IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 21-1965 Filed July 20, 2022
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF JAMES ANTHONY GOFORTH, Deceased.
KAREN GOFORTH, Appellant,
vs.
CORRIE MAYNE GOFORTH and JONAH JAMES GOFORTH, Appellees. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Madison County, Elisabeth S.
Reynoldson, Judge.
The administrator of an estate appeals a declaratory judgment ruling.
AFFIRMED.
Lylea Critelli and Nick Critelli of CritelliLaw, P.C., Des Moines, Samuel H.
Braland, Earlham, and Eric F. Turner of Turner Law Offices, West Des Moines, for
appellant.
Jane E. Rosien of Flander Rosien, P.C., Winterset, and Richard O.
McConville of Coppola, McConville, Carroll, Hockenberg, & Flynn, P.C., West Des
Moines, for appellees.
Heard by May, P.J., and Greer and Chicchelly, JJ. 2
MAY, Presiding Judge.
The administrator of James Goforth’s estate—Karen Goforth, who is also
James’s widow—appeals a declaratory judgment order. We affirm.
The case centers on some property in Earlham, Iowa. James bought the
property in August 2015. He financed it with a purchase-money mortgage (the
mortgage).1
In September 2018, James and Karen married. They lived on James’s
property in Earlham. But Karen never joined the mortgage.
In December, James died intestate. He was survived by Karen and his two
adult children, Corrie Goforth and Jonah Goforth. Karen is not the mother of Corrie
or Jonah.
Karen sought a declaratory judgment “to determine the source of payment”
for the mortgage as well as “other debts and charges” of the estate.2 She noted
that, under Iowa Code section 633.212(1) (2018), her distributive share of the
property was one half. She also claimed that—because the property was her
homestead—the mortgage must be wholly satisfied from the other heirs’ shares of
the estate “with [her] share being liable only for the deficiency.”
The district court disagreed. The court noted that James’s interest in the
property had only been his equity in the property, that is, the property’s “fair market
value less the outstanding balance of” the mortgage. And Karen’s statutory share
1 Later, the property was encumbered by second and third mortgages. Because they are not at issue in this appeal, we discuss them no more. 2 Karen had been appointed administrator for the estate. And Karen’s petition
noted her role as administrator. But she also referred to herself as “the administrator/spouse.” And her petition was largely concerned with her rights as spouse. 3
was “limited to one-half of” James’s interest. So, just as James’s interest had been
subject to the mortgage, Karen’s statutory share was too. Thus, the court
concluded, Karen’s distributive share as surviving spouse “is subject to a pro rata
share of the” mortgage.
Karen appeals. Our review of declaratory judgments depends on how the
case was tried. Here, the parties agree this action was tried at law. So our review
is for correction of legal error. United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Shelly Funeral Home, Inc.,
642 N.W.2d 648, 651 (Iowa 2002).
As the district court correctly noted, Iowa Code section 633.212 “dictates
the distribution of assets when a decedent dies without a will leaving a surviving
spouse and children who are not also the children of the surviving spouse.” It
provides as follows:
If the decedent dies intestate leaving a surviving spouse and leaving issue some of whom are not the issue of the surviving spouse, the surviving spouse shall receive the following share: 1. One-half in value of all the legal or equitable estates in real property possessed by the decedent at any time during the marriage, which have not been sold on execution or by other judicial sale, and to which the surviving spouse has made no relinquishment of right. 2. All personal property that, at the time of death, was in the hands of the decedent as the head of a family, exempt from execution. 3. One-half of all other personal property of the decedent which is not necessary for the payment of debts and charges. 4. If the property received by the surviving spouse under subsections 1, 2 and 3 of this section is not equal in value to the sum of fifty thousand dollars, then so much additional of any remaining homestead interest and of the remaining real and personal property of the decedent that is subject to payment of debts and charges against the decedent’s estate, after payment of the debts and charges, even to the extent of the whole of the net estate, as necessary to make the amount of fifty thousand dollars.
Iowa Code § 633.212. 4
We find a statute’s meaning “in the text of the statute, the words chosen by
the legislature.” In re Guardianship of Jorgensen, No. 18-1235, 2020 WL 7021507,
at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2020) (cleaned up) (quoting Fishel v. Redenbaugh,
939 N.W.2d 660, 663 (Iowa Ct. App. 2019)), aff’d, 959 N.W.2d 670 (Iowa 2021).
The words of subsection (1) entitle Karen to one-half of “the value of all the
legal or equitable estates in real property possessed by” James. Iowa Code
§ 633.212(1) (emphasis added). So, as to the property at issue here, the statute
plainly entitles Karen to one-half of James’s equity in the property, that is, the value
of the property minus the mortgage obligation. But nothing in the statute suggests
that Karen is entitled to a greater interest in the property than what James
possessed. So, because James didn’t own the property free and clear, Karen isn’t
entitled to have the property free and clear, either. Certainly, the statute doesn’t
obligate the other heirs—Corrie and Jonah—to pay off the whole mortgage so that
Karen can have the property free and clear.
Karen does not argue otherwise. She points to no language in
section 633.212 that would obligate the other heirs to pay the whole mortgage for
Karen’s benefit.
Instead, Karen argues that, because she was not a party to the mortgage,
two cases—Haynes v. Rolstin, 145 N.W. 336 (Iowa 1914) and Dalton v. Dalton,
159 N.W. 992 (Iowa 1916)—require the mortgage to be satisfied first from Corrie
and Jonah’s portion of the inherited property. But Haynes and Dalton rely on
statutes and cases that long predate the enactment of our current probate code.
Cf. 1963 Iowa Acts ch. 326, § 212. And the holdings in Haynes and Dalton are
plainly inconsistent with our current code—particularly section 633.212, which 5
expressly states what a surviving spouse “shall receive” but does not empower the
surviving spouse to require other heirs to satisfy mortgages on the decedent’s real
property. Compare Haynes, 145 N.W. at 336, and Dalton, 159 N.W. at 993–94,
with Iowa Code § 633.212(1). So we do not believe Haynes and Dalton govern.
Rather, we think the case is governed by the plain language of section 633.212.
Karen argues that a different outcome is required because the property is
her homestead. We disagree. The legislature has addressed the “homestead” in
several statutes. For instance, chapter 561 is entitled “Homestead,” and its focus
is homestead rights. The homestead is also addressed in the probate code,
chapter 633.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 21-1965 Filed July 20, 2022
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF JAMES ANTHONY GOFORTH, Deceased.
KAREN GOFORTH, Appellant,
vs.
CORRIE MAYNE GOFORTH and JONAH JAMES GOFORTH, Appellees. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Madison County, Elisabeth S.
Reynoldson, Judge.
The administrator of an estate appeals a declaratory judgment ruling.
AFFIRMED.
Lylea Critelli and Nick Critelli of CritelliLaw, P.C., Des Moines, Samuel H.
Braland, Earlham, and Eric F. Turner of Turner Law Offices, West Des Moines, for
appellant.
Jane E. Rosien of Flander Rosien, P.C., Winterset, and Richard O.
McConville of Coppola, McConville, Carroll, Hockenberg, & Flynn, P.C., West Des
Moines, for appellees.
Heard by May, P.J., and Greer and Chicchelly, JJ. 2
MAY, Presiding Judge.
The administrator of James Goforth’s estate—Karen Goforth, who is also
James’s widow—appeals a declaratory judgment order. We affirm.
The case centers on some property in Earlham, Iowa. James bought the
property in August 2015. He financed it with a purchase-money mortgage (the
mortgage).1
In September 2018, James and Karen married. They lived on James’s
property in Earlham. But Karen never joined the mortgage.
In December, James died intestate. He was survived by Karen and his two
adult children, Corrie Goforth and Jonah Goforth. Karen is not the mother of Corrie
or Jonah.
Karen sought a declaratory judgment “to determine the source of payment”
for the mortgage as well as “other debts and charges” of the estate.2 She noted
that, under Iowa Code section 633.212(1) (2018), her distributive share of the
property was one half. She also claimed that—because the property was her
homestead—the mortgage must be wholly satisfied from the other heirs’ shares of
the estate “with [her] share being liable only for the deficiency.”
The district court disagreed. The court noted that James’s interest in the
property had only been his equity in the property, that is, the property’s “fair market
value less the outstanding balance of” the mortgage. And Karen’s statutory share
1 Later, the property was encumbered by second and third mortgages. Because they are not at issue in this appeal, we discuss them no more. 2 Karen had been appointed administrator for the estate. And Karen’s petition
noted her role as administrator. But she also referred to herself as “the administrator/spouse.” And her petition was largely concerned with her rights as spouse. 3
was “limited to one-half of” James’s interest. So, just as James’s interest had been
subject to the mortgage, Karen’s statutory share was too. Thus, the court
concluded, Karen’s distributive share as surviving spouse “is subject to a pro rata
share of the” mortgage.
Karen appeals. Our review of declaratory judgments depends on how the
case was tried. Here, the parties agree this action was tried at law. So our review
is for correction of legal error. United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Shelly Funeral Home, Inc.,
642 N.W.2d 648, 651 (Iowa 2002).
As the district court correctly noted, Iowa Code section 633.212 “dictates
the distribution of assets when a decedent dies without a will leaving a surviving
spouse and children who are not also the children of the surviving spouse.” It
provides as follows:
If the decedent dies intestate leaving a surviving spouse and leaving issue some of whom are not the issue of the surviving spouse, the surviving spouse shall receive the following share: 1. One-half in value of all the legal or equitable estates in real property possessed by the decedent at any time during the marriage, which have not been sold on execution or by other judicial sale, and to which the surviving spouse has made no relinquishment of right. 2. All personal property that, at the time of death, was in the hands of the decedent as the head of a family, exempt from execution. 3. One-half of all other personal property of the decedent which is not necessary for the payment of debts and charges. 4. If the property received by the surviving spouse under subsections 1, 2 and 3 of this section is not equal in value to the sum of fifty thousand dollars, then so much additional of any remaining homestead interest and of the remaining real and personal property of the decedent that is subject to payment of debts and charges against the decedent’s estate, after payment of the debts and charges, even to the extent of the whole of the net estate, as necessary to make the amount of fifty thousand dollars.
Iowa Code § 633.212. 4
We find a statute’s meaning “in the text of the statute, the words chosen by
the legislature.” In re Guardianship of Jorgensen, No. 18-1235, 2020 WL 7021507,
at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2020) (cleaned up) (quoting Fishel v. Redenbaugh,
939 N.W.2d 660, 663 (Iowa Ct. App. 2019)), aff’d, 959 N.W.2d 670 (Iowa 2021).
The words of subsection (1) entitle Karen to one-half of “the value of all the
legal or equitable estates in real property possessed by” James. Iowa Code
§ 633.212(1) (emphasis added). So, as to the property at issue here, the statute
plainly entitles Karen to one-half of James’s equity in the property, that is, the value
of the property minus the mortgage obligation. But nothing in the statute suggests
that Karen is entitled to a greater interest in the property than what James
possessed. So, because James didn’t own the property free and clear, Karen isn’t
entitled to have the property free and clear, either. Certainly, the statute doesn’t
obligate the other heirs—Corrie and Jonah—to pay off the whole mortgage so that
Karen can have the property free and clear.
Karen does not argue otherwise. She points to no language in
section 633.212 that would obligate the other heirs to pay the whole mortgage for
Karen’s benefit.
Instead, Karen argues that, because she was not a party to the mortgage,
two cases—Haynes v. Rolstin, 145 N.W. 336 (Iowa 1914) and Dalton v. Dalton,
159 N.W. 992 (Iowa 1916)—require the mortgage to be satisfied first from Corrie
and Jonah’s portion of the inherited property. But Haynes and Dalton rely on
statutes and cases that long predate the enactment of our current probate code.
Cf. 1963 Iowa Acts ch. 326, § 212. And the holdings in Haynes and Dalton are
plainly inconsistent with our current code—particularly section 633.212, which 5
expressly states what a surviving spouse “shall receive” but does not empower the
surviving spouse to require other heirs to satisfy mortgages on the decedent’s real
property. Compare Haynes, 145 N.W. at 336, and Dalton, 159 N.W. at 993–94,
with Iowa Code § 633.212(1). So we do not believe Haynes and Dalton govern.
Rather, we think the case is governed by the plain language of section 633.212.
Karen argues that a different outcome is required because the property is
her homestead. We disagree. The legislature has addressed the “homestead” in
several statutes. For instance, chapter 561 is entitled “Homestead,” and its focus
is homestead rights. The homestead is also addressed in the probate code,
chapter 633. See Iowa Code §§ 633.239, .240. For example, section 633.240
permits a surviving spouse to elect to receive a life estate in the homestead “in lieu
of the spouse’s share in the real property possessed by the decedent.” (Emphasis
added.) But section 633.212, subsection (1)—the provision on which Karen’s case
depends—makes no distinction between homesteads and other real property. It
does not mention the “homestead” at all. Compare Iowa Code § 633.212(1)
(making no reference to “homestead”), and § 633.212(4) (distinguishing between
the “homestead interest” and other “real . . . property”). Nor does Karen cite any
other statute that entitles a surviving spouse to take title to the homestead free and
clear of any encumbrance. Nor does Karen cite any statute that requires other
heirs to satisfy encumbrances on the homestead for the benefit of the surviving
spouse.3 If the legislature had intended to grant such important rights to the
3 Iowa Code section 633.239 does provide: The share of the surviving spouse in such real estate shall be set off in such manner as to include the homestead, or so much thereof as will be equal to the share allotted to the spouse pursuant 6
surviving spouse—and to place such onerous burdens on other heirs—we think
the legislature would have said so. It did not.
For these reasons, we conclude Karen has shown no error in the district
court’s ruling. So we affirm.
to section 633.238 unless the spouse prefers a different arrangement, but no such different arrangement shall be allowed unless there is sufficient property remaining to pay the claims and charges against the decedent’s estate. However, section 633.239 applies when a surviving spouse elects to take against a will. Because James died intestate, section 633.239 is inapplicable to this case.