In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-25-00036-CV
IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF THE PERSON AND ESTATE OF KENNETH GREGG
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3 Lubbock County, Texas Trial Court No. CC-2023-GD-0078, Honorable Ben Webb, Presiding
May 29, 2025 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before PARKER and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.
Monte Gregg appeals a temporary injunction order1 that prohibits him from selling
or otherwise disturbing certain property of Kenneth Gregg, a ward of the court, that had
1 Monte perfected appeal from a January 2, 2025 order that granted Lucretia Howe’s application
for temporary injunction. On April 11, 2025, the trial court signed an amended order granting temporary injunction, which deviated from the January 2 order only in that it set a hearing on Lucretia’s request for a permanent injunction. Monte filed an unopposed motion to treat this appeal as being from the amended order. We granted the motion on April 24, and will treat this appeal as an appeal from the trial court’s amended order. been purportedly conveyed to Monte by Kenneth on or after June 5, 2023.2 We reverse
the trial court’s order and dissolve the temporary injunction.
BACKGROUND
Kenneth is the owner of thousands of acres of land in multiple counties on which
he has conducted substantial farming operations. In 2023, he experienced complex and
severe health issues, including the amputation of a portion of his left leg and a diagnosis
of moderate to severe dementia. In June and October of 2023, Kenneth transferred
certain real property and cattle to his son Monte. In December of 2023, Lucretia Howe
and Sharla Gregg, Kenneth’s daughters, filed an application for appointment of temporary
and permanent guardianship of Kenneth. On December 22, the trial court entered an
order appointing Lucretia temporary guardian of Kenneth’s estate. Consistent with her
appointment, Lucretia posted a $1,500,000 guardianship bond. In July of 2024, Kenneth
purportedly created a trust, named Monte as trustee, and conveyed all of his remaining
property to the trust. After holding a hearing over the course of three days in May and
July of 2024, the trial court entered its Order Appointing Permanent Guardian.3
After being named permanent guardian of Kenneth’s estate, Lucretia filed an
application for temporary restraining order and injunctive relief that sought an order
restraining Monte’s ability to transfer or dispose of any of the property Kenneth
purportedly transferred to Monte or the trust from June of 2023 forward based on
2 Because many of the parties share the same surname, we will refer to them by their first names.
3 In a separate proceeding, Monte has appealed the trial court’s Order Appointing Permanent Guardian.
2 allegations that those transfers were the result of fraud and undue influence. After holding
a hearing on Lucretia’s application, the trial court signed an order granting a temporary
injunction against Monte on January 2, 2025. From this order, Monte timely filed this
interlocutory appeal.
By his appeal, Monte presents four issues: (1) the trial court abused its discretion
by allowing the guardianship bond to also serve as the bond for the temporary injunction,
(2) the trial court abused its discretion by granting injunctive relief against Monte in his
capacity as trustee even though Lucretia did not sue him in that capacity, (3) the
temporary injunction order is substantively defective, and (4) the temporary injunction
order is void because it fails to comply with the mandatory requirements of Texas Rule of
Civil Procedure 683. Because we find Monte’s first issue dispositive, we will limit our
analysis to that issue.
INTERLOCUTORY JURISDICTION
Generally, an appeal may be taken only from a final judgment. Lehmann v. Har-
Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). However, there are some statutory
exceptions to the general rule. Id. One such exception allows interlocutory appeals from
the grant or refusal of a temporary injunction. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 51.014(a)(4). Thus, we have jurisdiction over Monte’s interlocutory appeal of the trial
court’s temporary injunction.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“A temporary injunction’s purpose is to preserve the status quo of the litigation’s
subject matter pending a trial on the merits.” Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 3 204 (Tex. 2002). A temporary injunction is an extraordinary remedy. Id. An applicant for
a temporary injunction must plead and prove that she has a cause of action against the
defendant; probable right to the relief sought; and probable, imminent, and irreparable
injury in the interim. Id.
We review a ruling on a temporary injunction using an abuse of discretion
standard. Id. In conducting this review, we may not substitute our judgment for that of
the trial court unless the trial court’s action was so arbitrary that it exceeded the bounds
of reasonable discretion. Id. “[A] failure by the trial court to analyze or apply the law
correctly . . . constitutes an abuse of discretion.” In re Kuntz, 124 S.W.3d 179, 181 (Tex.
2003) (orig. proceeding).
BOND
Monte contends that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to require an
adequate bond to support the temporary injunction. Lucretia argues that it was not an
abuse of discretion for the trial court to allow the guardianship bond to also serve as the
injunction bond.
Under Texas law, a trial court must set the bond of a guardian in an amount equal
to the estimated value of all personal property belonging to the ward, plus an additional
amount to cover anticipated revenue from interest, dividends, collectible claims, periodic
payments, and rentals for the use of property. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. §1105.154(a). The
purpose of this bond is to ensure the guardian’s diligent performance of her duties and to
protect the ward from loss due to the guardian’s waste or mismanagement. Thedford v.
White, 37 S.W.3d 494, 498 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2000, no pet.).
4 Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 684 requires that in an order granting a temporary
injunction, the court must fix the amount of security to be given by the applicant. TEX. R.
CIV. P. 684. A temporary injunction is void if the trial court fails to require a bond. Ex
parte Lesher, 651 S.W.2d 734, 736 (Tex. 1983). In fact, a trial court’s failure to set a bond
can render a temporary injunction void even if the issue is not raised by the parties in
either the trial or appellate courts. Expo Grp., LLC v. Purdy, No. 05-24-00653-CV, 2025
Tex. App. LEXIS 370, at *14–15 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 27, 2025, pet. filed) (mem. op.).
“The intent of this Court in promulgating Rule 684 was to require a bond payable
to a party against whom a temporary restraining order or injunction is issued before the
order may lawfully issue. Without such bond the order is void.” Ex parte Lesher, 651
S.W.2d at 736 (emphasis in original). In the present case, the guardianship bond of
$1,500,000 was ordered to protect the estate against any malfeasance of the guardian.
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In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-25-00036-CV
IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF THE PERSON AND ESTATE OF KENNETH GREGG
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3 Lubbock County, Texas Trial Court No. CC-2023-GD-0078, Honorable Ben Webb, Presiding
May 29, 2025 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before PARKER and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.
Monte Gregg appeals a temporary injunction order1 that prohibits him from selling
or otherwise disturbing certain property of Kenneth Gregg, a ward of the court, that had
1 Monte perfected appeal from a January 2, 2025 order that granted Lucretia Howe’s application
for temporary injunction. On April 11, 2025, the trial court signed an amended order granting temporary injunction, which deviated from the January 2 order only in that it set a hearing on Lucretia’s request for a permanent injunction. Monte filed an unopposed motion to treat this appeal as being from the amended order. We granted the motion on April 24, and will treat this appeal as an appeal from the trial court’s amended order. been purportedly conveyed to Monte by Kenneth on or after June 5, 2023.2 We reverse
the trial court’s order and dissolve the temporary injunction.
BACKGROUND
Kenneth is the owner of thousands of acres of land in multiple counties on which
he has conducted substantial farming operations. In 2023, he experienced complex and
severe health issues, including the amputation of a portion of his left leg and a diagnosis
of moderate to severe dementia. In June and October of 2023, Kenneth transferred
certain real property and cattle to his son Monte. In December of 2023, Lucretia Howe
and Sharla Gregg, Kenneth’s daughters, filed an application for appointment of temporary
and permanent guardianship of Kenneth. On December 22, the trial court entered an
order appointing Lucretia temporary guardian of Kenneth’s estate. Consistent with her
appointment, Lucretia posted a $1,500,000 guardianship bond. In July of 2024, Kenneth
purportedly created a trust, named Monte as trustee, and conveyed all of his remaining
property to the trust. After holding a hearing over the course of three days in May and
July of 2024, the trial court entered its Order Appointing Permanent Guardian.3
After being named permanent guardian of Kenneth’s estate, Lucretia filed an
application for temporary restraining order and injunctive relief that sought an order
restraining Monte’s ability to transfer or dispose of any of the property Kenneth
purportedly transferred to Monte or the trust from June of 2023 forward based on
2 Because many of the parties share the same surname, we will refer to them by their first names.
3 In a separate proceeding, Monte has appealed the trial court’s Order Appointing Permanent Guardian.
2 allegations that those transfers were the result of fraud and undue influence. After holding
a hearing on Lucretia’s application, the trial court signed an order granting a temporary
injunction against Monte on January 2, 2025. From this order, Monte timely filed this
interlocutory appeal.
By his appeal, Monte presents four issues: (1) the trial court abused its discretion
by allowing the guardianship bond to also serve as the bond for the temporary injunction,
(2) the trial court abused its discretion by granting injunctive relief against Monte in his
capacity as trustee even though Lucretia did not sue him in that capacity, (3) the
temporary injunction order is substantively defective, and (4) the temporary injunction
order is void because it fails to comply with the mandatory requirements of Texas Rule of
Civil Procedure 683. Because we find Monte’s first issue dispositive, we will limit our
analysis to that issue.
INTERLOCUTORY JURISDICTION
Generally, an appeal may be taken only from a final judgment. Lehmann v. Har-
Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). However, there are some statutory
exceptions to the general rule. Id. One such exception allows interlocutory appeals from
the grant or refusal of a temporary injunction. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 51.014(a)(4). Thus, we have jurisdiction over Monte’s interlocutory appeal of the trial
court’s temporary injunction.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“A temporary injunction’s purpose is to preserve the status quo of the litigation’s
subject matter pending a trial on the merits.” Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 3 204 (Tex. 2002). A temporary injunction is an extraordinary remedy. Id. An applicant for
a temporary injunction must plead and prove that she has a cause of action against the
defendant; probable right to the relief sought; and probable, imminent, and irreparable
injury in the interim. Id.
We review a ruling on a temporary injunction using an abuse of discretion
standard. Id. In conducting this review, we may not substitute our judgment for that of
the trial court unless the trial court’s action was so arbitrary that it exceeded the bounds
of reasonable discretion. Id. “[A] failure by the trial court to analyze or apply the law
correctly . . . constitutes an abuse of discretion.” In re Kuntz, 124 S.W.3d 179, 181 (Tex.
2003) (orig. proceeding).
BOND
Monte contends that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to require an
adequate bond to support the temporary injunction. Lucretia argues that it was not an
abuse of discretion for the trial court to allow the guardianship bond to also serve as the
injunction bond.
Under Texas law, a trial court must set the bond of a guardian in an amount equal
to the estimated value of all personal property belonging to the ward, plus an additional
amount to cover anticipated revenue from interest, dividends, collectible claims, periodic
payments, and rentals for the use of property. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. §1105.154(a). The
purpose of this bond is to ensure the guardian’s diligent performance of her duties and to
protect the ward from loss due to the guardian’s waste or mismanagement. Thedford v.
White, 37 S.W.3d 494, 498 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2000, no pet.).
4 Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 684 requires that in an order granting a temporary
injunction, the court must fix the amount of security to be given by the applicant. TEX. R.
CIV. P. 684. A temporary injunction is void if the trial court fails to require a bond. Ex
parte Lesher, 651 S.W.2d 734, 736 (Tex. 1983). In fact, a trial court’s failure to set a bond
can render a temporary injunction void even if the issue is not raised by the parties in
either the trial or appellate courts. Expo Grp., LLC v. Purdy, No. 05-24-00653-CV, 2025
Tex. App. LEXIS 370, at *14–15 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 27, 2025, pet. filed) (mem. op.).
“The intent of this Court in promulgating Rule 684 was to require a bond payable
to a party against whom a temporary restraining order or injunction is issued before the
order may lawfully issue. Without such bond the order is void.” Ex parte Lesher, 651
S.W.2d at 736 (emphasis in original). In the present case, the guardianship bond of
$1,500,000 was ordered to protect the estate against any malfeasance of the guardian.
In the order granting the temporary injunction, the trial court stated that “the bond currently
held by this Court in conjunction with the Guardianship of Kenneth Gregg shall satisfy the
bond requirement for the Temporary Injunction . . . .”4 However, the temporary injunction
enjoins actions that might be taken by Monte and, as such, for the injunction bond to be
“payable to [the] party against whom [the] temporary . . . injunction is issued,” it would
have to be payable to Monte. Id. The guardianship bond that the trial court stated would
satisfy the bond requirement for the temporary injunction is not payable to Monte. Since
the bond set by the trial court for the temporary injunction does not protect the interests
of the enjoined party, it is essentially the equivalent of the trial court’s failure to set a bond
4 We also note that Lucretia’s request for temporary injunction expressly requested that same be
issued “without the necessity of a bond . . . .”
5 to support the temporary injunction. Because the temporary injunction was issued without
a bond, it is void. Id.
At oral arguments, Lucretia cited this Court’s opinion in Rhoads v. McBee, No. 07-
23-00047-CV, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 5947, at *18–19 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 8, 2023,
no pet.) (mem. op.), for the proposition that Monte’s failure to object to the adequacy of
the bond set by the trial court waived his right to complain about the bond on appeal. We
acknowledge that a challenge to the adequacy of the amount of a bond supporting a
temporary injunction must be raised in the trial court or it is waived. See id. But a
temporary injunction is void if the issuing court fails to set a bond in support of it that is
payable to the party against whom the temporary injunction is issued. Ex parte Lesher,
651 S.W.2d at 736. Because the trial court in the present case did not set a bond in
support of its temporary injunction that was payable to Monte, we conclude that Monte’s
appeal is predicated on the trial court’s failure to set a valid bond rather than to the
adequacy of the bond’s amount. Consequently, we conclude that Rhoads is inapplicable
to the present case.
We sustain Monte’s first issue.
MONTE’S OTHER ISSUES
Because we have concluded that the temporary injunction was void, we need not
address the other challenges to the temporary injunction order raised by Monte. See TEX.
R. APP. P. 47.1.
6 CONCLUSION
Having determined that the trial court’s failure to set a bond in support of its
temporary injunction renders the temporary injunction order void, we reverse the trial
court’s order and dissolve the temporary injunction.5
Judy C. Parker Justice
5 Due to our resolution of this matter, we deny Monte’s pending Motion for Emergency Temporary
Relief as moot.