IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE
In the Matter of the Detention of No. 88111-6-I
C.L., UNPUBLISHED OPINION Appellant.
BOWMAN, A.C.J. — C.L. challenges the trial court’s order revoking his less
restrictive alternative treatment (LRA). Because substantial evidence supports
the trial court’s finding that C.L. suffered a substantial decompensation with a
reasonable probability that the decompensation could be reversed with further
inpatient treatment, we affirm.
FACTS
In January 2025, C.L.’s mother brought him to Connections Kirkland crisis
care center to address concerns with his mental health. After evaluation, a
designated crisis responder (DCR) petitioned for C.L. to be involuntarily detained.
The DCR stated that C.L. presented with a behavioral health disorder
characterized by “disorganization, religious preoccupations, responding to
internal stimuli, increased impulsivity, limited insight, and limited judgment.”
On January 10, Connections petitioned for C.L. to be involuntarily
detained for up to 14 days, alleging that C.L. was gravely disabled. On February
12, C.L. agreed to a 90-day LRA in lieu of a 14-day detention. He stipulated that
sufficient facts showed he was gravely disabled. As to the terms and conditions
of the LRA, the court ordered that C.L. reside with his mother in Seattle, attend No. 88111-6-I/2
all appointments and follow all treatment recommendations, and refrain from
“acts, attempts, and threats of harm to self, others, and others’ property.”
On March 19, C.L. asked his mother to take him back to Connections.
Connections readmitted C.L. and then discharged him on April 15. But several
days later, C.L. again asked to return to Connections because he had not slept
for four days, was experiencing paranoia, and felt unsafe. C.L.’s mother brought
him back to Connections on April 24.
The same day, a DCR petitioned for revocation of C.L.’s LRA. The
petition alleged that C.L. (1) failed to adhere to the terms and conditions of his
February LRA, (2) demonstrated a substantial deterioration in functioning, (3)
showed evidence of substantial decompensation with a reasonable probability
that the decompensation could be reversed by further inpatient treatment, and (4)
posed a likelihood of serious harm.
The court held a revocation hearing on April 30. C.L.’s mother testified at
the hearing. She said that C.L. has been struggling with mental health issues for
more than three years. At his baseline, C.L. is respectful, outgoing, sociable, and
not aggressive toward others. She explained that C.L. asked her to bring him
back to Connections in late April because he had not slept for the four days he
was home. She also said that C.L. was deteriorating and acting paranoid.
Hyemin Song, a court evaluator and licensed clinical social worker, also
testified. Song was familiar with C.L. from his prior hospitalizations. And she
interviewed C.L. both on April 15, before he was discharged from Connections,
and again on April 28, after he returned.
2 No. 88111-6-I/3
Song testified that C.L. suffers from schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type.
When C.L. arrived at the hospital on April 24, staff noted he was severely
agitated, disorganized, psychotic, and threatening. He threatened to spit on staff
members and threatened another patient, saying, “ ‘[W]ant to go?’ ” The next
day, C.L. walked toward a staff member, started yelling, took off his shirt, and got
in a fighting stance. On April 26, he pushed another patient’s head against a
phone and hit him. And on April 28, he exhibited inappropriate behavior, such as
“ ‘anatagoniz[ing] others by clapping in their face and laughing,” making
“inappropriate comments” toward staff, and running and hitting exit signs.
Song explained that during the April 28 interview, C.L. presented as “a bit
more symptomatic and decompensated” compared to April 15. C.L. “mumbl[ed]
a lot under his breath,” did not coherently answer questions, and was “tangential
in his speech.” Song said C.L.’s mood was pleasant and cooperative and he
tried to engage in the interview, but his ability appeared limited because of
“internal preoccupation,” to the point that he could not coherently engage with
her.
Based on her interviews and a review of his chart notes, Song opined that
C.L. exhibited a substantial decompensation in functioning with a reasonable
possibility that the decompensation could be reversed by further inpatient
treatment. She explained that he exhibited many of the same schizoaffective
disorder symptoms as he did during prior hospitalizations. She said that C.L.
showed signs of improvement during hospitalization and that she believed he
could be restored to his baseline level of functioning after continued treatment.
3 No. 88111-6-I/4
But she was concerned that he was still showing signs of severe agitation,
aggression, and poor impulse control on April 28, just two days before the
hearing.
The trial court found that clear and cogent evidence established that C.L.
violated the terms and conditions of his February LRA, suffered a substantial
decompensation with a reasonable probability that the decompensation could be
reversed by further inpatient treatment, and posed a likelihood of serious harm.
Based on its findings of fact, the trial court revoked C.L.’s LRA and ordered that
he be returned to Connections for further inpatient treatment.
C.L. appeals.
ANALYSIS
C.L. argues that the trial court erred by relying on evidence of his
aggressive behavior at the hospital to show he violated the terms and conditions
of his LRA. We decline to address C.L.’s argument because substantial
evidence supports the trial court’s other basis for revoking his LRA—that C.L.
was decompensating and that it was reasonably probable the decompensation
could be reversed with further inpatient treatment.
For an involuntary commitment order, we review whether substantial
evidence supports the court’s findings of fact and whether those findings support
its conclusions of law. In re Det. of LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d 196, 209, 728 P.2d 138
(1986). “Substantial evidence” is evidence sufficient “ ‘to persuade a fair-minded
person of the truth of the declared premise.’ ” In re Det. of A.S., 91 Wn. App.
146, 162, 955 P.2d 836 (1998) (quoting Holland v. Boeing Co., 90 Wn.2d 384,
4 No. 88111-6-I/5
390-91, 583 P.2d 621 (1978)), aff’d, 138 Wn.2d 898, 982 P.2d 1156 (1999).
Unchallenged findings of fact are verities on appeal. In re Det. of L.S., 23 Wn.
App. 2d 672, 686, 517 P.3d 490 (2022).
Under RCW 71.05.590, a court must engage in a two-step process when
determining whether to revoke an LRA. See RCW 71.05.590(5)(b), (d). First,
the court must determine whether
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE
In the Matter of the Detention of No. 88111-6-I
C.L., UNPUBLISHED OPINION Appellant.
BOWMAN, A.C.J. — C.L. challenges the trial court’s order revoking his less
restrictive alternative treatment (LRA). Because substantial evidence supports
the trial court’s finding that C.L. suffered a substantial decompensation with a
reasonable probability that the decompensation could be reversed with further
inpatient treatment, we affirm.
FACTS
In January 2025, C.L.’s mother brought him to Connections Kirkland crisis
care center to address concerns with his mental health. After evaluation, a
designated crisis responder (DCR) petitioned for C.L. to be involuntarily detained.
The DCR stated that C.L. presented with a behavioral health disorder
characterized by “disorganization, religious preoccupations, responding to
internal stimuli, increased impulsivity, limited insight, and limited judgment.”
On January 10, Connections petitioned for C.L. to be involuntarily
detained for up to 14 days, alleging that C.L. was gravely disabled. On February
12, C.L. agreed to a 90-day LRA in lieu of a 14-day detention. He stipulated that
sufficient facts showed he was gravely disabled. As to the terms and conditions
of the LRA, the court ordered that C.L. reside with his mother in Seattle, attend No. 88111-6-I/2
all appointments and follow all treatment recommendations, and refrain from
“acts, attempts, and threats of harm to self, others, and others’ property.”
On March 19, C.L. asked his mother to take him back to Connections.
Connections readmitted C.L. and then discharged him on April 15. But several
days later, C.L. again asked to return to Connections because he had not slept
for four days, was experiencing paranoia, and felt unsafe. C.L.’s mother brought
him back to Connections on April 24.
The same day, a DCR petitioned for revocation of C.L.’s LRA. The
petition alleged that C.L. (1) failed to adhere to the terms and conditions of his
February LRA, (2) demonstrated a substantial deterioration in functioning, (3)
showed evidence of substantial decompensation with a reasonable probability
that the decompensation could be reversed by further inpatient treatment, and (4)
posed a likelihood of serious harm.
The court held a revocation hearing on April 30. C.L.’s mother testified at
the hearing. She said that C.L. has been struggling with mental health issues for
more than three years. At his baseline, C.L. is respectful, outgoing, sociable, and
not aggressive toward others. She explained that C.L. asked her to bring him
back to Connections in late April because he had not slept for the four days he
was home. She also said that C.L. was deteriorating and acting paranoid.
Hyemin Song, a court evaluator and licensed clinical social worker, also
testified. Song was familiar with C.L. from his prior hospitalizations. And she
interviewed C.L. both on April 15, before he was discharged from Connections,
and again on April 28, after he returned.
2 No. 88111-6-I/3
Song testified that C.L. suffers from schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type.
When C.L. arrived at the hospital on April 24, staff noted he was severely
agitated, disorganized, psychotic, and threatening. He threatened to spit on staff
members and threatened another patient, saying, “ ‘[W]ant to go?’ ” The next
day, C.L. walked toward a staff member, started yelling, took off his shirt, and got
in a fighting stance. On April 26, he pushed another patient’s head against a
phone and hit him. And on April 28, he exhibited inappropriate behavior, such as
“ ‘anatagoniz[ing] others by clapping in their face and laughing,” making
“inappropriate comments” toward staff, and running and hitting exit signs.
Song explained that during the April 28 interview, C.L. presented as “a bit
more symptomatic and decompensated” compared to April 15. C.L. “mumbl[ed]
a lot under his breath,” did not coherently answer questions, and was “tangential
in his speech.” Song said C.L.’s mood was pleasant and cooperative and he
tried to engage in the interview, but his ability appeared limited because of
“internal preoccupation,” to the point that he could not coherently engage with
her.
Based on her interviews and a review of his chart notes, Song opined that
C.L. exhibited a substantial decompensation in functioning with a reasonable
possibility that the decompensation could be reversed by further inpatient
treatment. She explained that he exhibited many of the same schizoaffective
disorder symptoms as he did during prior hospitalizations. She said that C.L.
showed signs of improvement during hospitalization and that she believed he
could be restored to his baseline level of functioning after continued treatment.
3 No. 88111-6-I/4
But she was concerned that he was still showing signs of severe agitation,
aggression, and poor impulse control on April 28, just two days before the
hearing.
The trial court found that clear and cogent evidence established that C.L.
violated the terms and conditions of his February LRA, suffered a substantial
decompensation with a reasonable probability that the decompensation could be
reversed by further inpatient treatment, and posed a likelihood of serious harm.
Based on its findings of fact, the trial court revoked C.L.’s LRA and ordered that
he be returned to Connections for further inpatient treatment.
C.L. appeals.
ANALYSIS
C.L. argues that the trial court erred by relying on evidence of his
aggressive behavior at the hospital to show he violated the terms and conditions
of his LRA. We decline to address C.L.’s argument because substantial
evidence supports the trial court’s other basis for revoking his LRA—that C.L.
was decompensating and that it was reasonably probable the decompensation
could be reversed with further inpatient treatment.
For an involuntary commitment order, we review whether substantial
evidence supports the court’s findings of fact and whether those findings support
its conclusions of law. In re Det. of LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d 196, 209, 728 P.2d 138
(1986). “Substantial evidence” is evidence sufficient “ ‘to persuade a fair-minded
person of the truth of the declared premise.’ ” In re Det. of A.S., 91 Wn. App.
146, 162, 955 P.2d 836 (1998) (quoting Holland v. Boeing Co., 90 Wn.2d 384,
4 No. 88111-6-I/5
390-91, 583 P.2d 621 (1978)), aff’d, 138 Wn.2d 898, 982 P.2d 1156 (1999).
Unchallenged findings of fact are verities on appeal. In re Det. of L.S., 23 Wn.
App. 2d 672, 686, 517 P.3d 490 (2022).
Under RCW 71.05.590, a court must engage in a two-step process when
determining whether to revoke an LRA. See RCW 71.05.590(5)(b), (d). First,
the court must determine whether
(i) [t]he person adhered to the terms and conditions of the order; (ii) substantial deterioration in the person’s functioning has occurred; (iii) there is evidence of substantial decompensation with a reasonable probability that the decompensation can be reversed by further inpatient treatment; or (iv) there is a likelihood of serious harm.
RCW 71.05.590(5)(d). If the court determines that any of those conditions apply,
it must then decide whether to reinstate or modify the person’s LRA or order the
person detained for inpatient treatment. Id.
Here, the court found that C.L. suffered substantial decompensation with a
reasonable probability that the decompensation could be reversed by further
inpatient treatment. Substantial evidence supports that finding.
At the revocation hearing, court evaluator Song testified that C.L. suffers
from schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type. She testified that when C.L. had
previously been admitted to the hospital, he was calm and nonaggressive toward
others. C.L.’s mother also testified that at his baseline, C.L. is respectful,
outgoing, sociable, and not aggressive toward others. But Song explained that
C.L. engaged in threatening and aggressive behavior while in the hospital,
including assaulting another patient on April 26. She said that he exhibited many
of the same symptoms of his schizoaffective disorder during his three prior
5 No. 88111-6-I/6
hospitalizations. And C.L. showed signs of improvement during hospitalization,
so she believed he could be restored to his baseline level of functioning with
further treatment.
C.L. does not challenge the court’s finding of substantial decompensation.
Still, he argues we should address his challenge to the court’s finding that he
violated the terms of the LRA because the court did not suggest it would revoke
the LRA based on a finding of only substantial decompensation. But the record
does not support C.L.’s argument. The court explained that it would not be in
C.L.’s best interest to modify or reinstate his LRA, “as his symptoms are similar
to past cycles of decompensation that led to hospitalizations.” And inpatient
treatment is required, “particularly in light of [C.L.]’s prior rapid decompensation
and re-hospitalization between April 16 [and] 24.”
Because substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that C.L.
suffered substantial decompensation with a reasonable probability that the
decompensation could be reversed with further inpatient treatment, we affirm the
court’s order revoking his LRA.
WE CONCUR: