In the Matter of the Expungement of the Criminal Records of C.T.

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: October 1, 2025
• Docket: A-3295-23
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3295-23

IN THE MATTER OF THE EXPUNGEMENT OF THE CRIMINAL RECORDS OF C.T.1 _____________________________

Submitted September 25, 2025 – Decided October 1, 2025

Before Judges Mawla and Puglisi.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County, Docket No. XP-22-002565.

Alfred V. Gellene, attorney for appellant C.T.

Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for respondent New Jersey Department of Corrections (Sookie Bae-Park, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Kendall J. Collins, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Appellant C.T. appeals from a June 19, 2024 order granting respondent

the New Jersey Department of Corrections (DOC) access and the ability to use

1 We use appellant's initials pursuant to Rule 1:38-3(c)(7). appellant's expunged criminal records in a disciplinary hearing before the Office

of Administrative Law (OAL). We affirm.

Appellant was employed by the DOC as a senior corrections officer. On

October 30, 2017, she was served with a complaint, arrested, and charged with

fourth-degree cruelty and neglect of children, N.J.S.A. 9:6-3, after her child

appeared at school with bruised arms. At 5:24 a.m. the following day, appellant

requested an unscheduled administrative leave day, but did not inform the DOC

of her arrest until 7:10 p.m. that evening.

On November 3, 2017, the DOC filed and served a preliminary notice of

disciplinary action (PNDA) on appellant. The PNDA charged her with: conduct

unbecoming a public employee, N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(6); other sufficient cause,

N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(12); actions involving criminal matters, N.J.A.C. 4A:2-

2.7; and forfeiture of employment, N.J.S.A. 2C:51.2. Appellant was

immediately suspended, pending a disciplinary hearing held on November 14,

2017. At the hearing, a hearing officer found sufficient evidence to support the

charges and suspended appellant without pay.

On June 27, 2018, the criminal charges were dismissed without prejudice

and appellant was reinstated to her position on September 28, 2018. On October

A-3295-23 2 2, 2018, a grand jury indicted appellant on second-degree abuse and neglect of

a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2).

As a result of the renewed charges, the DOC issued a new PNDA on

January 9, 2019. The new disciplinary charges alleged appellant failed to timely

notify the DOC of her arrest as required by the DOC's policies and standards.

The DOC immediately suspended appellant.

On June 28, 2019, appellant enrolled in a pretrial intervention program

(PTI), and she completed it on May 12, 2022. The indictment was then

dismissed. On July 26, 2023, appellant applied for and was granted an

expungement of her criminal record pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:52-1 to -32.1 (the

expungement statute).

The DOC issued a final notice of disciplinary action (FNDA) terminating

her employment on December 6, 2023. The FNDA sustained the charges of:

conduct unbecoming a public employee, N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(6); other

sufficient cause, N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(12); violation of DOC Human Resource

Bulletin 84-17 as amended; conduct unbecoming an employee, C-11; and

violation of a rule, regulation, policy, procedure, order, or administrative

decision, E-1. Appellant challenged the FNDA, and her appeal was transmitted

to the OAL as a contested case.

A-3295-23 3 The DOC filed a verified petition in the Law Division for release of

appellant's criminal records, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:52-19, for use in the OAL

hearing. It argued it needed all the facts from the criminal proceedings because

if appellant prevailed on her appeal, she would be returned to work as a

corrections officer with the ability to exercise police powers. This constituted

both good cause and a compelling need for release of the expunged records,

pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:52-19. The statute was also satisfied because the

records sought were the object of the disciplinary appeal and therefore, the

request was tailored to the scope of the issues to be addressed in the appeal.

In opposition, appellant argued granting the DOC's petition would vitiate

the purpose of the expungement, which is to treat the expunged matter as if it

never happened. Pursuant to In re D.H., the records sought had to be directly

related to her job duties. 204 N.J. 7 (2010). She asserted they were not because

unproven allegations of abuse or neglect had no connection with her duties as a

corrections officer. Appellant also claimed laches barred the DOC's petition

because it had the chance to object to the expunged records and did not do so.

On June 19, 2024, the motion judge issued an order granting the DOC's

petition. One month later, the judge issued a written opinion amplifying the

June order with his reasons for granting the petition.

A-3295-23 4 The judge found D.H. inapposite because the case concerned "whether a

forfeiture order in a civil suit would fall under the scope of an expunged

conviction." Instead, the judge focused on the plain language of N.J.S.A. 2C:52-

19, which states "upon motion for good cause shown and compelling need based

on specific facts . . . [l]eave to inspect [expunged records] shall be granted by

the court only in those instances where the subject matter of the records of arrest

. . . is the object of litigation or judicial proceedings."

The judge found the DOC's petition met the statutory prerequisites. The

DOC demonstrated a compelling need and good cause for the record because it

had the burden of proof in disciplinary proceedings, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-

1.4(a). Given the "considerable authority" possessed by corrections officers, the

information sought by the DOC was "vital [so] that any disciplinary action taken

against an employee is adjudicated fairly and accurately to preserve the safety

of the public." Practically, the judge observed "there is no way [the] DOC can

prove its administrative charges . . . without [the] evidence[,] which implicates

her expunged charges."

The judge determined appellant's "removal from her position as a

corrections officer was clearly a direct result of [the disposition of her criminal

matter.]" Her "appeal of that removal commenced the pending administrative

A-3295-23 5 hearing at issue. Thus, it is evident . . . that the subject matter of [appellant]'s

expunged records is the object of the pending litigation in the OAL."

The judge rejected the laches argument because although the DOC sought

the documents well after the expungement proceeding had concluded and could

have objected to the expungement itself, these facts were not tantamount to

barring a consideration of the expunged records in the disciplinary case. The

FNDA and appellant's removal occurred on December 6, 2023. However,

"[b]efore her [a]ppeal, there was no litigation pending[,] which would [have]

incentivized the DOC to access and save [appellant]'s records, nor reject her

application for [e]xpungement."

I.

Rulings on matters of law, including the applicability, validity, or

interpretation of statutes, are reviewed de novo. In re Ridgefield Park Bd. of

Educ., 244 N.J. 1, 17 (2020). As a result, "[a] trial court's interpretation of the

law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled

to any special deference." Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Co., 239 N.J. 531, 552 (2019)

(alteration in original) (quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of

Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

A-3295-23 6 We review the denial of equitable remedies for an abuse of discretion. See

Sears Mortg. Corp. v. Rose, 134 N.J. 326, 354 (1993). "[A] functional approach

to abuse of discretion examines whether there are good reasons for an appellate

court to defer to the particular decision at issue." Flagg v. Essex Cnty.

Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002).

II.

Appellant argues the motion judge erred because the bar to pierce the

protections afforded by the expungement statute is high. That bar was not met

since the DOC did not demonstrate good cause or a compelling need for the

expunged information, as it did not indicate what information was essential to

prove the disciplinary charges. Appellant points to D.H. and claims the judge

did not adhere to its holding to determine whether the expunged charges touched

upon her employment. As a result, the judge's finding that the records sought

by the DOC were the object of litigation was erroneous.

Appellant contends the judge ignored the plain language of the

expungement statute. If the judge's interpretation is affirmed, every time the

factual basis for the expunged charges is at issue in a disciplinary matter, the

expunged records could be accessed.

A-3295-23 7 Further, the judge erred when he found appellant's removal was due to her

criminal conviction since she was never convicted. The mere event of her arrest

was not the basis for her removal.

A.

The expungement statute's "primary objective" is to "provid[e] relief to

the reformed offender who has led a life of rectitude and disassociated

[themselves] with unlawful activity." N.J.S.A. 2C:52-32. Our Supreme Court

has held the statute's provisions "do[] not include the wholesale rewriting of

history" and "it does not alter the metaphysical truth of [defendant's] past, nor

does it impose a regime of silence on those who know the truth." G.D. v. Kenny,

205 N.J. 275, 294-95, 302 (2011).

When records are expunged, they are not destroyed, but rather isolated so

that the records may not be "utilized or referred to for any purpose." N.J.S.A.

2C:52-15(a); see also N.J.S.A. 2C:52-27 ("[T]he arrest, conviction and any

proceedings related thereto shall be deemed not to have occurred . . . ."); States

Newsroom, Inc. v. City of Jersey City, 261 N.J. 392, 408-09 (2025) (discussing

the construction of the expungement statute and its effects). However, the

expungement statute, specifically N.J.S.A. 2C:52-19, contains exceptions

permitting the disclosure of expunged records.

A-3295-23 8 Our role in statutory construction "is to effectuate legislative intent," with

the "best source for . . . legislative intent [being found in] the very language used

by the [L]egislature." Gilleran v. Twp. of Bloomfield, 227 N.J. 159, 171-72

(2016). We must "ascribe to the statutory words their ordinary meaning and

significance, Lane v. Holderman, 23 N.J. 304, 313 (1957), and read them in

context with related provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole,

Chasin v. Montclair State Univ., 159 N.J. 418, 426-27 (1999)." DiProspero v.

Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005). "If the language is clear, the court's job is

complete." In re Expungement Application of D.J.B., 216 N.J. 433, 440 (2014).

N.J.S.A. 2C:52-19 sets forth the requirements that must be met before

expunged records may be reviewed or inspected on the orders of a trial court,

namely, "good cause"; a "compelling need"; and the subject matter of the

requested expunged records must be the "object of litigation or judicial

proceedings." When those statutory elements are met, then as a matter of law,

a court may permit the inspection of expunged records.

Our Supreme Court has held that "good cause" is a "flexible standard"

imposed on the party seeking the records. N.J. Div. of Child Prot. &

Permanency v. A.P., 258 N.J. 266, 280 (2024). The standard does not have a

precise definition or framework, but rather "[i]ts application requires the

A-3295-23 9 exercise of sound discretion in light of the facts and circumstances of the

particular case considered in the context of the purposes of the [statute or rule]

being applied." Ibid. (alterations in original). "[C]ompelling need based on

specific facts" is an elevated standard, which requires a moving party "to explain

in detail why categories of . . . information that may be among the expunged

records are needed in the pending case." Id. at 280-81.

In A.P., the defendant was charged with child endangerment after his child

suffered serious brain injuries. Id. at 273. A grand jury declined to indict A.P.

on criminal charges but a Title 9 child and abuse proceeding previously

commenced by the New Jersey Division of Child Protection & Permanency

(Division) against A.P. was continued. Id. at 273. A.P.'s criminal records were

expunged because of the failure to indict, but the Division sought to vacate the

expungement and, under N.J.S.A. 2C:52-19, moved to use the records for a

limited purpose in the Title 9 proceeding against A.P. Id. at 274-75. The trial

court found N.J.S.A. 2C:52-19's standard was met and granted the Division a

limited order to review the expunged records in connection with the Title 9

hearing. Id. at 275.

On appeal, our Supreme Court held there was good cause shown for the

records because of the "close nexus between [the Division's] investigation . . .

A-3295-23 10 and the . . . Prosecutor's Office's arrest and prosecution of [A.P.]." Id. at 284.

Additionally, the Division met its burden regarding the "compelling need based

on specific facts" because the only witnesses to the incident were A.P., the

child's mother, and the child, who was "incapable of recounting the incident."

Ibid. As a result, the "expunged records . . . may provide crucial evidence that

cannot be obtained from other sources." Ibid.

The Court also held that a criminal prosecution and a Title 9 proceeding

satisfy the expungement statute's "object of litigation or judicial proceeding"

requirement because the record reflected that the injuries sustained by the child

were the basis for both actions. Id. at 284-85. Therefore, the use of the

expunged records in the Title 9 proceeding met the requirements of N.J.S.A.

2C:52-19. Id. at 285.

Here, the DOC clearly established good cause for appellant's expunged

records because they relate to the OAL proceeding and form the basis for

appellant's termination. As in A.P., where the Division sought the limited use

of the records in a Title 9 proceeding, the issue here involves access to expunged

records for limited use in factually intertwined litigation proceedings. Id. at

284-85.

A-3295-23 11 Also, like A.P., where the Court found a compelling need because there

were limited witnesses to the incident and the records could provide crucial

evidence, here the DOC met its burden of showing a compelling need because

the disciplinary charge is based on appellant's expunged criminal charges. Id.

at 283-84. The expunged records are likely to provide crucial evidence for the

DOC to meet its burden of proof in defending the termination decision in the

disciplinary appeal. Just as the Division's child abuse and neglect proceeding in

A.P. constituted an "object of litigation or judicial proceedings" under N.J.S.A.

2C:52-19, the subject matter of appellant's criminal matter and her pending OAL

hearing are the same. Id. at 271.

The motion judge correctly found the elements of N.J.S.A. 2C:52-19 were

met. His order granting the DOC access to the expunged records did not

misapply the law.

Appellant's argument that D.H. controls lacks merit. D.H. involved a

detective, who inappropriately used the Criminal Justice Information System to

conduct an unauthorized search of criminal records for a private employer. 204

N.J. at 10. D.H. was charged with a disorderly conduct offense and unauthorized

access to a computer. Id. at 11. She entered a plea agreement, which included

a mandatory order of forfeiture of public employment. Ibid. Nine years later,

A-3295-23 12 D.H. was granted an expungement of her criminal record. Id. at 13. The trial

court and we affirmed the forfeiture was a "collateral consequence" to the

expungement because it "involved or touched" on her work and therefore,

voided the forfeiture order. Id. at 13-15.

Our Supreme Court held that while expungement of D.H.'s conviction was

proper, the expungement statute did not require the expungement of a statutorily

required forfeiture order. Id. at 24. The Court noted that while D.H.'s conviction

"involved and touched" her employment, the forfeiture order was separate from

the expungement under N.J.S.A. 2C:52-27, which states the effect of an

expungement order is that "[u]nless otherwise provided by law, the arrest,

conviction and any proceedings related thereto shall be deemed not to have

occurred." D.H., 204 N.J. at 22. The Court held the "[u]nless otherwise

provided by law" language provided the basis for exceptions to N.J.S.A. 2C:52-

27. Id. at 24 (alteration in original).

The Court harmonized the expungement and forfeiture statutes. It

observed the former "allows for 'providing relief to the one-time offender who

has led a life of rectitude and disassociated [themself] with unlawful activity,'

N.J.S.A. 2C:52-32," while the latter insures "'any person convicted of an offense

involving or touching on [their] public office, position or employment shall be

A-3295-23 13 forever disqualified from holding any office or position of honor, trust or profit

under this State or any of its administrative or political subdivisions[,]' N.J.S.A.

2C:51-2(d)." Id. at 25 (third alteration in original) (emphasis omitted).

D.H. is inapplicable because the issue here is not whether the

expungement of a conviction also expunges the record of a collateral

consequence of the conviction. The issue in appellant's case is whether a

previously expunged record can be used in a subsequent civil proceeding under

the expungement statute's exceptions. We conclude it can.

III.

Appellant reiterates the laches argument she made to the motion judge.

She contends the DOC had seven years to obtain the records to determine her

employment status. Because she completed PTI in May 2022 and the indictment

was subsequently dismissed, the case was no longer pending. Therefore, the

judge's finding that her disciplinary charges remained pending at the time of the

expungement of her record was error. Even so, the DOC had the opportunity to

object to her expungement application and knew as early as 2017 that more

information would be required but did not act. As a matter of public policy and

in the interests of the finality of judgments, the DOC should not be granted

access to her expungement records.

A-3295-23 14 Laches is an equitable remedy that applies when "a party sleeps on [its]

rights to the harm or detriment of others." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v.

F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 445 (2012). The remedy "is invoked to deny a party

enforcement of a known right when the party engages in an inexcusable and

unexplained delay in exercising that right to the prejudice of the other party."

Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169, 180-81 (2003). A court must consider the: length

of the delay; reasons for the delay; and "changing conditions of either or both

parties during the delay." Id. at 181.

As the motion judge noted, laches did not apply because appellant's

termination was not finalized until the FNDA was issued on December 6, 2023.

Appellant's challenge to the FNDA in January 2024 is what required the DOC

to seek the expunged records to adjudicate the disciplinary appeal. The DOC

did not sleep on its rights, and given the context, the delay in seeking the

expunged records was excusable. And aside from the fact that the records

obtained by the DOC may result in an adverse outcome in the disciplinary

matter, appellant has not explained how she was prejudiced by the alleged delay

in the disclosure of the expunged records.

A-3295-23 15 To the extent we have not addressed arguments raised on appeal, it is

because they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R.

2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.

A-3295-23 16