Supreme Court No. 2025-64-M.P.
In the Matter of Santiago H. Posas. :
ORDER This attorney disciplinary matter came before the Court pursuant to Article
III, Rule 6(d) of the Supreme Court Rules of Disciplinary Procedure. On August 21,
2025, we received a decision issued by the Honorable Justice Netti C. Vogel (ret.),
sitting as a hearing officer pursuant to Article III, Rule 4(c), finding that the
respondent, Santiago H. Posas, had violated the Supreme Court Rules of
Professional Conduct and recommending we publicly censure the respondent for his
conduct. Rule 6(d) provides:
“If the [Disciplinary] Board determines that a proceeding should be dismissed, or that it should be concluded by public censure, suspension or disbarment, it shall submit its findings and recommendations, together with the entire record, to this Court. This Court shall review the record and enter an appropriate order. Proceedings, if any, before this Court shall be conducted by [Disciplinary] Counsel.”
We directed the respondent to appear before the Court at its conference on
October 9, 2025, to show cause, if any, why we should not accept the
recommendation of the hearing officer. The respondent appeared before the Court
and accepted full responsibility for his actions. Having heard the representations of
-1- respondent and this Court’s Disciplinary Counsel, we concur with the hearing
officer’s decision that respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct and
should be publicly censured.
The respondent is subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted and
promulgated as Article V of the Rhode Island Supreme Court Rules. The respondent
was admitted to the Rhode Island bar in 2015 and has been removed from the master
roll since December 2024. The respondent currently resides out-of-state. In 2023,
respondent was employed by a local law firm and represented one of the firm’s
clients in a litigation matter. The respondent admits to knowingly filing a false
affidavit in that litigation matter with respect to his failure to timely file an answer
on behalf of his client. The respondent has expressed great remorse and
embarrassment for his actions and has accepted full responsibility, including making
an unsolicited confession to his supervising attorney on the Monday following the
submission of the false affidavit on a Friday. The respondent voluntarily subjected
himself to court hearings in the litigation matter. The respondent further offered
significant mitigation that the hearing officer found contributed to his conduct.
Based upon the foregoing, the hearing officer found that respondent violated
Rules 3.3(a)(1) and (a)(3) (“Candor toward the tribunal”) and 8.4(a) and (c)
(“Misconduct”) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 3.3 provides, in
pertinent part:
-2- “(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
“(1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer;
“* * *
“(3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer, the lawyer’s client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered material evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal. A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence, other than the testimony of a defendant in a criminal matter, that the lawyer reasonably believes is false.” R. Prof. Conduct 3.3.
Rule 8.4 provides, in pertinent part:
“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
“(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;
“(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation[.]” R. Prof. Conduct 8.4.
Having found that respondent’s conduct constituted a violation of Rules
3.3(a)(1) and (a)(3), and 8.4(a) and (c), the hearing officer next turned to the issue
of the appropriate sanction to recommend to this Court. “In fashioning an
appropriate sanction, the [Hearing Officer] and this Court are cognizant that the
-3- purposes of professional discipline are to protect the public and to maintain the
integrity of the profession * * * and not to punish the attorney * * *.” In re
Glucksman, 333 A.3d 504, 507 (R.I. 2025) (mem.); In re Scott, 694 A.2d 732, 736
(R.I. 1997); In re Almonte, 678 A.2d 457, 457-58 (R.I. 1996). “Mitigating and
aggravating factors must be weighed to determine the proper level of discipline that
should be imposed.” In re Glucksman, 333 A.3d at 507.
In In re Levine, 840 A.2d 1098 (R.I. 2003), this Court publicly censured an
out-of-state attorney who filed a false affidavit about his own credentials when he
sought to appear pro hac vice in the Rhode Island Superior Court. In re Levine, 840
A.2d at 1098-99. The Court noted that the attorney “acknowledged that this was
wrong and ha[d] expressed his sincere remorse for this misrepresentation.” Id. at
1099. This Court came to the same conclusion in In re Fisher, 175 A.3d 490 (R.I.
2018) (mem.). In that case, the respondent signed his client’s name to foreclosure
deeds and notarized his own false signature. In re Fisher, 175 A.3d at 490-91. In
choosing public censure as an appropriate sanction, the Court referenced his
“lengthy, unblemished history, coupled with his heartfelt remorse * * *.” Id. at 492.
Further, in another case, In re McAteer, 183 A.3d 1133 (R.I. 2018) (mem.), the
respondent appeared in the Superior Court and represented to the court that his client
was entitled to receive the return of a real estate deposit from a defaulted defendant
after his client already received the return of that payment in settlement with a co-
-4- defendant. In re McAteer, 183 A.3d at 1134. In imposing public censure as a
sanction, this Court considered his sincere remorse, unblemished professional
history and reputation, as well as his cooperation with the disciplinary process,
recognition of his wrongful conduct and his acceptance of the consequences he
would face for misleading the Superior Court. Id. at 1135.
In other cases where the respondents have made false filings, this Court
ordered that they be suspended from the practice of law in this state for varying
periods of time. For example, this Court concluded that a suspension was warranted
where a respondent not only had made false statements on his bar application but
also gave “less than candid” testimony before the Committee on Character and
Fitness. In re Press, 627 A.2d 842,842 (R.I. 1993) (mem.).
In another case, this Court chose to suspend an attorney rather than to publicly
censure her after the attorney made false statements on an application filed in the
federal district court for a substantially unjustified post-verdict award of attorneys’
fees and costs and then defended the amount at a hearing. In re Schiff,
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Supreme Court No. 2025-64-M.P.
In the Matter of Santiago H. Posas. :
ORDER This attorney disciplinary matter came before the Court pursuant to Article
III, Rule 6(d) of the Supreme Court Rules of Disciplinary Procedure. On August 21,
2025, we received a decision issued by the Honorable Justice Netti C. Vogel (ret.),
sitting as a hearing officer pursuant to Article III, Rule 4(c), finding that the
respondent, Santiago H. Posas, had violated the Supreme Court Rules of
Professional Conduct and recommending we publicly censure the respondent for his
conduct. Rule 6(d) provides:
“If the [Disciplinary] Board determines that a proceeding should be dismissed, or that it should be concluded by public censure, suspension or disbarment, it shall submit its findings and recommendations, together with the entire record, to this Court. This Court shall review the record and enter an appropriate order. Proceedings, if any, before this Court shall be conducted by [Disciplinary] Counsel.”
We directed the respondent to appear before the Court at its conference on
October 9, 2025, to show cause, if any, why we should not accept the
recommendation of the hearing officer. The respondent appeared before the Court
and accepted full responsibility for his actions. Having heard the representations of
-1- respondent and this Court’s Disciplinary Counsel, we concur with the hearing
officer’s decision that respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct and
should be publicly censured.
The respondent is subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted and
promulgated as Article V of the Rhode Island Supreme Court Rules. The respondent
was admitted to the Rhode Island bar in 2015 and has been removed from the master
roll since December 2024. The respondent currently resides out-of-state. In 2023,
respondent was employed by a local law firm and represented one of the firm’s
clients in a litigation matter. The respondent admits to knowingly filing a false
affidavit in that litigation matter with respect to his failure to timely file an answer
on behalf of his client. The respondent has expressed great remorse and
embarrassment for his actions and has accepted full responsibility, including making
an unsolicited confession to his supervising attorney on the Monday following the
submission of the false affidavit on a Friday. The respondent voluntarily subjected
himself to court hearings in the litigation matter. The respondent further offered
significant mitigation that the hearing officer found contributed to his conduct.
Based upon the foregoing, the hearing officer found that respondent violated
Rules 3.3(a)(1) and (a)(3) (“Candor toward the tribunal”) and 8.4(a) and (c)
(“Misconduct”) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 3.3 provides, in
pertinent part:
-2- “(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
“(1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer;
“* * *
“(3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer, the lawyer’s client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered material evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal. A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence, other than the testimony of a defendant in a criminal matter, that the lawyer reasonably believes is false.” R. Prof. Conduct 3.3.
Rule 8.4 provides, in pertinent part:
“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
“(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;
“(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation[.]” R. Prof. Conduct 8.4.
Having found that respondent’s conduct constituted a violation of Rules
3.3(a)(1) and (a)(3), and 8.4(a) and (c), the hearing officer next turned to the issue
of the appropriate sanction to recommend to this Court. “In fashioning an
appropriate sanction, the [Hearing Officer] and this Court are cognizant that the
-3- purposes of professional discipline are to protect the public and to maintain the
integrity of the profession * * * and not to punish the attorney * * *.” In re
Glucksman, 333 A.3d 504, 507 (R.I. 2025) (mem.); In re Scott, 694 A.2d 732, 736
(R.I. 1997); In re Almonte, 678 A.2d 457, 457-58 (R.I. 1996). “Mitigating and
aggravating factors must be weighed to determine the proper level of discipline that
should be imposed.” In re Glucksman, 333 A.3d at 507.
In In re Levine, 840 A.2d 1098 (R.I. 2003), this Court publicly censured an
out-of-state attorney who filed a false affidavit about his own credentials when he
sought to appear pro hac vice in the Rhode Island Superior Court. In re Levine, 840
A.2d at 1098-99. The Court noted that the attorney “acknowledged that this was
wrong and ha[d] expressed his sincere remorse for this misrepresentation.” Id. at
1099. This Court came to the same conclusion in In re Fisher, 175 A.3d 490 (R.I.
2018) (mem.). In that case, the respondent signed his client’s name to foreclosure
deeds and notarized his own false signature. In re Fisher, 175 A.3d at 490-91. In
choosing public censure as an appropriate sanction, the Court referenced his
“lengthy, unblemished history, coupled with his heartfelt remorse * * *.” Id. at 492.
Further, in another case, In re McAteer, 183 A.3d 1133 (R.I. 2018) (mem.), the
respondent appeared in the Superior Court and represented to the court that his client
was entitled to receive the return of a real estate deposit from a defaulted defendant
after his client already received the return of that payment in settlement with a co-
-4- defendant. In re McAteer, 183 A.3d at 1134. In imposing public censure as a
sanction, this Court considered his sincere remorse, unblemished professional
history and reputation, as well as his cooperation with the disciplinary process,
recognition of his wrongful conduct and his acceptance of the consequences he
would face for misleading the Superior Court. Id. at 1135.
In other cases where the respondents have made false filings, this Court
ordered that they be suspended from the practice of law in this state for varying
periods of time. For example, this Court concluded that a suspension was warranted
where a respondent not only had made false statements on his bar application but
also gave “less than candid” testimony before the Committee on Character and
Fitness. In re Press, 627 A.2d 842,842 (R.I. 1993) (mem.).
In another case, this Court chose to suspend an attorney rather than to publicly
censure her after the attorney made false statements on an application filed in the
federal district court for a substantially unjustified post-verdict award of attorneys’
fees and costs and then defended the amount at a hearing. In re Schiff, 677 A.2d 422,
424-25 (R.I. 1996).
The hearing officer found that significant mitigating factors in this instant
matter distinguish it from those cited cases in which this Court imposed a
suspension. We agree. The facts and circumstances here more closely resemble the
cited cases in which the respondent was publicly censured. The respondent’s
-5- misrepresentations involved a single incident of wrongdoing—one which he made
on a Friday and self-reported the following Monday morning. He disclosed that he
had falsified the affidavit before anyone discovered or even suspected that his
statements were untrue. The respondent never attempted to defend or hide his
misrepresentations and instead promptly filed a corrected affidavit with the court.
The respondent was honest throughout the entire investigation and proceedings.
These measures demonstrate the sincerity of his remorse and distinguish this case
from those in which a respondent displayed a continued lack of candor after making
initial false statements. The respondent has no disciplinary history other than this
matter and offered compelling evidence of certain personal circumstances that
contributed significantly to his actions.
The Court accepts the hearing officer’s findings of fact and conclusions of law
and adopts the hearing officer’s well-reasoned decision.
The respondent is hereby publicly censured.
Entered as an Order of this Court this 24th day of October 2025.
By Order,
/s/ Meredith A. Benoit Clerk
-6- STATE OF RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE Licht Judicial Complex 250 Benefit Street Providence, RI 02903
ORDER COVER SHEET
Title of Case In the Matter of Santiago H. Posas.
Case Number No. 2025-64-M.P.
Date Order Filed October 24, 2025
Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Justices Long, JJ.
Source of Appeal N/A
Judicial Officer from Lower Court N/A
For Petitioner:
Kerry Reilley Travers, Esq. Maria R. Lenz, Esq. Attorney(s) on Appeal Office of Disciplinary Counsel For Respondent:
Santiago H. Posas, pro se
SU-CMS-02B (revised November 2022)