In the Matter of: S.L.J.V., a Minor
This text of In the Matter of: S.L.J.V., a Minor (In the Matter of: S.L.J.V., a Minor) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
J-S08001-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE MATTER OF: S.L.J.V., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: L.M.J., MOTHER : : : : : No. 1373 MDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered August 25, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Orphans' Court at No(s): 30-AD-2022
IN THE MATTER OF: C.R.J., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : APPEAL OF: L.M.J., MOTHER : : : : : : No. 1374 MDA 2022
Appeal from the Decree Entered August 25, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Orphans' Court at No(s): 29-AD-2022
IN THE MATTER OF: J.E.H.J., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: L.M.J., MOTHER : : : : : No. 1375 MDA 2022
Appeal from the Decree Entered August 25, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Orphans' Court at No(s): 28-AD-2022 J-S08001-23
BEFORE: OLSON, J., McCAFFERY, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J. FILED: MAY 19, 2023
L.M.J., (“Mother”), appeals from the decrees entered August 25, 2022,
that involuntarily terminated her parental rights to her dependent children,
S.L.J.V., C.R.J., and J.E.H.J. (collectively, the “Children”). Mother’s rights
were terminated pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A § 2511(a)(1), (2),
(5), (8), and (b). We affirm.
On March 31, 2022, the Dauphin County Social Services for Children and
Youth filed petitions to involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental rights to the
Children. Upon motion, the trial court appointed Jeffrey C. Clark, Esquire, to
serve as guardian ad litem for the Children.1 On July 26, 2022, and August
25, 2022, the trial court held hearings on the termination petitions. Mother
was represented by counsel during each hearing. Thereafter, on August 25,
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 On April 7, 2022, for each of the Children, Attorney Clark filed motions to appoint guardian ad litem as counsel for purposes of involuntary termination of parental rights proceedings. Motions to Appoint Guardian ad Litem, 4/7/22, at 1-2. In each motion, Attorney Clark averred that he was “able to represent both the best interest[s] and legal interests of the [Children] in the involuntary termination of parental rights proceedings, as no conflict exists.” Id. at 2. The trial court granted Attorney Clark’s motion and appointed him as counsel for each of the Children during the involuntary termination of parental rights proceedings. See Trial Court Orders, 4/11/22, at 1. Upon doing so, we conclude that the trial court implicitly found that there was no conflict of interest with Attorney Clark serving as both guardian ad litem and the Children’s legal counsel in accordance with In re Adoption of K.M.G., 240 A.3d 1218, 1236 (Pa. Super. 2020).
-2- J-S08001-23
2022, the trial court entered decrees terminating Mother’s parental rights to
the Children under Section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b).2
On September 23, 2022, Mother, through new counsel, timely filed her
notices of appeal from the trial court's decrees involuntarily terminating her
parental rights, and her concise statement of errors complained of on appeal,
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).3
Mother raises the following issue on appeal:
Did the trial court abuse its discretion, or commit an error of law by determining it was in the [C]hildren’s best interest to have Mother’s parental rights terminated[?]
Mother’s Brief at 7.
We review this appeal in accordance with the following standard:
[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard when considering a trial court's determination of a petition for termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, ____________________________________________
2 That same day, the trial court also entered separate decrees involuntarily terminating the parental rights of J.E.H.J.’s unknown father, and M.V., the father of S.L.J.V. and C.R.J. pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A § 2511(a)(1), (2), (4) and (b). See Trial Court Orders, 8/25/22, at 1. The decrees entered in the cases involving S.L.J.V. and C.R.J. indicate that the parental rights of these children’s “unknown father” were terminated. However, there is no dispute the M.V. is the father of S.L.J.V. and C.R.J. and his rights were expressly terminated by the decrees entered on August 5, 2022. The fathers have not appealed the trial court’s termination decrees and are not parties to this appeal.
3 In accordance with the decision of our Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018), Mother filed three separate notices of appeal at each relevant trial court docket.
-3- J-S08001-23
1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. Id.; R.I.S., [36 A.3d 567, 572 (Pa. 2011) (plurality opinion)]. As has been often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion. Id.; see also Samuel Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc., 34 A.3d 1, 51 (Pa. 2011); Christianson v. Ely, 838 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa. 2003). Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.
As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190. Therefore, even where the facts could support an opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the record and the court's legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of Atencio, 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994).
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826–827 (Pa. 2012).
We have carefully reviewed the certified record, the submissions of the
parties, the detailed opinion of the trial court, and the pertinent case law. Our
review of the record demonstrates that there is sufficient, competent evidence
in the record that supports the trial court's factual and legal determinations.
Thus, we will not disturb the trial court's decision. In re Adoption of S.P.,
47 A.3d at 826-827. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's decrees
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