IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Detention of No. 87128-5-I F.L. DIVISION ONE
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
HAZELRIGG, C.J. — F.L. appeals from an order committing him to 14 days
of involuntary mental health treatment. He contends that the evidence presented
was insufficient to support the court’s findings that he presented a likelihood of
serious harm to others and was gravely disabled. We disagree and affirm.
FACTS
On August 2, 2024, the Shoreline Police Department responded to a call
that F.L. was outside his parent’s house in violation of a no contact order issued
in June 2024 that specifically prohibited contact with his step-mother, Eileen. 1
Officers found F.L. sitting on a bench in the backyard and arrested him.
Following his arrest, F.L. was evaluated while being held at the South
Correctional Entity Regional Jail, after which a designated crisis responder (DCR)
filed a petition for initial detention pursuant to the involuntary treatment act (ITA). 2
The petition alleged that F.L. “presented an imminent likelihood of serious harm
1 F.L. and his parents share the same last name. As such, we refer to the parents by their
first names in the interest of privacy and clarity. No disrespect is intended. 2 Ch. 71.05 RCW. No. 87128-5-I/2
to others” as defined by RCW 71.05.020(37)(a) and he was “in imminent danger
due to grave disability” pursuant to the definitions set out in RCW
71.05.020(25)(a) and (b). The petition requested that F.L. be detained at an
evaluation and treatment facility for “inpatient psychiatric treatment for safety and
stabilization.”
F.L. was admitted to Fairfax Hospital for treatment. Fred Schwartz, a
licensed mental health counselor and evaluator for Fairfax, filed a petition for 14
days of involuntary treatment on behalf of the hospital. Schwartz identified that
F.L. had a “profound history of 9 [involuntary commitments under the ITA], 2
revocations, and 17 other hospitalizations.” He further observed that while in the
hospital, F.L. continued “to be guarded, exhibit a flat, detached affect, be internally
preoccupied, and not attend group therapy.” Schwarz also reported that F.L. had
caused property damage in the hospital, “including drawing on the wall and
blocking his toilet.”
On August 20, 2024, the court conducted a probable cause hearing on the
petition. In support of the petition, the State called Eileen, F.L.’s father Donald,
and Schwartz to testify. Donald testified that F.L. had foregone medication for the
past three years, had become almost nonverbal during that time and engaged in
a variety of behaviors that caused Donald to be concerned about his son’s
wellbeing. Critically, he also stated that he was concerned for the couple’s safety
due to the repeated violations of the no contact order and F.L.’s increased
exhibition of extreme anger. Eileen described the incident that caused her to seek
a no contact order and explained that she was afraid of F.L. for similar reasons
-2- No. 87128-5-I/3
as Donald. The State admitted F.L.’s diagnostic and treatment history through
Schwartz, who testified to F.L.’s symptoms and behavior at Fairfax, some of which
had already been described in the petition. Schwartz opined that F.L. has a
“mental health disorder” of “unspecified schizophrenia” and noted that F.L.’s
symptoms included “delusions, hallucinations,” being “easily dysregulated,” denial
of the existence of his own disorder, having impaired insight and judgment about
his condition, and unwillingness to participate in treatment.
The court found Donald, Eileen, and Schwartz were credible witnesses. It
also found that the State had proved by a preponderance of the evidence all three
statutory bases presented in the petition and specifically noted the evidence on
which it had relied for each finding. It further found that less restrictive alternative
treatment was not in F.L.’s best interest and concluded that he was subject to
commitment for up to 14 days of involuntary treatment because of the likelihood
of serious harm to others and due to grave disability.
F.L. timely appealed.
ANALYSIS
As a threshold matter, F.L.’s avers that although the 14-day commitment
has concluded, his appeal is not moot because “he still faces collateral
consequences from the commitment order.” We agree and reach the merits. 3
3 The State, appropriately, does not challenge F.L.’s appeal on the basis of mootness.
-3- No. 87128-5-I/4
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
F.L. asserts that the trial court erred when it entered a 14-day commitment
order because there was insufficient evidence to support the findings that he
presents a likelihood of serious harm to others and that he is gravely disabled
because of both his inability to provide for his basic human needs and his behavior
manifests severe deterioration in routine functioning. Each of these individual
statutory bases may separately support the court’s ultimate decision on
commitment. See In re Det. of K.P., 32 Wn. App. 2d 214, 221-22, 555 P.3d 480
(2024). As such, if any one of the three bases found by the court is supported by
substantial evidence, we may affirm. Id.
Our review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the
trial court’s commitment order “is limited to determining whether substantial
evidence supports the findings and, if so, whether the findings in turn support the
trial court’s conclusions of law and judgment.” In re Det. of LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d
196, 209, 728 P.2d 138 (1986). “Substantial evidence ‘is evidence that is in
sufficient quantum to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the declared
premise.” In re Det. of T.C., 11 Wn. App. 2d 51, 56, 450 P.3d 1230 (2019) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Det. of A.S., 91 Wn. App. 146, 162, 955
P.2d 836 (1998), aff’d, 138 Wn.2d 898, 982 P.2d 1156 (1999)). “The party
challenging a finding of fact bears the burden of demonstrating the finding is not
supported by substantial evidence.” A.S., 91 Wn. App. at 162. We will not disturb
the trial court’s assessment of witness credibility or the strength of the evidence.
In re Det. of A.F., 20 Wn. App. 2d 115, 125, 498 P.3d 1006 (2021).
-4- No. 87128-5-I/5
F.L. first contends that the State did not offer sufficient evidence to support
the court’s findings underpinning its conclusion that he presented a likelihood of
serious harm to others. He avers that the State failed to provide a “recent overt
act to support the conclusion that [F.L.] was a substantial danger to anyone”
because “[e]xpressions of subjective fear are inadequate when they are not
tethered to an objective, reasonable fear of substantial risk of physical harm.”
The ITA provides that
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Detention of No. 87128-5-I F.L. DIVISION ONE
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
HAZELRIGG, C.J. — F.L. appeals from an order committing him to 14 days
of involuntary mental health treatment. He contends that the evidence presented
was insufficient to support the court’s findings that he presented a likelihood of
serious harm to others and was gravely disabled. We disagree and affirm.
FACTS
On August 2, 2024, the Shoreline Police Department responded to a call
that F.L. was outside his parent’s house in violation of a no contact order issued
in June 2024 that specifically prohibited contact with his step-mother, Eileen. 1
Officers found F.L. sitting on a bench in the backyard and arrested him.
Following his arrest, F.L. was evaluated while being held at the South
Correctional Entity Regional Jail, after which a designated crisis responder (DCR)
filed a petition for initial detention pursuant to the involuntary treatment act (ITA). 2
The petition alleged that F.L. “presented an imminent likelihood of serious harm
1 F.L. and his parents share the same last name. As such, we refer to the parents by their
first names in the interest of privacy and clarity. No disrespect is intended. 2 Ch. 71.05 RCW. No. 87128-5-I/2
to others” as defined by RCW 71.05.020(37)(a) and he was “in imminent danger
due to grave disability” pursuant to the definitions set out in RCW
71.05.020(25)(a) and (b). The petition requested that F.L. be detained at an
evaluation and treatment facility for “inpatient psychiatric treatment for safety and
stabilization.”
F.L. was admitted to Fairfax Hospital for treatment. Fred Schwartz, a
licensed mental health counselor and evaluator for Fairfax, filed a petition for 14
days of involuntary treatment on behalf of the hospital. Schwartz identified that
F.L. had a “profound history of 9 [involuntary commitments under the ITA], 2
revocations, and 17 other hospitalizations.” He further observed that while in the
hospital, F.L. continued “to be guarded, exhibit a flat, detached affect, be internally
preoccupied, and not attend group therapy.” Schwarz also reported that F.L. had
caused property damage in the hospital, “including drawing on the wall and
blocking his toilet.”
On August 20, 2024, the court conducted a probable cause hearing on the
petition. In support of the petition, the State called Eileen, F.L.’s father Donald,
and Schwartz to testify. Donald testified that F.L. had foregone medication for the
past three years, had become almost nonverbal during that time and engaged in
a variety of behaviors that caused Donald to be concerned about his son’s
wellbeing. Critically, he also stated that he was concerned for the couple’s safety
due to the repeated violations of the no contact order and F.L.’s increased
exhibition of extreme anger. Eileen described the incident that caused her to seek
a no contact order and explained that she was afraid of F.L. for similar reasons
-2- No. 87128-5-I/3
as Donald. The State admitted F.L.’s diagnostic and treatment history through
Schwartz, who testified to F.L.’s symptoms and behavior at Fairfax, some of which
had already been described in the petition. Schwartz opined that F.L. has a
“mental health disorder” of “unspecified schizophrenia” and noted that F.L.’s
symptoms included “delusions, hallucinations,” being “easily dysregulated,” denial
of the existence of his own disorder, having impaired insight and judgment about
his condition, and unwillingness to participate in treatment.
The court found Donald, Eileen, and Schwartz were credible witnesses. It
also found that the State had proved by a preponderance of the evidence all three
statutory bases presented in the petition and specifically noted the evidence on
which it had relied for each finding. It further found that less restrictive alternative
treatment was not in F.L.’s best interest and concluded that he was subject to
commitment for up to 14 days of involuntary treatment because of the likelihood
of serious harm to others and due to grave disability.
F.L. timely appealed.
ANALYSIS
As a threshold matter, F.L.’s avers that although the 14-day commitment
has concluded, his appeal is not moot because “he still faces collateral
consequences from the commitment order.” We agree and reach the merits. 3
3 The State, appropriately, does not challenge F.L.’s appeal on the basis of mootness.
-3- No. 87128-5-I/4
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
F.L. asserts that the trial court erred when it entered a 14-day commitment
order because there was insufficient evidence to support the findings that he
presents a likelihood of serious harm to others and that he is gravely disabled
because of both his inability to provide for his basic human needs and his behavior
manifests severe deterioration in routine functioning. Each of these individual
statutory bases may separately support the court’s ultimate decision on
commitment. See In re Det. of K.P., 32 Wn. App. 2d 214, 221-22, 555 P.3d 480
(2024). As such, if any one of the three bases found by the court is supported by
substantial evidence, we may affirm. Id.
Our review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the
trial court’s commitment order “is limited to determining whether substantial
evidence supports the findings and, if so, whether the findings in turn support the
trial court’s conclusions of law and judgment.” In re Det. of LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d
196, 209, 728 P.2d 138 (1986). “Substantial evidence ‘is evidence that is in
sufficient quantum to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the declared
premise.” In re Det. of T.C., 11 Wn. App. 2d 51, 56, 450 P.3d 1230 (2019) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Det. of A.S., 91 Wn. App. 146, 162, 955
P.2d 836 (1998), aff’d, 138 Wn.2d 898, 982 P.2d 1156 (1999)). “The party
challenging a finding of fact bears the burden of demonstrating the finding is not
supported by substantial evidence.” A.S., 91 Wn. App. at 162. We will not disturb
the trial court’s assessment of witness credibility or the strength of the evidence.
In re Det. of A.F., 20 Wn. App. 2d 115, 125, 498 P.3d 1006 (2021).
-4- No. 87128-5-I/5
F.L. first contends that the State did not offer sufficient evidence to support
the court’s findings underpinning its conclusion that he presented a likelihood of
serious harm to others. He avers that the State failed to provide a “recent overt
act to support the conclusion that [F.L.] was a substantial danger to anyone”
because “[e]xpressions of subjective fear are inadequate when they are not
tethered to an objective, reasonable fear of substantial risk of physical harm.”
The ITA provides that
at the conclusion of the probable cause hearing, if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that a person detained for behavioral health treatment, as the result of a behavioral health disorder, presents a likelihood of serious harm, or is gravely disabled, and, after considering less restrictive alternatives to involuntary detention and treatment, finds that no such alternatives are in the best interests of such person or others, the court shall order that such person be detained for involuntary treatment not to exceed 14 days in a facility licensed or certified to provide treatment by the department or under RCW 71.05.745.
RCW 71.05.240(4)(a). In RCW 71.05.020(37), the legislature defined “[l]ikelihood
of serious harm” as:
(a) A substantial risk that: (i) Physical harm will be inflicted by a person upon [their] own person, as evidenced by threats or attempts to commit suicide or inflict physical harm on oneself; (ii) physical harm will be inflicted by a person upon another, as evidenced by behavior which has caused such harm or which places another person or persons in reasonable fear of sustaining such harm; or (iii) physical harm will be inflicted by a person upon the property of others, as evidenced by behavior which has caused substantial loss or damage to the property of others; or (b) The person has threatened the physical safety of another and has a history of one or more violent acts.
(Emphasis added.) We have previously interpreted “reasonable fear of sustaining
such harm” as requiring “that the person[] threatened be in fear, that they must be
in fear of harm to themselves, and that the harm they are fearful of must be in the
-5- No. 87128-5-I/6
nature of the harm threatened.” In re Det. of D.V., 200 Wn. App. 904, 907, 403
P.3d 941 (2017). The ITA further instructs the trial court that
(3) In making a determination of whether there is a likelihood of serious harm in a hearing conducted under RCW 71.05.240 or 71.05.320, the court shall give great weight to any evidence before the court regarding whether the person has: (a) A recent history of one or more violent acts; or (b) a recent history of one or more commitments under this chapter or its equivalent provisions under the laws of another state which were based on a likelihood of serious harm. The existence of prior violent acts or commitments under this chapter or its equivalent shall not be the sole basis for determining whether a person presents a likelihood of serious harm. For the purposes of this subsection “recent” refers to the period of time not exceeding three years prior to the current hearing.
RCW 71.05.245.
Here, the trial court concluded that F.L. created “a substantial risk” of
“physical harm . . . evidenced by behavior which has caused such harm or which
places another person or persons in reasonable fear of sustaining such harm.”
The trial court’s conclusion was premised on the findings it made in reliance on
Donald and Eileen’s testimony about their past confrontations with F.L. beginning
in May 2024, the basis for the no contact order, through the date of F.L.’s arrest
in August, in addition to Schwartz’ testimony regarding hospital records that
described F.L.’s behavior during his initial commitment at Fairfax following his
August arrest.
Eileen and Donald both testified they were scared to leave their home
when F.L. was not in jail or treatment and that F.L. had repeatedly violated the no
contact order intended to prohibit his contact with Eileen. Eileen testified that the
basis of the no contact order issued in June 2024 was that F.L. had charged at
her, running with clenched fists, in May of that year. She also testified that she
-6- No. 87128-5-I/7
does not “garden when he’s out of jail” and does not “do anything outside unless
there’s a whole bunch of neighbors outside where I would feel comfortable.” She
further testified that she doesn’t take walks, watches “continuously just to walk
from the house to the car” and looks outside before she leaves. Schwartz testified
to an incident during F.L.’s initial detention at Fairfax, when he was in a “very
agitated . . . dysregulated state. His eyes were bulging. He was screaming and
yelling, slamming the door.” It required the efforts of several staff “to redirect him,”
which still proved “difficult.” Schwartz explained that F.L. “appeared aggressive
and quite honestly, scary” during the outburst, which had occurred the day of the
hearing, although Schwartz also observed that F.L. eventually gained “enough
composure” to attend the proceedings.
F.L. nevertheless avers the court did not apply the correct standard
because there was no evidence of a “recent overt act,” as required under In re
Detention of Harris, 98 Wn.2d 276, 284, 654 P.2d 109 (1982), and the court based
its findings on his “elderly stepmother’s subjective fear,” instead of applying an
objective standard as required by law. However, F.L. relies solely on Justice
Sanders’ nonbinding dissent in In re Detention of Anderson to support this
contention. 166 Wn.2d 543, 556-57, 211 P.3d 994 (2009) (Sanders J.,
dissenting). 4 Contrary to F.L.’s assertion, the controlling statute and
corresponding interpretive authority do not require that the fear be objective, only
4 F.L. specifically offers Justice Sanders’ statement that the “purpose of the recent overt
act requirement is to add objectivity to an otherwise subjective determination of mental illness and dangerousness.” Anderson, 166 Wn.2d at 556-57 (Sanders, J., dissenting) (citing Harris, 98 Wn.2d at 284). However, even if this was binding precedent, it does not state that fears must be objective, instead that the purpose of the Harris interpretation of the recent overt act requirement was to add objectivity, meaning that reasonable fears will be grounded in the actions of the respondent.
-7- No. 87128-5-I/8
that the apprehension of harm is reasonable. The State appropriately responds
that the ITA defines “likelihood of serious harm” as “a substantial risk that . . .
physical harm will be inflicted by a person upon another, as evidenced by behavior
which has caused such harm or which places another person or persons in
reasonable fear of sustaining such harm.” RCW 71.05.020(37)(a)(ii) (emphasis
added).
The court expressly found Eileen and Donald’s testimony was credible and
each voiced reasonable fears of harm; Donald described his fear that F.L. would
harm Eileen and conduct that caused concern for his own safety like F.L. growling
at him, while Eileen explained her concern for her safety and the ways that her
fear caused her to modify her conduct to protect herself and her grandchildren.
The couple told the court that F.L. had repeatedly violated the no contact order,
which made them frightened of leaving their home or even spending time in the
yard. We defer to the trial court’s assessment of witness credibility. A.F., 20 Wn.
App. at 125. Further, while the incident when F.L. charged at Eileen in the yard
occurred roughly three months before the hearing on the 14-day petition, both
Donald and Eileen testified to F.L.’s repeated violations of the no contact order,
no less than four times in a span of approximately two months, including the
incident that resulted in his arrest two weeks prior to the hearing. The record does
not support F.L.’s contention on appeal that the court relied solely on the May
incident in reaching its ruling on involuntary commitment. Moreover, all of these
incidents occurred within the three-year time frame established in RCW
71.05.245.
-8- No. 87128-5-I/9
Though Donald and Eileen’s testimony was sufficient to support the trial
court’s finding that F.L. presented a substantial risk of harm to them, the court
also relied on Schwartz’ testimony about descriptions in the treatment records of
F.L.’s conduct and presentation during his hospitalization at Fairfax. Specifically,
Schwartz testified to F.L.’s outburst that he had observed the day of the hearing.
This is a separate and even more recent act, providing a further basis for the trial
court to find that F.L. presented a substantial risk of harm to others.
The challenged finding as to Donald and Eileen’s fears is supported by
substantial evidence consisting of their testimony and corroborated by Schwartz’,
all of which the trial court found to be credible. Further, all of the incidents relied
on occurred well within the statutory timeframe such that they were properly
considered recent overt acts. Therefore, the court did not err when it found that
F.L. recently posed a substantial risk of physical harm to others through the
creation of a reasonable fear of harm, which in turn supports its conclusion that
F.L. presented a likelihood of serious harm to others. 5
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
5 Because we conclude that the 14-day commitment order was properly entered based
on the court’s finding that the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that F.L. presented a likelihood of serious harm, and because that is an independent basis to affirm the order on review, we need not reach his sufficiency challenges to the alternate bases for the court’s separate findings regarding grave disability.
-9-