In the Matter of the Commitment of A.W.

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: May 11, 2026
• Docket: A-0895-24
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0895-24

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMMITMENT OF A.W.1 ___________________________

Submitted April 15, 2026 – Decided May 11, 2026

Before Judges Vanek and Jacobs.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Passaic County, Indictment No. 07-05-0667.

Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant A.W. (Ian P. Liberty, First Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

Camelia M. Valdes, Passaic County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent State of New Jersey (Ali Y. Ozbek, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

1 Consistent with the parties' submissions, we refer to appellant by his initials. A.W. appeals from an October 17, 2024 Law Division order continuing

his involuntary commitment, alleging his due-process rights were violated

during a Krol2 review hearing. Discerning no plain error, we affirm.

I.

In 2006, A.W. set fires at a church and its assistant pastor's home. In

2007, he was found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) on all charges,

including two counts of aggravated arson in the first degree, two counts of

risking widespread injury or damage in the fourth degree, and four counts of

criminal mischief in the fourth degree. Had he been convicted, A.W. would

have been subject to a maximum term of forty years of incarceration.

Once acquitted, A.W. was committed to the Anne Klein Forensic Center.

He had a psychiatric history of schizophrenia, paranoid type; anxiety disorder—

not otherwise specified; personality disorder—not otherwise specified with

antisocial traits; coupled with a history of cannabis, cocaine, LSD, ecstasy,

heroin, and alcohol abuse. In 2010, A.W. was transferred to Greystone Park

Psychiatric Hospital, a less restrictive facility. In 2021, he was briefly returned

2 State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236 (1975) (requiring a trial court to hold periodic hearings at which the State must prove an acquittee poses a danger to themselves or society in order to continue commitment). A-0895-24 2 to Anne Klein after violating his commitment order. In 2022, he was transferred

back to Greystone.

After a Krol review hearing in October 2023, the trial court ordered A.W.'s

transfer to the "cottages," an open unit separate from the main building at

Greystone. At the next Krol hearing in May 2024, the court ordered A.W.

remain under observation in the cottages for three months before moving

forward with discharge planning.

According to treating psychiatrist Dr. Ravi Baliga, A.W.'s behavior

changed after the May hearing—he stopped attending some groups group

therapy sessions, was seen using a contraband cellphone, and had in his

possession several contraband credit cards, debit cards, and cancelled checks.

The items were confiscated, and A.W. was informed they were contraband.

Later, after staff confiscated more contraband, A.W. was informed he had

violated rules governing the use of Greystone-issued flip phones. A.W.

threatened Greystone staff, used racial slurs, and reported that a staff-member

had made "sexual advances towards him." A.W. later withdrew that complaint.

In July, after Dr. Baliga informed the court of A.W.'s behavior, the judge

ordered A.W. be returned to a closed unit in the main building at Greystone, and

his level of supervision (LOS) raised to one, the highest level with the fewest

A-0895-24 3 privileges. The judge scheduled A.W.'s next Krol hearing for September 27,

2024, and ordered Dr. Baliga to submit an updated psychiatric evaluation.

Returning to the main building, A.W. remained under the care of Dr.

Baliga in the Admissions Unit until July 30, when he was transferred to Dr.

Rebecca Tennis's care in the Forensics Unit. According to Dr. Tennis, A.W.

was "calm, cooperative, and in behavioral control and compliant with

medications" while in the Admissions Unit. Once in the Forensics Unit, A.W.

exhibited continued compliance with medications and attended 75% of group

therapy meetings. Dr. Tennis reported that although patients were seen entering

A.W.'s room in September 2024, that behavior ceased when A.W. was informed

it was a violation of the unit's rules.

Ahead of the September 27 hearing, Drs. Tennis and Baliga submitted

psychiatric evaluations. Both doctors affirmed A.W.'s diagnoses, noted his

history of "impulsive behavior," and recommended he remain on Krol status and

be subject to their discretionary lessening of the LOS. Dr. Tennis also

recommended another Krol review hearing be held in three months.

Drs. Baliga and Tennis testified at the September 27 hearing. On direct

examination, Dr. Baliga testified A.W. had become irritable and belligerent,

leading to his removal from the cottages and transfer to an LOS-one closed unit

A-0895-24 4 after he had received contraband and reacted negatively to being told he was

violating the cottages' cellphone policy and that his preferred food was not

available. A.W. responded by hurling racial slurs at the staff, threatening to

have staff fired, unjustly claiming neglect and sexual abuse, and threatening to

report staff to the police for enforcing the rules.

On cross-examination, Dr. Baliga was asked about his knowledge of

Greystone's policies and A.W.'s violations. Dr. Baliga responded that he had

not read Greystone's rules, but he was told the receipt of contraband debit cards

was a violation. Concerning A.W.'s LOS, Dr. Baliga testified that he had not

recommended in July that A.W. be returned to LOS one, the highest level—he

had recommended A.W. be returned to LOS three, the lowest level.

After cross-examination, the judge asked Dr. Baliga to describe A.W.'s

offensive interaction with Greystone staff in greater detail and stated the court

would hold a "full-blown hearing with witnesses" if A.W. denied the allegations.

Dr. Baliga confirmed this behavior occurred after the May hearing, at which the

judge stated she "was going to be very, very careful about" A.W.'s discharge.

Dr. Tennis testified consistently with Dr. Baliga, describing A.W.'s "very

rude and . . . racist comments toward the staff" as well as his occasionally

"irritable and belligerent" behavior. Dr. Tennis added that A.W.'s "judgment

A-0895-24 5 [was] variable," meaning "there's times when . . . he's made bad decisions." She

added that although A.W. no longer had delusions, he sometimes appeared

anxious. But his thinking was "linear and logical," and he did not have thoughts

of hurting himself or others. Dr. Tennis also noted A.W. had been recently

diagnosed with narcissistic personality disorder, a diagnosis not reflected in

earlier Krol hearing records. During cross-examination, Dr. Tennis testified

A.W. did not need to be placed in the cottages but instead should have been

moved to an "APlus group home, where he would still have [twenty-four]-hour

supervision [and] . . . would benefit from a different environment."

After Dr. Tennis's testimony, the parties submitted their requested

dispositions to the judge: A.W.'s attorney requested the judge adopt the

psychiatrists' recommendations in full and give the treatment team discretion to

move A.W. to an appropriate LOS; the State recommended A.W. remain on the

highest LOS with a three-month review. A.W.'s counsel did not request his

client's removal from Krol status or discharge planning.

The judge then issued an oral ruling, finding there was "no doubt, as a

result of underlying mental illness, [A.W.] [was] a danger to himself or others

if he is not within the confines of a locked unit." Referring to A.W.'s racial

insults to minority staff members as "rude," "vicious," and "horrible" and A.W.'s

A-0895-24 6 recanted accusations that staff had sexually abused him, the judge expressed

concern about A.W. 's behavior and stability. However, the judge granted

A.W.'s treating physicians the discretion to adjust his LOS subject to approval

of the required state agencies. The judge stated she would not consider

discharge planning until there was a "long period of . . . reasonable behavior."

The judge continued A.W.'s commitment and scheduled another Krol

hearing for September 25, 2025, concluding A.W. was "entitled to one hearing

a year." The October 17, 2024 order further provided for the continuation of the

previously court-ordered conditions including periodic drug screening, searches

for contraband and fire-setting materials, no off-site outings, taking all

prescribed medications, and judicial review of the LOS should there be any

future incidents.

II.

A.W. argues he was deprived of a fair hearing in violation of his

procedural due-process rights. Specifically, he alleges the judge improperly

shifted the burden of proof to him, in violation of Krol, by stating a full hearing

on the facts testified to by Drs. Baliga and Tennis would be held only if A.W.

denied the allegations he had violated Greystone’s policies. A.W. also claims

the judge's statements evinced animus and prospective bias against him as to

A-0895-24 7 future Krol hearings. Accordingly, A.W. requests we remand for a new hearing

before a different judge.

Because A.W. did not object on these grounds at the October 17, 2024

hearing, we may reject A.W.'s arguments "on this basis alone." See In re Civil

Commitment of A.H.B., 386 N.J. Super. 16, 28 (App. Div. 2006) (citing Nieder

v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 32 N.J. 229, 234 (1973)). However, "in the interests

of justice," we may also consider plain error not raised before the trial court. R.

2:10-2. Here, we consider A.W.'s arguments under the plain-error standard

"because of the personal liberty interests at stake." A.H.B., 386 N.J. Super. at

28 (citing R. 2:10-2).

Plain error must be "of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of

producing an unjust result." R. 2:10-2. "The mere possibility of error is

insufficient for reversal." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. N.S., 412 N.J.

Super. 593, 622 (App. Div. 2010). "Relief under the plain error rule, Rule 2:10-

2, at least in civil cases, is discretionary and 'should be sparingly employed."

Baker v. Nat'l State Bank, 161 N.J. 220, 226 (1999) (quoting Ford v. Reichert,

23 N.J. 429, 435 (1957)).

A-0895-24 8 III.

"The scope of appellate review of a commitment determination is

extremely narrow." In re Civ. Commitment of R.F., 217 N.J. 152, 174 (2014)

(quoting In re D.C., 146 N.J. 31, 58 (1996)). "[A]n appellate court should not

modify a trial court's determination either to commit or release an individual

unless 'the record reveals a clear mistake.'" Id. at 175 (quoting D.C., 146 N.J.

at 58). "An appellate court should give the 'utmost deference' to the reviewing

judge's determination of the appropriate balancing of societal interest and

individual liberty." In re Civ. Commitment of M.L.V., 388 N.J. Super. 454, 465

(App. Div. 2006) (quoting In re Commitment of J.P., 339 N.J. Super. 443, 459

(App. Div. 2001)).

We consider well-settled principles of law governing NGI acquittees, who

"may be held in continued confinement if the person is a danger to self or others

and is in need of medical treatment." In re Commitment of W.K., 159 N.J. 1, 2

(1999). The purpose is not to punish, but "to protect society against individuals

who, through no culpable fault of their own, pose a threat to public safety. "

Krol, 68 N.J. at 246.

Once committed, NGI acquittees "are reviewed on a periodic basis under

the same standards as those applied to civil commitments generally." In re

A-0895-24 9 Commitment of M.M., 377 N.J. Super. 71, 76 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting Krol,

68 N.J. at 260) aff'd, 186 N.J. 430 (2006). "The burden for establishing the need

for continued commitment is by a preponderance of the evidence, whereas in a

civil commitment proceeding it is by clear and convincing evidence." W.K.,

159 N.J. at 4; see also N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b)(3) (establishing preponderance of the

evidence as standard of proof). To satisfy due-process requirements in civil

commitment proceedings, the State must adhere to certain core procedural

protections, including notice, the opportunity to present evidence, and

representation by counsel. In re Commitment of S.L., 94 N.J. 128, 137 (1983);

N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.14.

Here, the judge adhered to well-established due-process principles during

the October 17, 2024 Krol hearing. A.W. received notice of the hearing, was

represented by counsel, and was afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the

State's witnesses. Defense counsel cross-examined Dr. Baliga, focusing in

particular on his unfamiliarity with Greystone policies that A.W. did not dispute

violating.

We are unconvinced the judge shifted the burden of proof to A.W. by

finding a "full-blown hearing with witnesses" was required only if A.W. denied

A-0895-24 10 the allegations of misconduct. Because A.W. did not object at the hearing, we

review this claim under the plain-error standard. R. 2:10-2.

Although the burden to prove continued dangerousness rests squarely with

the State, State v. Fields, 77 N.J. 282, 300 (1978), defense counsel did not

contest the facts supporting the State's assertion about A.W.'s continued

dangerousness. Counsel did not assert that A.W. denied the allegations, or

contest the underlying factual allegations in any other meaningful way: his

cross-examination focused on the lack of documentary support for the rules

themselves, not on disputing A.W.'s conduct. As a result, the judge's narrowing

of the proofs at the hearing to only disputed issues was not "clearly capable of

producing an unjust result." R. 2:10-2.

A.W.'s claim of judicial animus and prospective bias is likewise

unavailing. Although A.W. characterizes the judge's comments, through her

description of his behavior as "vicious" and decision to schedule the next hearing

one year later as evidence of bias and hostility, judicial animus is not supported

by the record. The judge's decision to hold another Krol after no less than a year

fell within her discretion because a one-year Krol review is expressly permitted

by court rule. See R. 4:74-7(f)(2) (requiring trial courts hold "periodic reviews"

in A.W.'s circumstances "at least annually"); see also Fields, 77 N.J. at 303

A-0895-24 11 (noting "the relaxation of the restraints on the committee's liberty must proceed

in gradual stages").

Moreover, trial courts are not bound to accept the recommendations of

expert witnesses in Krol proceedings. See Krol, 68 N.J. at 261. Because the

ultimate determination of dangerousness is a legal one, the judge is charged with

balancing public safety against individual liberty. Ibid. The judge was entitled

to consider A.W.'s recent conduct, including the incidents leading to his removal

from the cottages, as warranting a longer rule-sanctioned review period than the

experts had recommended. See N.J.S.A. 30:4–27.2(h) to (i) (requiring

reviewing courts "take into account a person's history, recent behavior and any

recent act, threat or serious psychiatric deterioration").

We discern no plain error in the judge's October 17, 2024 order.

Affirmed.

A-0895-24 12