In the Matter of the Estate of Anne Weems

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: June 18, 2026
• Docket: A-0932-24
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0932-24

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF ANNE WEEMS. _________________________

Submitted May 12, 2026 – Decided June 18, 2026

Before Judges Gilson and Vinci.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Essex County, Docket No. CP- 000427-22.

Wanda L. Weems, self-represented appellant.

Simon Monahan & Simon, LLC, attorneys for respondent Yolanda A. Weems-Palmer (Thomas M. Monahan, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff Wanda L. Weems, self-represented, appeals from an October 18,

2024 Chancery Division, Probate Part order enforcing a settlement agreement

between her and defendant Yolanda A. Weems-Palmer. We affirm. I.

On October 10, 2022, plaintiff filed a complaint seeking to be appointed

as guardian for her mother, Anne Weems, and accusing defendant, her sister, of

placing Anne in an assisted living facility against her will, in order to "sell her

properties," among other things. Plaintiff alleged "Anne has

dementia, . . . seizures, . . . memory lapses as well as some memory loss, which

[were the] results of her brain injury in 2018."

On December 5, 2022, the court entered an order to show cause (OTSC)

why judgment should not be entered awarding plaintiff temporary guardianship

and "stop[ping] the sale of Anne['s] . . . home" on Farley Avenue in Newark (the

property). The court scheduled a hearing for December 22, 2022.

On December 17, 2022, plaintiff went to the assisted living facility where

Anne was residing and procured her signature on a deed transferring the property

to plaintiff for $1 (the deed). On December 22, 2022, plaintiff caused the deed

to be recorded with the Essex County Clerk.

On January 12, 2023, defendant filed an answer and counterclaim seeking,

among other relief, to be appointed as guardian for Anne and to vacate the deed

and quiet title to the property. She alleged plaintiff "either forged Anne's

signature" on the deed "or procured Anne's signature . . . despite her incapacity"

A-0932-24 2 after seeking "[g]uardianship of Anne . . . based upon such incapacity." That

same day, the court entered an order denying plaintiff's request to be appointed

temporary guardian and appointing defendant "temporary guardian of the person

and estate of Anne." The court ordered defendant to file a complaint for

guardianship and permitted plaintiff to do the same, "if she [chose] to do so."

On February 8, 2022, defendant filed her verified complaint seeking to be

appointed as guardian for Anne, supported by certifications of two physicians

that Anne suffered from "dementia" and was "unfit and unable to govern

herself . . . and to manage her . . . affairs." On April 18, 2023, the court entered

an order appointing an attorney for Anne to conduct an investigation and file a

report pursuant to Rule 4:86-4(b).

On August 7, 2023, Anne's appointed attorney submitted a report

recommending the court "enter adjudication of incapacitation and issue letters

of general guardianship over [her] person and property to [defendant] ." He

could not "fathom how [Anne] ever had the capacity . . . to transfer . . . the deed

to the" property and recommended the deed "be deemed void at [its] inception

due to lack of capacity on [Anne's] part and revoked." On August 24, 2023, the

court entered a judgment of incapacity and appointed defendant as guardian of

Anne and her estate.

A-0932-24 3 On January 11, 2024, the court entered an order establishing a briefing

schedule in connection with defendant's contention "that the deed should be

voided[,] and the property [should] go back into the [e]state of her ward."

Defendant served a February 19, 2024 expert report by Dr. Mihir J. Shah, who

opined that Anne "lacked the capacity to understand the consequences of signing

her house over for $1[] in December 2022." On July 3, 2024, the court entered

an order scheduling a trial on defendant's claim that the deed should be voided.

The parties, who were both represented by counsel, appeared for trial on

August 15, 2024. After several hours of negotiations, counsel advised the court

that the parties had reached a settlement and placed the terms of the settlement

on the record. The parties "agreed that [plaintiff would] execute a deed to the

property . . . back to Anne" and the deed would "be held in escrow [by plaintiff's

counsel] pending . . . [plaintiff's] purchase of the property pursuant to the terms

of th[e] settlement." "The purchase price [would] be based upon an

appraisal . . . to determine the fair market value" by an appraiser appointed by

the court.

Plaintiff agreed to "cooperate to promptly schedule" the appraisal and

"provide access . . . to complete the appraisal." Plaintiff agreed to provide a

"pre-approval of her ability to complete the purchase" "within [thirty] days" and

A-0932-24 4 "close on the purchase within [sixty] days of the date of . . . the appraisal."

Defendant agreed plaintiff "w[ould] be entitled to a credit against the purchase

price for documented improvements to the property." Defendant also agreed to

provide plaintiff with "a copy of the guardianship accounting which [was] due

to the [c]ourt" on approximately September 1, 2024.

The parties agreed if plaintiff did "not provide either the pre[-]approval

or . . . proceed with the purchase of the property" the deed would "be released

from escrow and recorded and the property [could] then be sold to a third party

or refinanced or reverse mortgage in accordance with [defendant's] discretion to

obtain funds to pay for Anne's care." Defendant agreed to cooperate with

plaintiff "with the clearing of the title" so that she could "get a loan on the

property." Defense counsel agreed to discharge the lis pendens on the property

"if that is a loan condition" and "if need be . . . [to] provide a discharge of the

lis pendens also to be held in escrow pending closing."

Plaintiff testified under oath that she understood the terms of the

agreement, agreed to the terms of the agreement, and entered into the agreement

voluntarily. Plaintiff agreed the terms were "fair and adequate and just . . . in

light of . . . the circumstances" and she would "abide by the[] terms." While

plaintiff's counsel was questioning her, she clarified her understanding that "[i]f

A-0932-24 5 this house appraises for less than what [defendant] tried to sell it for

before, . . . that[ is] the rate [they were] going to go with."

Plaintiff testified nobody "force[d] . . . or coerce[d] her . . . to enter into

th[e] agreement." She also confirmed her counsel "represented [her] for

approximately the last two months" and this was "not the first time that [they

had] discussed these terms." Plaintiff testified she did not have "any questions

of [her counsel] or the [j]udge" and was "satisfied with [her counsel's] services."

Plaintiff then signed the deed returning the property to Anne and her counsel

"explain[ed] each thing" to her "as she sign[ed]" it.

After the parties testified, the court

f[ound] that [they] ha[d] voluntarily entered into a settlement which encompasse[d] all of the issues that were open on the ownership of the property that was held in the name of Anne . . . and transferred to [plaintiff]. [It] f[ound] that the parties . . . ha[d] entered into the agreement voluntarily. That both agree[d] that under all circumstances it is a fair agreement, and [it] f[ound] that th[e] agreement contain[ed] all of the material terms of their agreement such that if there are other terms that they wish to add at a later date, and both sides agree, they can do that.

But the elements of the agreement which were placed on the record [were] the agreement. It [was] an enforceable agreement. So, if either side d[id] not comply with the agreement or its components then the parties c[ould] come into court to have it enforced.

A-0932-24 6 Immediately following the settlement, the parties scheduled the appraisal

to be conducted by the court-appointed appraiser. On August 16, 2024, plaintiff

sent two letters to the court captioned "[r]escind [l]etter" and "[c]ancellation of

[c]ontract [l]etter." Plaintiff stated she "wish[ed] to rescind" and cancel "[her]

previous instruction to transfer [her] property . . . to Anne or her estate" and "no

longer wish[ed] for [her] asset to leave [her]." She demanded to "immediately

stop all processing of this transaction of this transfer."

She asserted there were "[m]istake of [f]acts" because "[t]ransferring [her]

property to Anne . . . would [stop] her from receiving Medicaid as per

represent[ative] of Medicaid" and "[t]he property [would] become a large asset

and the five years spend down calculator will restart." She asserted "Medicaid

is only concerned about the [f]air [m]arket [v]alue of the property on the date in

which it was sold to [her] for $1[]."

She also contended the settlement agreement was "an unconscionable

contract[] because the property [was] legally owned by [her], and [her] rights

should not be compromised." Plaintiff asserted "[m]ost importantly, due to the

concerns of the guardian['s] inability to account for the management of assets,

[she] believe[d] it[ was] in the best interests of Anne" to have the property

A-0932-24 7 "available for Anne's convenien[ce] to reside in the event, she is soon or in the

future removed from a [f]acility due to nonpayment."

On September 30, 2024, plaintiff filed a motion pursuant to Rule 5:5-4

seeking "[c]ancel[l]ation of agreement." Plaintiff contended on "August 15,

2024, an incomplete[] oral order was placed on the record in which [the court]

instructed [counsel] to complete terms and conditions of the agreement ." She

argued "[t]hese instructions were never followed" and "[t]his is necessary to

provide a clear and legal agreement." Plaintiff argued defense counsel failed

"to remove the [lis pendens] off [her] property[] and submit to [her] the payoff

statement" causing her "to be unable to secure a loan."

Plaintiff also sought an "order to disregard the first [five]–[ten] minutes

of the oral agreement" because she "was not a[]part of the conversation and [her

counsel] misrepresented [her]." She claimed "the trial transcripts were edited

or[] merged with appearances of [her] being a part of the conversation when

[she] was not in the courtroom during the first part of the oral agreement."

Defendant subsequently filed a proposed OTSC to enforce the settlement.

On October 18, 2024, the court heard oral argument on the pending applications.

Plaintiff appeared, self-represented, and argued "the settlement was never

authorized or finalized," she "was misrepresented by [her] attorney," she "was

A-0932-24 8 under duress," and "the transcript was altered." She claimed "the loan fell

through because they . . . did[ not] [re]move the lis [pendens] and . . . did not

give [her] the settlement." Plaintiff also argued it was "[her] property that [her]

mother sold to [her] before we even came to put guardianship" and "this should

not even be a guardianship case."

Defense counsel responded that he and plaintiff's former counsel

contacted the court-appointed appraiser immediately after the settlement was

placed on the record and "had an appraiser scheduled until [plaintiff] cancelled"

it. He argued the reason plaintiff did not get a loan was that "[s]he, on her own,

cancelled the appraisal and sent a letter saying that she changed her

mind . . . and did[ not] want to buy the property." The appraisal "was the very

first step to determine what she was going to be paying for the property."

Following oral argument, the court entered an order enforcing the

settlement agreement, supported by an oral decision. It found the terms of the

settlement were placed on the record and are "embodied in [the] transcript that

contains all of the terms of the settlement" and "acknowledgments by both

parties." The settlement "was consented to in the presence of and agreed to

under oath by [plaintiff] in the presence of her attorney."

A-0932-24 9 The court was "satisfied that [the] settlement agreement [was] a fully

enforceable agreement" and "the parties were fully questioned and were asked

if they believed that it was fair under all of the terms" and "[t]hey agreed." It

found it was "undisputed . . . [plaintiff] cancelled the appraisal that was

scheduled and . . . asserted that she was rescinding the agreement." The court

determined plaintiff "asserted . . . she [was] not going forward with the purchase

of the property" and, therefore, "the deed should be released to the attorney for

[defendant], so that the property [could] be placed on the market for sale"

pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement.

II.

On appeal, plaintiff argues: (1) the court did not have jurisdiction because

"[p]robate courts have limited jurisdiction and may only adjudicate matters

involving the [e]state of a deceased person"; (2) the settlement agreement was

incomplete and unenforceable because "[t]here was no specified agreed amount

of compensation for [her]" and it was "never finalized"; (3) the court did not

"acknowledge that [her] performance was rendered impossible" by defendant's

failure to discharge the lis pendens and "enforce[d] the agreement against [her]

without requiring [d]efendant to first perform a critical term"; (4) the agreement

violated the statute of frauds, N.J.S.A. 25:1-13; (5) the court should have

A-0932-24 10 enforced a prior proposed July 30, 2024 consent order that defendant rejected

and refused to sign; (6) her "rights and the principles of fairness have been

compromised due to judicial misconduct and preferential treatment toward"

defense counsel; (7) she was deprived of "property rights without due process"

in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Const. amend. XIV; (8) the

court's order enforcing the settlement constituted the "taking of private property

without payment or just compensation" in violation of the Fifth Amendment,

U.S. Const. amend. V; (9) she was under "stress and duress" and "did not know

she was being defrauded by the judicial system"; (10) defendant has "unclean

hand[s]" and "wants to be unjustly enriched"; and (11) she "purchased the

[property] for $1[] before [this] matter was heard" and the court did not have

"authority to undo this lawful transfer unless a civil complaint was filed."

III.

We are unpersuaded by plaintiff's arguments and affirm substantially for

the reasons set forth by the court in its oral decision. We add the following

comments.

"Our review of a motion to enforce [a] settlement is de novo." Gold Tree

Spa, Inc. v. PD Nail Corp., 475 N.J. Super. 240, 245 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting

Amatuzzo v. Kozmiuk, 305 N.J. Super. 469, 474-75 (App. Div. 1997)). Thus,

A-0932-24 11 no special deference is accorded a trial court's interpretation of an agreement

entered into by the parties. Kaur v. Assured Lending Corp., 405 N.J. Super.

468, 474 (App. Div. 2009).

Settlement agreements are "governed by principles of contract law."

Thompson v. City of Atlantic City, 190 N.J. 359, 379 (2007). "[I]f parties agree

on essential terms and manifest an intention to be bound by those terms, they

have created an enforceable contract." Weichert Co. Realtors v. Ryan, 128 N.J.

427, 435 (1992). "[A] contract is no less a contract because some preferable

clauses may be omitted either deliberately or by neglect. So long as the basic

essentials are sufficiently definite, any gaps left by the parties should not

frustrate their intention to be bound." Berg Agency v. Sleepworld-Willingboro,

Inc., 136 N.J. Super. 369, 377 (App. Div. 1975).

Based on our de novo review, we are convinced the court properly granted

defendant's application to enforce the settlement. There is no genuine dispute

about the fact that the parties agreed on the essential terms of the settlement

agreement. Plaintiff agreed to execute a deed to be held in escrow in exchange

for defendant's agreement to abandon her claim that the deed transferring the

property from Anne to plaintiff was void and to permit plaintiff to purchase the

property at the fair market value as determined by the court-appointed appraiser.

A-0932-24 12 Defendant also agreed to cooperate with plaintiff and her lender, including

agreeing to discharge the lis pendens at closing, to facilitate plaintiff's purchase

of the property.

Plaintiff's claim that defendant failed to satisfy an essential condition of

the contract because she did not discharge the lis pendens lacks merit. As the

court found, plaintiff was unable to obtain a loan and purchase the property

because she cancelled the appraisal and attempted to rescind the agreement, not

due to defendant's failure to discharge the lis pendens.

Plaintiff's argument that the settlement agreement violated the statute of

frauds lacks merit. N.J.S.A. 25:1-13 provides:

An agreement to transfer an interest in real estate or to hold an interest in real estate for the benefit of another shall not be enforceable unless:

a. a description of the real estate sufficient to identify it, the nature of the interest to be transferred, the existence of the agreement, and the identity of the transferor and transferee are established in a writing signed by or on behalf of the party against whom enforcement is sought; or

b. a description of the real estate sufficient to identify it, the nature of the interest to be transferred, the existence of the agreement and the identity of the transferor and the transferee are proved by clear and convincing evidence.

A-0932-24 13 Even if the statute of frauds applied to an agreement to settle a lawsuit,

there is no question the terms of the agreement, which were placed on the record

in open court, can be "proved by clear and convincing evidence" as required by

N.J.S.A. 25:1-13(b).

Plaintiff's claim that the court did not have jurisdiction to determine

ownership of the property because Anne was alive is incorrect. The Chancery

Division, Probate Part has jurisdiction to hear "[e]very action for the

determination of incapacity of a person and for the appointment of a guardian

for that person or of the person's estate or both." R. 4:86-1(a).

The ability of the Probate Part to appoint a guardian and confer the court's

power to exercise control over a ward's estate and affairs on a guardian, is broad

and discretionary. Matter of Mason, 305 N.J. Super. 120, 128-29 (Ch. Div.

1997); see also In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 44-45 (1976). In recognition of the

Probate Part's significant authority, N.J.S.A. 3B:12-36 states, "[i]f a guardian

has been appointed to the estate of . . . an incapacitated person, the court shall

have authority over the ward's estate, and all matters relating thereto." Here,

defendant alleged plaintiff procured Anne's signature on the deed despite her

incapacity while the probate action was pending. The court plainly had

jurisdiction to determine if the property was an asset of Anne's estate.

A-0932-24 14 Plaintiff's claim that she was deprived of due process is belied by the

record. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that a

State may not "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law." U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1. Due process is a flexible concept

that "depends on the particular circumstances" of the case. Doe v. Poritz, 142

N.J. 1, 106 (1995). It requires adequate notice and the opportunity to be heard,

Harrison Redevelopment Agency v. DeRose, 398 N.J. Super. 361, 403 (App.

Div. 2008), which is further understood as an opportunity to be heard at a

meaningful time and in a meaningful manner, Klier v. Sordoni Skanska Constr.

Co., 337 N.J. Super. 76, 84 (App. Div. 2001). In this case, there is no dispute

plaintiff was given proper notice, and the record reflects she was heard in a

meaningful manner both at the time of the settlement, when she was represented

by counsel, and at the argument on the enforcement motions, when she

proceeded self-represented.

Finally, we have carefully reviewed the underlying proceedings and are

satisfied plaintiff's claims of judicial misconduct and preferential treatment

toward defense counsel are baseless. The court took great pains to treat plaintiff

fairly, gave her ample time to place her arguments on the record, and gave all of

A-0932-24 15 her arguments appropriate consideration. Additionally, there is no evidence of

any preferential treatment toward defense counsel.

To the extent we have not specifically addressed any remaining

arguments, it is because they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a

written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.

A-0932-24 16