In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-25-00057-CV
IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE OF BRANDON WATERS AND STACEY WATERS AND IN THE INTEREST OF E.W., L.W., L.W., AND F.W., CHILDREN
On Appeal from the 415th District Court Parker County, Texas Trial Court No. CV22-1343, Honorable Graham Quisenberry, Presiding
November 18, 2025 MEMORANDUM OPINION 1 Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and YARBROUGH, JJ.
Stacey Waters appeals from the final divorce decree entered by the trial court. She
contends the trial court’s rulings were erroneous. We affirm.
Background
Brandon and Stacey married in 1995 and had five children over the course of their
marriage. Stacey homeschooled them, while Brandon owned and operated a motor
1 Because this matter was transferred from the Second Court of Appeals, we apply its precedent when it conflicts with that of the Seventh Court of Appeals. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3. vehicle repair shop. Brandon filed for divorce in 2022 following several years of
separation.
Stacey made allegations of a sexual nature against Brandon. There were also
accusations of his sexual misconduct with their older daughter, possible physical
misconduct toward another child, assertion of Brandon’s preoccupation with adolescent
females, and evidence of Brandon’s addiction to pornography. The record also contains
evidence showing that Stacey suffered from mental health conditions and that at least
some of her allegations were fabricated. There was also evidence of emotional abuse
and trauma to the children inflicted by Stacey and of her attempts to alienate the children
against Brandon.
The court held a final hearing during the summer of 2024. The trial court signed
the final decree on December 13, 2024. Thereafter, it executed findings of fact and
conclusions of law. Through one such finding the trial court said: “[m]ost of Stacey’s
testimony was not credible.”
Conservatorship of Children
Through her first and third issues, Stacey contends the trial court erred when it
awarded to Brandon sole conservatorship of the children and found her a physical danger
to her children. We overrule the issues.
The best interest of the child “shall always be the primary consideration of the court
in determining the issues of conservatorship and possession of and access to the child.”
In re Marriage of Bentrott, No. 07-23-00363-CV, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 7320, at *18-19
(Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct. 11, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.). We review a “best interests”
determination for abused discretion, and do so with an eye on the factors announced in
2 Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. 1976). Id. Furthermore, there is no abused
discretion “as long as some evidence of a substantive and probative character exists to
support the trial court's decision.” Id.
The trial court designated Brandon the sole managing conservator of the children.
Stacey argues the trial court erroneously relied on a polygraph taken by Brandon. To the
extent she posits that the polygraph was inadmissible, her complaint was not preserved
for review, for she failed to object to its admission. 2 Gardner v. State, 02-09-00360-CR,
2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 8991, at *7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 4, 2010, no pet.) (mem.
op., not designated for publication) (stating one must assert a proper and timely objection
the admission of polygraph results to preserve error for review). Having waived her
complaint to that evidence, we cannot fault the trial court for considering the polygraph
evidence.
Moreover, the court also heard evidence about 1) the children initially living with
Stacey but later coming to live with Brandon’s parents and, ultimately Brandon, 2)
Brandon often seeing his children when they lived elsewhere, 3) Stacey coaching the
children, 4) Stacey uttering delusions to them resulting in emotional damage, 5) Stacey
endeavoring to fracture their relationship with their father, 6) Stacey isolating the children,
which caused emotional damages, 7) Stacey uttering unsubstantiated allegations against
Brandon, 8) Stacey hiding the children from Brandon on occasion, 9) at least one child
exhibiting bruising or welts reminiscent of being struck by a belt or stick while in Stacey’s
2 We note also that aside from lodging hearsay objections during Brandon’s testimony, Stacey did not otherwise object to the admission of the polygraph evidence. Indeed, the parties stipulated to the Custody Evaluation Report of Findings and Conclusions that referenced the polygraph examination. She has not preserved the complaint concerning the polygraph examination results. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1.
3 care, 10) various witnesses, including therapists, testifying that the children’s behavior
and social skills changed in a positive manner upon leaving the supervision of Stacey and
coming to live with their father, 11) Stacey’s mental health, which included signs of
depression, anxiety disorder, trichotillomania, and a hoarding disorder, 12) Stacey’s mood
dysregulation and thought distortion, and 13) the fear of Dr. Crystal Baird, who conducted
a custody evaluation, in permitting Stacey to have physical access to the children, even
if supervised. Indeed, Baird concluded, among other things, that “[t]he mother presents
a significant danger to the children emotionally and physically. The mother has absconded
with the children and hid them from the court. The mother has engaged in emotional
abuse for years, which has been documented in therapeutic notes.” So too did she
recommend that 1) “[Brandon] . . . should be granted sole managing conservatorship with
the mother having possessory conservatorship” and 2) “[t]he mother should only be
allowed supervised phone access until she provides all medical and mental health
documents to this evaluator and the amicus attorney.”
On the other hand, the court also heard testimony indicating Brandon suffered
mental or emotional conditions and once had an addiction to pornography. Nevertheless,
Brandon maintained both a stable home and employment. And, while living with their
father, the children seemed to improve. Nor did the custody evaluator have concerns
about father’s ability to parent. And, though the children may have expressed a desire
to live with their mother, their amicus attorney recommended that the youngest two boys
remain with their father because of concern for their progress if returned to mother. 3
3 The oldest of the three children subject to this suit turned 18 in late 2024. The record indicates her plan was to move out of the family home.
4 No doubt, the evidence was mixed. Yet, the trial court, as factfinder, was in the
best position to evaluate witness demeanor and credibility. And, in exercising that
authority as factfinder, it had evidence upon which to conclude that the best interests of
the children favored the selection of Brandon as sole managing conservator. See, e.g.,
In re M.L.P., No. 13-20-00547-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 251, at *29 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi Jan. 13, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (finding the evidence established that father’s
parental abilities were slightly superior to mother’s and that father’s residence was more
stable and appropriate for the children). So too did the evidence described above support
the finding that Stacey posed both a physical and emotional danger to the children.
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In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-25-00057-CV
IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE OF BRANDON WATERS AND STACEY WATERS AND IN THE INTEREST OF E.W., L.W., L.W., AND F.W., CHILDREN
On Appeal from the 415th District Court Parker County, Texas Trial Court No. CV22-1343, Honorable Graham Quisenberry, Presiding
November 18, 2025 MEMORANDUM OPINION 1 Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and YARBROUGH, JJ.
Stacey Waters appeals from the final divorce decree entered by the trial court. She
contends the trial court’s rulings were erroneous. We affirm.
Background
Brandon and Stacey married in 1995 and had five children over the course of their
marriage. Stacey homeschooled them, while Brandon owned and operated a motor
1 Because this matter was transferred from the Second Court of Appeals, we apply its precedent when it conflicts with that of the Seventh Court of Appeals. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3. vehicle repair shop. Brandon filed for divorce in 2022 following several years of
separation.
Stacey made allegations of a sexual nature against Brandon. There were also
accusations of his sexual misconduct with their older daughter, possible physical
misconduct toward another child, assertion of Brandon’s preoccupation with adolescent
females, and evidence of Brandon’s addiction to pornography. The record also contains
evidence showing that Stacey suffered from mental health conditions and that at least
some of her allegations were fabricated. There was also evidence of emotional abuse
and trauma to the children inflicted by Stacey and of her attempts to alienate the children
against Brandon.
The court held a final hearing during the summer of 2024. The trial court signed
the final decree on December 13, 2024. Thereafter, it executed findings of fact and
conclusions of law. Through one such finding the trial court said: “[m]ost of Stacey’s
testimony was not credible.”
Conservatorship of Children
Through her first and third issues, Stacey contends the trial court erred when it
awarded to Brandon sole conservatorship of the children and found her a physical danger
to her children. We overrule the issues.
The best interest of the child “shall always be the primary consideration of the court
in determining the issues of conservatorship and possession of and access to the child.”
In re Marriage of Bentrott, No. 07-23-00363-CV, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 7320, at *18-19
(Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct. 11, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.). We review a “best interests”
determination for abused discretion, and do so with an eye on the factors announced in
2 Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. 1976). Id. Furthermore, there is no abused
discretion “as long as some evidence of a substantive and probative character exists to
support the trial court's decision.” Id.
The trial court designated Brandon the sole managing conservator of the children.
Stacey argues the trial court erroneously relied on a polygraph taken by Brandon. To the
extent she posits that the polygraph was inadmissible, her complaint was not preserved
for review, for she failed to object to its admission. 2 Gardner v. State, 02-09-00360-CR,
2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 8991, at *7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 4, 2010, no pet.) (mem.
op., not designated for publication) (stating one must assert a proper and timely objection
the admission of polygraph results to preserve error for review). Having waived her
complaint to that evidence, we cannot fault the trial court for considering the polygraph
evidence.
Moreover, the court also heard evidence about 1) the children initially living with
Stacey but later coming to live with Brandon’s parents and, ultimately Brandon, 2)
Brandon often seeing his children when they lived elsewhere, 3) Stacey coaching the
children, 4) Stacey uttering delusions to them resulting in emotional damage, 5) Stacey
endeavoring to fracture their relationship with their father, 6) Stacey isolating the children,
which caused emotional damages, 7) Stacey uttering unsubstantiated allegations against
Brandon, 8) Stacey hiding the children from Brandon on occasion, 9) at least one child
exhibiting bruising or welts reminiscent of being struck by a belt or stick while in Stacey’s
2 We note also that aside from lodging hearsay objections during Brandon’s testimony, Stacey did not otherwise object to the admission of the polygraph evidence. Indeed, the parties stipulated to the Custody Evaluation Report of Findings and Conclusions that referenced the polygraph examination. She has not preserved the complaint concerning the polygraph examination results. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1.
3 care, 10) various witnesses, including therapists, testifying that the children’s behavior
and social skills changed in a positive manner upon leaving the supervision of Stacey and
coming to live with their father, 11) Stacey’s mental health, which included signs of
depression, anxiety disorder, trichotillomania, and a hoarding disorder, 12) Stacey’s mood
dysregulation and thought distortion, and 13) the fear of Dr. Crystal Baird, who conducted
a custody evaluation, in permitting Stacey to have physical access to the children, even
if supervised. Indeed, Baird concluded, among other things, that “[t]he mother presents
a significant danger to the children emotionally and physically. The mother has absconded
with the children and hid them from the court. The mother has engaged in emotional
abuse for years, which has been documented in therapeutic notes.” So too did she
recommend that 1) “[Brandon] . . . should be granted sole managing conservatorship with
the mother having possessory conservatorship” and 2) “[t]he mother should only be
allowed supervised phone access until she provides all medical and mental health
documents to this evaluator and the amicus attorney.”
On the other hand, the court also heard testimony indicating Brandon suffered
mental or emotional conditions and once had an addiction to pornography. Nevertheless,
Brandon maintained both a stable home and employment. And, while living with their
father, the children seemed to improve. Nor did the custody evaluator have concerns
about father’s ability to parent. And, though the children may have expressed a desire
to live with their mother, their amicus attorney recommended that the youngest two boys
remain with their father because of concern for their progress if returned to mother. 3
3 The oldest of the three children subject to this suit turned 18 in late 2024. The record indicates her plan was to move out of the family home.
4 No doubt, the evidence was mixed. Yet, the trial court, as factfinder, was in the
best position to evaluate witness demeanor and credibility. And, in exercising that
authority as factfinder, it had evidence upon which to conclude that the best interests of
the children favored the selection of Brandon as sole managing conservator. See, e.g.,
In re M.L.P., No. 13-20-00547-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 251, at *29 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi Jan. 13, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (finding the evidence established that father’s
parental abilities were slightly superior to mother’s and that father’s residence was more
stable and appropriate for the children). So too did the evidence described above support
the finding that Stacey posed both a physical and emotional danger to the children.
Limitations on Possession
By her second issue, Stacey contends the trial court erred in limiting her access to
two supervised phone calls twice a month. She argues that when Brandon was suspected
of sexually assaulting his oldest daughter, his visitation was limited only to supervised in-
person visitation. Stacey claims there was no justification to limit her access more
severely than Brandon’s. We overrule the issue.
Again, the best interests of the children control. TEX. FAM. CODE § 153.002; In re
J.J.R.S., 627 S.W.3d 211, 218 (Tex. 2021). Furthermore, there is a rebuttable
presumption that the standard possession order provides the reasonable minimum level
of possession and access for a parent named possessory conservator and is in the best
interest of the child. In re J.J.R.S., 627 S.W.3d at 218 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE § 153.252);
see also TEX. FAM. CODE § 153.131(b) (rebuttable presumption that the appointment of
parents of child as joint managing conservators is in best interest of child). When
determining whether to deviate from the standard possession order, a court may consider
5 “(1) the age, developmental status, circumstances, needs, and best interest of the child;
(2) the circumstances of the managing conservator and of the parent named as a
possessory conservator; and (3) any other relevant factor.” In re J.J.R.S., 627 S.W.3d at
218-19; see also TEX. FAM. CODE § 153.004 (addressing conservatorship with history of
domestic violence or sexual abuse). Nor may “the terms of an order that deviates from
the standard possession order . . . exceed those that are required to protect the best
interest of the child.’” Id. (citing TEX. FAM. CODE § 153.193).
Regarding the accusations of sexual abuse, no evidence other than Stacey’s
testimony supported them. Again, the trial court found most of what she said non-
credible. Furthermore, the polygraph findings to which Stacey did not object tended to
contradict the accusations of abuse. Nor did those allegations result in criminal
prosecutions.
And, as discussed in our analysis of Stacey’s first and third issues, there was a
plethora of evidence of emotional abuse and developmental trauma suffered by the
children at the hands of Stacey. The limitations imposed were intended to prevent further
abuse and trauma and fell within its discretion to order. Indeed, in its findings of fact, the
trial court explicitly stated, “[t]he periods of possession should vary from the Standard
Possession Order and Stacey’s access and possession of the children should be
drastically limited.”
While Stacey repeatedly compares her alleged risk to that of Brandon’s, that is not
the inquiry. The inquiry was what risk Stacey posed to the children and how best to further
the children’s best interests. And the record is replete with evidence of just how damaging
Stacey’s emotional abuse and developmental trauma were to her children. It also
6 contained evidence of Stacy’s mental state and physical injury inflicted on at least one
child. See In re P.A.C., 498 S.W.3d 210, 218 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet.
denied) (noting mental state among other factors to consider). So too do we harken back
to the evidence of her attempts to alienate the children from Brandon and restrict his
access to them. Trevino v. O’Quinn, No. 03-18-00197-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 7970,
at *15-16 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 30, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting factors that courts
have cited in support of their decisions to limit a parent’s possession and access to her
child to supervised visits as including a parent’s inability to follow court orders, attempts
to alienate the child from the other parent, and actions that improperly deny the other
parent contact with the child); accord In re Marriage of Fraker, No. 13-23-00340-CV, 2025
Tex. App. LEXIS 5343, at *27 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi July 24, 2025, no pet.) (mem.
op.) (stating that “[p]oisoning a child’s mind against a parent is not in the child’s best
interest”). Nor can we ignore 1) the evaluator’s recommendation to restrict mother’s
visitation to phone calls; 2) the unquestioned finding that “[w]hen with Stacey, the children
slept in the same bed and were unable to function as individuals”; 3) the unquestioned
finding that “[t]he children ‘parroted’ their mother and were socially behind”; 4) the
unquestioned finding that “[t]he children had no social life and were reserved in
demeanor . . .” during the time they were in Stacey’s possession; 5) the unquestioned
finding that “Stacey filed unfounded, false reports with CPS against Brandon”; 6) the
unquestioned finding that “Stacey’s conduct significantly harmed the children's
relationship with Brandon”; 7) the unquestioned finding that “Stacey committed parental
alienation” against Brandon; and 8) the unquestioned finding that “Dr. Baird testified that
she has concerns about the mother having physical access to the children even if
7 supervised because of the mental illness of Stacey and the underlying issues with her.”
Given the foregoing, we cannot say the trial court’s decision heeding the evaluator’s
recommendation restricting access to supervised phone calls was arbitrary, capricious,
or otherwise a deviation from controlling principles and authority. See In re Walters, 39
S.W.3d 280, 286 n.2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, no pet.) (stating that “a severe
restriction or limitation, even one that amounts to a denial of access, is permissible if it is
in the best interest of the child”).
Just and Right Division of Marital Estate
Stacey lastly argues the trial court abused its discretion in dividing the marital
estate as it did. We overrule the issue.
A trial court is charged with ordering a division of the community property estate
“in a manner that the court deems just and right, having due regard for the rights of each
party.” In re Marriage of Luna, No. 07-16-00065-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 12432, at *4-
5 (Tex. App.—Amarillo, Nov. 18, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing TEX. FAM. CODE § 7.001;
Hrncirik v. Hrncirik, No. 07-15-00001-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 9661, at *6 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo Aug. 30, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op)). The application of this statutory standard
means that the trial court does not have to divide the community estate equally, so long
as the division is equitable. In re Marriage of Luna, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 12342, at *4
(citing O’Carolan v. Hopper, 414 S.W.3d 288, 311 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.) (op.
on reh’g.)). Because the trial court has wide discretion in dividing the community estate,
we again review its decision for abused discretion. Id. And, “a party complaining of the
division of the community estate has the burden of showing from the evidence in the
record that the trial court's division of the community estate was so unjust and unfair as
8 to constitute an abuse of discretion.” Quijano v. Amaya, No. 13-16-00485-CV, 2018 Tex.
App. LEXIS 2762, at *7 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Apr. 19, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Stacey framed her issue around her unsupported allegation that Brandon hid cash,
and without evidence of the amount he hid, the trial court was unable to make a just
division of the estate. Yet, again, the trial court found most of her testimony unbelievable.
Thus, we cannot simply accept her contention about hidden funds in assessing the
legitimacy of the trial court’s division.
Next, the community estate at issue was valued at around $880,000. Brandon
received approximately $463,000, while Stacey garnered $424,000 of the marital estate.
The net variance between the two awards approximated $39,000, or about 4.4%. To that
we note the unquestioned findings that 1) “Stacey made false police reports and CPS
complaints which increased costs to Brandon”; 2) “Stacey made false allegations about
Brandon which caused unnecessary and expensive testing”; 3) “Brandon also paid nearly
all litigation and professional costs, some of which was caused by false allegations made
by Stacey”; 4) “Brandon paid Stacey $1,200/week until about July 2023 and $2,500/month
beginning November 2023”; 5) he “also paid $1,157/month for health insurance for the
children and covered medical expenses himself.” So given these unchallenged findings
and the totality of record evidence, we cannot find Stacey carried her burden to prove the
division was so unjust and unfair as to constitute an abuse of discretion.
Having overruled each issue, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Brian Quinn Chief Justice