In The Matter Of The Detention Of J.b.

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE

In re the Detention of: No. 88014-4-I J.B. DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

PER CURIAM — This case under the involuntary treatment act (ITA), chapter

71.05 RCW, involves a series of emergency detention proceedings, agreed commitment

orders as a less restrictive alternative (LRA) to inpatient treatment, and petitions to

revoke the LRA orders. J.B. contends, and respondent Navos Inpatient Services (the

Hospital) concedes, that the trial court’s January 7, 2025 order and subsequent orders

allowed him to be held beyond the court’s authority under the ITA, and thereby “totally

disregarded” the provisions of the ITA. RCW 71.05.010(2) (construing the provisions of

the ITA, courts “must focus on the merits of the petition, except where requirements

have been totally disregarded”).

The concession is consistent with the statute, which allows a commitment of no

more than 90 days as “further commitment” following a 14-day detention. See RCW

71.05.320(2) (authorizing 90-day commitment on various grounds, including grave

disability, “not to exceed 90 days from the date of judgment”); RCW 71.05.590(5)(d)

(allowing a court to modify an LRA order by ordering inpatient treatment, but not by

exceeding the number days remaining on the underlying 90-day commitment order). It

is also consistent with applicable caselaw. See In re Detention of A.C., 1 Wn.3d 731, No. 88014-4-I/2

736, 533 P.3d 81 (2023) (“the State totally disregards the requirements of the ITA by

holding someone despite lacking the authority under the ITA to do so”). And we agree

with the Hospital that three orders stemming from the violation of the ITA violation

should be vacated: (1) the January 7, 2025 “1st Amended” LRA order, (2) the February

27, 2025 order granting a motion to revoke the LRA, and (3) the April 11, 2025 agreed

180-day LRA order.

We reverse and remand to the trial court to enter an order that (1) vacates the

January 7, 2025, February 27, 2025, and April 11, 2025 orders, and (2) reflects that, as

the period of detention permitted under the petition filed on November 7, 2024, has now

expired, there is no authority to warrant further petitions or detention under this cause. 1

See RCW 71.05.320(4) (an individual “shall be released from involuntary treatment at

the expiration of the period of commitment imposed under subsection (1) or (2) of this

section” unless a new petition is filed).

FOR THE COURT:

1 J.B.’s motion to accelerate consideration of his appeal and issuance of the mandate is hereby granted. -2-