In the Matter of the Guardianship of SS

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: December 27, 2024
• Docket: 24A-GU-02154
• Status: Published

Opinion

FILED Dec 27 2024, 11:59 am

CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court

IN THE

Court of Appeals of Indiana In the Guardianship of: S.S., Minor Balwinder Kaur, Appellant-Petitioner

December 27, 2024 Court of Appeals Case No. 24A-GU-2154 Appeal from the Johnson Superior Court The Honorable Kevin M. Barton, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 41D01-2404-GU-66

Opinion by Judge Bradford Judges Bailey and Foley concur.

Bradford, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-GU-2154 | December 27, 2024 Page 1 of 10 Case Summary [1] S.S. was born in 2006 in India and, prior to July of 2023, lived there with his

parents and other family members. At some point, S.S. became involved with a

political party, which led to harassment and violence by members of an

opposing political party. In July of 2023, S.S.’s parents told him to leave their

home for safety reasons, and he traveled first to El Salvador and then to the

Mexico-United States border, where transportation to the Greenwood home of

his aunt Balwinder Kaur was arranged.

[2] In April of 2024, Kaur petitioned the juvenile court to appoint her as S.S.’s legal

guardian and requested that it enter specific findings of fact that would allow

S.S. to pursue classification as a special immigrant juvenile (“SIJ”) before the

United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”). The juvenile

court granted Kaur’s petition for guardianship but denied her request for SIJ-

related findings. The juvenile court denied Kaur’s motion to correct error.

Kaur contends that the juvenile court erred in refusing to find her requested SIJ-

related findings, specifically that S.S. had been abandoned and/or neglected by

his parents. Because we disagree, we affirm.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-GU-2154 | December 27, 2024 Page 2 of 10 Facts and Procedural History [3] S.S. is a native and citizen of India, born on September 12, 2006. 1 Prior to July

of 2023, S.S. lived with his parents, grandmother, and older brother in

Haryana, India. S.S.’s natural father worked as a farmer in India, and his

natural mother did not work outside the home. At the hearing on May 20,

2024, S.S. testified about his upbringing and explained that he had frequently

not had enough food to eat. S.S. agreed that were times when there had not

been enough food for the entire family to have a meal. S.S. added that he had

not always been regularly fed and would often eat only one, sometimes two,

meals per day.

[4] In October of 2022, S.S. joined the Indian National Lok Dal Party (“INLDP”)

and began actively volunteering for and campaigning on behalf of it. S.S.

worked for the INLDP, in part, because it would provide him with food and

occasionally with work and money. Because of his involvement with the

INLDP, S.S. became a target for abuse and persecution by members of the

Bharatiya Janata Party (“BJP”). On two separate occasions, S.S. was abducted

by members of the BJP, beaten, and threatened with death. S.S. and his father

attempted to report the abuse to the police, but the police refused to take the

1 Although S.S. is no longer a minor, having turned eighteen in September of 2024, he is still eligible for SIJ status until he reaches the age of twenty-one. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(b)(1) (“A petitioner is eligible for classification as a special immigrant juvenile [if, among other requirements, they are] under 21 years of age at the time of filing the petition[.]”).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-GU-2154 | December 27, 2024 Page 3 of 10 report and instead threatened to lock S.S. and his father in jail if they again tried

to file a report against workers of the BJP.

[5] Following these incidents, S.S.’s parents ordered him to stop attending school

and cease his political activities. When S.S. refused, his parents decided that it

would be better if he left India on the basis that the BJP “would kill [him], so

it’s better that [he] leave that place.” Tr. Vol. II p. 16. S.S.’s parents

determined that they were no longer able to protect him from the BJP.

[6] After leaving his family’s home, S.S. flew to El Salvador and then traveled by

land to the Mexico-U.S. border. An unknown member of S.S.’s family had

paid for his air fare to El Salvador but had not otherwise provided any support.

Once S.S. arrived at the Mexico-United States border, he was taken into

custody by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Office of Refugee

Resettlement and placed in a detention center for unaccompanied minors. The

Department of Homeland Security contacted Kaur and arranged for S.S.’s

travel to her home.

[7] On April 3, 2024, Kaur petitioned the juvenile court to appoint her as S.S.’s

legal guardian and requested that it enter specific findings of fact that would

allow S.S. to pursue classification as an SIJ. Specifically, Kaur requested that

the juvenile court issue findings of fact that it would not be viable to reunify S.S.

with either of his parents due to their abandonment and neglect and that it

would not be in S.S.’s best interests to return to India.

[8] Neither S.S.’s mother nor father objected to Kaur’s petition to become the legal

guardian of S.S. Indeed, both parents waived service of summons and notice of

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-GU-2154 | December 27, 2024 Page 4 of 10 hearing and consented to Kaur having sole legal guardianship over S.S. Both

parents also provided a notarized affidavit, in which they detailed how they

were unable to provide for S.S.’s essential needs, had ordered S.S. to leave their

home, and would refuse to provide for his essential needs or protect him if he

were to return to India.

[9] The juvenile court conducted a hearing on May 20, 2024. On June 6, 2024, the

juvenile court issued an order granting the guardianship. The juvenile court,

however, found that S.S. had neither been abandoned nor neglected by either of

his parents. Kaur moved to correct error on July 8, 2024, and the juvenile court

denied the motion on August 12, 2024.

Discussion and Decision Background [10] Under federal law, a child may be eligible for lawful permanent residency in the

United Sates if the child qualifies for classification as an SIJ. See 8 U.S.C.

1101(a)(27)(J); 8 C.F.R. § 204.118 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)(J) (providing definitions

that apply to a request for SIJ classification). This benefit was intended to

“‘protect abused, neglected, and abandoned immigrant youth through a process

allowing them to become legal permanent citizens.’” In re Guardianship of Luis,

114 N.E.3d 855, 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018)In re Guardianship of Luis, 114 N.E.3d

855, 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting In the Interest of J.J.X.C., a Child, 734

S.E.2d 120 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012)). Establishing eligibility for SIJ status is “a

unique hybrid procedure that directs the collaboration of state and federal

systems.” Id. at 858 (citations and quotation marks omitted).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-GU-2154 | December 27, 2024 Page 5 of 10 [11] In order to qualify for SIJ status, the child must first obtain a state juvenile court

order that: (1) declares them dependent upon the juvenile court or places them

in the legal custody of another; (2) finds that reunification with one or both of

their natural parents would not be viable due to abuse, abandonment, neglect,

or a similar basis under state law; and (3) determines that it would not be in the

child’s best interests to be returned to their or their parents’ country of

nationality or last habitual residence. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J). In making its

findings, “[t]he [juvenile] court is not required to terminate parental rights to

determine that parental reunification is not viable.” 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(1)(ii).

Rather, the juvenile court’s purpose is “simply to identify abused, neglected, or

abandoned alien children under its jurisdiction who cannot reunify with a

parent or be safely return in their best interests to their home country.” A.J.L.B.

by Lemus v. Alvarenga, 224 N.E.3d 345, 350 (Ind Ct. App. 2023) (citations

omitted).

Standard of Review [12] “The standard of appellate review of trial court rulings on motions to correct

error is abuse of discretion.” Newland Res., LLC v. Branham Corp., 918 N.E.2d

763, 772 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Similarly,

[f]indings and orders issued in guardianship proceedings are within the discretion of the trial court. In re Adoption of J.L.J., 4 N.E.3d 1189, 1194 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied; see also Ind. Code § 29-3-2-4(a). Accordingly, we review a trial court’s findings for an abuse of discretion, which occurs when the decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or if the court has misinterpreted the law.” Id.Id. We review any questions of law de novo,

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-GU-2154 | December 27, 2024 Page 6 of 10 however, affording no deference to the trial court’s legal conclusions. Id. Id.

Matter of Guardianship of Xitumul, 137 N.E.3d 945, 951 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

“We do not reweigh the evidence; rather we consider the evidence most

favorable to the judgment with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the

judgment.” In re Guardianship of J.K., 862 N.E.2d 686, 691 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)In re

Guardianship of J.K., 862 N.E.2d 686, 691 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

I. Abandonment [13] Kaur contends that the juvenile court erred in failing to find that S.S. had been

abandoned by his parents due to using an inappropriate legal standard.

Specifically, Kaur argues that the juvenile court, instead of defining

“abandonment” as “the deprivation of requisite support and the demonstration

of an intent to permanently terminate the parent child relationship[,]” Order p.

12, should have adopted the definition of “abandoned” from the Indiana Child

Custody Jurisdiction Act: “left without provision for reasonable and necessary

care or supervision.” Ind. Code § 31-21-2-2.

[14] We need not choose between these two options, however, because the juvenile

court’s findings regarding possible abandonment fail to satisfy either one. Kaur

focuses on whether one needs to prove that an abandonment is permanent, but

the juvenile court found that there was no abandonment at all, permanent or

otherwise: “The Court does not find evidence that [S.S.] was abandoned. He

was living in the home of his parents before he came to the United States. The

parents have not relinquished their role as parents.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-GU-2154 | December 27, 2024 Page 7 of 10 13. This finding is supported by the evidence. As the juvenile court noted,

there is evidence that S.S.’s parents told him to leave home for his safety but not

that they abandoned him. S.S.’s passage to North America was financed by

unknown members of his family, and he was taken in by a family member

when he arrived in Indiana. We agree that this evidence strongly implies

parental support, not abandonment.

[15] Kaur draws our attention to evidence tending to show abandonment, including

an affidavit from S.S.’s parents, in which they have averred that they have, in

fact, abandoned him. The juvenile court, however, was under no obligation to

credit this evidence and did not. See In re Guardianship of J.K., 862 N.E.2d at

691. Kaur’s argument in this regard is nothing more than an invitation to

reweigh the evidence, which we will not do.

II. Neglect [16] Kaur also contends that the juvenile court erred in failing to find that S.S.’s

parents neglected him, a term that is not defined statutorily in this context.

[W]hen a statutory term is undefined, the legislature directs us to interpret the term using its “plain, or ordinary and usual, sense.” [Town of Brownsburg v. Fight Against Brownsburg Annexation, 124 N.E.3d 597, 605 (Ind. 2019)Town of Brownsburg v. Fight Against Brownsburg Annexation, 124 N.E.3d 597, 605 (Ind. 2019)] (quoting I.C. § 1-1-4-1(1)). We generally avoid legal or other specialized dictionaries for such purposes and turn instead to general-language dictionaries.

Rainbow Realty Grp., Inc. v. Carter, 131 N.E.3d 168, 174 (Ind. 2019)Rainbow

Realty Grp., Inc. v. Carter, 131 N.E.3d 168, 174 (Ind. 2019). “Neglect” may be

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-GU-2154 | December 27, 2024 Page 8 of 10 defined as “to fail to attend to sufficiently or properly [or] not give proper

attention or care to[.]” WEBSTER’S 3D NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 1513 (Phillip

Babcock Gove et al. eds., G.&C. Merriam Company 1964). Regarding alleged

neglect, the juvenile court found that S.S. “did receive food and clothing from

his father. While the family would be considered poor, the basic necessities

were met. [S.S.] testified that he was attending public school.” Appellant’s

App. Vol. II p. 14. We agree with the juvenile court that occasional deprivation

does necessarily prove a failure to give proper attention or care, and that, if

anything, the evidence establishes the opposite. As the juvenile court observed

in its order on Kaur’s motion to correct error,

What the Petitioner asserts to be neglect, would be evidence of poverty. There is also evidence that the family did provide necessities to the Petitioner, the family paid for education and the international travel was paid by the family. A desire for safety and betterment does not equate to neglect.

Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 12. Kaur (as she did with abandonment) points to

evidence, including S.S.’s parents’ affidavit, tending to prove neglect. As

mentioned, however, the juvenile court was under no obligation to credit any of

this testimony and apparently did not. See In re Guardianship of J.K., 862 N.E.2d

at 691In re Guardianship of J.K., 862 N.E.2d at 691. Kaur’s argument on this

point is a request to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do.

[17] We affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.

Bailey, J., and Foley, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-GU-2154 | December 27, 2024 Page 9 of 10 ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Thomas R. Ruge Joseph P. Rompala Allison L. Upchurch Lewis & Kappes, P.C. Indianapolis, Indiana

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-GU-2154 | December 27, 2024 Page 10 of 10