FILED AUGUST 14, 2025 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
In the Matter of the Dependency of ) No. 40529-0-III ) (Consolidated with J.S., ) Nos. 40530-3-III, 40531-1-III, G.S, ) 40532-0-III) C.H., ) K.H. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
STAAB, A.C.J. — Following a contested fact-finding and disposition hearing, the
court found all four of K.H.’s (Mother) children dependent, placed them in-home with the
Mother, and ordered services to address the Mother’s parental deficiencies. The trial
court concluded that C.H. was dependent pursuant to RCW 13.34.030(6)(b), based on
abuse or neglect. Additionally, the court concluded that all four of the children were
dependent pursuant to RCW 13.34.030(6)(c), because they had no parent capable of
adequately caring for them.
The Mother appeals, contending that several of the court’s findings were not
supported by substantial evidence and in turn, that the findings did not support the
conclusion of dependency on each of the children. Specifically, the Mother challenges
the court’s findings that C.H. was abused in the Mother’s care, that the Mother’s
explanations were inconsistent with the medical records, and the injuries were not caused
by the other children. Nos. 40529-0-III (Consol. with 40530-3-III, 40531-1-III, 40532-0-III) In re Dependency of J.S., G.S., C.H., K.H.
The Mother also challenges the findings supporting the court’s conclusion that the
Mother was not capable of safely parenting her children without court intervention. She
contends that substantial evidence does not support the court’s finding that K.H. tested
positive for drugs at birth and the children were at risk due to a lack of medical care. In
addition, she argues that the court’s findings that the Mother allowed unsafe persons
around the children were based on inadmissible hearsay.
Finally, the Mother contends that the remaining findings fail to support the
conclusion that her children are dependent.
We affirm.
BACKGROUND
K.H. is the Mother of the four children involved in this dependency, J.S., G.S.,
C.H., and K.H.1 On December 1, 2023, the Department of Children, Youth, and Families
(Department) filed a dependency petition alleging all four children were dependent. The
Department alleged the Mother’s barriers to safe parenting included “unmitigated
chemical dependency, unaddressed mental health, and lack of appropriate parenting skills
or knowledge, including inappropriate discipline leading to non-transitory and non-
accidental bruising to [C.H.], and inability to provide for the children’s basic needs like
school or medical care.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 1642-43
1 Because K.H. and her son share the same initials, she will be referred to as “the Mother” throughout this opinion for clarity.
2 Nos. 40529-0-III (Consol. with 40530-3-III, 40531-1-III, 40532-0-III) In re Dependency of J.S., G.S., C.H., K.H.
At the shelter care hearing the court entered an order placing the children in-home
with the Mother so long as she complied with certain conditions.
In February 2024, the Department moved to compel the Mother’s compliance with
the conditions for in-home placement, which had been set at the shelter care hearing. The
court granted the motion, finding that the children were being harmed by the Mother’s
failure to follow through with the conditions set for safe placement. The court also found
there was reasonable suspicion of substance use in the home and that it was concerning
the Mother’s reported use of cannabis to help her sleep and as a coping mechanism. The
court also amended the shelter care order to explicitly require the Mother to maintain
communication with the Department, the school, and daycare, and ordered that future
UA2 tests must be negative.
Fact-finding and disposition on the dependency
A contested fact-finding and disposition hearing was held over several days in
March and April 2024. We summarize the evidence provided at this hearing and the
court’s findings.
The court found that the Mother had a significant child protective services (CPS)
history including one prior dependency. In the last five years, the family had
approximately 20 intakes reporting suspected child abuse or neglect. The Mother also
2 Urinalysis.
3 Nos. 40529-0-III (Consol. with 40530-3-III, 40531-1-III, 40532-0-III) In re Dependency of J.S., G.S., C.H., K.H.
has at least two founded findings of abuse or neglect. This history demonstrates a pattern
and informs the opinions of the social workers and medical experts in this dependency.
In 2022, J.S., G.S., and C.H. were involved in a dependency. The Mother
admitted that during the last dependency she was pregnant and gave birth to K.H., was
using methamphetamine and alcohol, and did not have safe or stable housing. The court
found that K.H tested positive for methamphetamine at the time of his birth, but the
Mother contests the factual basis for this finding. The court also found that during the
last dependency, the Mother was living at Rising Strong and was engaged in chemical
dependency treatment. Based on an agreement between both parties, the last dependency
was dismissed in December 2022. As part of its recommendations, the Department
asked the Mother to re-engage in mental health counseling and to follow through with all
medical and other needs for all of her children. The Mother admitted that she did not
follow through with this recommendation and instead self-medicated with marijuana.
The following year, the Department received reports concerning both J.S. and
G.S.’s school attendance. The principal documented at least one incident in which she
needed to drive the children home from school because the Mother had not picked them
up and she was unable to get a hold of her. Around this same time, C.H.’s attendance at
her daycare became inconsistent. Additionally, there were reports that both C.H. and
K.H. were frequently dropped off at daycare without underwear or appropriate clothes
and without milk/formula for K.H.
4 Nos. 40529-0-III (Consol. with 40530-3-III, 40531-1-III, 40532-0-III) In re Dependency of J.S., G.S., C.H., K.H.
On November 30, 2023, a CPS intake was initiated after C.H. was dropped off at
Little Scholars Early Learning Center and had what was described as bruises on her. The
daycare staff reported that they had noticed a bruise on C.H.’s upper thigh, rib cage, and
leg. Based on her experience, and because C.H. had reported her Mother inflicted the
injuries, a staff member contacted the Department to report suspected child abuse.
CPS social worker Madison Davis arrived and took photographs of the bruises
with her phone. She sent the photographs to Kathy Ormsby, ARNP,3 a child abuse
medical expert who works at Partners with Families and Children (Partners). Upon
reviewing the photographs, Ormsby diagnosed the marks as bruises and concluded that it
did not appear to her that they were from an accidental injury. For this reason, she
recommended that C.H. be seen in the emergency room. The Mother declined this
recommendation, indicating that she wanted the children to be seen by their primary care
physician although the children had been released due to repeated cancellations and no-
shows.4
3 Advanced Registered Nurse Practitioner. 4 Prior to the current dependency petition being filed, the Department reported that C.H. was last seen by her primary care provider for a “sick appointment” back on November 8, 2022. Furthermore, K.H. was likewise last seen for a “sick appointment” in September 2023. G.S. was last seen on April 11, 2023, for a vaccine and J.S., on June 29, 2022, for a child well-exam. The medical records also demonstrated that C.H. and K.H. had inconsistent attendance for their medical appointments.
5 Nos. 40529-0-III (Consol. with 40530-3-III, 40531-1-III, 40532-0-III) In re Dependency of J.S., G.S., C.H., K.H.
The next day (December 1) when C.H. did not show up to daycare and the other
children were not at school, the Department went to the family home to speak with the
Mother, but were unable to contact her. The Department then drafted a dependency
petition for the children and asked for an emergent pick-up of the children from the
home.
After the children were removed from the home, both C.H. and K.H. were seen in
the emergency room. At the emergency room, it was noted that C.H. had “bruising to
[her] left thigh and lower back” and that it appeared she had a “Mongolian spot at the
base of her spine.” CP at 1652. K.H. was diagnosed with a diaper rash but no bruising
was noted.
Two medical experts testified at the fact-finding hearing: Ormsby for the
Department and Dr. Niran Al-Agba for the Mother. Both experts reviewed C.H.’s
medical records, the family’s intake history, as well as the photographs taken at the
daycare and at the emergency room. The court found the testimony of both experts to be
helpful and accepted parts of their respective opinions as credible based on their
specialized expertise and the facts in this case.
Ormsby testified that the photographs of C.H from the daycare showed bruising
that is typically the result of finger-tip type bruising. Additionally, she explained that,
because children are top heavy, accidental injuries tend to be on the front part of a child’s
6 Nos. 40529-0-III (Consol. with 40530-3-III, 40531-1-III, 40532-0-III) In re Dependency of J.S., G.S., C.H., K.H.
body. However, when bruises are in more protected areas, it is a concern for intentional
injury. She also indicated there was semi-oval bruising on C.H.’s lower buttocks.
Ormsby also testified about the children’s medical history. She indicated that the
children had inconsistent attendance in their medical appointments. In particular, K.H.
had been diagnosed with eczema, which, if left untreated, could cause discomfort and put
him at risk for infection. Ormsby testified to the importance of medical care and
explained that a child exposed to drugs in-utero often has higher medical needs that could
worsen with infection. Furthermore, she opined that the failure to have routine medical
care puts a child at significant risk of substantial danger or harm.
Dr. Al-Agba testified for the Mother. She testified that photographs are not a
reliable scientific method for making a diagnosis and that to diagnose bruising, a physical
examination is necessary. Dr. Al-Agba disagreed with Ormsby’s opinion and concluded,
based on her review of the records and photographs, that C.H.’s injuries did not constitute
physical abuse. Generally, Dr. Al-Agba also stressed the importance of medical care for
younger children and the concern she would have if a parent failed to ensure their
children received routine care.
Justine Hudson was assigned as the ongoing social worker to this case. At the
hearing, she was called to testify as both a fact witness and an expert witness in child
welfare and social work. She identified the Mother’s parental deficiencies as physical
abuse toward C.H. and her inability to follow through with the children’s school
7 Nos. 40529-0-III (Consol. with 40530-3-III, 40531-1-III, 40532-0-III) In re Dependency of J.S., G.S., C.H., K.H.
attendance and appointments, which were important for their development as well as
social and emotional needs. She opined that physical abuse could sever the bond
between a parent and a child and make them feel afraid to speak to others as well as
emotionally damage them.
Likewise, she opined that the lack of medical care endangers a child’s physical
and psychological development because preventative care ensures they stay healthy, and
if they are sick, it affects them educationally, socially, and emotionally. Additionally,
although Hudson had not received reports that the Mother behaved inappropriately while
under the influence, she was concerned that substance use could lead to a parent being
unavailable to the children and their needs. She felt that the Mother’s admitted use of
cannabis could affect her judgment and supervision of the children.
Based on her review of relevant records and investigations, Hudson’s expert
opinion was that C.H. had been abused and that the Mother was not capable of
adequately parenting her children. Additionally, she opined that remedial services and
court ordered conditions of placement, including consistent attendance at school or
daycare, were needed to ensure the safety of the children.
Social Worker Madison Davis also testified as a fact witness and an expert
witness. She concluded that the Mother’s unaddressed deficiencies put the children in
circumstances that constituted substantial danger to their psychological or physical
development. She opined that the Mother could not safely care for the children without
8 Nos. 40529-0-III (Consol. with 40530-3-III, 40531-1-III, 40532-0-III) In re Dependency of J.S., G.S., C.H., K.H.
Department assistance due to the children’s medical care, education, and supervision
needs. Furthermore, she explained that the Mother had not followed through with
recommendations from the last dependency and it was unlikely she would engage in
services to address the concerns. In addition, Davis indicated that the Mother’s mental
health impacted her ability to supervise the children and address their needs.
The Mother also testified at the hearing. She admitted to regularly using
marijuana to help with sleep but added that she did not consider it a mind or mood-
altering substance or that it put her children at risk of harm. However, she explained that
at the time of the hearing she was sober from all substances because the court’s order
prohibited such use.
The Mother also testified about the children’s medical history. She indicated that
K.H. has specialized medical needs. The Mother testified that when K.H. was
approximately four months old, he spent 15 days at Sacred Heart Hospital, when he had
COVID-19, bronchitis, and double ear infections. He was discharged with a feeding tube
for three-and-a-half to four months. The Mother noted that K.H. has a current diagnosis
for eczema as well as lactose intolerance. The last medical appointment the Mother
remembered K.H. attended was when he had chickenpox. At the time of the hearing,
K.H. was using prescription hydrocortisone cream. G.S. had a prescription for albuterol
and took this with a nebulizer when needed for asthma. The Mother also described G.S.
as having behavior problems.
9 Nos. 40529-0-III (Consol. with 40530-3-III, 40531-1-III, 40532-0-III) In re Dependency of J.S., G.S., C.H., K.H.
During the Mother’s testimony, she was asked about C.H.’s bruises. She
explained that any statements from C.H. that the Mother inflicted the injuries were a lie
and that C.H. “says some pretty crazy things sometimes.” Rep. of Proc. (RP) at 216. She
stated that C.H. received a bruise on her hip after falling from her scooter. She indicated
the bruises on C.H.’s legs were from accidents or roughhousing with her brothers and that
the spot on her back was not a bruise but rather a “Mongolian” spot.
The principal of the school the children attend, also testified at the hearing. She
explained that there is a difference between behavioral and academic intervention and
that J.S. was a full year behind academically. Gillmer indicated that J.S. had missed so
much school that it was possible he needed an “Individualized Educational Plan”
(IEP),however, because of the Mother’s failure to get him to school consistently, the
school was unable to properly evaluate him. By missing school, she opined that it
prevented him from accessing services he may need to be successful in school and life,
which significantly impacted his development.
As it relates to G.S., he demonstrated escalated behavior in his classroom. He
would often elope from the classroom and the school had difficulty getting ahold of the
Mother when this occurred. Additionally, there was a delay in getting G.S. in the IEP
process due to the actions of his Mother. The previous IEP was put on hold while the
Mother followed up with the necessary paperwork and with his developmental
assessments. The school tried to initiate the process again, but the Mother was not
10 Nos. 40529-0-III (Consol. with 40530-3-III, 40531-1-III, 40532-0-III) In re Dependency of J.S., G.S., C.H., K.H.
available to sign the final plan. Eventually, a final plan was put in place because the
school was able to reach G.S.’s adult brother who could sign it. As a result of these
constant delays, it caused substantial damage to G.S.’s development and an increase in
emotional dysregulation, which impacted his ability to develop at school as well as
psychologically.
Dependency findings
At the conclusion of the dependency hearing, the court entered several relevant
findings. The court identified the Mother’s barriers to being a safe parent as her
unmitigated chemical dependency, unaddressed mental health, and lack of appropriate
parenting skills or knowledge. In particular, the court identified inappropriate discipline
leading to non-transitory and non-accidental bruising to C.H. as well as the inability to
provide for her children’s basic needs like school or medical care.
The court found the testimony of both Ormsby and Dr. Al-Abga to be helpful. As
an initial matter, the court rejected Ormsby’s attempt to diagnose bruises on C.H. from
the daycare photographs. Instead, the court agreed with Dr. Al-Agba that the standard of
practice requires a physical examination to diagnose bruising. Nevertheless, the court
found the physical exam taken at the hospital to be credible and based on the diagnosis of
medical providers at the emergency room, found that K.H. had marks consistent with
bruising on her left thigh and lower back.
11 Nos. 40529-0-III (Consol. with 40530-3-III, 40531-1-III, 40532-0-III) In re Dependency of J.S., G.S., C.H., K.H.
Additionally, the court found that the Mother’s reason for the bruises was not
consistent with the medical evidence. Although the Mother believed the injuries could
have been inflicted by rough housing, the court accepted Ormsby’s opinion that the
bruising could not be the result of rough housing from other children based on the size
and pattern of the bruises. The court also found by a preponderance of the evidence that
the Mother was the person responsible for C.H.’s care and the cause of the bruising.
Furthermore, the court found that at the time of the initial petition, the children
were behind on their routine medical appointments. The court was concerned that they
had missed so many appointments that it led to their discharge from a previous provider
and that this was serious given their young age. This put them at risk of serious harm,
particularly K.H., including substantial damage to their physical development as testified
to by the social workers and Ormsby.
Additionally, the court found that the Mother’s marijuana use directly impacted
her ability to safely parent the children and provide for their needs. It also found that the
Mother was pregnant and gave birth to K.H. during her last dependency, and that at the
time of K.H.’s birth, he tested positive for methamphetamine, but was never removed
from the Mother’s care. The court discussed the Mother’s history with marijuana use and
noted that it was unclear and concerning what information the Mother was relying on for
her decision to use mood and mind-altering substances to address her sleep concerns and
anxiety.
12 Nos. 40529-0-III (Consol. with 40530-3-III, 40531-1-III, 40532-0-III) In re Dependency of J.S., G.S., C.H., K.H.
The Mother also had a diagnosis for anxiety disorder, depression, and stimulant
use disorder. Untreated mental health was a previous parental deficiency, and she had
not followed through with treatment after her last case was dismissed. Additionally, the
Mother would report that she needed to address her mental health but then would refuse
to engage.
Finally, the court found that the Mother allowed unsafe persons in the home
around the children. Specifically, the court found that the Mother lived in housing where
several families were involved with CPS. Accordingly, she was limited in neighbors she
could rely on to assist with her children. In one situation, she asked a neighbor with a
concerning dependency and criminal history to watch C.H. While the Mother denied
knowing the neighbor’s history, the court found it equally concerning that the Mother
would not want to know the background of individuals before having them supervise her
children.
The court also found that the Mother allowed a previously alleged father, C.G., to
live in the home. Social worker Hudson was allowed to testify over a hearsay objection
that the children told her that C.G. was living in the home. The Mother denied he was
living in the home but acknowledged that he was visiting. The court found credible the
Department’s opinion that he was living in the home and was unsafe. The court found
this opinion credible because of the reports the social worker received from the children.
13 Nos. 40529-0-III (Consol. with 40530-3-III, 40531-1-III, 40532-0-III) In re Dependency of J.S., G.S., C.H., K.H.
Based on all the evidence presented, the court entered dependency findings for
J.S., G.S., C.H. and K.H. In particular, it found that C.H. was dependent pursuant to
RCW 13.34.030(6)(b) based on abuse or neglect. Additionally, it found all four children
dependent pursuant to RCW 13.34.030(6)(c) because the children had no parent capable
of adequately caring for them such that they were in circumstances which constituted a
danger of substantial damage to their psychological or physical development.
The Mother appeals.
ANALYSIS
EVIDENCE OF ABUSE OF C.H.
The Mother contends that substantial evidence does not support several of the
court’s findings and in turn, the findings do not support the conclusion that C.H. is a
dependent child under RCW 13.34.030(6)(b). In particular, she contends the court erred
by finding (1) Ormsby’s opinion credible when she did not consider whether the marks
could have been caused by an adult-sized child, (2) that the Mother’s explanation for the
bruises did not match medical evidence, and (3) the Mother physically abused C.H. when
this finding was not supported by the other findings. Additionally, the Mother contends
that there was no evidence that supports the conclusion that the other children were
dependent pursuant to RCW 13.34.030(6)(b). The Department responds, arguing that
substantial evidence supports the finding that C.H. received non-accidental bruising while
in the Mother’s care and that C.H. was abused.
14 Nos. 40529-0-III (Consol. with 40530-3-III, 40531-1-III, 40532-0-III) In re Dependency of J.S., G.S., C.H., K.H.
As an appellate court, our role is “limited to assessing whether substantial
evidence supports the trial court’s findings.” In re Parental Rights to D.H., 195 Wn.2d
710, 718, 464 P.3d 215 (2020). “Substantial evidence” requires this court to determine if
the evidence is “sufficient to persuade a rational, fair-minded person of the truth of the
finding.” In re Estate of Jones, 152 Wn.2d 1, 8, 93 P.3d 147 (2004). Unchallenged
findings will be treated as verities on appeal. Id.
When a dependency proceeding is initiated, the State must prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the child meets the statutory definition of a
“dependent child.” In re Welfare of Ca.R., 191 Wn. App. 601, 608, 365 P.3d 186 (2015).
As relevant here, a child is considered dependent if they are “abused or neglected as
defined in chapter 26.44 RCW by a person legally responsible for the care of the child.”
RCW 13.34.030(6)(b). “Abuse or neglect,” in turn, means “injury of a child by any
person under circumstances which cause harm to the child’s health, welfare, or safety.”
RCW 26.44.020(1).
The Mother challenges several of the trial court’s findings, arguing that they are
not supported by substantial evidence because the trial court failed to consider evidence
or misinterpreted evidence. We reject these arguments because they raise issues of
credibility. As an appellate court, we do not reweigh evidence or witness credibility. In
re Dependency of A.VD., 62 Wn. App. 562, 568, 815 P.2d 277 (1991).
15 Nos. 40529-0-III (Consol. with 40530-3-III, 40531-1-III, 40532-0-III) In re Dependency of J.S., G.S., C.H., K.H.
For example, the Mother contends that the trial court erred in relying on the
opinion of Ormsby that the Mother was the cause of bruising on C.H. She contends that
Ormsby’s testimony on this issue was not credible because it did not consider whether a
larger child could cause the bruises. But Ormsby rejected the possibility of C.H.’s older
siblings as the cause of the bruises. Regardless, whether her opinion properly gave
weight to certain factors goes to credibility, a question for the trial court.
Likewise, the Mother challenges the trial court’s finding that the Mother’s
explanation for the bruising was not credible. She contends that the trial court
misapprehended the Mother’s testimony and improperly relied on the testimony of
Ormsby who she claims conflated statements made by the Mother and C.H. Again, these
challenges go to the weight and credibility of testimony assigned by the trial court.
Whether Ormsby explained her reasoning or considered certain evidence in developing
her conclusion goes to the credibility of her conclusion.
Next, the Mother challenges the trial court’s finding that social workers Davis and
Hudson had testified that in their opinion C.H. had been abused by the Mother. Although
the State concedes that Hudson’s opinion was not supported by substantial evidence,
even without this finding or the Mother’s explanation for the bruising, the conclusion that
C.H. was dependent based on neglect or abuse is supported by substantial evidence. See
Dalton v. State, 130 Wn. App. 653, 670, 124 P.3d 305 (2005) (supportive evidence was
ample to support the conclusion even with unwarranted deference to other findings);
16 Nos. 40529-0-III (Consol. with 40530-3-III, 40531-1-III, 40532-0-III) In re Dependency of J.S., G.S., C.H., K.H.
Andren v. Dake, 14 Wn. App. 2d 296, 472 P.3d 1013 (2020) (conclusion was supported
by substantial evidence even with findings not adequately supported by the record).
The relevant definition of a “dependent child” is “any child who: . . . [is] abused or
neglected.” RCW 13.34.030(6)(b). Likewise, “abuse” means “injury of a child by any
person under circumstances which cause harm to the child’s health, welfare, or safety,
excluding conduct [reasonably and moderately inflicted to restrain or correct a child],”
while “neglect” means “the negligent treatment or maltreatment of a child by a person
responsible for or providing care to the child.” RCW 26.44.020(1).
After C.H. reported to daycare staff that her injuries were inflicted by her Mother,
they contacted the Department to report the suspected child abuse. Once C.H. was
examined at the emergency room, medical professionals took photographs, conducted
laboratory tests, and noted bruising to C.H.’s left thigh and lower back. The Mother does
not assign error to any of these findings; thus, they are verities on appeal. In re Estate of
Jones, 152 Wn.2d at 8.
Ormsby, qualified as an expert in child abuse, provided testimony that the court
found credible. Her conclusion that the bruising was caused by abuse was based on her
experience and her review of C.H.’s history, medical provider notes, imaging, and
laboratory studies. The court’s findings and conclusion that C.H. was a dependent child
based on abuse or neglect is thus supported by substantial evidence.
17 Nos. 40529-0-III (Consol. with 40530-3-III, 40531-1-III, 40532-0-III) In re Dependency of J.S., G.S., C.H., K.H.
Finally, the Mother contends no findings support the court’s conclusion that the
other three children were dependent pursuant to RCW 13.34.030(6)(b) for abuse or
neglect. The Mother misunderstands the court’s findings. Although the basis of
dependency for C.H. was neglect or abuse, the dependency was also established for all
four children upon the court’s finding that the children have no parent adequately caring
for them such that the circumstances constitute a danger of substantial damage
psychologically or to their physical development pursuant to RCW 13.34.030(6)(c).
Therefore, there was no finding of abuse or neglect for the other children as the Mother
contends.
EVIDENCE THAT NO PARENT WAS CAPABLE OF SAFELY PARENTING THE CHILDREN
The Mother contends the trial court erred by concluding that she was not capable
of safely parenting her children without court intervention. In particular, she assigns
error to the findings that K.H. tested positive for methamphetamine at the time of his
birth and the children were at risk of serious harm due to a lack of medical care.
Additionally, she challenged findings related to C.G. living in the home as based on
hearsay. Finally, she argues that the remaining findings do not support the conclusion
that the children were dependent pursuant to RCW 13.34.030(6)(c). The State responds,
conceding that the finding regarding K.H. testing positive for methamphetamine was not
supported by substantial evidence. However, the State contends the remaining findings
18 Nos. 40529-0-III (Consol. with 40530-3-III, 40531-1-III, 40532-0-III) In re Dependency of J.S., G.S., C.H., K.H.
are supported by substantial evidence and support the conclusion that the children were
dependent pursuant to RCW 13.34.030(6)(c).
The Mother contends that substantial evidence does not support the conclusion
that the children are dependent pursuant to RCW 13.34.030(6)(c). Under this subsection,
a child is considered dependent if he or she has “no parent, guardian, or custodian
capable of adequately caring for the child, such that the child is in circumstances which
constitute a danger of substantial damage to the child’s psychological or physical
development.” RCW 13.34.030(6)(c). However, a finding of actual abuse or neglect is
not necessary to find a child dependent under subsection 6(c). In re Welfare of X.T., 174
Wn. App. 733, 737, 300 P.3d 824 (2013). Nor is it necessary for the court to find the
parent “unfit.” In re Dependency of Schermer, 161 Wn.2d 927, 944, 169 P.3d 452
(2007).
1. K.H. testing positive for methamphetamine at birth
The Mother first challenges the trial court’s finding that K.H. tested positive for
methamphetamine at the time of his birth and the Department conceded. As both parties
note, the evidence demonstrated that the Mother used methamphetamine during the initial
stages of her pregnancy, exposing K.H. to substances in-utero. However, while the
Mother gave birth to K.H., she resided at Rising Strong and tested negative on urinalysis
tests performed there. Consequently, this finding is not supported by substantial
evidence.
19 Nos. 40529-0-III (Consol. with 40530-3-III, 40531-1-III, 40532-0-III) In re Dependency of J.S., G.S., C.H., K.H.
2. Unsafe persons in the home
K.H. next challenges the court’s finding that C.G., a previously alleged father to
K.H., was living in the home and was unsafe. She argues that this finding was based on
inadmissible hearsay. The State contends that the court did not rely on hearsay as
substantive evidence but instead, relied on the opinion of Hudson to find that the Mother
had allowed an unsafe individual around the children. Regardless, the State claims any
alleged hearsay considered by the court did not materially affect the trial court’s outcome.
During the fact-finding hearing, Hudson was asked if she was “aware of any
inappropriate or unauthorized people with the children in the home?” RP at 1024.
Hudson testified that she had observed the Mother allow a neighbor with significant
dependency history to watch the children.
Hudson also testified that two of the children had conveyed to her that C.G. had
been living on and off in the home. Hudson added that C.G. had a recent assault
conviction. When asked to testify about statements made by C.G., the Mother raised a
hearsay objection. In response, the Department asked that the hearsay come in for
disposition purposes but also argued that the hearsay was the basis for Hudson’s opinion
as an expert in child welfare. The court overruled the objection. Hudson continued to
testify about statements made by C.G. at an earlier hearing. Based on this testimony, the
court found “credible the Department’s opinion that [C.G.] was living in the home and
was unsafe.” CP at 1673.
20 Nos. 40529-0-III (Consol. with 40530-3-III, 40531-1-III, 40532-0-III) In re Dependency of J.S., G.S., C.H., K.H.
A hearsay statement is one made by an out-of-court declarant offered to prove the
truth of the matter asserted. ER 801(c). These rules apply at dependency hearings and
generally bar the court from relying on a hearsay statement for its truth. RCW
13.34.110(1); ER 801(c), 802. Parents “should not be deprived of their parental rights on
hearsay.” In re Dependency of A.C., 1 Wn.3d 186, 192, 525 P.3d 177 (2023).
A hearsay statement is generally inadmissible unless an exception applies. Id.
One exception to the general rule against hearsay allows an expert to relay facts that
“need not be admissible in evidence” to show the basis for their expert opinion. ER 703.
But ER 703 “is not designed to allow a witness to ‘summarize and reiterate all manner of
inadmissible evidence.’” Deep Water Brewing, LLC v. Fairway Res. Ltd., 152 Wn. App.
229, 275, 215 P.3d 990 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v.
Martinez, 78 Wn. App. 870, 880, 899 P.2d 1302 (1995)). Even when hearsay is admitted
under ER 703, “a judge cannot rely on that hearsay as substantive evidence.” A.C., 1
Wn.3d at 192.
Here, the social worker’s testimony on where C.G. was living was a fact not an
opinion. Hudson was asked if she was aware of inappropriate people in the house with
the children. Her testimony that C.G was living in the home was based on hearsay
statements of the children. Just because Hudson was qualified as an expert does not
mean that her entire testimony can be characterized as an opinion. C.G.’s place of
residence is a fact, not an opinion. On the other hand, her testimony that C.G. was unsafe
21 Nos. 40529-0-III (Consol. with 40530-3-III, 40531-1-III, 40532-0-III) In re Dependency of J.S., G.S., C.H., K.H.
was an opinion. While Hudson could consider C.G.’s living arrangements to support her
opinion that C.G. was not safe, the court erred by adopting this hearsay statement as
substantive evidence of a fact. See Id. at 192-93.
Finding error, we must determine if the error “materially affected” the outcome of
the trial. Id. at 194. Under this standard, “ʻ[a]n erroneous admission of evidence is not
prejudicial unless, within reasonable probabilities, the outcome of the trial would have
been materially affected had the error not occurred.’” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting In re Welfare of X.T., 174 Wn. App. at 739). In A.C., the court found
that within reasonable probabilities, the impermissible reliance on hearsay prejudiced the
parents and materially affected the outcome of the trial. 1 Wn.3d at 197. However, in
A.C., there was “an enormous amount” of hearsay that included “accounts of domestic
abuse, criminal warrants, heavy cannabis use, confrontations with medical staff, [the
child]’s] potential ‘developmental delays’ and alleged physical disability, and—most
damaging for [the parent]—multiple encounters with the police.” 1 Wn.3d at 196. Such
is not the case here.
In this case, the court found that there were “Unsafe Persons in the Home.” CP at
1672. While this finding was based in part on hearsay, the hearsay did not materially
affect the outcome of the hearing. The Mother admitted that C.G. had been to the home
but denied that he stayed overnight or was alone with the children. She acknowledged
that he had a criminal and substance use history. Regardless, the finding of unsafe
22 Nos. 40529-0-III (Consol. with 40530-3-III, 40531-1-III, 40532-0-III) In re Dependency of J.S., G.S., C.H., K.H.
persons in the home was also based on the Mother’s admission of allowing a neighbor
with a concerning CPS and criminal history to watch her children.
Finally, the finding of unsafe persons in the home was only one of several
deficiencies that the court found. Other deficiencies included (1) her inability to provide
for the children’s basic needs, (2) unmitigated chemical dependency, (3) unaddressed
mental health, and (4) the lack of appropriate parenting skills. The court acknowledged
that this was a “very hard” case but stressed that the finding of dependency was based on
a culmination of factors, not any one parental deficiency. RP at 1206. Based on the
numerous findings that contributed to the dependency, we conclude that there is not a
reasonable probability the outcome would be different without this one piece of evidence.
3. Medical care
The Mother also contends substantial evidence did not support the court’s finding
that the children were at risk of serious harm due to a lack of routine medical care.
Although parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care and welfare of
their minor children, the State also has an interest “in protecting the physical, mental, and
emotional health of children.” Schermer, 161 Wn.2d at 941. It is thus “well established
that when a child’s physical or mental health is seriously jeopardized by parental
deficiencies, ‘the State has a parens patriae right and responsibility to intervene to protect
the child.’” Id. (quoting In re Welfare of Sumey, 94 Wn.2d 757, 762, 621 P.2d 108
23 Nos. 40529-0-III (Consol. with 40530-3-III, 40531-1-III, 40532-0-III) In re Dependency of J.S., G.S., C.H., K.H.
(1980)). Furthermore, a parent’s “inability to provide necessary medical care, including
mental health care, may support a dependency finding.” Id. at 947.
Here, the evidence demonstrated that the children lacked routine medical care.
C.H. had last seen a medical provider in November 2022, but this was for a sick exam
rather than a routine child well-exam. Additionally, the last time J.S. was seen by a
doctor was in June 2022, and G.S. in April 2023. In the last dependency, K.H. indicated
she would follow through with medical appointments or counseling for herself although
she did not. Instead, the children had been dismissed from their pediatrician because of
no-show and missed appointments.
As it relates to K.H., in particular, he had specialized medical needs. At birth,
K.H. spent 15 days in Sacred Heart Medical Center, where he had COVID-19,
bronchiolitis, and double ear infections. After he was discharged, he had a feeding tube
for three-and-a-half to four months. And, at the time of the dependency hearing, K.H.
had eczema as well as lactose intolerance. The last appointment the Mother could recall
for K.H. was when he had chickenpox. Sufficient medical care is a factor courts may
consider for a dependency especially for a child with special medical needs. See In re
Dependency of T.L.G., 126 Wn. App. 181, 186 n.2, 108 P.3d 156 (2005) (recognizing that
“the challenges of parenting a child with special medical needs” was an appropriate
factor for the trial court to consider in evaluating whether the parents could adequately
care for the child under RCW 13.34.030(6)(c)).
24 Nos. 40529-0-III (Consol. with 40530-3-III, 40531-1-III, 40532-0-III) In re Dependency of J.S., G.S., C.H., K.H.
At the hearing, several witnesses testified regarding the importance of routine
medical care. For example, the Mother’s expert, Dr. Al-Agba, stressed the importance of
medical care for younger children and her concern if a parent failed to ensure their
children received routine care. With respect to K.H., Ormsby testified that a child
exposed to drugs in-utero often has higher needs and symptoms that could worsen with
infection and that he was at significant risk of substantial danger or harm if he did not
have consistent medical care. Furthermore, Hudson explained how the lack of medical
care can affect a child’s health, which can then prevent school attendance. This finding is
supported by substantial evidence.
On appeal the Mother points to the Department’s website and argues that it
provides specific information regarding when children should receive well-exams and
that not all children receive annual well-exams. She contends the children were “not
especially behind on their medical care” and that their appointments “essentially” aligned
with the Department’s recommendations. Appellant’s Br. at 59. The data contained on
the website and relied on by the Mother on appeal was not used during cross-examination
at the dependency hearing. Likewise, the failure to raise the “inability to provide”
argument below prevented the court from considering it. Regardless, her inability to
provide is a factor a court may consider in support of a dependency. See Schermer, 161
Wn.2d at 947.
25 Nos. 40529-0-III (Consol. with 40530-3-III, 40531-1-III, 40532-0-III) In re Dependency of J.S., G.S., C.H., K.H.
4. Whether the remaining findings support the conclusion the children were dependent
The Mother next contends that the remaining findings did not support the
conclusion that the children were dependent pursuant to RCW 13.34.030(6)(c). She
explains that the remaining findings establish that she had inconsistent communication
with the school and providers, she struggled to get the children to school, and they were
often absent or tardy. Furthermore, she concedes she was not in mental health treatment
and self-medicated with marijuana. However, these are some of the very findings,
supported by substantial evidence, that uphold the conclusion that the children were
dependent.
As discussed above, the Mother failed to ensure the children received regular
medical care. Likewise, the children chronically missed school, demonstrating an
inability to provide for their basic needs. Additionally, the court found that the Mother’s
continued cannabis use directly impacted her ability to safely parent and provide for their
needs. Furthermore, she has an extensive history with substances including
methamphetamine, alcohol, and marijuana. Additionally, the behavior of disengagement
from services, consistent with prior behavior during relapse, and the lack of contact were
indicative to the court that she was using mind-altering substances.
26 Nos. 40529-0-III (Consol. with 40530-3-III, 40531-1-III, 40532-0-III) In re Dependency of J.S., G.S., C.H., K.H.
The Mother also had a diagnosis of anxiety disorder, depression, and stimulant use
disorder. This was a previous deficiency in her last dependency, and she did not follow
through with care after dismissal. Additionally, the court found that the Mother was
using substances to self-treat her mental health rather than seeking treatment. Even when
mental health counseling had been court ordered and expected for the Mother to follow
through with therapy, she did not. Based on this evidence, the court did not have an
expectation the Mother would follow through with services and address her mental health
without court intervention.
Despite the findings above, the Mother asserts that the evidence also showed that
she was a capable and caring Mother, citing several facts to demonstrate this point.
Although it is most likely true that the Mother has redeeming qualities, our review is
limited to whether substantial evidence supports the court’s findings and whether those
findings support the conclusion of dependency. In re Welfare of Ca.R., 191 Wn. App. at
601. “[W]e do not reweigh evidence.” Id. at 609. Reweighing these positive qualities
against the other evidence presented at trial is outside our scope of review on appeal.
Consequently, this argument must fail.
The court’s finding that the children were dependent because they had no parent
capable of caring for them was supported by substantial evidence.
27 Nos. 40529-0-III (Consol. with 40530-3-III, 40531-1-III, 40532-0-III) In re Dependency of J.S., G.S., C.H., K.H.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW
2.06.040.
_________________________________ Staab, A.C.J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________________ Murphy, J.
_________________________________ Cooney, J.