RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3211-23
IN THE MATTER OF THE CIVIL COMMITMENT OF J.R., SVP-785-15. ___________________________
Argued October 7, 2025 – Decided November 12, 2025
Before Judges Gooden Brown and DeAlmeida.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Somerset County, Docket No. SVP-785-15.
Michael Mangels, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant J.R. (Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney; Michael Mangels, on the brief).
Stephen Slocum, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent State of New Jersey (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney; Janet Greenberg Cohen, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Stephen Slocum, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
J.R. appeals from the May 8, 2024 Law Division judgment continuing his
commitment to the Special Treatment Unit (STU), the secure facility designated
for the custody, care, and treatment of sexually violent predators (SVP) pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA), N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.24 to -27.38.
We affirm.
I.
J.R. is a sixty-seven-year-old man who in 1985 violently raped and
repeatedly stabbed D.W. after breaking into her home at approximately 1:00
a.m. while armed with a handgun. D.W. was awakened by J.R.'s weight after he
climbed on top of her while she slept. J.R. choked D.W. into unconsciousness.
When she awoke, he digitally penetrated her vagina against her will, forced her
to perform fellatio on him, and vaginally raped her repeatedly, despite her
begging him not to. J.R. held D.W. captive in her home for the entire night.
During that time, J.R. threatened D.W. and her three- and five-year-old children,
who were present and sometimes awake. Before the vaginal rapes, J.R. forced
D.W. to make him alcoholic drinks and demanded she put on a dress. J.R. placed
his handgun on the counter at one point, making D.W. aware of the weapon.
After J.R. raped D.W., he stabbed her with a knife seventeen times. J.R.
lodged the weapon in D.W.'s sternum so deeply he had to put his foot on her
chest to pull it out. J.R. told D.W. he was going to watch her die, then left, with
$100 he stole from D.W. During the assault, D.W. recognized J.R. as the
husband of a woman who had recently babysat her children. She stated his name
A-3211-23 2 during the assault. D.W. reported J.R., apparently concerned she had identified
him, told her he would come back and kill her and her family even if it took
thirty years. J.R. denied making that threat.
After J.R. left her home, D.W. managed to crawl to a telephone and dial
9-1-1. She underwent four hours of emergency surgery at a trauma center.
Police apprehended J.R. walking on a street approximately one mile from
the home shortly after the attack. He was in possession of a gun matching the
description given by D.W., a bloody knife, a bloody mask, and the stolen $100.
He said to an officer, "I know what I did."
A jury convicted J.R. of three counts of aggravated sexual assault,
attempted murder, kidnaping, burglary, aggravated assault, and weapons
offenses. The court initially sentenced J.R. to a 120-year term of imprisonment,
with a sixty-year period of parole ineligibility. The sentence was later reduced
to a sixty-year term of imprisonment, with a thirty-year period of parole
ineligibility.1
1 In 1981, J.R. was charged with following a woman home and raping her at gunpoint. The record does not contain further details about this alleged offense or the reasons the charges were ultimately dismissed. J.R. denies the offense, alternatively asserting the victim was a consensual sexual partner and he was out of state at the time the rape took place. A-3211-23 3 J.R. also has a non-sexual criminal history. As a juvenile, he was
adjudicated delinquent for stealing a motorcycle, driving without a license, and
attempting to elude police. He was also charged with being a runaway and
possessing a firearm. As an adult, J.R. was charged in 1984 with carrying a
prohibited weapon. That charge was dismissed after J.R. completed pre-trial
intervention.
In 2015, as J.R. was approaching release from his custodial sentence, the
State filed a petition to civilly commit him under the SVPA. The court granted
the petition. J.R. has remained at the STU after regularly scheduled annual
review hearings through 2024 when the hearing in this matter took place.
In May 2024, the court held a two-day hearing on the State's petition to
continue J.R.'s commitment. The State presented two expert witnesses:
psychiatrist Dr. Roxanne Lewin and psychologist Dr. Nafisa Mandani. Both
experts were qualified in the subspeciality of risk assessment for SVPs and
prepared a written report admitted into evidence. J.R. called as an expert witness
psychologist Dr. Dorota Novitskie, who has a subspecialty of risk assessment
for SVPs. The court admitted Novitskie's report into evidence.
As part of her evaluation, Lewin met with J.R. for eighty minutes. She
also reviewed J.R.'s treatment notes from the STU, which included reports of
A-3211-23 4 other professionals who evaluated J.R. during his commitment. Lewin
examined J.R.'s criminal history, both sexual and non-sexual, and the details of
his assault of D.W.
Lewin gave J.R. a provisional diagnosis of sexual sadism based, in large
part, on the significantly violent nature of his sexual assault of D.W. Lewin
explained the diagnosis was provisional because J.R. had only one offense but
noted J.R. had disclosed during treatment he was aroused by D.W. being helpless
during the assault. J.R. also previously described, but later partially retracted,
being aroused by the smell of blood during the assault and by being the cause of
D.W.'s extreme distress during the attack.
Lewin also diagnosed J.R. with antisocial personality disorder and opined
he has "significant criminogenic tendencies," which have existed since his
youth. J.R.'s violent tendencies were evidenced by statements he made during
therapy about his frustration with another STU resident who made noise outside
his cell. J.R. stated he fantasized about stabbing the resident and dropping him
in a hole, pouring gasoline on him, and setting him on fire. Lewin found the
remarks concerning given J.R.'s offense history.
Lewin also opined J.R. has a significant substance abuse history involving
alcohol, which caused him to lose his job and may have caused marital problems.
A-3211-23 5 J.R. admitted to Lewin he drank alcohol and smoked marijuana before assaulting
D.W. and, as noted above, forced D.W. to make him alcoholic drinks prior to
vaginally raping her. The expert opined J.R.'s substance abuse disorder, if not
controlled, can contribute to him reoffending sexually. Since 2017, J.R. has
facilitated an Alcoholics Anonymous group at the STU. He has a sponsor and
has sponsored other residents over the years. Lewin testified that while J.R.'s
efforts at ameliorating his substance abuse are laudable, he must also address
his sexual offending cycle to mitigate his serious risk of sexually reoffending if
released.
Lewin testified J.R. was improving in his efforts at sex offender treatment,
has not been on refusal status, and incurred no disciplinary charges during his
incarceration and subsequent commitment. However, Lewin opined that despite
many years of sex offender treatment, J.R. continues to avoid addressing his
assault of D.W. because doing so, in J.R.'s words, "brings him to a dark place."
In addition, when J.R. is compelled to discuss his index offense, he continues to
minimize some aspects of his assault of D.W.
For example, J.R. first told Lewin he stabbed D.W. one time. He later
said he may have stabbed her three times. He did not admit to having stabbed
D.W. seventeen times. According to Lewin, J.R. struggles to make meaningful
A-3211-23 6 connections between the details of his assault of D.W. and his sex offending
cycle. He therefore does not understand the dynamics of his future risk to
reoffend. Lewin opined that without fully acknowledging his assault of D.W.
and understanding the causes of his criminal behavior, including his triggers and
risk factors, J.R. will be unable to address the dynamics of his offense cycle and
limit the risk of reoffending if released. 2
Lewin gave J.R. a score of zero on the Static-99 actuarial tool,
corresponding to the below average risk group. 3 J.R.'s age provided significant
mitigation to his risk of reoffending sexually. Lewin, however, opined the score
understates J.R.'s risk of reoffending. On the Stable 2007 tool, which assesses
dynamic and potentially changeable factors that contribute to sexual reoffending
2 J.R. has given wildly conflicting accounts of his involvement in the attack of D.W. J.R. has denied any involvement. He also has claimed his second wife stabbed D.W. and he took the knife from her when arriving on scene but was too afraid to call 9-1-1 to assist D.W. On other occasions, J.R. said he could not possibly recall any information about the assault because of the passage of time and could not say for sure whether he was involved in the attack. 3 "The Static-99 is an actuarial test used to estimate the probability of sexually violent recidivism in adult males previously convicted of sexually violent offenses." In re Civil Commitment of R.F., 217 N.J. 152, 164 n.9 (2014). Our Supreme "Court has explained that actuarial information, including the Static - 99, is 'simply a factor to consider, weigh, or even reject, when engaging in the necessary factfinding under the SVPA.'" Ibid. (quoting In re Commitment of R.S., 173 N.J. 134, 137 (2002)). A-3211-23 7 risk, Lewin gave J.R. a score of eleven out of twenty-four. This score
corresponds to a moderate level of risk. Finally, on the psychopathic checklist-
revised (PCLR) tool, J.R. received a score of 28.4, which reflects a high level
of psychopathic personality traits.
Lewin opined that J.R. suffers from a mental abnormality or personality
disorder that affects him emotionally, cognitively, or volitionally, so as to
predispose him to commit acts of sexual violence in the foreseeable future.
Those conditions, Lewin testified, do not spontaneously remit and can be
controlled only through successful sex offender treatment. She testified because
J.R. has not sufficiently benefited from sex offender therapy, he is highly likely
to sexually reoffend if released into the community.
Mandani, a member of the STU's Treatment Progress Review Committee
who previously worked as the facilitator for J.R.'s group therapy, reviewed
records detailing J.R.'s treatment and progress at the STU, and met with J.R.
Mandani testified J.R. has progressed to Phase 3A of treatment, a core phase
where a resident does the bulk of treatment work. The phase includes
exploration of the resident's offenses, high-risk situations, coping skills, risk
mitigation, and other topics.
A-3211-23 8 Mandani opined J.R.'s offense is extraordinary because of the level of
impulsiveness he displayed. The expert noted J.R. initially intended to commit
a burglary. However, when he saw D.W. in her bed he decided to rape her.
Then, over the course of the night, he decided to murder D.W. Mandani also
noted J.R.'s decision to prolong the attack for several hours, terrorizing D.W.
and extending her fear for herself and her children.
Mandani diagnosed J.R. with provisional sexual sadism disorder, anti-
social personality disorder, and substance abuse disorder (alcohol) moderated in
a controlled environment. He opined J.R. is at a high risk to reoffend if released
into the community. Mandani noted J.R. consistently maintained a fair level of
treatment engagement at the STU, but occasionally expressed violent ideation,
and has been hesitant in treatment to fully explore his sex offense cycle and the
reasons for his violent fantasies.
Mandani addressed physical limitations J.R. has experienced because of
his age. While J.R. can no longer achieve an erection, he continues to be
mentally aroused when he thinks of women he finds attractive. Mandani
testified J.R. remains a risk to sexually reoffend because he is aroused by more
than sexual penetration. J.R. has acknowledged he was aroused by the power
A-3211-23 9 and control he wielded over D.W., including demanding she make him alcoholic
drinks and put on a dress while she was terrified by him.
Mandani scored J.R. at a one on the Static-99 actuarial tool, corresponding
to an average risk of sexual reoffending. On the Stable 2007 tool, Mandani gave
J.R. a score of six out of twenty-four. This score falls in the moderate level of
risk. Finally, on the PCLR tool, Mandani gave J.R. a score of 25, which reflects
a high level of psychopathic personality traits.
Mandani opined J.R. suffers from a mental abnormality or personality
disorder that affects him emotionally, cognitively, or volitionally, so as to
predispose him to commit acts of sexual violence in the foreseeable future.
Those conditions, Mandani testified, do not spontaneously remit and can be
controlled only through successful sex offender treatment. Because J.R. has not
sufficiently benefitted from sex offender therapy, Mandani testified, J.R. is
highly likely to sexually reoffend if released into the community.
Novitskie prepared a psychological evaluation of J.R. after meeting with
him twice and reviewing his STU treatment records and offense history.
Novitskie diagnosed J.R. with anti-social personality disorder and alcohol abuse
disorder. She opined the disorders do not spontaneously remit, but can be
managed with treatment. Novitskie did not diagnose J.R. with sexual sadism.
A-3211-23 10 She opined J.R.'s one violent assault was insufficient to support the diagnosis
because there was no evidence J.R. fantasized about assaulting D.W. or had
engaged in similar behavior or fantasies with other women. In addition, she
testified it was inappropriate to give J.R. a provisional diagnosis of sexual
sadism that has been in place for more than nine years because a provisional
diagnosis is intended to be temporary until it is determined if the diagnosis is
accurate.
Novitskie did not complete a Static-99 or Stable evaluation of J.R. She
instead used the Risk for Sexual Violence Protocol (RSVP), a structured tool
which considers twenty-two empirically supported sexual violence risk factors.
Novitskie testified the RSVP is a more accurate assessment tool for a person
who has been institutionalized for a long period. According to Novitskie, J.R.
is not highly likely to sexually reoffend if released from the STU. In support of
this opinion, Novitskie relied in part on the absence of any sexual offense or
sexual acting out by J.R. during his incarceration and subsequent confinement
at the STU, his consistent participation in alcohol abuse treatment, and family
A-3211-23 11 members willing to assist him upon release. Novitskie recommended continued
sex offender therapy after release as a safety net for J.R. 4
J.R. also testified. He expressed regret for having assaulted D.W. and
described his index offense as senseless. J.R. acknowledged there was no
justification for the harm he inflicted on D.W. He stated sex offender therapy
and continued sobriety were "everything to [him]" and he had no intention of
creating another victim if released.
After the conclusion of the hearing, the court issued an oral decision
granting the State's application to continue J.R.'s commitment. The court noted
J.R. conceded prong one of the SVPA, i.e., that he was convicted of a sexually
violent offense. In addition, the court found it was undisputed J.R. satisfies
prong two of the statute, i.e., that he suffers from a mental abnormality or
personality disorder predisposing him to commit acts of sexual violence and that
his conditions do not spontaneously remit. The court rejected the provisional
diagnosis of sexual sadism and found J.R. had antisocial personality disorder .
As to the third element of the SVPA, the court found Lewis's testimony
credible and adopted her opinion J.R. was highly likely to reoffend sexually if
4 Novitskie also opined it was inappropriate for Mandani, who was involved in J.R.'s therapy in the past, to evaluate him for the purpose of providing expert testimony at a commitment hearing. A-3211-23 12 released from the STU. The court adopted Lewin's opinion J.R. has not
progressed sufficiently in treatment to fully understand his triggers and sexual
offense cycle, which elevates his risk of reoffending if released. In addition, the
court found credible Lewin's opinion J.R. minimizes his index offense and
continues to harbor violent thoughts, as evidenced by his significantly violent
fantasy with respect to another STU resident. The court found Mandani's
testimony supports Lewin's opinion regarding the likelihood of J.R. reoffending
sexually if released from the STU.
The court discounted some of J.R.'s testimony as self-serving and noted
that if sex offender treatment truly was "everything" to J.R. he would have
participated more fully in treatment at the STU. In addition, the court found
J.R.'s stated goal to not create another victim appeared motivated by his desire
not to return to custody and not reflective of the need to protect another person
from being harmed.
The court found:
[J.R.] has made great strides related to his substance abuse issues while at the STU and that is not in question. Moreover, he's also shown great progress in handling his anger, being that he has not had any institutional infractions for the entirety of his institutionalization. However, this [c]ourt is not convinced that [J.R.] does not currently pose a high risk of sexual reoffending. While the [c]ourt acknowledges
A-3211-23 13 and both parties agree that no resident of the STU is expected to perform perfectly in treatment, [J.R.], despite having been at the STU for nine years, still only has an elementary understanding of the sexual assault cycle. The treatment team has advised that his discussions of his index offense have been superficial, that he struggles in making the connections between various events and his internal experience.
. . . He has yet to address the violen[t] and sadistic nature of his offense, and his sexual arousal . . . in response to inflicting pain and harm to his victim, nor has he explored his experience of arousal to any sadistic stimuli at other points in his past as well as the present.
The court adopted the State's experts' opinions that J.R. "seems to
understand some of the principles he's learned through therapy . . . but he has
not yet demonstrated that he is able to integrate those lessons in his own life."
The court found J.R.'s reluctance to discuss his assault of D.W. inhibits his
ability to "understand why he did it and what triggered him to commit such a
heinous and brutal crime." The court also found to be concerning J.R.'s
expression of violent thoughts about another resident of the STU and a statement
attributed to him in treatment notes that his girlfriend should not live with him
if he is released because her defiance of his wishes would endanger her safety.
The court concluded it was
not confident . . . that [J.R.] has developed sufficient relapse prevention skills such that he would not pose a
A-3211-23 14 high risk of reoffense because the record is absent of sufficient evidence [J.R.] understands why and how he could have committed such a brutal crime and how he can ensure that he never commits such a crime again in light of his very current anger issues.
So, it is this [c]ourt's decision that [J.R.] remain committed to the STU for another year and have a hearing review date in one year.
A May 8, 2024 judgment memorialized the trial court's decision. This
appeal followed.
J.R. makes the following arguments.
THIS COURT SHOULD VACATE THE ORDER BELOW, BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ADEQUATELY PROTECT J.R.'S DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO A FAIR HEARING.
A. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED LEGAL ERRORS SHIFTING THE FOCUS OF THE HEARING, WHICH PREJUDICED J.R.
1. THE COURT ERRED IN ITS UNDERSTANDING OF J.R.'S ADMISSION THAT THE SECOND PRONG OF THE STATUTE WAS MET.
2. THE TRIAL COURT SUBTLY SHIFTED THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO J.R.
B. THE TRIAL COURT TREATED J.R.'S COUNSEL DIFFERENTLY FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL DENYING J.R.'S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL.
A-3211-23 15 C. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PERMIT CROSS[-]EXAMINATION INTO RELEVANT 5 AREAS BY J.R.'S COUNSEL.
II.
The SVPA establishes three requisites for commitment. A person must:
(1) have been "convicted, adjudicated delinquent or found not guilty by reason
of insanity for commission of a sexually violent offense, or . . . charged with a
sexually violent offense but found to be incompetent to stand trial"; (2) suffer
"from a mental abnormality or personality disorder" predisposing him to commit
acts of sexual violence; and (3) as a result be "likely to engage in acts of sexual
violence if not confined in a secure facility for control, care and treatment."
N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.26. To secure an order for civil commitment under the SVPA,
the State must prove each element of the SVPA by clear and convincing
evidence. In re Civil Commitment of E.D., 183 N.J. 536, 552 (2005); N.J.S.A.
30:4-27.32(a).
Once an individual has been committed under the SVPA, a court must
conduct an annual review hearing to determine whether the individual will be
5 We obtained these point headings from the body of J.R.'s brief. The table of contents of J.R.'s brief includes some point headings that are not reflective of the contents of the brief. We assume those point headings are typographic errors. A-3211-23 16 released or remain in treatment. N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.35. The same standard for
the initial involuntary commitment of a sex offender under the SVPA applies to
the annual review hearing. See In re Civil Commitment of E.D., 353 N.J. Super.
450, 452-53 (App. Div. 2002). "[T]he State must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the individual has serious difficulty controlling his or her harmful
sexual behavior such that it is highly likely that the person will not contr ol his
or her sexually violent behavior and will reoffend." In re Commitment of W.Z.,
173 N.J. 109, 133-34 (2002); N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.26. During the annual review,
the court must focus on the committee's current mental condition and the present
danger to commit a sexually violent offense. In re Commitment of P.C., 349
N.J. Super. 569, 582 (App. Div. 2002).
"The scope of appellate review of a commitment determination is
extremely narrow. The judges who hear SVPA cases generally are 'specialists'
and 'their expertise in the subject' is entitled to 'special deference.'" R.F., 217
N.J. at 174 (quoting In re Civil Commitment of T.J.N., 390 N.J. Super. 218, 226
(App. Div. 2007)). "[A]n appellate court should not modify a trial court's
determination either to commit or release an individual unless 'the record reveals
a clear mistake.'" Id. at 175 (quoting In re D.C., 146 N.J. 31, 58 (1996)). "The
appropriate inquiry is to canvass the significant amount of expert testimony in
A-3211-23 17 the record and determine whether the lower court['s] findings were clearly
erroneous." D.C., 146 N.J. at 58-59. As the fact finder, "[a] trial judge is 'not
required to accept all or any part of [an] expert opinion[,]'" but may "place[]
decisive weight on [the] expert." R.F., 217 N.J. at 156, 174. We undertake our
review of the judgment mindful the trial court had the "opportunity to hear and
see the witnesses and to have the 'feel' of the case, which a reviewing court
cannot enjoy." Id. at 174 (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964));
see also In re Civil Commitment of M.L.V., 388 N.J. Super. 454, 468 (App. Div.
2006).
We are satisfied the record supports the trial court's conclusion J.R. suffers
from antisocial personality disorder. Antisocial personality disorder alone is
sufficient to meet the requirements for commitment under the SVPA. See In re
Civil Commitment of A.Y., 458 N.J. Super. 147, 167 (App. Div. 2019). Based
on credible expert testimony, the judge determined J.R.'s disorder, past
behavior, and limited progress in sex offender treatment clearly and
convincingly proved he was, at the time of the hearing, highly likely to engage
in acts of sexual violence if released from civil commitment. The court's
decision, to which we owe the "utmost deference" and may modify only where
A-3211-23 18 there is a clear abuse of discretion, In re J.P., 339 N.J. Super. 443, 459 (App.
Div. 2001), was supported by the record.
The State's experts explained the factual bases for their opinions and the
correlation of those facts to J.R.'s clinical presentation and likelihood to sexually
reoffend. The experts relied on interviews with J.R., the details of his sexually
violent assault on D.W., his failure to sufficiently progress in sex offender
therapy, and extensive treatment notes to reach their opinions. The court
acknowledged J.R.'s progress in sex offender therapy but accepted the opinions
of the State's experts that he does not yet sufficiently understand his triggers and
offense cycle to employ an effective plan to prevent sexually reoffending if
released into the community.
We are not persuaded by J.R.'s arguments he was denied due process
during the hearing. We begin with J.R.'s contention the court mischaracterized
the nature of his stipulation with respect to prong two of the statute. The court
stated J.R. did not dispute he had a mental abnormality or personality disorder
that does not spontaneously remit and can only be mitigated by sex offender
treatment. J.R. argues, however, he disputed whether his disorder can only be
mitigated by treatment. In addition, although the court stated J.R. admitted his
A-3211-23 19 antisocial personality disorder caused him to have serious difficulty controlling
his behavior, J.R. argues he disputed that concept.
J.R. concedes that at the hearing his counsel stipulated prong two of the
statute had been met. He argues he intended the stipulation to be limited to his
diagnosis, confirmed by his own expert, that J.R. had antisocial personality
disorder. According to J.R., the court mistakenly interpreted his stipulation too
broadly. We reviewed the record and find no error warranting reversal.
The court's decision describes J.R.'s stipulation as a concession his
antisocial personality disorder does not spontaneously remit, affects him
cognitively, emotionally, or volitionally, and causes him to have serious
difficulty controlling his sexually violent behavior. However, the court did not
rely on that interpretation of the stipulation to conclude J.R. will remain
committed to the STU. Instead, the court analyzed the testimony of J.R.'s expert
that it is possible for a sex offender to refrain from committing a new sexual
offense without having fully benefitted from sex offender therapy and that J.R.
had amply demonstrated his ability to control his antisocial personality disorder
were he to be released from confinement.
The court made findings the expert's opinion was not credible and adopted
the testimony of the State's experts that J.R. had not advanced sufficiently
A-3211-23 20 through sex offender therapy to fully understand his triggers and sexual
offending cycle and was not, therefore, likely to refrain from committing a
sexual offense if released from the STU. Despite its description of the scope of
J.R.'s stipulation, the court undertook the necessary analysis of the evidence
admitted at the hearing before concluding the State had satisfied the three
statutory prongs necessary to continue J.R.'s commitment.
Nor do we find merit in J.R.'s argument the trial court subtly shifted the
burden of proof in its decision. According to J.R., "rather than being clearly
convinced that J.R. will reoffend if released, the [c]ourt instead found it wasn't
clearly convinced that he won't reoffend if released." In its decision, the trial
court repeatedly and correctly stated the State had the burden of proving by clear
and convincing evidence J.R. was highly likely to reoffend sexually if released
from commitment. The court applied that standard when it reached its
conclusion that the State had established J.R.'s continued commitment was
warranted. We detect nothing in the court's decision suggesting it shifted the
burden of proof to J.R. to establish he would not reoffend sexually if released.6
6 At the outset of its decision the court stated it was considering "the application of [J.R.] for release from a term of civil commitment," which suggests it viewed J.R. as having the burden to prove he should be released. However, the remainder of the court's decision makes clear it correctly applied the burden of
A-3211-23 21 To the extent we have not specifically addressed any of J.R.'s remaining
contentions, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a
written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
proof to the State. We also are not convinced the court considered the likelihood of J.R. committing any criminal offense, as opposed to the statutorily required sexual offense, when it decided he should remain committed to the STU. While the court did not use the term "sexually" every time it referred to reoffending, the record establishes the court applied the correct statutory criteria . A-3211-23 22