In the Matter of the Estate of Mary Jane Gravel.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: August 15, 2025
• Docket: 24-P-1288
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-1288

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF MARY JANE GRAVEL.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

In 2017, Mary Jane Gravel (decedent) settled the "Everest

Realty Trust" (trust) as part of her estate plan. The

declaration of trust named her son Shane A. Gravel (Shane) as

the successor trustee and, by attached exhibit, identified

Shane's three minor children as beneficiaries. In 2022, the

decedent executed a document titled "Amendment to Everest Realty

Trust" (2022 trust amendment), replacing the sentence naming

Shane as successor trustee with a new sentence naming her

nephew, Jason J. Armstrong (Jason), as successor trustee. The

same document included a new section naming Jason to "receive

all property, accounts, and other titles and property" of the

trust. After the decedent died, Shane and Jason filed competing

petitions for probate of the estate, each of which identified

the petitioner as the personal representative named in the decedent's will.1 In addition, and in the same court, Jason

sought a declaration that the 2022 trust amendment was valid

(third action), which Shane contested. After cross motions for

summary judgment in the third action, a judge of the Probate and

Family Court (motion judge) granted summary judgment in favor of

Shane and declared the 2022 trust amendment void ab initio. We

affirm.

"We review a decision on a motion for summary judgment de

novo." Conservation Comm'n of Norton v. Pesa, 488 Mass. 325,

330 (2021). "Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no

genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law." Barbetti v. Stempniewicz, 490

Mass. 98, 107 (2022), quoting Conservation Comm'n of Norton,

supra; Mass. R. Civ. P. 56 (c), as amended, 436 Mass. 1404

(2002). "Because the parties filed cross motions for summary

judgment, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to

the party against whom summary judgment was entered," here,

Jason. Conservation Comm'n of Norton, supra.

Disagreement about the nature of the trust -- specifically,

whether the trust is properly considered as revocable or nominee

-- underlies the parties' dispute, with Jason asserting that the

1 These petitions remained pending, and no personal representative had been appointed at the time of this litigation. Neither of these petitions is at issue in this appeal.

2 decedent settled a revocable trust that she properly amended by

the 2022 trust amendment, and Shane maintaining that it was an

irrevocable nominee trust that was not amended. However, we

need not determine the nature of the trust because even

assuming, favorably to Jason, that the trust was revocable, the

decedent failed to follow its express terms when executing the

2022 trust amendment.

"The interpretation of a written trust is a matter of law

to be resolved by the court." Ferri v. Powell-Ferri, 476 Mass.

651, 654 (2017). "The rules of construction of a contract apply

similarly to trusts; where the language of a trust is clear, we

look only to that plain language." Id. "In deciding whether

there is ambiguity, 'the court must first examine the language

of the contract by itself, independent of extrinsic evidence

concerning the drafting history or the intention of the

parties.'" Id., quoting Bank v. Thermo Elemental, Inc., 451

Mass. 638, 648 (2008). "When interpreting trust language, . . .

we do not read words in isolation and out of context. Rather we

strive to discern the settlor's intent from the trust instrument

as a whole and from the circumstances known to the settlor at

the time the instrument was executed." Hillman v. Hillman, 433

Mass. 590, 593 (2001).

Assuming that the trust was revocable, the decedent could

have amended it "by complying with a method provided in the

3 terms of the trust." G. L. c. 203E, § 602 (c) (1). See Phelps

v. State St. Trust Co., 330 Mass. 511, 512 (1953) ("a valid

trust, once created, cannot be revoked or altered except by the

exercise of a reserved power to do so, which must be exercised

in strict conformity to its terms"). The trust instrument

specified that amendments could be made "by an instrument in

writing signed by beneficiaries holding at least 51% of the

beneficial interest as designated by the Schedule of

Beneficiaries and acknowledged by one or more of them." This

term unambiguously requires signed approval by the trust's

beneficiaries to amend the trust. The 2022 trust amendment did

not include the signatures or acknowledgements of any

beneficiary and thus did not comply with these terms, so the

amendment is void.

Jason asserts that it was impossible for the trust to be

amended pursuant to its terms because the minor beneficiaries

could not legally consent to amend the trust; therefore, he

maintains, amendment was permissible under a provision in G. L.

c. 203E, § 602 (c), that applies when "the terms of the trust do

not provide a method" for amendment. G. L. c. 203E,

§ 602 (c) (2). We agree with the motion judge that this

provision does not apply because, pursuant to the schedule of

beneficiaries, "the beneficial interests of the minor

beneficiaries were being held in trust by their legal guardian,"

4 and "[t]he legal guardian of the beneficiaries, acting as their

trustee, could have taken action on their behalf" to amend the

trust.2 In so ruling, we are guided by the principle that, "[i]n

determining the meaning of a [trust] provision, the court will

prefer an interpretation which gives a 'reasonable, lawful and

effective meaning to all manifestations of intention, rather

than one which leaves a part of those manifestations

unreasonable, unlawful or [of] no effect.'" Ferri, 476 Mass. at

654-655, quoting Siebe, Inc. v. Louis M. Gerson Co., 74 Mass.

App. Ct. 544, 550 n.13 (2009). Thus, the beneficiaries' ages

posed no actual impediment to amending the trust pursuant to its

terms. This is true even if the beneficiaries' interests in the

trust had not yet vested; regardless of whether the

beneficiaries' rights had vested, any revocation or amendment

must be pursuant to the trust's terms. See G. L. c. 203E,

§ 602 (c) (1). See also G. L. c. 203E, § 303 (6) (barring

conflict of interest, "a parent may represent and bind the

parent’s minor or unborn child if a conservator or guardian for

the child has not been appointed"), and G. L. c. 203E, § 305 (a)

(guardian ad litem may be appointed to "bind and act on behalf

2 The schedule of beneficiaries, executed at the time the trust was settled, provides, "the interest of any minor . . . beneficiary shall be transferred to their legal guardian, in trust, . . . until such beneficiary attains the age of twenty- five (25) years and thereupon transfer the balance then remaining to such beneficiary, absolutely."

5 of a minor"). As the decedent made no effort to adhere to those

terms in the 2022 trust amendment, the amendment was void ab

initio.3 See G. L. c. 203E, § 602 (c) (1).4

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Massing, Hand & Hershfang, JJ.5),

Clerk

Entered: August 15, 2025.

3 Jason also claims there was an existing dispute of fact about the decedent's intent, and therefore this case was inappropriately disposed of on summary judgment. Because "the language of [the] trust is clear," and we can "discern the settlor's intent from the trust instrument as a whole," this argument is unavailing. Ferri, 476 Mass. at 654.

4 Shane's request for attorney's fees in connection with the appeal is denied.

5 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.