benefits if the employee spouse is eligible to retire but has not yet retired. [If the court grants the motion,] the employee spouse must pay the nonemployee ex-spouse from the date of filing until actual retirement. The Nevada Court determines the present value of the employee spouse’s pension benefits based on the date the non-employee ex-spouse make an election to receive the benefit. Payment of these benefits is not from the Nevada retirement system but directly from the employee spouse. This Nevada option of payment is not the same or similar to the “split” option in Washington. . . .

. . . By requiring Mr. Morris, not the State of Nevada, to begin paying Ms. Morris her portion of his PERS benefits prior to his actual retirement, [Ms. Morris] has impermissibly modified the decree.

. . . Res judicata bars [this].

....

. . . Given the totality of the facts regarding the parties’ negotiated settlement and issues litigated in Washington, the Nevada order addressed matters that could have and should have been raised in Washington. Direct payment by Mr. Morris to Ms. Morris materially alters their agreement and the property division in their decree.

Ms. Morris is enjoined from enforcing the Nevada Order (entered 11/4/2024) . . . .

7 No. 40978-3-III Marriage of Morris

CP at 207-09 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).

After the court entered a formal order, Charletta timely appealed.

ANALYSIS

A. FULL FAITH AND CREDIT

Charletta argues that the Washington court’s order failed to give the Nevada

court’s Henson order full faith and credit. Michael responds that the Nevada court failed

to give the Washington court’s divorce decree full faith and credit. We begin our

analysis by discussing this constitutional requirement.

Article IV, section 1 of the United States Constitution states, “Full faith and credit

shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every

other state.” Thus, states must recognize the judgments of sister states. OneWest Bank,

FSB v. Erickson, 185 Wn.2d 43, 55-56, 367 P.3d 1063 (2016). “[A party] can collaterally

attack a foreign order ‘only if the court lacked jurisdiction or constitutional violations

were involved.’” Id. at 56 (quoting State v. Berry, 141 Wn.2d 121, 128, 5 P.3d 658

(2000)). “Otherwise, a Washington court ‘must give full faith and credit to the foreign

judgment and regard the issues thereby adjudged to be precluded in a Washington

proceeding.’” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Est. of Tolson,

89 Wn. App. 21, 30, 947 P.2d 1242 (1997)). If the foreign court had jurisdiction, “the

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full faith and credit clause of the Constitution precludes any inquiry into the merits of the

cause of action, the logic or consistency of the decision, or the validity of the legal

principles on which the judgment is based.” Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462,

61 S. Ct. 339, 85 L. Ed. 278 (1940).

Michael contends that the Nevada court’s Henson order is not entitled to full faith

and credit because it is derivative of the Washington divorce order and “[t]he only

judgment that exists in Nevada is the Washington decree.” Resp’t’s Br. at 11 (emphasis

omitted). We disagree that the Nevada court’s Henson order is not a judgment. Nevada

law defines a judgment to include any order from which an appeal lies. Lytle v.

Rosemere Ests. Prop. Owners, 129 Nev. 923, 926, 314 P.3d 946 (2013). Michael does

not contest that he could have appealed the Nevada court’s Henson order.

On appeal, both parties agree that both the Washington and the Nevada courts

have jurisdiction over their Nevada PERS accounts. We note there is nothing in the

divorce decree that said when Charletta could receive her portion of Michael’s Nevada

PERS benefits. For this reason, the Nevada court was not precluded by full faith and

credit principles from adhering to Nevada law and granting Charletta’s request to begin

receiving her portion of Michael’s Nevada PERS before he retired.

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Conversely, the Washington court’s order enjoining Charletta from enforcing the

Nevada court’s Henson order is directly contrary to that order. Full faith and credit

principles precluded the Washington court from enjoining such enforcement.

We conclude that the trial court erred by enjoining Charletta from enforcing the

Nevada Henson order. Moreover, to the extent that common law principles such as res

judicata or collateral estoppel might imply a different result, the Nevada court’s Henson

order cannot be collaterally attacked on those bases. OneWest Bank, 185 Wn.2d at 56.

B. MODIFICATION OF PROPERTY AWARD NOT PRECLUDED

The parties dispute whether the Nevada court’s Henson order granted Charletta

relief beyond that afforded by the divorce decree. The Washington court determined:

“By requiring [Michael], not the State of Nevada, to begin paying [Charletta] her portion

of his PERS benefits prior to his actual retirement, [Charletta] has impermissibly

modified the decree.” CP at 208. The court later added, “Direct payment by [Michael] to

[Charletta] materially alters their agreement and the property division in their decree.”

CP at 208. We agree.

In Washington, interests in state retirement plans are “split” by the Washington

State Department of Retirement Systems, and the “split” allows the nonemployee spouse

to receive their share of the employee spouse’s retirement benefits even if that ex-spouse

10 No. 40978-3-III Marriage of Morris

is still working. Monthly payment of this benefit comes from Washington, not from the

still working spouse. Whereas in Nevada, Henson requires the employee spouse,

personally, to pay the nonemployee spouse their share of benefits until the employee

spouse retires. See Henson, 130 Nev. at 822. Although Henson requires the amount the

nonemployee spouse receives to be reduced to present value, and for this reason would

not alter the parties’ 50/50 pension split, it still imposes a cash flow problem on the

employee spouse until retirement.

We affirm the trial court’s determination that the Nevada Henson order materially

altered the parties’ property division. We do not decide whether this material alteration

could serve as a basis for the Washington court to modify the parties’ property division

under RCW 26.09.170(1). But we do not preclude the trial court from conducting a

hearing and awarding appropriate relief, including modification of the property award, if

supported by adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law.3

3 Collateral estoppel would not preclude the Washington court from modifying the property award. The Nevada court’s decision to grant Charletta’s Henson motion rested on it having jurisdiction to enforce the Nevada QDRO, which, by its terms, controlled if there was a conflict between it and the divorce decree. For this reason, the trial court did not, nor was it required to, determine whether Charletta’s request would modify the divorce decree.

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Reversed and remanded.

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to

RCW 2.06.040.

_________________________________ Lawrence-Berrey, J.

WE CONCUR:

______________________________ _________________________________ Staab, C.J. Hill, J.