This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A23-0810
In the Matter of the Appeal of the Termination of Angela Gibson’s lease under the Family Affordable Housing Program and her Project Based Voucher Rent Assistance.
Filed May 13, 2024 Affirmed Kirk, Judge *
Metropolitan Housing and Redevelopment Authority
Angela Gibson, Coon Rapids, Minnesota (pro se relator)
Mary G. Dobbins, Landrum Dobbins, L.L.C., Edina, Minnesota (for respondent agency)
Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
KIRK, Judge
In this certiorari appeal, relator challenges the termination of her Section 8 rental
assistance and lease. Because the termination is supported by substantial evidence and
relator does not identify procedural defects in the proceedings upholding the termination,
we affirm.
* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. FACTS
Relator Angela Gibson contests the termination of her Section 8 rental assistance
and lease by respondent Metropolitan Housing and Redevelopment Authority (Metro
HRA). Since December 2015, Gibson has leased one of Metro HRA’s units, receiving
rental assistance. Under the lease, Gibson’s tenant obligations included “permit[ing] the
Property Manager, the Owner, and repair and maintenance personnel reasonable access to
the Dwelling Unit . . . for the purpose of: performing repair or maintenance work or making
necessary improvements.” The lease provided that it could be terminated should the tenant
fail to fulfill tenant obligations. Gibson also signed a statement of responsibilities for rental
assistance, which provided that her rental assistance would be terminated if she “committed
any serious or repeated lease violations.”
During her lease, Gibson had a contentious relationship with Metro HRA related to
the maintenance of her unit. Some of the issues included Gibson’s many maintenance and
appliance-replacement requests, refusals to allow access to her unit to complete repairs or
maintenance, negativity towards contractors and vendors, and a rent escrow action.
The final incident triggering the termination of Gibson’s lease and rental assistance
related to Gibson’s refusal to allow access to her unit to replace a furnace. Gibson’s furnace
stopped working on January 20, 2023, around 10 p.m., requiring an emergency, temporary
repair. Metro HRA sought to replace the furnace on January 26 and 27. Gibson, however,
refused to allow access to the unit to install the new furnace. Gibson informed Metro HRA
that she would not allow access to install the furnace—a process that would take about four
to six hours—unless Metro HRA paid for her to stay in a hotel.
2 On January 30, Metro HRA told Gibson that it would not pay for a hotel during the
replacement of the furnace and attempted to schedule a date for the installation. Gibson
again refused to cooperate with scheduling a day to replace the furnace or allow access to
her unit. The next day, Metro HRA sent Gibson a notice that she had violated the section
of her lease requiring reasonable access to her unit. Gibson continued to refuse access to
complete the installation of the furnace.
On February 10, Metro HRA sent Gibson a letter stating that the furnace
replacement was scheduled for February 15 at 9:00 a.m. The letter stated that “[r]eliable
heating is an absolute necessity in winter in Minnesota for comfort, safety, and the
protection of property” and that, if she did not permit the installation, her lease would be
terminated. Gibson refused to allow access to her unit on February 15.
Metro HRA terminated Gibson’s rental assistance and lease because of her failure
to allow reasonable access to her unit to make repairs. Gibson requested an informal
hearing to challenge the termination of her rental assistance and lease. Prior to the hearing,
Metro HRA emailed Gibson its exhibits. Gibson failed to timely submit her exhibits to
Metro HRA.
At the April 20 virtual hearing, Gibson alleged that the termination of her rental
assistance and lease was retaliation for a rent escrow action that she filed against Metro
HRA. She did not dispute that she prevented Metro HRA from accessing her unit to install
the furnace or that she previously prevented Metro HRA from accessing her unit to
complete repairs.
3 Two days later, the hearing officer issued an order upholding the termination of
Gibson’s rental assistance and lease. The hearing officer determined that Metro HRA met
its burden to show that Gibson violated her lease by failing to allow reasonable access for
repairs on multiple occasions. The hearing officer also reviewed Gibson’s untimely
exhibits and found that Gibson was not prejudiced by their exclusion.
Gibson requested reconsideration of the decision based on the exhibits she
submitted. Metro HRA also requested that the hearing be reopened to allow additional
testimony. At an in-person hearing on May 11, the hearing officer informed Gibson that,
based on both parties’ requests, the hearing would be reopened to allow the submission of
additional evidence and hear additional testimony. Gibson said that she wanted only
reconsideration of her submitted exhibits and left the hearing early.
Following the hearing, the hearing officer issued an order denying Gibson’s request
to reconsider her exhibits. The hearing officer affirmed that Metro HRA met its burden to
prove that Gibson failed to allow reasonable access to her unit to perform maintenance and
repairs on multiple occasions and found that Metro HRA did not terminate her benefits or
lease in retaliation for Gibson’s rent escrow actions.
Gibson appeals by writ of certiorari.
DECISION
Gibson argues that the hearing officer erred in upholding Metro HRA’s decision to
terminate her rental assistance and lease. When a public housing authority receives
evidence, hears testimony, and makes a decision, it acts in a quasi-judicial capacity. Carter
v. Olmsted Cnty. Hous. & Redev. Auth., 574 N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. App. 1998). Our
4 review of a quasi-judicial decision not subject to the Minnesota Administrative Procedure
Act is limited to questions affecting jurisdiction, the regularity of the proceedings, and
whether the decision “was arbitrary, oppressive, unreasonable, fraudulent, under an
erroneous theory of law, or without any evidence to support it.” Dietz v. Dodge County,
487 N.W.2d 237, 239 (Minn. 1992) (quotation omitted). We will uphold a housing
authority’s decision unless it is “unconstitutional, outside the agency’s jurisdiction,
procedurally defective, based on an erroneous legal theory, unsupported by substantial
evidence, or arbitrary and capricious.” Wilhite v. Scott Cnty. Hous. & Redev. Auth., 759
N.W.2d 252, 255 (Minn. App. 2009) (quotation omitted). “We examine the findings to
determine whether they support the decision but do not retry facts or challenge the
credibility determinations of the agency.” Id.
Under the applicable federal regulations, Metro HRA could terminate Gibson’s
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This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A23-0810
In the Matter of the Appeal of the Termination of Angela Gibson’s lease under the Family Affordable Housing Program and her Project Based Voucher Rent Assistance.
Filed May 13, 2024 Affirmed Kirk, Judge *
Metropolitan Housing and Redevelopment Authority
Angela Gibson, Coon Rapids, Minnesota (pro se relator)
Mary G. Dobbins, Landrum Dobbins, L.L.C., Edina, Minnesota (for respondent agency)
Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
KIRK, Judge
In this certiorari appeal, relator challenges the termination of her Section 8 rental
assistance and lease. Because the termination is supported by substantial evidence and
relator does not identify procedural defects in the proceedings upholding the termination,
we affirm.
* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. FACTS
Relator Angela Gibson contests the termination of her Section 8 rental assistance
and lease by respondent Metropolitan Housing and Redevelopment Authority (Metro
HRA). Since December 2015, Gibson has leased one of Metro HRA’s units, receiving
rental assistance. Under the lease, Gibson’s tenant obligations included “permit[ing] the
Property Manager, the Owner, and repair and maintenance personnel reasonable access to
the Dwelling Unit . . . for the purpose of: performing repair or maintenance work or making
necessary improvements.” The lease provided that it could be terminated should the tenant
fail to fulfill tenant obligations. Gibson also signed a statement of responsibilities for rental
assistance, which provided that her rental assistance would be terminated if she “committed
any serious or repeated lease violations.”
During her lease, Gibson had a contentious relationship with Metro HRA related to
the maintenance of her unit. Some of the issues included Gibson’s many maintenance and
appliance-replacement requests, refusals to allow access to her unit to complete repairs or
maintenance, negativity towards contractors and vendors, and a rent escrow action.
The final incident triggering the termination of Gibson’s lease and rental assistance
related to Gibson’s refusal to allow access to her unit to replace a furnace. Gibson’s furnace
stopped working on January 20, 2023, around 10 p.m., requiring an emergency, temporary
repair. Metro HRA sought to replace the furnace on January 26 and 27. Gibson, however,
refused to allow access to the unit to install the new furnace. Gibson informed Metro HRA
that she would not allow access to install the furnace—a process that would take about four
to six hours—unless Metro HRA paid for her to stay in a hotel.
2 On January 30, Metro HRA told Gibson that it would not pay for a hotel during the
replacement of the furnace and attempted to schedule a date for the installation. Gibson
again refused to cooperate with scheduling a day to replace the furnace or allow access to
her unit. The next day, Metro HRA sent Gibson a notice that she had violated the section
of her lease requiring reasonable access to her unit. Gibson continued to refuse access to
complete the installation of the furnace.
On February 10, Metro HRA sent Gibson a letter stating that the furnace
replacement was scheduled for February 15 at 9:00 a.m. The letter stated that “[r]eliable
heating is an absolute necessity in winter in Minnesota for comfort, safety, and the
protection of property” and that, if she did not permit the installation, her lease would be
terminated. Gibson refused to allow access to her unit on February 15.
Metro HRA terminated Gibson’s rental assistance and lease because of her failure
to allow reasonable access to her unit to make repairs. Gibson requested an informal
hearing to challenge the termination of her rental assistance and lease. Prior to the hearing,
Metro HRA emailed Gibson its exhibits. Gibson failed to timely submit her exhibits to
Metro HRA.
At the April 20 virtual hearing, Gibson alleged that the termination of her rental
assistance and lease was retaliation for a rent escrow action that she filed against Metro
HRA. She did not dispute that she prevented Metro HRA from accessing her unit to install
the furnace or that she previously prevented Metro HRA from accessing her unit to
complete repairs.
3 Two days later, the hearing officer issued an order upholding the termination of
Gibson’s rental assistance and lease. The hearing officer determined that Metro HRA met
its burden to show that Gibson violated her lease by failing to allow reasonable access for
repairs on multiple occasions. The hearing officer also reviewed Gibson’s untimely
exhibits and found that Gibson was not prejudiced by their exclusion.
Gibson requested reconsideration of the decision based on the exhibits she
submitted. Metro HRA also requested that the hearing be reopened to allow additional
testimony. At an in-person hearing on May 11, the hearing officer informed Gibson that,
based on both parties’ requests, the hearing would be reopened to allow the submission of
additional evidence and hear additional testimony. Gibson said that she wanted only
reconsideration of her submitted exhibits and left the hearing early.
Following the hearing, the hearing officer issued an order denying Gibson’s request
to reconsider her exhibits. The hearing officer affirmed that Metro HRA met its burden to
prove that Gibson failed to allow reasonable access to her unit to perform maintenance and
repairs on multiple occasions and found that Metro HRA did not terminate her benefits or
lease in retaliation for Gibson’s rent escrow actions.
Gibson appeals by writ of certiorari.
DECISION
Gibson argues that the hearing officer erred in upholding Metro HRA’s decision to
terminate her rental assistance and lease. When a public housing authority receives
evidence, hears testimony, and makes a decision, it acts in a quasi-judicial capacity. Carter
v. Olmsted Cnty. Hous. & Redev. Auth., 574 N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. App. 1998). Our
4 review of a quasi-judicial decision not subject to the Minnesota Administrative Procedure
Act is limited to questions affecting jurisdiction, the regularity of the proceedings, and
whether the decision “was arbitrary, oppressive, unreasonable, fraudulent, under an
erroneous theory of law, or without any evidence to support it.” Dietz v. Dodge County,
487 N.W.2d 237, 239 (Minn. 1992) (quotation omitted). We will uphold a housing
authority’s decision unless it is “unconstitutional, outside the agency’s jurisdiction,
procedurally defective, based on an erroneous legal theory, unsupported by substantial
evidence, or arbitrary and capricious.” Wilhite v. Scott Cnty. Hous. & Redev. Auth., 759
N.W.2d 252, 255 (Minn. App. 2009) (quotation omitted). “We examine the findings to
determine whether they support the decision but do not retry facts or challenge the
credibility determinations of the agency.” Id.
Under the applicable federal regulations, Metro HRA could terminate Gibson’s
lease and Section 8 rental assistance if she committed serious or repeated violations of her
lease. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.551(e), .552 (2022) (termination of rental assistance);
Fairmont Hous. & Redev. Auth. v. Winter, 969 N.W.2d 839, 849 (Minn. App. 2021)
(termination of lease). The hearing officer found that Gibson committed serious or repeated
lease violations by refusing to allow access to her unit for repairs and maintenance on
multiple occasions.
Gibson first asserts that the record does not suggest she “hindered access with
repairs,” and thus argues that the hearing officer’s findings were unsupported by substantial
evidence. “[A] substantial-evidence analysis requires us to determine whether the agency
has adequately explained how it derived its conclusion and whether that conclusion is
5 reasonable on the basis of the record.” In re NorthMet Project Permit to Mine Application
Dated Dec. 2017, 959 N.W.2d 731, 749 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). And “if the
ruling by the agency decision-maker is supported by substantial evidence, it must be
affirmed.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Contrary to Gibson’s assertion, the record contains extensive documentation
supporting the hearing officer’s finding that Gibson refused to allow reasonable access to
her unit on multiple occasions. Both Metro HRA and the vendor attempted to schedule a
time to install the furnace on multiple days, and Gibson refused to cooperate with
scheduling or allow access to her unit. And the Metro HRA director testified that “[t]he
installation of a new furnace is a reasonable and necessary repair,” that it was “particularly
urgent” because the current furnace might fail during winter, and “[a] failure of a furnace
could cause significant damage to the structure and the unit.” Metro HRA also submitted
documentation about Gibson’s prior refusals to allow access to her unit to complete repairs,
including refusing to allow access to repair a significant leak. Although Gibson asserts that
Metro HRA’s termination was instead retaliation for her rent escrow action, such an
inference would require this court to reweigh the evidence and ignore the hearing officer’s
credibility determination. We may not do so. See Wilhite, 759 N.W.2d at 255. We therefore
conclude that substantial evidence supported the hearing officer’s decision to affirm the
termination of Gibson’s lease and rental assistance.
Finally, Gibson contends that the termination was procedurally defective because
the hearing officer should have rescheduled the virtual hearing for an in-person hearing
and Gibson did not have enough time to review the evidence. But the federal regulations
6 governing informal hearings do not require that a hearing be conducted in person, see 24
C.F.R. § 982.555(a)(1)(iv) (2022), and there is no record that Gibson objected to the virtual
meeting or requested an in-person hearing. Likewise, the regulations required that Gibson
“be given the opportunity to examine” any documents prior to the hearing, see id. (e)(2)(i)
(2022), and Metro HRA emailed its exhibits to her on April 4—well before the April 20
hearing. Then, during the April 20 virtual hearing, Gibson acknowledged she received
Metro HRA’s evidence and questioned the Metro HRA director. And when the hearing
officer held an in-person hearing following Gibson’s and Metro HRA’s requests, Gibson
declined to provide additional evidence or testimony and left the hearing early. We discern
no procedural defects related to the termination of Gibson’s lease and rental assistance.
Affirmed.