In the Matter of the Expungement of the Criminal Records of Sonia Harris

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: July 21, 2025
• Docket: A-0329-23
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0329-23

IN THE MATTER OF THE EXPUNGEMENT OF THE CRIMINAL RECORDS OF SONIA HARRIS. _______________________

Submitted May 5, 2025 – Decided July 21, 2025

Before Judges Gummer and Berdote Byrne.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County, Docket No. XP-22-001776.

Lomurro Munson, LLC, attorneys for appellant Sonia Harris (Emeka Nkwuo, on the brief).

William A. Daniel, Union County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent State of New Jersey (Michele C. Buckley, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Petitioner Sonia Harris appeals from a September 28, 2023 order denying

her petition for expungement of her criminal record. The trial court denied the

petition, finding the need for the availability of the record outweighed the petitioner's benefit from the expungement. Because the trial court properly held

that the need for the availability of petitioner's criminal records outweighed the

benefits of expungement pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:52-14, we affirm.

I.

Petitioner is a former attorney who obtained her Juris Doctor from Seton

Hall University School of Law and her Master of Business Administration from

Rutgers University. As an attorney, petitioner represented George Shamond

Scott, a real estate developer. State v. Harris, 373 N.J. Super. 253, 257 (App.

Div. 2004). Scott would contract to buy property and sell it before legally

acquiring it. He "also purchased property and acquired multiple mortgages

without paying off the existing mortgage." Ibid. Petitioner:

was the closing attorney in some of these transactions. [Petitioner] failed to file and record title documents and failed to disclose pre-existing mortgages. [Petitioner] also maintained an attorney trust account for the funds derived from the illicit transactions and drew checks to the order of Scott, to cash, or to another recipient. Scott paid [petitioner] a total of $14,000 in legal fees.

[Ibid.]

On April 6, 2001, a Union County Grand Jury charged petitioner with: (1)

first-degree conspiracy to commit money laundering, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and

N.J.S.A. 2C:21-25(c); (2) first-degree money laundering, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-

A-0329-23 2 25(b)(1), and N.J.S.A. 2C:20-6; (3) second-degree conspiracy to commit theft

by deception, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and N.J.S.A. 2C:20-4; (4) second-degree theft by

deception, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-4 and N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6; and (5) second-degree

misapplication of entrusted property, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-15 and N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6.

Id. at 256. On July 5, 2002, a jury convicted her on all counts. Id. at 257.

Petitioner was sentenced to eighteen years of incarceration and ordered to pay

$110,405 in restitution, fines, and fees. Ibid. On July 10, 2006, defendant was

released on parole.

In April 2007, petitioner was hired as an assistant assessor for the City of

East Orange Department of Property Taxation. However, petitioner could not

obtain a certification to become a certified tax assessor because of her prior

criminal conviction. Due to this obstacle, in 2022, petitioner filed a petition for

expungement, requesting the court grant an expungement order as authorized by

N.J.S.A. 2C:52-1 to -32.1. The State objected, arguing the need for the

availability of the records outweighed any benefit expungement might confer on

petitioner. The State also claimed petitioner's eligibility could not be

determined at the time the petition was filed because of the pending restitution,

fines, and fees in the amount of $110,405 and requested proof of payment.

A-0329-23 3 At the subsequent hearing, when asked if petitioner had made payments

on the $110,405 owed in restitution and fines, petitioner explained the money

had been taken out of her tax refunds. When the trial court requested proof of

payment, petitioner was unable to provide proof, stating the amount had been

converted to a judgment.

The trial court denied the petition for expungement, finding "the offenses

that [petitioner] was convicted of and sentenced to [eighteen] years for . . .

undermined the public's confidence in the legal system" but also noting, "this

court certainly commends [petitioner] that she has been out since 2006. She has

been gainfully employed since 2007. And those facts weigh in her favor."

Referencing N.J.S.A. 2C:52-14(b), the court stated, "[a] petition shall be

denied when the need for the availability of the record outweighs the desirability

of having a person freed from any disabilities as otherwise provided in this

Chapter." In denying the petition, the judge explained:

[M]y concern is that [petitioner] was in a licensed position of trust to the public when she committed these offenses. They were financial crimes. And although I know she has been in the position since 2007, I believe that the Licensing Board, as well as any potential future employers have a right to know that [petitioner] was convicted of very serious first- and second-degree crimes, in fraudulent financial transactions, for which she was convicted and sentenced to a significant period of incarceration.

A-0329-23 4 The judge held:

[Petitioner] betrayed her trust as an attorney. She took an oath of office when she became an attorney. And she violated those oath [sic], and she was disbarred for it. And I do think that in this situation the public, the Licensing Board, and future employers have a right to know based on the seriousness of the offense, and the fact that it is a financial position, a fiduciary position that she is seeking, and she was in a fiduciary position when she committed these offenses. I do think that in this particular situation the public, future employers[,] and a Licensing Board their need to know outweighs [petitioner's] need to be free from these disabilities.

This appeal followed.

II.

Because a trial court's denial of an expungement petition and its statutory

interpretation of N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a) and N.J.S.A. 2C:52-14(b) are legal

determinations, our review is de novo. See In re Expungement Application of

K.M.G., 477 N.J. Super. 167, 173 (App. Div. 2023) ("Our review of statutory

interpretation is 'de novo, unconstrained by deference to the decisions of the trial

court.'" (quoting State v. Grate, 220 N.J. 317, 329 (2015))); In re Kollman, 210

N.J. 557, 578 (2012) ("We review legal questions de novo.").

On appeal, petitioner argues the State presented insufficient evidence that

the need for the availability of records outweighs any benefit of expungement,

A-0329-23 5 and the court considered irrelevant factors in the denial of petitioner's

expungement petition.

Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a), a petitioner may petition for

expungement five years after completing his or her sentence without a

subsequent conviction. Kollman, 210 N.J. at 562 (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a)).

A petitioner who applies for expungement has the "initial burden to satisfy the

requirements of the expungement statute by a preponderance of the evidence."

In re Petition for Expungement of the Crim. Rec. Belonging to T.O., 244 N.J.

514, 524 (2021). In that regard, petitioners must present verified petitions

establishing certain facts. See N.J.S.A. 2C:52-7 to -8. Among the

representations a petitioner must establish are that she does not "otherwise have

any subsequent conviction for another crime or offense in addition to those

convictions included in the expungement application, whether any such

conviction was within this State or any other jurisdiction," and more than five

years have elapsed from the petitioner's "most recent conviction, payment of any

court-ordered financial assessment, satisfactory completion of probation or

parole, or release from incarceration." N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a), -8.

After the petitioner satisfies that burden, the State may still object to the

expungement based on one of the grounds listed in N.J.S.A. 2C:52-14 and must

A-0329-23 6 demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence why the petition for

expungement should not be granted. T.O., 244 N.J. at 524-25; Kollman, 210

N.J. at 573.

Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:52-14(b), an expungement may be denied if the

need for availability of records outweighs the benefits of expungement. See

T.O., 244 N.J. at 525; Kollman, 210 N.J. at 570. N.J.S.A. 2C:42-14(b) requires:

a qualitative assessment of the public and private interests at stake, which does not turn on the fact of a conviction. Otherwise, because most petitioners have a prior conviction they are seeking to expunge, section 14(b) could override much of the expungement scheme. Instead, the section places the burden on the objector to assert grounds that might weigh against expungement. Those grounds could include, among other things, the circumstances of a particular offense, details about what the [petitioner] did, and the harm the person caused.

[T.O., 244 N.J. at 536.]

The judge correctly determined the need for the availability of records

outweighed the benefits of expungement. Petitioner committed serious financial

crimes and is now attempting to expunge her record to obtain a job in the

financial field where she would act in a fiduciary capacity. Because the trial

court properly considered all relevant factors, we affirm the denial of the

petition.

A-0329-23 7 We reject petitioner's argument that the trial court relied on the clean slate

statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3, to deny expungement. Petitioner contends the court

improperly considered the argument that petitioner would be eligible for a clean

slate expungement. The clean slate statute provides any person "not otherwise

eligible to present an expungement application pursuant to any other section of

chapter 52 of Title 2C of the New Jersey Statutes" may submit a petition for

expungement "after the expiration of a period of ten years from the date of the

person's most recent conviction, payment of any court-ordered financial

assessment, satisfactory completion of probation or parole, or release from

incarceration, whichever is later." N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3(a), (b). Importantly,

petitioners eligible for expungement pursuant to any other section of the statute

may not apply for expungement pursuant to the clean slate statute. K.M.G., 477

N.J. Super. at 176.

Petitioner argues the trial court improperly considered the argument she

would be eligible for a clean slate expungement, contending the intent of the

Legislature in implementing the clean slate statute is for the automatic

expungement of the records of all eligible petitioners, and N.J.S.A. 2C:52-14(b)

"should not be used arbitrarily [to] deny eligible [petitioners] of expungements

A-0329-23 8 because the [p]rosecutor does not like the crime." Her argument is belied by the

record.

The trial court did not improperly consider the clean slate statute. The

trial court aptly found, "I have absolutely nothing before me that indicates this

is going to be automatically granted, in an automatic system" and "[c]lean [s]late

only applies when you don't qualify under any other part of the [s]tatute."

Finally, petitioner argues the trial court erred by improperly shifting the

burden to petitioner and making factual determinations based upon

representations by the prosecutor. We disagree. After finding that petitioner

had met the burden of satisfying the expungement statute's requirements by a

preponderance of the evidence, despite the lack of evidence of the payment of

the monetary aspect of the sentence, the trial court properly shifted the burden

to the State and ultimately found the State met its burden of demonstrating the

need for petitioner's records outweighed the benefits of expungement.

Accordingly, the trial court properly denied the expungement petition.

To the extent we have not addressed any of petitioner's remaining

arguments, we are satisfied they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion. R.

2:11-3(e)(2).

Affirmed.

A-0329-23 9