300 Ga. 648 FINAL COPY
S17Y0668. IN THE MATTER OF SHANNON BRILEY-HOLMES.
PER CURIAM.
This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the petition for voluntary
discipline filed by Respondent Shannon Briley-Holmes (State Bar No. 447679),
before the filing of a formal complaint by the State Bar, see Bar Rule 4-227 (b)
(2). Briley-Holmes, who became a member of the Bar in 2010, seeks the
imposition of a one-year suspension with conditions for reinstatement for her
admitted violations of Rules 1.3, 1.4, and 1.16 (d) of the Georgia Rules of
Professional Conduct, see Bar Rule 4-102 (d), related to her conduct in the
course of representation of seven clients — two of which have been considered
by the State Disciplinary Board (“SDB”) for probable cause determination.
In her petition, Briley-Holmes admits with regard to SDB Docket No.
6844 that on or around June 2013, she agreed to represent a client, whom she
met through her previous employment, pro bono in a civil service appeal
challenging his dismissal from the Atlanta Police Department. She admits that
she was unsuccessful in the appeal process and agreed to pursue the next step, a petition for writ of certiorari to the Superior Court, but that she failed to file
the petition before leaving on vacation; she instructed the client on how to file
the petition, but mistakenly calendared the deadline after it had expired, and, as
a result, the court dismissed the petition with prejudice. Briley-Holmes further
admits that the client then paid her $2,000 to pursue an appeal to this Court, and
she filed the notice of appeal and began work on it, but the representation ended
before anything else was filed. Finally, she admits, that while the civil service
matter was pending, the client’s “P.O.S.T. certification” was revoked; she
agreed to represent him in an effort to restore the certification for a fee of $750,
plus filing fees; he paid approximately $600, and she filed the paperwork
necessary to obtain a hearing, including a filing fee of $150; the client requested
that she accept payment of the balance he owed on the certification process from
the $2,000 he had paid for the civil service case, but she declined; and the
P.O.S.T. case was ultimately dismissed after they missed a hearing on the
matter. She admits that she violated Rule 1.3 by failing to timely perfect the
client’s petition for writ of certiorari, causing it to be dismissed with prejudice,
and for missing a scheduled hearing in the P.O.S.T. case and causing it to be
dismissed, although she notes that she was able to get the P.O.S.T. case
2 reinstated before the client ended her representation.
As to SDB Docket No. 6814, Briley-Holmes admits that a client contacted
her in November 2015 about possible representation to petition what the client
believed was an unwarranted disciplinary action proposed to be taken against
her son by his high school. Briley-Holmes admits that the client paid her a
$3,000 flat fee; she then contacted the school and executed a Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Act, 20 USC § 1232g (FERPA) release of information form
as directed by the school’s counsel; the client raised specific concerns about her
son’s circumstances with her on more than one occasion, but Briley-Holmes told
her that there was little she could do until the information she had requested in
the FERPA form was sent to her; the client terminated her representation soon
thereafter; and Briley-Holmes failed to give the client any refund upon being
discharged. She admits that she violated Rule 1.16 when, after being terminated,
she failed to return the fees paid that she had not earned.
Next, Briley-Holmes admits that in June 2015 the family of a client paid
$1,500 of the agreed upon flat fee of $2,500 for representation in a criminal case
by her and co-counsel; she promptly visited the client in prison to discuss his
case and filed an entry of appearance and preliminary motions, but after that she
3 never visited him again, and she had great difficulty communicating with his
family because they did not speak English; she attended the first calendar call
of the case, and co-counsel was supposed to attend the second calendar call but
failed to do so and did not inform her or the court in advance; and, after the fifth
missed court date, the client’s family terminated their representation. Briley-
Holmes asserts that, at the time, her law partner, who has since been disbarred,1
had begun acting in an irrational and destructive manner, including cutting off
her cell phone, which was on a business plan with their firm, and terminating her
access to their online case management database, making it difficult to
communicate with the client and his family. Briley-Holmes admits that she
violated Rule 1.3 when she failed to attend scheduled court appearances and
failed to ensure that all necessary actions in the client’s case were taken either
by her or co-counsel.
In addition, Briley-Holmes admits that in June 2015, a client paid her
$750 to represent him in pre-warrant issuance matters and to attend a pre-
warrant issuance hearing (although she later discovered that there was no
1 See In the Matter of Wright, 299 Ga. 139 (786 SE2d 686) (2016).
4 hearing). Briley-Holmes admits that she advised the client of his Fifth
Amendment right to silence and asked him to not make any statements to law
enforcement without her being present, but failed to communicate with him
about the risks of not arranging for an interview with law enforcement. She
admits that she attempted to reach the detective (and she understands he tried to
reach her as well), but she did not follow through and arrange an interview, and
the client ultimately was arrested because he failed to arrange an interview
voluntarily. She further admits that she immediately filed an entry of appearance
on his behalf, a motion for bond, and all preliminary motions associated with
representation in a criminal case, even though it was outside her original scope
of representation, but when she attended the bond hearing, it was made clear to
her that her client had hired new counsel. Briley-Holmes admits that she
violated Rule 1.3 by failing to arrange an interview with law enforcement,
causing her client’s arrest and a period of incarceration, and that she violated
Rule 1.4 when she failed to communicate with him about the risks of not
arranging for an interview with law enforcement.
Briley-Holmes further admits that in September 2015, she received a
$1,500 retainer to represent a client in obtaining a temporary protective order
5 (TPO) and divorce; she prepared the initiating documents, attended the TPO
hearing and obtained the TPO; a future hearing was then set on whether to
convert the TPO to a 12-month order; and she then worked out an oral
agreement with opposing counsel whereby his client would consent to a 12-
month order. Briley-Holmes admits that she notified her client of the agreement
and its terms and told her it was unnecessary to attend the hearing on the TPO,
but she did not notify the court that an agreement had been reached because
opposing counsel informed her that his client would submit it to the court. She
further admits that she followed up by e-mail with opposing counsel to ensure
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300 Ga. 648 FINAL COPY
S17Y0668. IN THE MATTER OF SHANNON BRILEY-HOLMES.
PER CURIAM.
This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the petition for voluntary
discipline filed by Respondent Shannon Briley-Holmes (State Bar No. 447679),
before the filing of a formal complaint by the State Bar, see Bar Rule 4-227 (b)
(2). Briley-Holmes, who became a member of the Bar in 2010, seeks the
imposition of a one-year suspension with conditions for reinstatement for her
admitted violations of Rules 1.3, 1.4, and 1.16 (d) of the Georgia Rules of
Professional Conduct, see Bar Rule 4-102 (d), related to her conduct in the
course of representation of seven clients — two of which have been considered
by the State Disciplinary Board (“SDB”) for probable cause determination.
In her petition, Briley-Holmes admits with regard to SDB Docket No.
6844 that on or around June 2013, she agreed to represent a client, whom she
met through her previous employment, pro bono in a civil service appeal
challenging his dismissal from the Atlanta Police Department. She admits that
she was unsuccessful in the appeal process and agreed to pursue the next step, a petition for writ of certiorari to the Superior Court, but that she failed to file
the petition before leaving on vacation; she instructed the client on how to file
the petition, but mistakenly calendared the deadline after it had expired, and, as
a result, the court dismissed the petition with prejudice. Briley-Holmes further
admits that the client then paid her $2,000 to pursue an appeal to this Court, and
she filed the notice of appeal and began work on it, but the representation ended
before anything else was filed. Finally, she admits, that while the civil service
matter was pending, the client’s “P.O.S.T. certification” was revoked; she
agreed to represent him in an effort to restore the certification for a fee of $750,
plus filing fees; he paid approximately $600, and she filed the paperwork
necessary to obtain a hearing, including a filing fee of $150; the client requested
that she accept payment of the balance he owed on the certification process from
the $2,000 he had paid for the civil service case, but she declined; and the
P.O.S.T. case was ultimately dismissed after they missed a hearing on the
matter. She admits that she violated Rule 1.3 by failing to timely perfect the
client’s petition for writ of certiorari, causing it to be dismissed with prejudice,
and for missing a scheduled hearing in the P.O.S.T. case and causing it to be
dismissed, although she notes that she was able to get the P.O.S.T. case
2 reinstated before the client ended her representation.
As to SDB Docket No. 6814, Briley-Holmes admits that a client contacted
her in November 2015 about possible representation to petition what the client
believed was an unwarranted disciplinary action proposed to be taken against
her son by his high school. Briley-Holmes admits that the client paid her a
$3,000 flat fee; she then contacted the school and executed a Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Act, 20 USC § 1232g (FERPA) release of information form
as directed by the school’s counsel; the client raised specific concerns about her
son’s circumstances with her on more than one occasion, but Briley-Holmes told
her that there was little she could do until the information she had requested in
the FERPA form was sent to her; the client terminated her representation soon
thereafter; and Briley-Holmes failed to give the client any refund upon being
discharged. She admits that she violated Rule 1.16 when, after being terminated,
she failed to return the fees paid that she had not earned.
Next, Briley-Holmes admits that in June 2015 the family of a client paid
$1,500 of the agreed upon flat fee of $2,500 for representation in a criminal case
by her and co-counsel; she promptly visited the client in prison to discuss his
case and filed an entry of appearance and preliminary motions, but after that she
3 never visited him again, and she had great difficulty communicating with his
family because they did not speak English; she attended the first calendar call
of the case, and co-counsel was supposed to attend the second calendar call but
failed to do so and did not inform her or the court in advance; and, after the fifth
missed court date, the client’s family terminated their representation. Briley-
Holmes asserts that, at the time, her law partner, who has since been disbarred,1
had begun acting in an irrational and destructive manner, including cutting off
her cell phone, which was on a business plan with their firm, and terminating her
access to their online case management database, making it difficult to
communicate with the client and his family. Briley-Holmes admits that she
violated Rule 1.3 when she failed to attend scheduled court appearances and
failed to ensure that all necessary actions in the client’s case were taken either
by her or co-counsel.
In addition, Briley-Holmes admits that in June 2015, a client paid her
$750 to represent him in pre-warrant issuance matters and to attend a pre-
warrant issuance hearing (although she later discovered that there was no
1 See In the Matter of Wright, 299 Ga. 139 (786 SE2d 686) (2016).
4 hearing). Briley-Holmes admits that she advised the client of his Fifth
Amendment right to silence and asked him to not make any statements to law
enforcement without her being present, but failed to communicate with him
about the risks of not arranging for an interview with law enforcement. She
admits that she attempted to reach the detective (and she understands he tried to
reach her as well), but she did not follow through and arrange an interview, and
the client ultimately was arrested because he failed to arrange an interview
voluntarily. She further admits that she immediately filed an entry of appearance
on his behalf, a motion for bond, and all preliminary motions associated with
representation in a criminal case, even though it was outside her original scope
of representation, but when she attended the bond hearing, it was made clear to
her that her client had hired new counsel. Briley-Holmes admits that she
violated Rule 1.3 by failing to arrange an interview with law enforcement,
causing her client’s arrest and a period of incarceration, and that she violated
Rule 1.4 when she failed to communicate with him about the risks of not
arranging for an interview with law enforcement.
Briley-Holmes further admits that in September 2015, she received a
$1,500 retainer to represent a client in obtaining a temporary protective order
5 (TPO) and divorce; she prepared the initiating documents, attended the TPO
hearing and obtained the TPO; a future hearing was then set on whether to
convert the TPO to a 12-month order; and she then worked out an oral
agreement with opposing counsel whereby his client would consent to a 12-
month order. Briley-Holmes admits that she notified her client of the agreement
and its terms and told her it was unnecessary to attend the hearing on the TPO,
but she did not notify the court that an agreement had been reached because
opposing counsel informed her that his client would submit it to the court. She
further admits that she followed up by e-mail with opposing counsel to ensure
that the agreement was signed and called the State Bar ethics hotline to make
sure that the agreement was proper and that she behaved reasonably, but that
opposing counsel did not submit the agreement or notify the court of the
agreement because her client’s husband refused to consummate it, asserting a
material change in circumstances involving their son’s behavior, and the court
dismissed the protective order for failure to appear and her client was upset and
terminated her representation. She admits that she violated Rule 1.3 when,
without having a written agreement and relying on opposing counsel’s word, she
told her client not to appear at the protective order hearing, did not appear
6 herself, did not notify the court of the oral settlement agreement, and failed to
follow up to assure that a written agreement was sent to the court.
Briley-Holmes next admits that in January 2016, a client retained her to
represent her in seeking a child custody modification order and paid her a flat
fee of $4,200; she planned to attend a scheduled hearing but was unable to after
she got into an automobile accident on the way to court; she had her assistant
call the court and discovered the hearing had been continued; and she spoke to
her client and told her that she would be sending her a verification form that
evening for the modification action and a financial affidavit, but the client did
not receive them; and when she sent a draft modification petition to her client
two days later, her client sent her an e-mail and a text terminating her services.
She admits that she failed to immediately refund any of her client’s fee, although
she claims she did attempt to refund the client’s credit card, but the client filed
a dispute on her credit card and the payment did not go through. She admits that
she violated Rule 1.16 (d) when she failed to promptly refund unearned fees
after her client terminated the representation.
Finally, Briley-Holmes admits that in April 2016, a client retained her to
seek emergency temporary custody to protect her son and paid her a flat fee of
7 $2,500; she exchanged numerous e-mails and phone conversations with the
client and drafted a petition for modification and emergency petition, which the
client signed and had notarized; the client then accompanied her to the
courthouse to file the documents in the hopes that a judge would be on duty to
hear the emergency ex parte petition she drafted; however, no judge was
available to consider the request; and, over the following weekend, the client
changed her mind about proceeding with the case. Briley-Holmes states that she
did not refund the full $2,500 fee because she felt that the work she had done
before termination justified her keeping the full amount paid for legal services.
However, the client filed a fee arbitration case with the State Bar, and Briley-
Holmes has agreed as part of the petition for voluntary discipline to pay any
award in full and admits that she violated Rule 1.16 in failing to promptly refund
unearned fees when her client terminated the representation.
In mitigation of discipline, Briley-Holmes provides a statement of
remorse, see American Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions Standard 9.32 (l), and states that she has been introspective about the
series of events and issues that brought her to this point and that she has been
working on bettering herself and her circumstances so that neither she, nor
8 another client, is in this position again. As to SDB Docket No. 6844, she states
that she feels a great deal of regret over the way the case was handled and that,
at the time that she was approached to take on the case pro bono, she was
working full time and the case became overwhelming because she had to request
time off of work and take away time from her children, and she should have
known her own limitations. Briley-Holmes further states that she has jumped too
quickly into large battles and projects without being able to adequately handle
all of her clients who depend on her, and she has struggled to effectively set
certain boundaries, expectations, and to convey a certain professionalism that
encourages confidence in her abilities as an attorney. She asserts that she has a
proven history of strong court performance and doing the work necessary in
cases, but there is a breakdown in how she is conveying this work to her clients
that causes them to panic, question her ability, and to ultimately get new counsel
and, in retrospect, she has realized that she should have hired a full-time
assistant and set up a brick-and-mortar office to help alleviate any sense of
chaos involved in her operations and to establish boundaries and a clearer, more
streamlined communication system with clients. She also states that during this
time period she was dealing with a multitude of stress from her job and family
9 life, including trouble in her marriage that led to her divorce and a former law
partner who was addicted to drugs and alcohol and was not operating at full
capacity, see ABA Standard 9.32 (c).
In further mitigation, Briley-Holmes states that she did not have a selfish
motive in her representation, see ABA Standard 9.32 (b); she has made a timely
good faith effort to make restitution and rectify consequences of her misconduct,
see ABA Standard 9.32 (d), including agreeing to pay any award from fee
arbitration and handing over her clients’ files to new counsel; and she has been
honest and open with all aspects of her representation of her clients and will
fully cooperate with all disciplinary proceedings, see ABA Standard 9.32 (e).
Finally, she states that, before the imposition of any discipline in these matters,
she independently determined that she needed to leave the practice of law for a
substantial period of time and has not represented a client since September 2016.
As discipline, Briley-Holmes seeks a suspension of her license to practice
law for one year and that her reinstatement to practice law be conditioned on:
(1) submitting to the jurisdiction of the State Bar’s Fee Arbitration Program with
respect to all fee arbitration petitions already filed or filed in the future against
her, taking the initiative to submit to the program any remaining fee disputes by
10 her clients, and paying in full any fee arbitration award; and (2) receiving the
services offered by the Law Practice Management Program of the State Bar and
waiving confidentiality to the extent of permitting that program to report to the
State Bar’s Office of General Counsel that she has received those services.
The State Bar has responded, agreeing with the facts and the mitigating
factors set out by Briley-Holmes, although it notes that she has only refunded
one of her clients, and also states in aggravation of the level of discipline that
Briley-Holmes received a formal admonition in 2014,2 see ABA Standard 9.22
(a); she has engaged in a pattern of misconduct and that her misconduct
encompasses multiple offenses, as is obvious in these seven cases, see ABA
Standards 9.22 (c) and 9.22 (d); and the client she was hired to represent in the
criminal case she references in her petition was a vulnerable victim, given he
was incarcerated and neither he nor his family could communicate in English,
see ABA Standard 9.22 (h). Nevertheless, the State Bar recommends that this
Court accept Briley-Holmes’ petition because it believes that a one-year
suspension with conditions for reinstatement as specified in her petition would
2 The State Bar does not specify the reason for the formal admonition.
11 be an appropriate discipline for her conduct, as a penalty to her, a deterrent to
others, and an indication to laymen that the courts will maintain the ethics of the
profession. See In the Matter of Ricks, 289 Ga. 136 (710 SE 2d 749) (2011).
Having reviewed the record as a whole, we disagree with Briley-Holmes’
petition and the State Bar’s recommendation that a one-year suspension with
conditions is an appropriate sanction in this matter. See In the Matter of Hentz,
300 Ga. 413 (794 SE2d 649) (2016); In the Matter of Polk, 295 Ga. 215 (758
SE2d 830) (2014). Accordingly, this Court rejects Briley-Holmes’ petition for
voluntary discipline.
Petition for voluntary discipline rejected. All the Justices concur.
Decided February 27, 2017.
Petition for voluntary discipline.
Kenneth B. Hodges III, for Briley-Holmes.
Paula J. Frederick, General Counsel State Bar, William J. Cobb, Assistant
General Counsel State Bar, for State Bar of Georgia.