NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1860-23
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF DANIEL J. RUSSOMANNO, deceased. __________________________
Submitted May 6, 2025 – Decided August 6, 2025
Before Judges Gilson, Bishop-Thompson and Augostini.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. 264016.
Kalish & Associates, attorneys for appellant Jerry Russomanno (Jared I. Kalish and Patrick J. Foy, on the briefs).
Parsons & Nardelli, attorneys for respondent Diane Mavrakes (James M. Nardelli, on the brief).
Pfeil Law, LLC, attorneys for respondent The Estate of Daniel J. Russomanno, deceased (Darren M. Pfeil, Court-Appointed Substituted Administrator, on the brief).
PER CURIAM This is the parties' second appeal arising from a dispute over their father's
estate. Defendant Jerry Russomanno appeals from a January 8, 2024 order
approving the court-appointed substituted administrator Darren M. Pfiel's
(Administrator Pfiel) final accounting and proposed distribution of the funds of
the Estate of Daniel J. Russomanno (decedent) and rejecting defendant's
exceptions.
Because the probate court's findings of fact and conclusions of law were
inadequate, we vacate the order and remand the matter for further proceedings.
On remand, we direct the probate court to make adequate findings of fact and
conclusions of law supporting its decision, as required by Rule 1:7-4.
I.
We summarize the facts from the motion record to the extent necessary to
resolve the issues on appeal. On January 5, 2019, decedent passed away and
was survived by his two children and beneficiaries: his daughter, plaintiff Diane
Mavrakes, and his son, defendant. In the prior matter, plaintiff brought an action
seeking to declare that decedent died intestate. Defendant disputed that claim,
sought to admit an unsigned document as decedent's will, and sought to be
appointed as the administrator. The probate court granted summary judgment
A-1860-23 2 to plaintiff. We affirmed that decision in the first appeal. Matter of Est. of
Russomanno, No. A-3760-20 (App. Div. July 22, 2022).
In a July 19, 2021 order, in relevant part, the court appointed plaintiff as
administratrix of decedent's estate. In a May 4, 2023 order, the court appointed
Pfiel as the substituted administrator. 1
The Estate's main asset was the real property located at 86 N.
Randolphville Road, Piscataway (Property). For several years, defendant
operated his trucking business on the Property. After decedent's death,
defendant "took control" of the Property and continued to operate his business
there.
In a judgment order entered on February 21, 2023, the court directed
defendant to remove all of his machinery and equipment from the Property
within forty-five days. Additionally, plaintiff was authorized to list the Property
for sale "with an initial list price of $559,000." The court provided defendant
with "the option to purchase the Property upon the exact same terms offered by
the third party purchaser . . . ."
1 The record does not contain a statement of reasons or transcript of the probate court's reasoning for this decision. A-1860-23 3 Administrator Pfiel inspected the Property and determined that, given the
water damage and its general state of disrepair, the Property was worth much
less than the initial listing amount specified in the February 21, 2023 order.
After engaging a real estate agent to determine the listing price for the Property,
Administrator Pfiel received a third-party offer for the Property, as-is, for
$335,000 and notified defendant of the offer. Defendant exercised his right of
first refusal and closed on the property on June 30, 2023. After various payoffs,
the Estate netted $292,950.78 in proceeds.
Administrator Pfiel identified additional assets owed by defendant to the
Estate, including storage fees as directed by the April 19, 2023 court order and
rent due from defendant for use of the Property's garage for business purposes.
Another significant asset of the Estate was an insurance claim for a water
incident that damaged the Property sometime in the spring of 2023. Although
the cause of the water damage was disputed, the insurance company found no
malfeasance and paid the Estate's claim.
The administrator also identified several liabilities, which included, for
example, reimbursement claims made by defendant for expenses and
maintenance of the Property during the years he maintained the Property,
commissions owed to plaintiff, and attorney's fees.
A-1860-23 4 The parties spent several months attempting to negotiate a distribution
schedule concerning the Estate. Unable to resolve the matter, on September 28,
2023, the administrator filed a motion to approve the insurance claim amount
and an informal accounting and a distribution schedule, thereby closing out the
Estate. Plaintiff supported the administrator's motion; however, defendant filed
opposition, noting several exceptions to the final accounting.
In his opposition, defendant contended that "[t]he proposed disbursement
is heavily skewed, biased, and far from an accurate accounting . . . ." Defendant
highlights three major issues: (1) the administrator's and plaintiff's own actions
and inactions caused the water damage to increase in seriousness and scope; (2)
the proposed disbursement ignored the unreimbursed work that he performed
while "monitoring" the Property after decedent's death; and (3) the legitimacy
of the third-party buyer's contract was questionable, and defendant was not
given enough time to review the offer with his attorney before he had to exercise
his right of first refusal. He also disputed the award of attorney's fees.
On November 3, 2023, the probate court held oral argument on the
administrator's motion and reserved decision. On January 8, 2024, the probate
court entered an order approving the administrator's accounting and "find[ing]
that [defendant's] proposed exceptions are meritless." Defendant filed a motion
A-1860-23 5 for reconsideration, but that motion was dismissed on March 8, 2024 because
defendant had already filed a notice of appeal on February 23, 2024.
Defendant's primary contention on this appeal is that the trial court erred
in approving the administrator's accounting because it failed to set forth its
reasoning for its decision. The parties agree that the probate court did not
provide findings of fact or conclusions of law explaining its decision
memorialized in the January 8, 2024 final order. The administrator contends
that the failure to provide a statement of reasons is harmless error pursuant to
Rule 2:10-2. Plaintiff argues that (1) the probate court's finding that defendant's
claims are "meritless" is enough to satisfy Rule 1:7-4, and (2) in the alternative,
urges us to exercise original jurisdiction given the adequacy of the record and
to avoid prolonged litigation.
II.
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1860-23
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF DANIEL J. RUSSOMANNO, deceased. __________________________
Submitted May 6, 2025 – Decided August 6, 2025
Before Judges Gilson, Bishop-Thompson and Augostini.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. 264016.
Kalish & Associates, attorneys for appellant Jerry Russomanno (Jared I. Kalish and Patrick J. Foy, on the briefs).
Parsons & Nardelli, attorneys for respondent Diane Mavrakes (James M. Nardelli, on the brief).
Pfeil Law, LLC, attorneys for respondent The Estate of Daniel J. Russomanno, deceased (Darren M. Pfeil, Court-Appointed Substituted Administrator, on the brief).
PER CURIAM This is the parties' second appeal arising from a dispute over their father's
estate. Defendant Jerry Russomanno appeals from a January 8, 2024 order
approving the court-appointed substituted administrator Darren M. Pfiel's
(Administrator Pfiel) final accounting and proposed distribution of the funds of
the Estate of Daniel J. Russomanno (decedent) and rejecting defendant's
exceptions.
Because the probate court's findings of fact and conclusions of law were
inadequate, we vacate the order and remand the matter for further proceedings.
On remand, we direct the probate court to make adequate findings of fact and
conclusions of law supporting its decision, as required by Rule 1:7-4.
I.
We summarize the facts from the motion record to the extent necessary to
resolve the issues on appeal. On January 5, 2019, decedent passed away and
was survived by his two children and beneficiaries: his daughter, plaintiff Diane
Mavrakes, and his son, defendant. In the prior matter, plaintiff brought an action
seeking to declare that decedent died intestate. Defendant disputed that claim,
sought to admit an unsigned document as decedent's will, and sought to be
appointed as the administrator. The probate court granted summary judgment
A-1860-23 2 to plaintiff. We affirmed that decision in the first appeal. Matter of Est. of
Russomanno, No. A-3760-20 (App. Div. July 22, 2022).
In a July 19, 2021 order, in relevant part, the court appointed plaintiff as
administratrix of decedent's estate. In a May 4, 2023 order, the court appointed
Pfiel as the substituted administrator. 1
The Estate's main asset was the real property located at 86 N.
Randolphville Road, Piscataway (Property). For several years, defendant
operated his trucking business on the Property. After decedent's death,
defendant "took control" of the Property and continued to operate his business
there.
In a judgment order entered on February 21, 2023, the court directed
defendant to remove all of his machinery and equipment from the Property
within forty-five days. Additionally, plaintiff was authorized to list the Property
for sale "with an initial list price of $559,000." The court provided defendant
with "the option to purchase the Property upon the exact same terms offered by
the third party purchaser . . . ."
1 The record does not contain a statement of reasons or transcript of the probate court's reasoning for this decision. A-1860-23 3 Administrator Pfiel inspected the Property and determined that, given the
water damage and its general state of disrepair, the Property was worth much
less than the initial listing amount specified in the February 21, 2023 order.
After engaging a real estate agent to determine the listing price for the Property,
Administrator Pfiel received a third-party offer for the Property, as-is, for
$335,000 and notified defendant of the offer. Defendant exercised his right of
first refusal and closed on the property on June 30, 2023. After various payoffs,
the Estate netted $292,950.78 in proceeds.
Administrator Pfiel identified additional assets owed by defendant to the
Estate, including storage fees as directed by the April 19, 2023 court order and
rent due from defendant for use of the Property's garage for business purposes.
Another significant asset of the Estate was an insurance claim for a water
incident that damaged the Property sometime in the spring of 2023. Although
the cause of the water damage was disputed, the insurance company found no
malfeasance and paid the Estate's claim.
The administrator also identified several liabilities, which included, for
example, reimbursement claims made by defendant for expenses and
maintenance of the Property during the years he maintained the Property,
commissions owed to plaintiff, and attorney's fees.
A-1860-23 4 The parties spent several months attempting to negotiate a distribution
schedule concerning the Estate. Unable to resolve the matter, on September 28,
2023, the administrator filed a motion to approve the insurance claim amount
and an informal accounting and a distribution schedule, thereby closing out the
Estate. Plaintiff supported the administrator's motion; however, defendant filed
opposition, noting several exceptions to the final accounting.
In his opposition, defendant contended that "[t]he proposed disbursement
is heavily skewed, biased, and far from an accurate accounting . . . ." Defendant
highlights three major issues: (1) the administrator's and plaintiff's own actions
and inactions caused the water damage to increase in seriousness and scope; (2)
the proposed disbursement ignored the unreimbursed work that he performed
while "monitoring" the Property after decedent's death; and (3) the legitimacy
of the third-party buyer's contract was questionable, and defendant was not
given enough time to review the offer with his attorney before he had to exercise
his right of first refusal. He also disputed the award of attorney's fees.
On November 3, 2023, the probate court held oral argument on the
administrator's motion and reserved decision. On January 8, 2024, the probate
court entered an order approving the administrator's accounting and "find[ing]
that [defendant's] proposed exceptions are meritless." Defendant filed a motion
A-1860-23 5 for reconsideration, but that motion was dismissed on March 8, 2024 because
defendant had already filed a notice of appeal on February 23, 2024.
Defendant's primary contention on this appeal is that the trial court erred
in approving the administrator's accounting because it failed to set forth its
reasoning for its decision. The parties agree that the probate court did not
provide findings of fact or conclusions of law explaining its decision
memorialized in the January 8, 2024 final order. The administrator contends
that the failure to provide a statement of reasons is harmless error pursuant to
Rule 2:10-2. Plaintiff argues that (1) the probate court's finding that defendant's
claims are "meritless" is enough to satisfy Rule 1:7-4, and (2) in the alternative,
urges us to exercise original jurisdiction given the adequacy of the record and
to avoid prolonged litigation.
II.
The decision to approve an estate's final accounting is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. In re Acct. of Ex'rs of Koretzky, 8 N.J. 506, 535 (1951).
An abuse of discretion occurs "when a decision is 'made without a rational
explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an
impermissible basis.'" Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571
A-1860-23 6 (2002) (quoting Achacoso-Sanchez v. Immigr. and Naturalization Serv., 779
F.2d 1260, 1265 (7th Cir. 1985)).
Rule 1:7-4 requires that a court make findings of fact and state its
conclusions of law on all motions that are appealable as of right. "Meaningful
appellate review is inhibited unless the judge sets forth the reasons for his or her
opinion." Salch v. Salch, 240 N.J. Super. 441, 443 (App. Div. 1990). Also,
litigants are entitled to have the benefit of the court's reasoning and analysis ,
explaining its decision. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 259 N.J. Super. 402, 407 (App. Div.
1992); see also R. 1:6-2(f).
In limited circumstances, "[w]hen the trial judge fails to make the required
findings of fact . . . the appellate court may avoid the necessity of a remand . . .
by [] making findings of fact pursuant to the constitutional grant of necessary
original jurisdiction and R[ule] 2:10-5." Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court
Rules, cmt. 1 on R. 1:7-4 (2025) (citing Farmingdale Realty Co. v. Borough of
Farmingdale, 55 N.J. 103, 106 (1969)). Rule 2:10-5 provides that appellate
courts may "exercise . . . original jurisdiction as is necessary to the complete
determination of any matter on review." Rivera v. Union Cnty. Prosecutor's
Off., 250 N.J. 124, 146 (2022). However,
[t]hat power should be invoked "sparingly," State v. Jarbath, 114 N.J. 394, 412 (1989), and is generally used
A-1860-23 7 when the record is adequately developed and no further fact-finding is needed, Price v. Himeji, LLC, 214 N.J. 263, 294-95 (2013); State v. Santos, 210 N.J. 129, 142 (2012).
[Ibid.]
"In determining whether to exercise original jurisdiction, an appellate
court not only must weigh considerations of efficiency and the public interest
that militate in favor of bringing a dispute to a conclusion, but also must evaluate
whether the record is adequate to permit the court to conduct its review." Price,
214 N.J. at 295. Generally, we have "exercised such jurisdiction to resolve a
single issue to conclude litigation, or to end perpetual or lengthy litigation."
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Fisher, 408 N.J. Super. 289, 301 (2009).
Here, the probate court made no findings of fact nor conclusions of law;
instead, it simply stated that it "finds that [defendant's] proposed exceptions are
meritless." The court did not adopt the arguments or reasoning of the
administrator to support its decision. Contrary to Rule 1:7-4, the court made no
detailed findings of fact explaining the factual basis for its decision, nor did it
outline the legal framework and apply it accordingly to those facts. Therefore,
the probate court's one-word reference to defendant's exceptions as "meritless"
fails to comport with the requirements of Rule 1:7-4. See Fisher, 408 N.J. Super.
at 299-300.
A-1860-23 8 The parties urge us to exercise original jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 2:10-
5 to avoid further litigation and to effectuate a prompt and complete resolution
of this matter. We decline to do so for the following reasons.
We begin by recognizing that "[a]n action to settle an account on an estate
trust is a formalistic proceeding, unique to probate." Higgins v. Thurber, 205
N.J. 227, 229 (2011); see R. 4:87-1 to -9. Such action is commenced by the
filing of a complaint and issuance of an order to show cause. R. 4:87-1(a).
In all actions for the settlement of accounts, other than plenary actions, any interested person may, at least [five] days before the return of the order to show cause or within such time as the court allows, serve the accountant with written exceptions, signed by that person or his or her attorney, to any item in or omission from the account, including any exceptions to the commissions or attorney's fees requested. The exceptions shall state particularly the item or omission excepted to, the modification sought in the account and the reasons for the modification. An exception may be stricken because of its insufficiency in law.
[R. 4:87-8.]
Exceptions to an executor's account are "a vehicle for determining the
propriety of the executor's statement of assets and claims for allowance." Perry
v. Tuzzio, 288 N.J. Super. 223, 229 (App. Div. 1996). Our Supreme Court has
described an action to settle an account as "involv[ing] a line-by-line review [of]
the exceptions to an accounting." Higgins, 205 N.J. at 229.
A-1860-23 9 "[T]he accounting procedure in general and the hearing on exceptions in
particular" are "limited" in nature. Perry, 288 N.J. Super. at 230. The action is
considered a summary matter and is conducted in accordance with Rule 4:67-5.
R. 4:83-1; see N.J.S.A. 3B:2-4 (allowing actions by fiduciaries to proceed in a
summary manner); Garruto v. Cannici, 397 N.J. Super. 231, 241-42 (App. Div.
2007) (providing an overview of probate proceedings in New Jersey). However,
if there are genuine issues as to any material fact, the court should conduct an
evidentiary hearing on those disputed issues. In re Est. of Skvir, 170 N.J. Super.
559, 562 (App. Div. 1979); Tractenberg v. Twp. of W. Orange, 416 N.J. Super.
354, 365 (App. Div. 2010) (citing R. 4:67-5); Courier News v. Hunterdon Cnty.
Prosecutor's Off., 358 N.J. Super. 373, 378 (App. Div. 2003).
Defendant presented several exceptions to the accounting, which he
claims are valid and raise genuine factual issues. Specifically, defendant
contends: (1) the modifications regarding the water leak and damage
demonstrated an increased water bill and damage to the Property, neither of
which were included in the accounting; (2) the accounting failed to include
reimbursement to defendant for years of work performed on the Property to
maintain it; and (3) defendant objected to the inclusion of attorney's fees both
from the prior will contest and the current matter. Original jurisdiction would
A-1860-23 10 not be appropriate because these claims do not raise legal issues but rather
factual disputes, which the probate court is in the best position to address.
Moreover, because this case implicates the parties' private interests rather than
the public's interests, original jurisdiction is not appropriate.
Although the probate court found defendant's exceptions "meritless," the
court did not amplify its reasoning for this finding or explain why the court did
not find any genuine issues of material facts. The same probate court presided
over this matter since plaintiff's initial filing of the verified complaint in 2019,
and has continued to preside over the present matter filed by the administrator,
thereby gaining a certain level of familiarity. Despite familiarity with the
matter, the probate court was obligated to state its findings of fact and
conclusions of law either in writing or orally and express its reasons for rejecting
defendant's arguments. See Vartenissian v. Food Haulers, Inc., 193 N.J. Super.
603, 611-12 (App. Div. 1984). Although we recognize remanding this case to
the probate court may briefly delay a resolution of the matter, the probate court
has a complete record of the case and can render a statement or reasons for its
January 8, 2024 order without unnecessary delay. In that regard, we point out
that our remand should not require extensive further proceedings and the probate
court can exercise its sound discretion in conducting the proceedings on remand.
A-1860-23 11 With regard to an award of attorney's fees, "Rule 4:42-9(a)(3) allows the
court to award attorneys' fees 'in probate actions.'" In re Prob. of Will & Codicil
of Macool, 416 N.J. Super. 298, 312 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting R. 4:42-9(a)(3)).
Fiduciaries are also normally entitled to an attorney's fee absent malfeasance.
But see In re Est. of Vayda, 184 N.J. 115, 124 (2005). The court may permit an
award of fees so long as those fees are reasonable. Rendine v.
Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 334-35 (1995).
In his final accounting, the administrator allocated $31,050.87 and
$13,473.42 to plaintiff for her prior counsel in the will contest and for the
attorney who served as both her substituted counsel in the will contest and
current counsel in the present action, respectively. He cites to both Rule 4:42-
9(a)(2) and Rule 4:42-9(a)(3).
We review an award of counsel fees for an abuse of discretion. Yueh v.
Yueh, 329 N.J. Super. 447, 466 (App. Div. 2000). However, without the benefit
of the court's analysis of the RPC 1.5(a) factors, we are unable to determine
whether the court properly exercised its discretion in assessing those fees.
Defendant contends that in the prior action, plaintiff was removed as the
administratrix due to her own malfeasance, which may affect an award of
attorney's fees. Without the benefit of the court's rationale in awarding fees for
A-1860-23 12 the prior matter, our review of the award of fees is limited. Here, as well, the
probate court is best positioned to resolve this issue with findings of fact and
conclusions of law.
Therefore, we decline to exercise original jurisdiction. We reverse and
remand this matter to the probate court and direct the probate court to issue a
statement of reasons for its January 8, 2024 order.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
A-1860-23 13