RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1770-24
IN THE MATTER OF THE CIVIL COMMITMENT OF T.T., SVP-226-02. ________________________
Submitted November 19, 2025 – Decided December 8, 2025
Before Judges Mayer and Vanek.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Docket No. SVP-226-02.
Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant T.T. (Stefan Van Jura, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, on the briefs).
Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for respondent State of New Jersey (Janet Greenberg Cohen, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Stephen Slocum, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
Appellant filed a supplemental brief on appellant's behalf.
PER CURIAM T.T. appeals from a February 14, 2025 order continuing his involuntary
civil commitment to the Special Treatment Unit (STU) under the Sexually
Violent Predator Act (SVPA), N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.24 to -27.38. We affirm.
T.T., who has two violent sexual offense convictions, has been
involuntarily committed to the STU since 2002. In addition, T.T. has a history
of alcohol abuse since he was sixteen years old.
In 1976, T.T. pleaded guilty to sexually abusing a six-year-old girl. T.T.
grabbed the victim from the hallway of her apartment building, took her to an
abandoned apartment, and raped her before returning the child to her mother and
telling the mother he took the girl to the store. T.T. claimed he had been drinking
and did not remember raping the victim. For that offense, T.T. received an
indeterminate five-year prison sentence.
In 1992, T.T. pleaded guilty to aggravated assault, aggravated sexual
assault, and terroristic threats against an adult female. He had been drinking
heavily with the victim prior to hitting her in the head with a bat, stabbing her
with a pair of scissors, and raping her. T.T. served time in prison for this
offense.
On January 21, 2025, a judge conducted an annual review of T.T.'s
continued civil commitment to the STU as required under N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.35
A-1770-24 2 and N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.32(a). At the time of the hearing, T.T. was sixty-nine years
old.
As part of the annual review, the judge relied on the submitted documents,
reports, and evaluations. The judge also considered the unrefuted expert
testimony presented at the hearing. The two experts who testified at T.T.'s
annual review hearing were Dr. Howard Gilman, an expert in psychiatry, and
Dr. Paul Dudek, an expert in psychology. T.T. stipulated to the experts'
qualifications and admission of their reports.
Dr. Gilman
Dr. Gilman evaluated T.T.'s mental condition and diagnosed T.T. as
suffering from substance abuse disorder, antisocial personality disorder, and
"rule out" disorder for pedophilia and sexual sadism. 1 Dr. Gilman acknowledged
T.T. did not use alcohol or other illegal substances while at the STU. However,
he maintained T.T. continued to suffer from alcohol use disorder because T.T.
was experiencing institutional remission.
Dr. Gilman determined T.T.'s personality disorders predisposed him to
sexual violence and he would not "spontaneously remit" absent treatment for his
1 Dr. Gilman was unable to confirm a diagnosis of pedophilia or sexual sadism because T.T. declined to meet with him. A-1770-24 3 disorders. The doctor relied heavily on T.T.'s prior sexual offenses and
considered T.T.'s arrests and convictions for nonsexual crimes, including
assault, burglary, theft, robbery, and weapons offenses, in reaching his
conclusions regarding T.T.'s risk of reoffending if released.
Dr. Gilman assessed T.T.'s score of a two on the Static-99R,2 which
reflected an "average" risk to reoffend. On the Stable 2007,3 Dr. Gilman stated
T.T. scored fourteen out of twenty-four, "placing him in the high range of
dynamic needs." According to Dr. Gilman, the combined scores on the Static-
99R and Stable 2007 placed T.T. at an above average risk for sexual reoffending
with a five-year recidivism risk of 13.6 percent.
2 The Static-99R "is an actuarial test used to estimate the probability of sexually violent recidivism in adult males previously convicted of sexually violent offenses." In re Civ. Commitment of R.F., 217 N.J. 152, 164 n.9 (2014). The Static-99R is based on ten static factors demonstrated to be associated with sexual reoffense, such as age, prolonged intimate connection, non-sexual violence, number of sexual offenses, non-contact sexual offenses, and victim characteristics. The test identifies factors a judge may "consider, weigh, or even reject, when engaging in the necessary factfinding under the SVPA." Ibid. (quoting In re Commitment of R.S., 173 N.J. 134, 137 (2002)). The scoring under the Static-99R estimates sexual and violent rearrest or reconviction over a period of five years. 3 The Stable 2007 is an actuarial instrument to assess dynamic risk factors associated with sexual recidivism and level of supervision needed if an individual was released. See Kevin Baldwin, Sex Offender Risk Assessment, Sex Offender Mgmt. Assessment and Plan. Initiative 2-3 (July 2015). A-1770-24 4 Dr. Gilman also noted sex offenders are generally less likely to reoffend
as they age. However, the doctor opined that T.T.'s non-participation in sex
offender treatment at the STU elevated his risk beyond his actual Static-99R and
Stable 2007 scoring. Dr. Gilman concluded, within a reasonable degree of
medical certainty, T.T. suffers from a mental abnormality affecting his
cognitive, vocational, and emotional capacity, remains at a high risk of
reoffending if released, and meets the criteria for continued civil commitment
under the SVPA.
Dr. Dudek
Dr. Dudek diagnosed T.T. with alcohol and cannabis abuse disorders,
paraphilic disorder with nonconsent and pedophilia specifiers,4 and personality
disorder with antisocial traits. He opined T.T.'s personality disorders would not
spontaneously remit. According to Dr. Dudek, T.T. required treatment to learn
how to control his impulses. Dr. Dudek considered T.T.'s age to be a mitigating
factor, but determined T.T. did not "show any evidence of any physiological
reduction of risk." Dr. Dudek also assessed T.T. according to the Static-99R
and scored him at a three, placing him at an average risk for reconviction or
4 Because T.T. refused to meet with Dr. Dudek, he was unable to render a formal diagnosis of nonconsent or pedophilic disorder. A-1770-24 5 rearrest and estimating a fourteen to twenty-three percent chance of recidivism
over ten years.
Dr. Dudek concluded T.T. was unable to demonstrate awareness of his
sexual offense cycle. The doctor explained the sexual offense cycle as a "way
of understanding the process that led to an offense," including consideration of
attitudes around sex, triggers, and feelings after offending. Dr. Dudek testified
T.T. would have serious difficulty controlling his sexually violent behavior
without treatment. Of particular concern to Dr. Dudek were T.T.'s unaddressed
issues, including:
[a] deviant pattern of sexual arousal that appear[ed] to include sadistic elements, poor cognitive problem solving, impulsivity, a lack of meaningful pro-social influences, a history of intimacy deficits, negative emotionality and hostility, poor cooperation with supervision, permissiveness towards sexual offending and antisocial behavior, a history of substance abuse, a history of sexual offending, and the use of weapons in his offending history.
Dr. Dudek concluded T.T.'s lack of participation in any treatment
programs required him to remain in Phase One of treatment. Due to T.T.'s
failure to make any progress toward reducing his risk of reoffending, and
considering the static and dynamic scoring factors, Dr. Dudek concluded T.T.
remained at a high risk to reoffend if not confined to the STU.
A-1770-24 6 Other evidence introduced at the review hearing including an annual
report from the STU. The report indicated T.T. was compliant with the STU's
rules and had not used alcohol while at the STU. However, the report stated
T.T. remained in Phase One of treatment due to his refusal to meaningfully
engage in treatment programs.
In June 2024, the STU's Treatment Progress Review Committee
(Committee) recommended T.T. remain in Phase One of treatment. The
Committee noted T.T.'s "active withdrawal from the treatment process" and his
failure to "attend groups, modules, or self-help groups." According to the
Committee, T.T. refused to engage in treatment because he believed he did not
have a "sex problem."
T.T. also testified at the hearing. T.T. told the judge the opinions of the
testifying experts should be discounted because those doctors were not part of
his treatment team. Further, T.T. explained he had problem with alcohol but
denied he had a sex problem.
After hearing the testimony and reviewing "over five hundred pages of
various records from the STU," the judge issued a February 14, 2024 judgment
ordering T.T.'s continued commitment with an accompanying written decision.
Based on T.T.'s refusal to participate in treatment at the STU, the judge found
A-1770-24 7 there was no evidence that T.T. would not re-offend if released. The judge
acknowledged T.T.'s lack of "problematic" or "difficult" behavior while at the
STU but concluded such behavior alone did not entitle T.T. to release.
The judge rejected T.T.'s argument that his past offenses were due to a
long-standing alcohol problem that had since resolved. As the judge noted,
T.T.'s status regarding alcohol abuse was the result of "institutional remission"
rather than any active treatment for alcohol abuse. Because T.T. has not been
treated for his alcohol abuse, the judge found there was no evidence that T.T.
would not relapse and consume alcohol once released. In reaching these
findings, the judge relied on the experts' testimony which the judge found was
"credible and uncontroverted."
Based on clear and convincing evidence and testimony, the judge
concluded the State satisfied all three prongs under the SVPA for T.T.'s
continued commitment to the STU. First, the judge found T.T. was twice
convicted of qualifying sexual offenses. Second, based on the uncontroverted
expert testimony, the judge found T.T. "suffer[ed] from a mental abnormality or
personality disorder that affects him emotionally, cognitively or volitionally and
that does not spontaneously remit." Additionally, the judge determined T.T.
A-1770-24 8 "remain[ed] highly likely to commit acts of sexual violence if not confined to
the [STU]." Thus, the judge entered a judgment for his continued committal.
On appeal, T.T., through his appellate counsel, raises the following
argument:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT THE STATE HAD PROVED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT THE RESIDENT MET THE CRITERIA FOR CONTINUED CIVIL COMMITMENT AS A SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR.
In addition, T.T. raises the following arguments in his self-represented
supplemental brief:5
SUPPLEMENTAL POINT ONE
The Trial Court Judge erred in relying on information contained in the 1992 Adult Presentence Report given by the State's Experts to conclude that [T.T.] was a High Risk in 2025.
SUPPLEMENTAL POINT TWO
Despite the predicate offense findings [T.T.] states that the State failed to establish all three statutory elements by clear and convincing evidence that he was highly likely to commit a future offense.
5 We recite T.T.'s supplemental point headings verbatim. A-1770-24 9 SUPPLEMENTAL POINT THREE
The State did not present clear and convincing evidence that [T.T.]'s mental abnormality would cause him to have serious difficulty refraining from sexually violent conduct.
SUPPLEMENTAL POINT FOUR
The Judge erred when relying on the [e]xpert's opinion were possibilities not probabilities, and none of which were factually supported by [T.T.]'s recent behavior. The Judge was mistaken[] in giving [T.T.] a Static-99R score a Three, which is a moderate high risk. When in fact the State's [e]xpert[] rendered his Static-99R score a [T]wo, which is a low medium risk.
SUPPLEMENTAL POINT FIVE
QUESTION OF LAW: How long can a person be confin[e]d (if) he or she no longer meets the standard in In re Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109, 237 (2002) or [t]he New Jersey Sexually Violent Predator Act, N.J.S.A. § 30:4-27.24[] et[] al.
SUPPLEMENTAL POINT SIX
The Court did not question the reliability of the testimony proffered by the State's expert[]s in court.
SUPPLEMENTAL POINT SEVEN
Under the Cronic[] [s]tandard trial counsel was ineffective [a]ssistance.
A-1770-24 10 SUPPLEMENTAL POINT EIGHT
The [t]reatment [p]roviders at the [STU] have deprived [T.T.] [of] a job in violation of his [c]onstitutional [r]ight of the [Fourteenth] Amendment to earn a living.
Our review of a judgment for commitment under the SVPA is "extremely
narrow." In re Civ. Commitment of R.F., 217 N.J. 152, 174 (2014) (quoting In
re D.C., 146 N.J. 31, 58 (1996)). "[C]ommitting judges under the SVPA are
specialists in the area," whose "expertise in the subject [is entitled to] special
deference." In re Civ. Commitment of R.Z.B., 392 N.J. Super. 22, 36 (App. Div.
2007) (quoting In re Civ. Commitment of T.J.N., 390 N.J. Super. 218, 226 (App.
Div. 2007)). A trial judge's commitment determination will be subject to
modification on appeal only where "the record reveals a clear mistake." R.F.,
217 N.J. at 175 (quoting D.C., 146 N.J. at 58). We give special deference to the
judge's findings "because they have the 'opportunity to hear and see the
witnesses and to have the "feel" of the case, which a reviewing court cannot
enjoy.'" Id. at 174 (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964)).
"The SVPA authorizes the Attorney General to initiate a court proceeding
for the involuntary commitment of an individual believed to be a 'sexually
violent predator' as defined by the Act." In re Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J.
109, 120 (2002) (citing N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.28). A "sexually violent predator" is
A-1770-24 11 defined as someone who: (1) has been "convicted, adjudicated delinquent or
found not guilty by reason of insanity for commission of a sexually violent
offense, or . . . charged with a sexually violent offense but found to be
incompetent to stand trial;" (2) suffers "from a mental abnormality or personality
disorder" predisposing him to commit acts of sexual violence; and (3) as a result
of that mental abnormality or personality disorder is "likely to engage in acts of
sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility for control, care and
treatment." N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.26.
T.T.'s annual review hearing focused on the second and third prongs of
the SVPA. Under the second prong, the State must prove the individual "suffers
from a mental abnormality or personality disorder." R.F., 217 N.J. at 173. The
SVPA does not define "personality disorder." See N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.26.
However, "the nomenclature . . . is not dispositive." W.Z., 173 N.J. at 127. The
focus is on "the mental condition . . . affect[ing] an individual's ability to control
his or her sexually harmful conduct." Ibid.
"An inability to control one's sexually violent behavior is the very essence
of the SVPA." Id. at 129. "A difficulty arises" in trying to quantify an
individual's probability of reoffending by a particular "quantum of proof." Id.
at 131. "Predictions of future dangerousness have been for some time a
A-1770-24 12 permitted basis for restriction of a citizen's liberty when that dangerousness is
tethered to a finding of mental illness or abnormality." Id. at 132 (citing Hubbart
v. Superior Court, 969 P.2d 584, 600 n.26 (Cal. 1999)). The inquiry is focused
on an individual's "present serious difficulty with control over dangerous sexual
behavior." Id. at 132-33 (emphasis in original).
Here, the State's experts diagnosed T.T. with personality disorders. Both
experts concluded T.T.'s disorders contributed to his past decisions to offend
and would not spontaneously remit without treatment. Further, both experts
noted T.T. refused treatment while at the STU. Additionally, both experts
utilized the Static-99R, which is generally accepted as a reliable tool in weighing
an individual's future dangerousness in SVPA hearings. See In re Civ.
Commitment of A.Y., 458 N.J. Super. 147, 171-72 (App. Div. 2019). Although
both experts acknowledged T.T. attained a low to average score on the static-
99R and considered his age as a potential mitigating factor, they found T.T.'s
refusal to engage in treatment elevated his risk beyond what his age or his static
factor scores entailed.
In finding the State proved the second prong under the SVPA, the judge
relied on the experts' testimony diagnosing T.T. with mental conditions affecting
his ability to control his sexually harmful conduct. The judge found the experts
A-1770-24 13 were credible and their opinions were consistent with the voluminous records
which they reviewed.
Under the third prong, the State must prove the individual has serious
difficulty controlling sexually harmful behavior such that it is highly likely that
he or she will not control his or her sexually violent behavior and will reoffend.
W.Z., 173 N.J. at 132. A determination whether a person is likely to sexually
reoffend "lies with the courts, not the expertise of psychiatrics or psychologists."
R.F., 217 N.J. at 174 (quoting D.C., 146 N.J. at 59). "Courts must balance
society's interest in protection from harmful conduct against the individual's
interest in personal liberty and autonomy." Ibid. (quoting D.C., 146 N.J. at 59).
Here, the judge found T.T. would have serious difficulty controlling his
sexually violent behavior given his lack of participation in any treatment while
at the STU. Thus, the judge concluded T.T. would be highly likely in the
foreseeable future to engage in acts of sexual violence if released. The judge's
conclusion is supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record including
the unrebutted and credible testimony of both experts.
T.T.'s argument on appeal points to his sobriety and lack of problematic
conduct at the STU as mitigating factors. However, the judge considered those
factors and determined any mitigating circumstances presented by T.T. were
A-1770-24 14 outweighed by the experts' unrefuted testimony that T.T. was highly likely to
sexually reoffend.
"[A] mere disagreement with the trial court's factfindings cannot be the
basis for substituted factfindings by an appellate court" absent a clear mistake.
R.F., 217 N.J. at 178. Here, the State's expert witnesses supplied sufficient
credible evidence for the judge to conclude T.T. was highly likely to sexually
reoffend if released.
Having reviewed the record, we are satisfied the judge properly concluded
the State proved by clear and convincing evidence each of the elements for T.T.'s
continued civil commitment under the SVPA.
We briefly address T.T.'s arguments in his supplemental pro se brief. T.T.
argues the judge impermissibly considered information in his presentence
report. However, in the context of New Jersey civil commitment hearings, "pre-
sentence investigation reports are . . . admissible since they are the type of
evidence reasonably ruled on by psychiatrists in formulating an opinion as to an
individual's mental condition." In re Civ. Commitment of J.M.B., 395 N.J.
Super. 69, 94 (App. Div. 2007). Therefore, the judge did not err in considering
T.T.'s presentence report.
A-1770-24 15 T.T. relies on out-of-state case law and an unpublished New Jersey case
in arguing the judge erred in finding he suffered from a continuing personality
disorder and was highly likely to reoffend. Out-of-state cases and unpublished
New Jersey cases are not binding on this court. See Pressler & Verniero, Current
N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 3.5 on R. 1:36-3 (2025).
T.T. further contends his counsel at the commitment hearing was
ineffective. We reject his argument.
In In re Commitment of J.S., 467 N.J. Super. 291, 305-06 (App. Div.
2021), we rejected a claim for ineffective assistance of SVPA counsel during a
commitment hearing. J.S. involved an individual who refused to meaningfully
engage in treatment at the STU. Id. at 306. We concluded SVPA defense
counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge the State's expert s regarding
his non-participation in treatment because there was ample evidence of the
defendant's refusal to accept treatment. Ibid. Thus, the attorney's decision not
to "adduce harmful testimony [regarding the defendant's non-participation in
treatment] was a strategic decision" and did not constitute ineffective assistance
of counsel. Ibid.
In T.T.'s case, there was ample evidence in the record, aside from the
experts' testimony, regarding T.T.'s refusal to engage in treatment at the STU.
A-1770-24 16 T.T. had ample opportunity while testifying at his annual review hearing to
clarify or refute evidence related to refusal to engage in treatment. He did not
do so.
To the extent we have not addressed any of T.T.'s arguments in his pro se
supplemental points, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant
discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
A-1770-24 17