In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-24-00360-CV No. 02-24-00361-CV ___________________________
IN THE MATTER OF R.R.
On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 1 Denton County, Texas Trial Court Nos. JV-2021-00593, JV-2023-00200
Before Birdwell, Wallach, and Walker, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Birdwell MEMORANDUM OPINION
R.R., a juvenile, appeals the trial court’s “Order of Modification [and]
Disposition” committing him to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department (TJJD) for an
indeterminate period not to exceed his nineteenth birthday. In one point of error,
R.R. argues that because there was insufficient evidence, the trial court abused its
discretion by ordering him committed to the TJJD. We affirm.
I. Background
A. Initial Offense and Previous Modifications
In April 2022, R.R. stipulated to and was adjudicated delinquent for the offense
of theft of property—a golf cart—valued more than $2,500 but less than $30,000, an
offense classified as a state jail felony. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 31.03(e)(4)(A). The
trial court placed him on probation for twelve months for that offense.
Two months later, the State moved to modify the trial court’s disposition after
R.R. committed the offense of disorderly conduct by pointing a BB gun at another
child. R.R. stipulated to that offense, and in November 2022, the trial court modified
its prior disposition and placed R.R. on Intensive Supervision Probation (ISP) for
twenty-eight months—until March 2025.
In March 2023, the State moved to modify the trial court’s disposition after
R.R. committed the offense of fraudulent use of identifying information by obtaining
or acquiring someone else’s debit card number. In its motion, the State also alleged
that R.R. had violated the conditions of ISP by receiving school suspension and
2 multiple absences from class, by failing to call and check in with his juvenile probation
officer on several dates, and by failing to appear for several scheduled office visits
with his juvenile probation officer. R.R. stipulated to that offense and to the State’s
allegations, and in May 2023, the trial court modified its prior disposition and placed
R.R. on ISP for twenty-four months, which included a placement at Denton County
Post Adjudication Courage to Change—a long-term residential placement facility.
B. Present Modification
Within his first week at the Post facility, R.R. had received multiple rule
violations. In one incident, two staff members had to escort R.R. to his room after he
refused their attempts to verbally de-escalate him. After approximately ten months at
Post, he was unsuccessfully discharged from the program with fifty-one minor rule
infractions and three major rule violations.
Following R.R.’s unsuccessful discharge from Post, the State filed another
motion to modify the trial court’s disposition. R.R. stipulated to the unsuccessful-
discharge allegation, and the trial court set the matter for a disposition hearing.
Pending the disposition hearing, R.R. was released to his mother’s custody. 1 He
returned home and remained in his mother’s custody for approximately two-and-a-
1 At that time, R.R. had an open warrant in Dallas County for a misdemeanor theft charge. Believing that R.R. would be picked up by Dallas County and held for continued detention on that offense, the trial court released him from detention. However, Dallas County recalled the warrant. Because R.R. had already been released, he returned home until the disposition hearing.
3 half months. During that time, he improved his behavior and mostly stayed out of
trouble.
C. Disposition–Modification Hearing
At the hearing, the trial court heard testimony from R.R.’s juvenile probation
officer, Jennifer Jenson, and from R.R.’s mother.
Jenson confirmed the various offenses and probation violations alleged in the
State’s motions to modify. She testified that R.R. had been placed in the community
on probation three times and that the Denton County Juvenile Probation Department
had made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate him.
Jenson expressed that she had seen progress in the two years that she had been
handling R.R.’s case. She recommended that R.R. be placed on probation again. She
explained that he needed more counseling and that he needed to work on developing
skills to control his impulsivity. She noted, however, that if the trial court followed her
recommendation, R.R. would be placed on probation in a different county because his
family had moved out of Denton County before the disposition hearing. Therefore,
Jenson—a Denton County probation officer—would no longer supervise R.R.’s
probation, and she did not know what probation services would be provided to him
in the new county.
The State then asked Jenson about the services that would be available to R.R.
if he were placed in the TJJD instead of probation. She explained that he could obtain
a GED or high school diploma. He could also learn social skills and develop coping
4 skills to help him progress, and he would have access to both individual and group
counseling.
Mother’s testimony focused on the two-and-a-half months that R.R. was home
awaiting the disposition hearing. During that time, R.R. mostly stayed out of trouble;
he violated the terms of his release once when he went with an older cousin to a gas
station. Mother explained that, after speaking to his probation officer, R.R.
understood what was expected of him, and there were no other violations. For two-
and-a-half months, R.R. had a consistent routine, worked with his stepfather doing
landscaping, and kept up with his medication. And the family, which had been
previously living in hotels, had acquired and was living in a stable home.
While Mother acknowledged that R.R. had had behavioral issues “prior to
th[ose] last few months,” she testified that he had been responding to her rules and
supervision and that he had not had any behavioral issues since he returned home.
Mother told the trial court that she did not want R.R. to go to the TJJD and that, if he
were placed on probation, she would do her part to ensure that he succeeded.
In addition to the testimony presented at the hearing, the trial court reviewed
R.R.’s social history and PACT2 Full-Screen Summary Report that was completed
after R.R. left Post. The report indicated several risk factors, including mental health
concerns, emotional abuse, and family violence. His need level was “Moderate” and
2 PACT stands for Positive Achievement Change Tool. In re Z.M., No. 02-21- 00213-CV, 2021 WL 4898851, at *4 n.3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 21, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.).
5 his overall risk to reoffend was “High.” R.R. exhibited risk factors of antisocial
personality: high impulsivity, an inability to control impulsive behavior, a propensity
for temper tantrums, and a lack of behavioral alternatives to aggression. He also
exhibited risk factors of criminal thinking: indifference about committing crimes, a
lack of empathy for his victims, a belief that rules only sometimes apply to him, a
tendency to minimize or blame others, and a resentment toward authority.
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In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-24-00360-CV No. 02-24-00361-CV ___________________________
IN THE MATTER OF R.R.
On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 1 Denton County, Texas Trial Court Nos. JV-2021-00593, JV-2023-00200
Before Birdwell, Wallach, and Walker, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Birdwell MEMORANDUM OPINION
R.R., a juvenile, appeals the trial court’s “Order of Modification [and]
Disposition” committing him to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department (TJJD) for an
indeterminate period not to exceed his nineteenth birthday. In one point of error,
R.R. argues that because there was insufficient evidence, the trial court abused its
discretion by ordering him committed to the TJJD. We affirm.
I. Background
A. Initial Offense and Previous Modifications
In April 2022, R.R. stipulated to and was adjudicated delinquent for the offense
of theft of property—a golf cart—valued more than $2,500 but less than $30,000, an
offense classified as a state jail felony. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 31.03(e)(4)(A). The
trial court placed him on probation for twelve months for that offense.
Two months later, the State moved to modify the trial court’s disposition after
R.R. committed the offense of disorderly conduct by pointing a BB gun at another
child. R.R. stipulated to that offense, and in November 2022, the trial court modified
its prior disposition and placed R.R. on Intensive Supervision Probation (ISP) for
twenty-eight months—until March 2025.
In March 2023, the State moved to modify the trial court’s disposition after
R.R. committed the offense of fraudulent use of identifying information by obtaining
or acquiring someone else’s debit card number. In its motion, the State also alleged
that R.R. had violated the conditions of ISP by receiving school suspension and
2 multiple absences from class, by failing to call and check in with his juvenile probation
officer on several dates, and by failing to appear for several scheduled office visits
with his juvenile probation officer. R.R. stipulated to that offense and to the State’s
allegations, and in May 2023, the trial court modified its prior disposition and placed
R.R. on ISP for twenty-four months, which included a placement at Denton County
Post Adjudication Courage to Change—a long-term residential placement facility.
B. Present Modification
Within his first week at the Post facility, R.R. had received multiple rule
violations. In one incident, two staff members had to escort R.R. to his room after he
refused their attempts to verbally de-escalate him. After approximately ten months at
Post, he was unsuccessfully discharged from the program with fifty-one minor rule
infractions and three major rule violations.
Following R.R.’s unsuccessful discharge from Post, the State filed another
motion to modify the trial court’s disposition. R.R. stipulated to the unsuccessful-
discharge allegation, and the trial court set the matter for a disposition hearing.
Pending the disposition hearing, R.R. was released to his mother’s custody. 1 He
returned home and remained in his mother’s custody for approximately two-and-a-
1 At that time, R.R. had an open warrant in Dallas County for a misdemeanor theft charge. Believing that R.R. would be picked up by Dallas County and held for continued detention on that offense, the trial court released him from detention. However, Dallas County recalled the warrant. Because R.R. had already been released, he returned home until the disposition hearing.
3 half months. During that time, he improved his behavior and mostly stayed out of
trouble.
C. Disposition–Modification Hearing
At the hearing, the trial court heard testimony from R.R.’s juvenile probation
officer, Jennifer Jenson, and from R.R.’s mother.
Jenson confirmed the various offenses and probation violations alleged in the
State’s motions to modify. She testified that R.R. had been placed in the community
on probation three times and that the Denton County Juvenile Probation Department
had made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate him.
Jenson expressed that she had seen progress in the two years that she had been
handling R.R.’s case. She recommended that R.R. be placed on probation again. She
explained that he needed more counseling and that he needed to work on developing
skills to control his impulsivity. She noted, however, that if the trial court followed her
recommendation, R.R. would be placed on probation in a different county because his
family had moved out of Denton County before the disposition hearing. Therefore,
Jenson—a Denton County probation officer—would no longer supervise R.R.’s
probation, and she did not know what probation services would be provided to him
in the new county.
The State then asked Jenson about the services that would be available to R.R.
if he were placed in the TJJD instead of probation. She explained that he could obtain
a GED or high school diploma. He could also learn social skills and develop coping
4 skills to help him progress, and he would have access to both individual and group
counseling.
Mother’s testimony focused on the two-and-a-half months that R.R. was home
awaiting the disposition hearing. During that time, R.R. mostly stayed out of trouble;
he violated the terms of his release once when he went with an older cousin to a gas
station. Mother explained that, after speaking to his probation officer, R.R.
understood what was expected of him, and there were no other violations. For two-
and-a-half months, R.R. had a consistent routine, worked with his stepfather doing
landscaping, and kept up with his medication. And the family, which had been
previously living in hotels, had acquired and was living in a stable home.
While Mother acknowledged that R.R. had had behavioral issues “prior to
th[ose] last few months,” she testified that he had been responding to her rules and
supervision and that he had not had any behavioral issues since he returned home.
Mother told the trial court that she did not want R.R. to go to the TJJD and that, if he
were placed on probation, she would do her part to ensure that he succeeded.
In addition to the testimony presented at the hearing, the trial court reviewed
R.R.’s social history and PACT2 Full-Screen Summary Report that was completed
after R.R. left Post. The report indicated several risk factors, including mental health
concerns, emotional abuse, and family violence. His need level was “Moderate” and
2 PACT stands for Positive Achievement Change Tool. In re Z.M., No. 02-21- 00213-CV, 2021 WL 4898851, at *4 n.3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 21, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.).
5 his overall risk to reoffend was “High.” R.R. exhibited risk factors of antisocial
personality: high impulsivity, an inability to control impulsive behavior, a propensity
for temper tantrums, and a lack of behavioral alternatives to aggression. He also
exhibited risk factors of criminal thinking: indifference about committing crimes, a
lack of empathy for his victims, a belief that rules only sometimes apply to him, a
tendency to minimize or blame others, and a resentment toward authority.
Regarding education, R.R. did not believe that education was valuable or that
school was encouraging. In December 2021, R.R. withdrew from school because he
had been failing all his core classes and would not pass that grade level. He received
multiple school conduct violations, and in one incident, he was sent to an alternative
school because he had brought a taser onto school grounds. In another incident, R.R.
was suspended for three days after he threw a milk carton at another student. While
he was at Post, R.R. made “mostly Cs and Ds, some Fs,” and he attended his classes
regularly.
As for R.R.’s home, the report indicated that there had been “[c]onsistently
insufficient punishment” and that R.R. did not respond to parental supervision. He
had a history of running away from home after arguments with Mother, and while he
was on ISP, he would leave the residence without permission. Mother had reported
that R.R. defied parental authority and that he “caused chaos in their home.” His “bad
behavior” had even caused the family to be evicted numerous times.
6 The report also highlighted the probation department’s efforts to rehabilitate
R.R. Despite multiple attempts to make services available to R.R. and his family—
such as life skills mentoring and family preservation counseling—they did not take
advantage of those services. Indeed, R.R. was unsuccessfully discharged from the
mentoring program, and the family never started counseling.
D. Judgment and Commitment
After hearing all the evidence, the trial judge stated on the record that R.R.’s
high risk of reoffending was “extremely concerning” and that his “good behavior” in
the two-and-a-half months he spent at home before the disposition hearing was “like
the white-knuckled good behavior to get to th[at] point.” The trial judge noted that a
child’s life is not “static” and explained that while she “do[es] very much believe in
consequences,” she also believed in “changed trajectories,” asking “where is this going
to stop?”
The trial court found that R.R. had violated the terms of his probation and,
after weighing the evidence, determined that the removal-from-the-home criteria had
been met. In its disposition order, the trial court sustained the State’s motion to
modify and committed R.R. to the TJJD for an indeterminate period not to exceed his
nineteenth birthday. The trial court found that it was in R.R.’s best interest to be
placed outside his home; that reasonable efforts had been made to prevent or
eliminate the need for R.R.’s removal from his home and to make it possible for him
to return home; and that R.R., in his home, “[could ]not be provided the quality of
7 care and level of support and supervision that [he] need[ed] to meet the conditions of
probation.” The trial court also made a “special commitment finding that [R.R.] ha[d]
behavioral health or other special needs that [could ]not be met with the resources
available in the community.”
II. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s decision to modify a juvenile disposition for an abuse
of discretion. See In re J.P., 136 S.W.3d 629, 632–33 (Tex. 2004). A juvenile court has
broad discretion to determine a suitable disposition for a child who has been
adjudicated as having engaged in delinquent conduct. In re J.D.P., 85 S.W.3d 420, 426
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.). This is particularly true in proceedings to
modify a juvenile’s earlier disposition. In re D.R.A., 47 S.W.3d 813, 815 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 2001, no pet.). A juvenile court abuses its discretion when it acts
unreasonably or arbitrarily—without reference to any guiding rules or principles. See
In re C.J.H., 79 S.W.3d 698, 702 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.).
Legal and factual sufficiency are relevant factors in determining whether the
trial court abused its discretion. Id. In the disposition phase of a juvenile proceeding,
we apply the civil standard of review to evidentiary-sufficiency challenges. In re M.C.S.,
Jr., 327 S.W.3d 802, 805 & n.3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, no pet.) (citing Jackson
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979)); In re M.D.H., 139 S.W.3d
315, 317 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied) (mem. op. on reh’g).
8 We may sustain a legal-sufficiency challenge only when (1) the record bears no
evidence of a vital fact, (2) the rules of law or of evidence bar the court from giving
weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (3) the evidence offered to
prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla, or (4) the evidence establishes
conclusively the opposite of a vital fact. Gunn v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645, 658 (Tex.
2018). In determining whether legally sufficient evidence supports the challenged
finding, we must consider evidence favorable to the finding if a reasonable factfinder
could, and we must disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could
not. Cent. Ready Mix Concrete Co. v. Islas, 228 S.W.3d 649, 651 (Tex. 2007); City of Keller
v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). We indulge “every reasonable inference
deducible from the evidence” in support of the challenged finding. Gunn, 554 S.W.3d
at 658 (quoting Bustamante v. Ponte, 529 S.W.3d 447, 456 (Tex. 2017)).
When reviewing a factual-sufficiency challenge under the civil standard of
review, we set aside the finding at issue only if, after considering and weighing all the
pertinent record evidence, we determine that the credible evidence supporting the
finding is so weak, or so contrary to the overwhelming weight of all the evidence, that
the finding should be set aside and a new trial ordered. Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715
S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986) (op. on reh’g); Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex.
1986); Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. 1965).
9 III. Applicable Law
Violating a single condition of probation is sufficient for a trial court to modify
a juvenile’s prior disposition. In re J.Y., No. 02-17-00092-CV, 2017 WL 3298301, at *3
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 3, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing In re S.G.V., No.
04-05-00605-CV, 2006 WL 923576, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 5, 2006, no
pet.) (mem. op.)). A trial court may commit a juvenile to the TJJD if it finds that (1) it
is in the child’s best interest to be placed outside the child’s home, (2) reasonable
efforts have been made to prevent or eliminate the need for the child’s removal from
the child’s home and to make it possible for him to return home, and (3) the child, in
the child’s home, cannot be provided the quality of care and level of support and
supervision needed to meet the conditions of probation. Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
§ 54.04(i)(1). When a child has engaged in delinquent conduct that constitutes a felony
offense, the trial court may commit the child to the TJJD without a determinate
sentence “if the court makes a special commitment finding that the child has
behavioral health or other special needs that cannot be met with the resources
available in the community.” Id. § 54.04013; see id. § 54.04(d)(2).
The trial court “is not required to exhaust all possible alternatives before
sending a juvenile to the TJJD.” In re K.H., 682 S.W.3d 567, 576 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, pet. denied); see In re J.R.C., 236 S.W.3d 870, 875 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.) (“The Texas Family Code permits a trial court to
decline third and fourth chances to a juvenile who has abused a second chance.”
10 (citing J.P., 136 S.W.3d at 633)). Generally, a trial court does not abuse its discretion
by committing a juvenile to the TJJD “when a delinquent juvenile has engaged in
some type of violent activity that makes the juvenile potentially dangerous to the
public.” K.H., 682 S.W.3d at 576; In re B.R., No. 02-19-00328-CV, 2020 WL 3969556,
at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 18, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).
IV. Analysis
In his sole point of error, R.R. contends that the trial court abused its discretion
by committing him to the TJJD because, “based on the most recent evidence of
success in the family home,” there was insufficient evidence to support the trial
court’s findings that (1) his home could not provide the quality of care and level of
support and supervision needed to meet the conditions of probation and (2) removal
from his home was in his best interest. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse
its broad discretion by committing R.R. to the TJJD.
The evidence shows that R.R. had been adjudicated delinquent for a state jail
felony and subsequently committed at least two more offenses; that he had been
placed on probation—regular, ISP, and Post—three times; and that he was
uncontrollable at home. R.R. was highly impulsive and showed no respect for rules or
authority, and on more than one occasion, he exhibited violent behavior. He did not
value his education and only appeared to show interest in school while he was at the
Post facility. The probation department offered numerous services to R.R. and his
family, including counseling, but they did not take advantage of them. R.R. had a high
11 risk of reoffending—a risk factor that the trial court found to be “extremely
concerning.” The trial court expressed an apparent desire to help R.R. change the
trajectory of his life.
Jenson recommended that R.R. be placed on probation again, though she could
not tell the trial court what a fourth chance at probation in a different county would
look like. She explained that R.R. had made progress but that he needed more
counseling and more work developing the skills to help him progress. The trial court
heard testimony that those services would be available to R.R. in the TJJD. Moreover,
the trial court was not bound by Jenson’s recommendation of probation. See In re
H.C., Nos. 02-18-00230-CV, 02-18-00231-CV, 02-18-00232-CV, 2019 WL 1185089,
at *20 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 14, 2019, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.) (citing
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.04(b)); In re C.G., No. 05-17-01063-CV, 2018 WL 2126812,
at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 9, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (finding no abuse of
discretion when trial court ordered juvenile committed to TJJD against probation
department’s recommendation).
R.R. concedes that “at some point[,] there may have been sufficient evidence”
to support removal-from-the-home findings. But that evidence, he asserts, was
“vitiated” by the evidence showing that he “successful[ly] implement[ed]” the skills he
had learned at Post. In other words, R.R. argues that the trial court should have
found—based only on the evidence of his improved behavior in the two-and-a-half
12 months he spent at home following his release from Post—that removal from the
home was not necessary.
While R.R.’s behavior did improve for the two-and-a-half months that he was
home awaiting the disposition hearing, there was at least some evidence—the
unauthorized trip to a gas station—that his home environment was not sufficiently
structured and supervised. Moreover, the record indicates that the trial court
considered the evidence of R.R.’s “white-knuckled good behavior” and determined
that it was not enough to overcome the behavior he had exhibited in the years leading
up to that point. B.R., 2020 WL 3969556, at *7 (upholding trial court’s order
committing juvenile to TJJD despite “some qualitative improvement” in juvenile’s
behavior at home pending disposition (citing In re J.M., 433 S.W.3d 792, 794–96 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.))); cf. In re J.S., 993 S.W.2d 370, 375 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 1999, no pet.) (finding abuse of discretion when the juvenile “[c]learly . . . did
more than exhibit temporary remorsefulness because he was caught”).
We conclude that more than a scintilla of evidence supports the trial court’s
findings that R.R.’s home could not provide the quality of care and level of support
needed to meet the conditions of probation and that it was in R.R.’s best interest to
remove him from his home. Based on our review of the record, we cannot conclude
that the credible evidence supporting the trial court’s findings was so weak or contrary
to the overwhelming weight of all the evidence as to be manifestly wrong.
13 Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering R.R.
committed to the TJJD.
We overrule R.R.’s sole point of error.
V. Conclusion
Having overruled R.R.’s sole point of error, we affirm the trial court’s
disposition order.
/s/ Wade Birdwell
Wade Birdwell Justice
Delivered: February 6, 2025