MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any Jun 19 2019, 10:16 am court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Valerie K. Boots Bryan H. Babb Marion County Public Defender Agency Sarah T. Parks Indianapolis, Indiana Bose McKinney & Evans, LLP Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Matter of the Civil June 19, 2019 Commitment of J.G., Court of Appeals Case No. Appellant-Respondent, 18A-MH-2763 Appeal from the Marion Superior v. Court The Honorable Steven R. Health & Hospital Corp. of Eichholtz, Judge Marion County d/b/a Eskenazi The Honorable Melanie Kendrick, Health/Midtown CMHC, Magistrate
Appellee-Petitioner Trial Court Cause No. 49D08-1810-MH-41440
Pyle, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-MH-2763 | June 19, 2019 Page 1 of 7 Statement of the Case [1] J.G. (“J.G.”) appeals the trial court’s order temporarily involuntarily
committing him to Eskenazi Health Midtown Community Mental Health
(“Eskenazi”) for a period not to exceed ninety days. He argues that there is
insufficient evidence to support the commitment. Finding sufficient evidence,
we affirm the temporary involuntary commitment.
[2] We affirm.1
Issue Whether there is sufficient evidence to support the commitment.
Facts The probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the commitment
reveal that in September 2018, J.G., who is a college graduate and who owns
his own painting company, was at his mother’s (“Mother”) house when he
suddenly fell backwards in a “fainting spell.” (Tr. at 24). “His eyes were open
but they were fluttering very fast. His hands were pale. And he couldn’t really
respond.” (Tr. at 26). Mother took J.G. to Community South Hospital, where
J.G. was diagnosed with depression and anxiety. After speaking with a doctor
1 We note that it is possible that J.G. has been discharged from the mental health facility, in which case this matter would be moot. Although we generally dismiss cases that are deemed to be moot, such cases may be decided on their merits where they involve questions of great public interest that are likely to recur. See Golub v. Giles, 814 N.E.2d 1034 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. The question of how persons subject to involuntary commitment are treated by our trial courts is one of great importance to society. Id. We will therefore address the issue in this case.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-MH-2763 | June 19, 2019 Page 2 of 7 from Community North Behavioral Health Center (“Community”), J.G. went
to that facility and stayed there for ten days. While at Community, J.G. “was
very paranoid” and refused treatment. (Tr. at 27). When J.G. was released
from Community, he was instructed to take an anti-psychotic medication for
thought disorders, but he failed to do so.
[3] Shortly thereafter, after an incident involving J.G., his mother, and a knife, J.G.
was admitted to Eskenazi’s mental health recovery unit. On October 11,
Eskenazi filed an Application for Emergency Detention wherein it alleged that
J.G. was “suffering from a psychiatric disorder.” (App. Vol. 2 at 11). The
petition further alleged that J.G. was “paranoid, picked up a knife, off meds, his
family is afraid of him, he has thoughts of hurting himself.” (App. Vol. 2 at 11).
Five days later, Eskenazi filed a report following emergency detention, which
alleged that J.G. was suffering from an unspecified psychosis.
[4] Two days later, the trial court held a commitment hearing wherein J.G.
stipulated to the expertise of Dr. Dana Hardin (“Dr. Hardin”), who is a
psychiatrist. Dr. Hardin testified that J.G. had been under her care for the
previous week, and that she had examined him every day since his admission to
Eskenazi. Dr. Hardin diagnosed J.G. with non-specified psychosis, which
“manifest[ed] itself as a thought disorder, inability to eat, inability to converse
on his behalf very well and not [] able to accept any type of care.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at
7). J.G. had refused to take medications, declined out-of-room activities, and
declined talk therapy. Dr. Hardin further testified that J.G. was “having trouble
processing simple thoughts. Just even questions and answers.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 7).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-MH-2763 | June 19, 2019 Page 3 of 7 [5] According to Dr. Hardin, the psychosis impaired J.G.’s ability to function day
to day, and he was having difficulty working at his painting business. (Tr. Vol.
2 at 8). Dr. Hardin also explained that she wanted to prescribe J.G.
Risperidone, which is an antipsychotic oral medication that works fairly
quickly. Once the Risperidone had stabilized J.G., Dr. Hardin wanted him to
participate in outpatient therapy and medication. She asked the trial court to
temporarily involuntary commit J.G. to Eskenazi for a minimal stay so that
J.G. “could function again back to his normal [] self.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 9). There
was no testimony that J.G. suffered from any physical condition or ailment.
[6] Following the hearing, the trial court issued an order finding that J.G. was
suffering from “Psychosis, Unspecified, which is a mental illness as defined in
I.C. 12-7-2-130[]” and committing him to Eskenazi. (App. Vol. 2 at 7). J.G.
appeals the commitment.
Decision [7] J.G. argues that there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s order
temporarily involuntarily committing him to the care of Eskenazi. Specifically,
his sole contention is that there is insufficient evidence to support the trial
court’s finding that he suffers from mental illness.
[8] The purpose of civil commitment proceedings is to protect the public and to
ensure the rights of the person whose liberty is at stake. Civil Commitment of
T.K. v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 27 N.E.3d 271, 273 (Ind. 2015). Given the
liberty interest at stake, the serious stigma involved, and the adverse social
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-MH-2763 | June 19, 2019 Page 4 of 7 consequences that accompany such physical confinement, a proceeding for an
involuntary civil commitment is subject to due process requirements. Id. In
order to protect the due process rights of a person subject to commitment, the
facts justifying an involuntary commitment must be shown by clear and
convincing evidence. Id.
[9] This standard of proof communicates the relative importance our legal system
attaches to a decision ordering an involuntary commitment, and it also has the
function of reducing the likelihood of inappropriate commitments. P.B. v.
Evansville State Hosp., 90 N.E.3d 1199, 1202 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). When we
review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting an involuntary civil
commitment, we will affirm if, after considering the probative evidence and
reasonable inferences supporting the decision, a reasonable trier of fact could
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MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any Jun 19 2019, 10:16 am court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Valerie K. Boots Bryan H. Babb Marion County Public Defender Agency Sarah T. Parks Indianapolis, Indiana Bose McKinney & Evans, LLP Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Matter of the Civil June 19, 2019 Commitment of J.G., Court of Appeals Case No. Appellant-Respondent, 18A-MH-2763 Appeal from the Marion Superior v. Court The Honorable Steven R. Health & Hospital Corp. of Eichholtz, Judge Marion County d/b/a Eskenazi The Honorable Melanie Kendrick, Health/Midtown CMHC, Magistrate
Appellee-Petitioner Trial Court Cause No. 49D08-1810-MH-41440
Pyle, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-MH-2763 | June 19, 2019 Page 1 of 7 Statement of the Case [1] J.G. (“J.G.”) appeals the trial court’s order temporarily involuntarily
committing him to Eskenazi Health Midtown Community Mental Health
(“Eskenazi”) for a period not to exceed ninety days. He argues that there is
insufficient evidence to support the commitment. Finding sufficient evidence,
we affirm the temporary involuntary commitment.
[2] We affirm.1
Issue Whether there is sufficient evidence to support the commitment.
Facts The probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the commitment
reveal that in September 2018, J.G., who is a college graduate and who owns
his own painting company, was at his mother’s (“Mother”) house when he
suddenly fell backwards in a “fainting spell.” (Tr. at 24). “His eyes were open
but they were fluttering very fast. His hands were pale. And he couldn’t really
respond.” (Tr. at 26). Mother took J.G. to Community South Hospital, where
J.G. was diagnosed with depression and anxiety. After speaking with a doctor
1 We note that it is possible that J.G. has been discharged from the mental health facility, in which case this matter would be moot. Although we generally dismiss cases that are deemed to be moot, such cases may be decided on their merits where they involve questions of great public interest that are likely to recur. See Golub v. Giles, 814 N.E.2d 1034 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. The question of how persons subject to involuntary commitment are treated by our trial courts is one of great importance to society. Id. We will therefore address the issue in this case.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-MH-2763 | June 19, 2019 Page 2 of 7 from Community North Behavioral Health Center (“Community”), J.G. went
to that facility and stayed there for ten days. While at Community, J.G. “was
very paranoid” and refused treatment. (Tr. at 27). When J.G. was released
from Community, he was instructed to take an anti-psychotic medication for
thought disorders, but he failed to do so.
[3] Shortly thereafter, after an incident involving J.G., his mother, and a knife, J.G.
was admitted to Eskenazi’s mental health recovery unit. On October 11,
Eskenazi filed an Application for Emergency Detention wherein it alleged that
J.G. was “suffering from a psychiatric disorder.” (App. Vol. 2 at 11). The
petition further alleged that J.G. was “paranoid, picked up a knife, off meds, his
family is afraid of him, he has thoughts of hurting himself.” (App. Vol. 2 at 11).
Five days later, Eskenazi filed a report following emergency detention, which
alleged that J.G. was suffering from an unspecified psychosis.
[4] Two days later, the trial court held a commitment hearing wherein J.G.
stipulated to the expertise of Dr. Dana Hardin (“Dr. Hardin”), who is a
psychiatrist. Dr. Hardin testified that J.G. had been under her care for the
previous week, and that she had examined him every day since his admission to
Eskenazi. Dr. Hardin diagnosed J.G. with non-specified psychosis, which
“manifest[ed] itself as a thought disorder, inability to eat, inability to converse
on his behalf very well and not [] able to accept any type of care.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at
7). J.G. had refused to take medications, declined out-of-room activities, and
declined talk therapy. Dr. Hardin further testified that J.G. was “having trouble
processing simple thoughts. Just even questions and answers.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 7).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-MH-2763 | June 19, 2019 Page 3 of 7 [5] According to Dr. Hardin, the psychosis impaired J.G.’s ability to function day
to day, and he was having difficulty working at his painting business. (Tr. Vol.
2 at 8). Dr. Hardin also explained that she wanted to prescribe J.G.
Risperidone, which is an antipsychotic oral medication that works fairly
quickly. Once the Risperidone had stabilized J.G., Dr. Hardin wanted him to
participate in outpatient therapy and medication. She asked the trial court to
temporarily involuntary commit J.G. to Eskenazi for a minimal stay so that
J.G. “could function again back to his normal [] self.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 9). There
was no testimony that J.G. suffered from any physical condition or ailment.
[6] Following the hearing, the trial court issued an order finding that J.G. was
suffering from “Psychosis, Unspecified, which is a mental illness as defined in
I.C. 12-7-2-130[]” and committing him to Eskenazi. (App. Vol. 2 at 7). J.G.
appeals the commitment.
Decision [7] J.G. argues that there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s order
temporarily involuntarily committing him to the care of Eskenazi. Specifically,
his sole contention is that there is insufficient evidence to support the trial
court’s finding that he suffers from mental illness.
[8] The purpose of civil commitment proceedings is to protect the public and to
ensure the rights of the person whose liberty is at stake. Civil Commitment of
T.K. v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 27 N.E.3d 271, 273 (Ind. 2015). Given the
liberty interest at stake, the serious stigma involved, and the adverse social
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-MH-2763 | June 19, 2019 Page 4 of 7 consequences that accompany such physical confinement, a proceeding for an
involuntary civil commitment is subject to due process requirements. Id. In
order to protect the due process rights of a person subject to commitment, the
facts justifying an involuntary commitment must be shown by clear and
convincing evidence. Id.
[9] This standard of proof communicates the relative importance our legal system
attaches to a decision ordering an involuntary commitment, and it also has the
function of reducing the likelihood of inappropriate commitments. P.B. v.
Evansville State Hosp., 90 N.E.3d 1199, 1202 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). When we
review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting an involuntary civil
commitment, we will affirm if, after considering the probative evidence and
reasonable inferences supporting the decision, a reasonable trier of fact could
have found the necessary elements proven by clear and convincing evidence.
Id. We do not reweigh the evidence, nor do we judge witness credibility. Id.
[10] “An individual who is alleged to be mentally ill and either dangerous or gravely
disabled may be committed to a facility for not more than ninety (90) days.”
IND. CODE § 12-26-6-1. Mental illness is defined as “a psychiatric disorder that
[] substantially disturbs an individual’s thinking, feeling, or behavior; and []
impairs the individual’s ability to function. The term includes mental
retardation, alcoholism, and addiction to narcotics or dangerous drugs.”
IND.CODE § 12-7-2-130 (emphasis added).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-MH-2763 | June 19, 2019 Page 5 of 7 [11] Here, at the commitment hearing, J.G. stipulated to the expertise of Dr.
Hardin, who was his treating psychiatrist. Dr. Hardin testified that J.G. had
been under her care for the previous week and that she had examined him every
day since his admission to Eskenazi. Dr. Hardin diagnosed J.G. with non-
specified psychosis, which “manifest[ed] itself as a thought disorder, inability to
eat, inability to converse on his behalf very well and not [] able to accept any
type of care.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 7). J.G. had refused to take medications, declined
out-of-room activities, declined talk therapy, and was “having trouble
processing simple thoughts. Just even questions and answers.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 7).
According to Dr. Hardin, the psychosis impaired J.G.’s ability to function day
to day. Dr. Hardin also explained that she wanted to prescribe J.G.
Risperidone, which is an antipsychotic oral medication, to stabilize him. There
was no testimony that J.G. suffered from any physical condition or ailment.
[12] From this evidence, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that there
was clear and convincing evidence that J.D. was mentally ill as defined by
INDIANA CODE § 12-7-2-130 because he had a psychiatric disorder, psychosis,
which was substantially disturbing his thinking, feeling, and behavior. There is
sufficient evidence to support J.G.’s temporary involuntary commitment, and
we affirm the trial court’s order.2
2 J.G. is correct that “Indiana’s involuntary commitment statutes may not be used to force an adult who is not mentally ill to accept medical treatment.” (J.G.’s Br. at 8). However, his argument that “the evidence indicated that [he] suffered from a physical illness rather than a mental illness” is an invitation for this Court to reweigh the evidence. (J.G.’s Br. at 9). This we cannot do. See P.B., 90 N.E.3d at 1202.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-MH-2763 | June 19, 2019 Page 6 of 7 [13] Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Bailey, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-MH-2763 | June 19, 2019 Page 7 of 7