In the Matter of the Estate of Veronica E. Carter

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: April 28, 2026
• Docket: A-2767-24
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2767-24

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF VERONICA E. CARTER, deceased,

JAMAL CARTER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

SHAINA NAYA JONES,

Defendant-Respondent. _________________________

Submitted April 21, 2026 – Decided April 28, 2026

Before Judges Perez Friscia and Vinci.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Camden County, Docket No. CP-000266-24.

Jamal Carter, self-represented appellant.

Respondent has not filed a brief.

PER CURIAM Petitioner Jamal Carter, self-represented, appeals from the April 10, 2025

Chancery Division, Probate Part order denying his motion for the trial court's

recusal.1 Jamal also appeals from the April 4, 2025 order granting summary

judgment dismissal of his complaint, which contested the admission of Veronica

E. Carter's Last Will and Testament (Will) to probate. He additionally appeals

from a companion order denying his motion to invalidate the Will based on fraud

and to vacate prior orders. Having reviewed the record, Jamal's arguments, and

applicable law, we affirm.

I.

On October 14, 2023, Veronica executed her Will, revoking any

previously signed testamentary instruments.2 Veronica's signing of her Will was

witnessed by her friends, Tonya Little and Wakida Townsend, who were present

1 Because this matter involves family members with the same surname, we use their first names. We intend no disrespect. 2 Jamal has failed to submit in his appendix a copy of Veronica's entire Will, which he alleges the court erred in admitting to probate. Additionally, he has submitted only parts of documents he references as material on appeal. See R. 2:6-1(a)(1)(I) (stating the appendix must contain parts of the record "essential to the proper consideration of the issues"). "We are not 'obliged to attempt review of an issue when the relevant portions of the record are not included.'" State v. D.F.W., 468 N.J. Super. 422, 447 (App. Div. 2021) (quoting Cmty. Hosp. Grp., Inc. v. Blume Goldfaden Berkowitz Donnelly Fried & Forte, P.C. , 381 N.J. Super. 119, 127 (App. Div. 2005)). We have nevertheless considered his arguments based on the record provided. A-2767-24 2 at Veronica's residence when she signed the Will. Veronica initialed each page

of the Will. She thereafter passed away on August 7, 2024.

Veronica had one biological son, Jamal. In separate provisions of the

Will, Veronica stated, "I have intentionally left no provision in this . . . Will

. . . for JAMAL," and "I have purposely left no provisions in this. . . Will . . . for

JAMAL." Veronica's Will also stated she had "the following children: JAMAL

. . . and SHAINA JONES." Veronica bequeathed Jones her entire estate and

appointed Jones as the "[e]xecutor of [the] Will." The Will named Jones as her

"beneficiary" and "[her] daughter," listing Jones' address and a partially redacted

social security number. Jones, while not Veronica's biological daughter, had a

familial type of relationship with Veronica and called her "mom."

On October 3, 2024, Jamal filed a verified complaint and order to show

cause (OTSC) requesting the court to restrain Jones from taking any action,

invalidate Veronica's Will, remove Jones as the executor, appoint him as the

administrator of Veronica's estate, require Jones to return dispersed assets and

provide an "accounting," and order an investigation of Jones. Jamal argued

Jones was not Veronica's daughter and because Veronica's Will referenced Jones

as her daughter, "it invalidate[d] the [W]ill." Regarding his relationship with

his mother, Jamal contended it did not "matter" whether he "ha[d] a relationship

A-2767-24 3 with" her. He further argued the Will was "not notarized" nor prepared by "legal

counsel."

On November 18, 2024, the court issued an order denying without

prejudice Jamal's application to invalidate the Will and be appointed as the

administrator of Veronica's estate. However, the court granted the request for

Jones to provide an informal accounting. Jones was also ordered to "marshal"

the assets without making any "disbursements." The court recognized Jones was

"paying the mortgage payments from her own funds." The court directed the

parties to conduct discovery within ninety days. Jamal thereafter moved for

reconsideration of the November 18, 2024 order, which the court denied.

After Jones moved for permission to sell Veronica's residence, the court

on January 24, 2025, appointed Carla Fowler as the Administrator CTA pursuant

to N.J.S.A. 3B:10-15. Fowler was authorized to sell Veronica's residence and

hold the proceeds in escrow, pending resolution of Jamal's will contest. On

January 27, 2025, Jamal moved to stay "all probate proceedings" because he had

referred Jones to police for a "criminal investigation" and there was a pending

municipal court proceeding. The court denied the stay and ordered that Fowler's

sale of Veronica's residence was "not to be interfered with by any party." Jamal

A-2767-24 4 had filed a lis pendens on the property that was later "discharged" on February

21, 2025.

On February 27, 2025, Jones moved for summary judgment, seeking

dismissal of Jamal's complaint. Jamal opposed the motion, contending there

were material issues of fact regarding the validity of the Will, Jones' fraudulent

actions, and whether Veronica was under undue influence and had capacity to

execute the Will. He specifically asserted there were "[s]uspicious

[c]ircumstances" and "capacity questions" surrounding the execution of the

Will.

On March 4, 2025, Jamal cross-moved for the court to issue "an immediate

written ruling on [Jones'] documented fraud" and to vacate all prior adverse

probate orders. He argued Jones had conducted unauthorized financial

transactions and breached her fiduciary duties because Veronica's death

certificate wrongly listed Jones as a daughter and Veronica's residence was sold

in error. He also filed an OTSC to stay the proceedings and reinstate his lis

pendens filed against Veronica's residence. 3

On March 6, 2025, Jamal moved for the court's recusal from hearing his

applications. Jamal accused the court of "improper directives and

3 We note it is unclear from the record the date on which the OTSC was filed. A-2767-24 5 communications[, which] create[d] the appearance of ex parte coordination" and

"systematic bias." Jamal further alleged there was a conflict of interest between

the court "and the Camden County Surrogate's Office," enabling a "fraudulent

scheme" and compromising "the integrity of the judicial process."

On April 4, 2025, the court heard argument on Jones' summary judgment

motion and Jamal's cross-motions. The court first heard Jamal's motion for

recusal, specifically addressing his accusations that the court had played a

"pivotal role in facilitating a fraudulent scheme" and there was "an inherent

conflict of interest" between the court and the Surrogate's Office. The court

denied the motion, finding Jamal "presented absolutely no information to . . .

support any of" the allegations and his statements of a grand fraudulent scheme

were "unsupported."

Regarding his motion to invalidate the Will and vacate prior orders, Jamal

argued Jones used Veronica's credit card "to pay for funeral expenses" and was

not an authorized user on the credit card. He argued Jones was fraudulently

listed on Veronica's death certificate as "daughter." Jones responded that "[n]o

fraud was committed in the listing of [her name] as daughter in either . . .

[Veronica's] [W]ill" or on "the death certificate." She explained Veronica

referred to her as "daughter" and she called Veronica "mother."

A-2767-24 6 The court denied Jamal's motion, finding his allegations were unsupported

and did not provide "any basis or reason to invalidate [Veronica's] [W]ill . . .

that [wa]s . . . properly executed." The court explained that while Jones was

undisputedly not Veronica's daughter, Veronica was not prevented from using

the term "daughter" and bequeathing Jones her estate. The court further denied

Jamal's OTSC to stay proceedings and reinstate the lis pendens filed against

Veronica's residence.

In support of her summary judgment motion, Jones argued the undisputed

material facts supported dismissing Jamal's complaint because the validity of

Veronica's Will was established. Regarding Jamal's assertions of undue

influence and lack of capacity, Jones highlighted that Veronica had a terminal

illness, but she was "competent" and exercised her "testamentary intent on

October 14[, 2023,] when she created and signed her . . . [W]ill." Jones argued

no "undue influence was exerted upon . . . [Veronica] to create her [W]ill or to

disinherit her son, Jamal." She asserted the supporting affidavits established the

Will's validity and Jamal "ha[d] not provided one element of proof or fact to

substantiate any of his allegations." Jamal countered that Veronica's Will was

"self-authored," Little was a "proven colluder," Veronica was under undue

A-2767-24 7 influence as she was "[sixty-six] years of age and . . . had a terminal illness,"

and Jones was "not blood related."

After argument, the court granted Jones' summary judgment motion,

finding Veronica's Will was "signed," "initial[ed]" on "every page," and

"witnessed" by Little and Townsend. While observing Jamal found it difficult

to be "specifically disinherit[ed]" by his mother, the court found he failed to

demonstrate any support of undue influence or lack of capacity to prevent

granting summary judgment. The court determined Jamal's "supposition and

conspiracy theories" were insufficient to "invalidate the [W]ill" and "shift the

burden to" Jones.

On appeal, Jamal argues reversal is warranted because: (1) the court "lost

jurisdiction by refus[ing] to adjudicate [his] fraud allegations," resulting in "all

subsequent orders [being] void ab initio"; (2) the court "refus[ed] to adjudicate

fraud under N.J.S.A. 3B:1-9 before proceeding," "violat[ing] mandatory law and

render[ing] all orders void"; (3) the Will falsely lists "two children," "creat[ing]

an inescapable legal trap where all scenarios render the [W]ill void as a matter

of law"; (4) "violation[s] of mandatory probate procedures denied due process

and voids all proceedings ab initio"; and (5) the court's "grant[ing] of summary

A-2767-24 8 judgment [while there were] pending criminal proceedings and with knowledge

of estate-funded defense violated due process."

II.

Our review of a trial court's summary judgment decision is de novo.

DeSimone v. Springpoint Senior Living, Inc., 256 N.J. 172, 180 (2024); see also

R. 4:46-2(c). "The court's function is not 'to weigh the evidence and determine

the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for

trial.'" Rios v. Meda Pharm., Inc., 247 N.J. 1, 13 (2021) (quoting Brill v.

Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995)). "A dispute of material

fact is 'genuine only if, considering the burden of persuasion at trial, the

evidence submitted by the parties on the motion, together with all legitimate

inferences therefrom favoring the non-moving party, would require submission

of the issue to the trier of fact.'" Gayles by Gayles v. Sky Zone Trampoline

Park, 468 N.J. Super. 17, 22 (App. Div. 2021) (quoting Grande v. Saint Clare's

Health Sys., 230 N.J. 1, 24 (2017)).

"Summary judgment should be granted 'if the discovery and any affidavits

show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that

the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law.'"

DeSimone, 256 N.J. at 180-81 (quoting Perez v. Professionally Green, LLC, 215

A-2767-24 9 N.J. 388, 405 (2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Insubstantial

arguments based on assumptions or speculation are not enough to overcome

summary judgment. Brill, 142 N.J. at 529; see also Dickson v. Cmty. Bus Lines,

Inc., 458 N.J. Super. 522, 533 (App. Div. 2019) ("'[C]onclusory and self-serving

assertions by one of the parties are insufficient to overcome' a motion for

summary judgment." (quoting Puder v. Buechel, 183 N.J. 428, 440-41 (2005))).

A will executed in accordance with N.J.S.A. 3B:3-2 shall be: "(1) in

writing"; "(2) signed by the testator"; and "(3) signed by at least two individuals,

each of whom signed within a reasonable time after each witnessed either the

signing of the will . . . or the testator's acknowledgment of that signature or

acknowledgment of the will." A document that fails to strictly comply with

the provisions of N.J.S.A. 3B:3-2 can be admitted as a will if "the proponent of

the document or writing establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the

decedent intended the document or writing to constitute . . . the decedent's will."

N.J.S.A. 3B:3-3.

It is presumed that a testator was competent and of sound mind when he

or she executed a will. Haynes v. First Nat'l State Bank of N.J., 87 N.J. 163,

175-76 (1981). The court should admit a testator's will to probate when "the

evidence is compelling as to the testamentary sufficiency of the document, its

A-2767-24 10 preparation[,] and [its] reflection of decedent's intent." In re Est. of Ehrlich, 427

N.J. Super. 64, 76 (App. Div. 2012).

Rule 4:85-1 states that once a will is probated, or letters testamentary are

issued by the Surrogate's Court, "any person aggrieved by that action may, upon

the filing of a complaint[,] . . . obtain an order requiring the personal

representative . . . to show cause why the probate should not be set aside or

modified or the grant of letters of appointment vacated."

III.

We first address Jamal's contentions that the court erred in refusing to

adjudicate his allegations of fraud. The record demonstrates the court fully

considered all of Jamal's fraud allegations and determined he failed to show a

material issue of fact supported invalidating the Will. The court correctly found

Veronica was permitted to execute a self-authored will and was not required to

have her signature notarized. Additionally, Veronica's naming Jones as her

"daughter" was insufficient to support fraud. Jamal offered no material facts

refuting that Veronica signed her Will, which Little and Townsend witnessed,

and the Will had Veronica's initials on each page. Therefore, the court's finding

that Veronica's Will satisfied N.J.S.A. 3B:3-2 is sufficiently supported by the

record.

A-2767-24 11 Further, Jamal demonstrated no evidence that there was undue influence

or lack of capacity. We are unpersuaded by Jamal's assertion that a material

issue of fact exists because Veronica was about sixty-six years of age and had a

terminal illness. Veronica signed her Will in October 2023, approximately ten

months before her passing. "There is a legal presumption that 'the testator was

of sound mind' when he [or she] executed the will." In re Will of Liebl, 260 N.J.

Super. 519, 524 (App. Div. 1992) (quoting Haynes, 87 N.J. at 175-76). Further,

testamentary capacity is determined by "whether the testator can comprehend

the property he is about to dispose of; the natural objects of his bounty; the

meaning of the business in which he is engaged; the relation of each of these

factors to the others[;] and the distribution that is made by the will." In re

Livingston's Will, 5 N.J. 65, 73 (1950). Jamal has not demonstrated a genuine

issue of material fact that Veronica was unduly influenced or lacked capacity.

For these reasons, we discern no error in the court's denial of Jamal's motion to

invalidate the Will and in granting Jones' motion for summary judgment.

We also reject Jamal's argument that the court improperly granted Jones'

summary judgment motion while there was a criminal proceeding pending. The

fact that Jamal filed a municipal court action was not cause for the court to stay

A-2767-24 12 the motions. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying Jamal's request

to stay proceedings.

Finally, we address Jamal's assertions that the court erred in denying his

recusal motion after demonstrating "bias" and "disparate treatment." Generally,

recusal motions are "entrusted to the sound discretion of the judge and are

subject to review for abuse of discretion." State v. McCabe, 201 N.J. 34, 45

(2010). The record is bereft of a single fact supporting Jamal's contentions. To

the contrary, the transcripts of the proceedings demonstrate that the court

exhibited great patience and provided Jamal a full opportunity to present each

of his arguments, many of which were repetitive. Based on our review, there

are no "doubts about the judge's impartiality." State v. Dalal, 221 N.J. 601, 606

(2015) (quoting DeNike v. Cupo, 196 N.J. 502, 517 (2008)).

To the extent not addressed, Jamal's remaining arguments lack sufficient

merit to warrant discussion in our written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.

A-2767-24 13