In The Matter Of The Detention Of J.p.

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: March 2, 2026
• Docket: 87816-6
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In the Matter of the Detention of No. 87816-6-I J.P. DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

HAZELRIGG, C.J. — J.P. challenges the order that committed her to 14 days

of involuntary mental health treatment and contends that the State did not provide

sufficient evidence to support the court’s conclusions that she both presented a

serious risk of harm to herself and was gravely disabled. We disagree and affirm.

FACTS

On December 18, 2024, J.P. got into a disagreement with her family, locked

herself in a bathroom, and attempted suicide by tying an item 1 around her neck.

She then “tied it to a fixture in the bathroom and sat down to hang herself.” Her

family became concerned, broke down the door, found her unconscious, and

called 911. When law enforcement arrived, they cut the object from J.P.’s neck

and provided medical care at the scene. J.P. was then admitted to Swedish

Edmonds Hospital through the emergency room.

A designated crisis responder evaluated J.P. at Swedish Edmonds and filed

a petition for initial detention for evaluation and treatment under the involuntary

1 The record alternately refers to the item as a cord or belt. However, it is the act of the suicide attempt, not its precise instrumentality, that is relevant to our inquiry here. No. 87816-6-I/2

treatment act 2 (ITA) on December 19. The petition stated that J.P. had been at

“North Sound Treatment Center for substance use disorder treatment” for about a

week but had “left prior to completing the program of her own volition” and a

urinalysis conducted pursuant to her emergency care at Swedish Edmonds “was

positive for methamphetamine and fentanyl.” The petition further alleged that her

behavioral disorder resulted in “an imminent risk to herself,” “a loss of cognitive

and volitional control,” and she was “unable to care for her health and safety”

because she showed a “profound lack of insight” into her suicide attempt and need

for treatment, which justified commitment under the ITA.

That same day, J.P. was taken to Fairfax Hospital for continued treatment

and evaluation pursuant to the custody authorization that followed the initial

petition. On December 24, Brian Hayden, a licensed mental health counselor and

evaluator at Fairfax, filed a petition for 14 days of involuntary treatment under the

ITA. Hayden’s petition averred that J.P. suffered from a “working diagnosis of

Unspecified Mood Disorder” which was “characterized by irritability, labile mood,

impaired impulse control, disorganized thought process, suicidal ideation with

recent serious attempt, and poor insight and judgment.” The 14-day petition

asserted that J.P. both presented “a likelihood of serious harm to self” and was

“gravely disabled” due to this behavioral health disorder which, separately or in

combination, necessitated continued commitment for involuntary treatment.

A court commissioner held a probable cause hearing on the 14-day petition

on December 26. The State presented testimony from the court evaluator from

2 Ch. 71.05 RCW

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Swedish Edmonds and Hayden. The court evaluator, “a licensed mental health

counselor,” testified to J.P.’s treatment and presentation while she was at Swedish

Edmonds, which included reading from the notes of hospital staff, and largely

reiterated the allegations from the December 19 initial petition.

Hayden testified to J.P.’s behavior while at Fairfax and also relied

extensively on records created by other employees at the hospital, as J.P. had

declined to speak with him directly. He adhered to his opinion contained in the 14-

day petition; J.P. had a “working diagnosis” of “unspecified mood disorder” which

resulted in a substantial risk of physical harm to herself and her grave disability.

Hayden noted one of her symptoms included “minimizing the severity of the suicide

attempt” and failing to engage with treatment and providers at Fairfax. The records

Hayden relied on included an evaluation for J.P.’s suicide risk which was assessed

as “high” on December 19, a “Mental Status Exam” which described her poor

judgment and denial on December 21 of “any need for treatment or medications,”

another assessment also conducted on December 21 that stated she was

“isolative” and was “[n]ot socializing with others and not attending groups,” an

assessment from December 22 that noted J.P. continued to minimize her

symptoms “and the seriousness of the suicide attempt,” and other records that

continued to raise concerns about isolation and minimization on subsequent days

leading up to the probable cause hearing.

J.P. called her occasional romantic partner, Rex Paul, to testify on her

behalf. Paul stated that he had known J.P. for many years, roughly 19 to 20 as his

former sister-in-law, and that she had appeared “really good” when they had

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interacted the day before the hearing. He further stated his beliefs that it was safe

for her to leave Fairfax and the suicide attempt was “out of character.” Paul was

present during J.P.’s suicide attempt and testified to the event. He also stated that

J.P. had expressed interest in treatment in the past, had gone to substance abuse

treatment willingly, but had left due to concerns over her storage unit and his

upcoming “court issues.”

J.P. also testified. She explained that she had not attended group therapy

at Fairfax because she felt unsafe, skipped daily showers because her roommate

had fouled the bathroom with excrement, and confirmed Paul’s testimony about

her treatment history. J.P. denied ongoing suicidal ideation but affirmed she had

not been fully engaging in treatment while at Fairfax.

At the end of the hearing, the commissioner found that the State had

established by a preponderance of the evidence that J.P. suffered from a

behavioral health disorder, specifically a “working diagnosis of unspecified mood

disorder.” It also found that as a result of this disorder, J.P. presented “a likelihood

of serious harm to herself” and she was “gravely disabled,” either of which justified

an order of commitment for involuntary treatment. The commissioner also stated

that J.P.’s own testimony showed she was minimizing her circumstances and did

not find Paul’s testimony credible.

The commissioner entered written findings of fact, conclusions of law, and

the order committing J.P. for involuntary treatment later that day and expressly

incorporated their oral findings. As to the first statutory basis presented by the

State, the commissioner found that J.P.’s condition was such that there was a

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substantial risk of harm to herself based on her recent admitted suicide attempt,

suicidality and depression in the six months leading up to the attempt, and

statements at Swedish Edmonds that “she needed treatment and it was not safe

for her to discharge.” The commissioner further found that the State had also

established that J.P. was gravely disabled because her disorder “had a substantial,

adverse effect upon [her] cognitive and volitional functioning” and her lack of

engagement in treatment showed she was not capable of “rational choices about

her need for care.” Finally, the commissioner found that a less restrictive

alternative to commitment was “not appropriate” because J.P. continued to be “too

symptomatic and ha[d] not engaged with treatment while in the hospital.” Based

on these findings, the commissioner concluded that J.P. had to be detained for

involuntary treatment.

J.P. sought revision of the 14-day commitment order on January 3, 2025.

The State filed a brief in opposition to J.P.’s motion for revision on January 7. A

few days later, a superior court judge considered the motion for revision and

denied it. In so doing, it affirmed and adopted the findings and conclusions of the

commissioner as its own.

J.P. timely appealed.

ANALYSIS

As a preliminary matter, J.P.’s briefing on appeal contends that although the

14-day commitment order has expired, her appeal is not moot because “a trial

court’s commitment order under the [ITA] has enduring effects, and reversal will

provide relief to J.P.” The State did not address mootness in its response brief.

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J.P. is correct that this appeal is not moot because the consequences of a

commitment order remain long after the detained person is no longer subject to it.

See In re Det. of C.B., 9 Wn. App. 2d 179, 182-83, 443 P.3d 811 (2019); RCW

71.05.012, .212, .245. Accordingly, we reach the merits.

We separately note that the procedural posture here is impacted by the

litigation decisions in the trial court. “All of the acts and proceedings of court

commissioners [pursuant to chapter 2.24 RCW] shall be subject to revision by the

superior court.” RCW 2.24.050. Where, as here, an appeal arises after a superior

court judge has denied a motion for revision, we consider only that order, not the

underlying order of the commissioner. In re Det. of B.R., 31 Wn. App. 2d 529, 538,

555 P.3d 435 (2024). This is so because denial of the motion to modify reflects an

adoption of the commissioner’s order by the superior court judge. Id. (quoting

Maldonado v. Maldonado, 197 Wn. App. 779, 789, 391 P.3d 546 (2017).

Accordingly, “‘we review the superior court’s ruling, not the commissioner’s

decision.’” Id. at 538-39 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Det. of

A.M., 17 Wn. App. 2d 321, 330, 487 P.3d 531 (2021)).

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

J.P. avers in her brief of appellant that the trial court erred because

substantial evidence did not support the finding “that J.P. posed ‘a likelihood of

serious harm’ to herself” because the suicide attempt was an impulsive one

resulting from “methamphetamine intoxication.” She also contends the State

“failed to present evidence tying J.P.’s mental illness to her failure to, or inability

to, provide for [her] essential needs” and the resulting legal conclusion was not

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justified because other evidence contradicted those findings. The State’s briefing

on appeal contends that the finding of a likelihood of harm to self was supported

by Hayden’s testimony that J.P. remained at risk of self-harm even when she was

no longer under the influence of methamphetamine and Hayden showed “that

there was a nexus between [J.P.’s] mental health disorder and the substantial risk

of harm.” We agree with the State.

“An appellate court reviewing the trial court’s decision on involuntary

commitment considers whether the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by

substantial evidence and if the court’s findings of fact support the court’s

conclusions of law and judgment.” In re Det. of A.F., 20 Wn. App. 2d 115, 125,

498 P.3d 1006 (2021). “‘Substantial evidence is the quantum of evidence sufficient

to persuade a fair-minded person.’” Id. (quoting In re Det. of H.N., 188 Wn. App.

744, 762, 355 P.3d 294 (2015)). “The burden is on the challenging party to

demonstrate that substantial evidence does not support a finding of fact.” In re

Det. of T.C., 11 Wn. App. 2d 51, 56, 450 P.3d 1230 (2019). “[W]e review the

evidence in a light most favorable to the petitioner.” In re Det. of K.P., 32 Wn. App.

2d 214, 221, 555 P.3d 480 (2024). “We do not review a trial court’s decision

regarding witness credibility or the persuasiveness of the evidence.” A.F., 20 Wn.

App. 2d at 125.

The trial court must find “by a preponderance of the evidence that a person

detained for behavioral health treatment, as the result of a behavioral health

disorder, presents a likelihood of serious harm, or is gravely disabled” before it can

order they “be detained for involuntary treatment not to exceed 14 days.” RCW

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71.05.240(4)(a). The court must also consider, and decide against, “less restrictive

alternatives.” Id. Here, the petition for 14-day commitment was premised on two

distinct statutory bases: a likelihood of serious harm to self and grave disability. A

“[l]ikelihood of serious harm” is defined as a “substantial risk that . . . [p]hysical

harm will be inflicted by a person upon [their] own person, as evidenced by threats

or attempts to commit suicide or inflict physical harm on oneself.” RCW

71.05.020(37)(a)(i). A person is “gravely disabled” for the purposes of the ITA if,

“as a result of a behavioral health disorder,” the person is “(a) in danger of serious

physical harm resulting from a failure to provide for [their] essential human needs

of health or safety” or “(b) manifests severe deterioration in routine functioning

evidenced by repeated and escalating loss of cognitive or volitional control over

[their] actions and is not receiving such care as is essential for [their] health or

safety.” RCW 71.05.020(25). Here, the State pursued a theory based on

subsection (a) regarding grave disability. The trial court concluded that

commitment and involuntary treatment were justified under both of the statutory

alternatives pleaded and argued by the State but we need only agree with one to

affirm the commitment order. This is because the statutory bases for 14-day

commitment are presented in the alternative, RCW 71.05.240, which means that

an order for involuntary treatment may properly be entered on any of those

grounds, individually or in combination, based on the particular facts of a case.

Here, the trial court’s findings were supported by the testimony of the court

evaluator from Swedish Edmonds and Hayden. Both relied on the observations of

medical staff from Swedish Edmonds and Fairfax, and Hayden also testified to his

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own observations. The evaluator from Swedish Edmonds stated that on

admission, J.P. had reported to “feeling suicidal for the last six months,” that she

did “not feel safe at home,” and she had “been having a lot of psychosocial

stressors.” Hayden testified that J.P. had a working diagnosis of “unspecified

mood disorder” evinced by symptoms of “labile mood, angry affect, isolation to self”

and J.P. had minimized “the severity of her suicide attempt,” was “not engaging in

active treatment,” and was “minimally engag[ed] with the provider” at Fairfax.

Hayden also read from the nursing assessment conducted on December 19. It

expressly indicated J.P. had reported that she felt depressed and wanted to end

her life. As part of that initial nursing assessment, J.P. was also given the

Columbia-Suicide Severity Lifetime Risk Assessment. 3 Hayden explained the

results of that assessment at length as follows:

It does note her suicidal ideation both for lifetime and in the past month that, for the first question wish to be dead, she did respond “yes” to both. For nonspecific or active suicidal thoughts, she again responded “yes” to both. For active suicidal ideation with any method not planned without intent to act, for lifetime she did report “no.” For the last month she did report “yes.” For active suicidal ideation with some intent to act out specific plan, for the lifetime she reported “no.” Within the last month reported “yes.” For active suicidal ideation with specific plan and intent, over lifetime she reported “no.” Within the last month she reported “yes.” For the intensity of ideation, for lifetime on a scale of 1 to 5 she reports 2 with the notation, “I became homeless. Life was hard. For the past six months I feel [sic] suicidal. No plan.” Recent most severe ideation 5. “Yesterday I did a suicide attempt via hanging.”

3 This is one of the suicide risk assessment tools developed by The Lighthouse Project at

Columbia University and involves a series of questions intended to assess “whether someone is at risk for suicide, determine the severity and immediacy of that risk, and gauge the level of support that the person needs.” About the Protocol, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, https://cssrs.columbia.edu/the- columbia-scale-c-ssrs/about-the-scale/ (last visited Feb.11, 2026).

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For the frequency, how many times have you had these thoughts, over lifetime she reports 2 which is once a week. For the past month she reports 5 which is many times each day. For the duration when you have these thoughts, how long do they last, over lifetime again she reports less than one hour some of the time and for the past month more than eight hours persistent or continuous. Moving forward within the Columbia-Suicide Severity Rating Screen, fourth page for the risk formulation. First, the suicide risk is high. The rationale for considerations for risk determination, patient attempted suicide yesterday. Patient is denial [sic] today.

In briefing, J.P. avers that the State was required to disprove her theory that

the suicide attempt was the result of “methamphetamine intoxication,” not the

result of her behavioral health disorder, and it needed “to prove an ongoing risk of

harm once the intoxication had dissipated.” She contends that because “within

days of her admission to the hospital, [she] no longer endorsed suicidal ideation,”

the trial court’s finding should have been that her suicidal ideation was “largely the

product of methamphetamine use.”

However, when we, as the reviewing court, conclude the trial court’s finding

of fact is supported by substantial evidence, we “will not substitute [our] judgment

for that of the trial court even though [we] might have resolved a factual dispute

differently.” Sunnyside Valley Irr. Dist. v. Dickey, 149 Wn.2d 873, 879-80, 73 P.3d

369 (2003). “[E]vidence of a past suicide attempt is evidence of a substantial risk

that physical harm will be inflicted.” H.N., 188 Wn. App. at 765. Our Supreme

Court has held that the risk of physical harm can be “evidenced by a recent overt

act.” In re Det. of Harris, 98 Wn.2d 276, 284, 654 P.2d 109 (1982). J.P.’s suicide

attempt on December 18 is plainly such a recent overt act that evinces a

substantial risk of physical harm. Further, our Supreme Court has held that the

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risk of harm remains even when lessened by hospitalization for treatment. In re

Det. of Labelle, 107 Wn.2d 196, 203, 728 P.3d 138 (1984).

Next, regarding the nexus between the behavioral health disorder and an

ongoing risk of harm, the trial court explicitly relied on Hayden’s testimony to find

that J.P.’s “mental disorder” included “minimization of her symptoms and suicide

attempt.” When asked about J.P.’s denial of suicidal ideation after she had been

at Fairfax for a few days, Hayden explained that J.P. did not fully engage in

subsequent suicide assessments, so “there would be no identified risk because

she’s not discussing what’s going on” and, critically, her answers were not

internally consistent, both factors suggestive of ongoing minimization, despite the

seriousness of her attempt. As Hayden also noted, “Attempted hanging is a more

lethal attempt because there really isn’t—you can’t kind of halfway strangle

yourself.” Further, even if methamphetamine intoxication did play a role in J.P.’s

attempt, she continued to minimize her attempt after the effects of intoxication had

dissipated, which Hayden attributed to her behavioral health disorder. Thus, there

was sufficient evidence to demonstrate a connection between J.P.’s working

diagnosis and the risk of harm to self.

When we consider the evidence regarding the circumstances and method

of J.P.’s suicide attempt, her initial acknowledgment of suicidal ideation, coupled

with her subsequent denials, sufficiently established that her symptoms placed her

at an ongoing risk of harm to herself because she was unwilling or unable to

acknowledge and address the issue with appropriate treatment. This evidence

was sufficient to support the trial court’s finding of fact and its ultimate conclusion

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that J.P. was at a substantial risk of harm to herself and required continued

commitment for involuntary treatment.

We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. See In re Det. of

Paschke, 136 Wn. App. 517, 521, 150 P.3d 586 (2007). The statutory bases for

involuntary treatment under the ITA are set out in the alternative, thus each may

independently support a commitment order. Because we conclude that the trial

court’s findings regarding risk of harm to self were supported by sufficient evidence

and its conclusions of law logically flowed from those findings, we need not analyze

the sufficiency of the alternate basis found by the court, grave disability under RCW

71.05.020(25)(a).

Affirmed.

WE CONCUR:

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