In the Matter of Rickie Dooley

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: October 17, 2025
• Docket: A-1567-23
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1567-23

IN THE MATTER OF RICKIE DOOLEY, SOUTHERN STATE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS. __________________________

Submitted September 24, 2025 – Decided October 17, 2025

Before Judges Gummer, Paganelli, and Jacobs.

On appeal from the New Jersey Civil Service Commission, Docket No. 2021-1372.

Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for respondent Southern State Correctional Facility, New Jersey Department of Corrections (Donna Arons, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Jana R. DiCosmo, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for respondent New Jersey Civil Service Commission (Bernadette Dronson, Deputy Attorney General, on the statement in lieu of brief).

Alterman & Associates, LLC, attorneys for appellant Rickie Dooley (Stuart J. Alterman, on the briefs).

PER CURIAM Rickie Dooley, a former Senior Correctional Police Officer (SCPO) at

Southern State Correctional Facility (SSCF), appeals from a final administrative

action of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) terminating his employment with

the Department of Corrections (DOC) for conduct unbecoming an employee and

other disciplinary charges. We affirm.

I.

Dooley began service as a correctional officer in 2002. During his tenure

with the DOC, he was subject to disciplinary reprimands and suspensions for

multiple infractions. Between November 2008 and October 2009, he received

an official written reprimand and three suspensions for "chronic or excessive

absenteeism." In February 2010, he was fined for failing to submit sick-leave

documentation. He received an official written reprimand in June 2014 and a

three-day suspension in July 2014, for calling out sick with no available sick

time. In April 2019, he received a two-day suspension for failing to submit sick-

leave documentation.

Aside from these infractions, Dooley was found guilty of operating a

vehicle under the influence of alcohol (DUI), N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, in 2003, 2004,

and 2019. Although the DOC did not pursue disciplinary action in response to

Dooley's first two DUI convictions, it acted following his arrest for a third

A-1567-23 2 offense on November 16, 2019. Three days later, the DOC issued a preliminary

notice of disciplinary action (PNDA) charging Dooley with conduct unbecoming

a public employee, N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(6), Human Resources Bulletin

(HRB) 84-17(C11); violation of a rule, regulation, or procedure, HRB 84-17

(E1); and other sufficient cause, N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(12). The PNDA

summarized details of the November 16 incident giving rise to the charges and

referenced Dooley's two prior convictions for DUI.

On July 23, 2020, pursuant to a plea agreement, Dooley pleaded guilty to

the third DUI. Consistent with the agreement, a municipal court judge imposed

mandatory fines, thirty days of community service, completion of an alcohol

education course, and a two-year license suspension. The judge dismissed

remaining charges of "refusal to consent to take samples of breath," N.J.S.A.

39:4-50.2, along with charges for reckless driving, N.J.S.A. 39:4-96; careless

driving, N.J.S.A. 39:4-97; possessing an open container of alcohol in a motor

vehicle, N.J.S.A. 39:4-51B; failure to wear seat belt, N.J.S.A. 39:3-76.2F; and

refusal to submit to a chemical test, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4A.

The DOC's Special Investigations Division (SID) conducted an

investigation and issued a report on August 4, 2020. In addition to citing the

DUI charge, the report noted Dooley "did not report his [July 23, 2020] court

A-1567-23 3 hearing adjudication to the SSCF Major[']s Office," as required. The report

concluded he had violated multiple DOC policies and procedures. On February

25, 2021, the DOC issued a final notice of disciplinary action (FNDA),

sustaining the charges in the PNDA and imposing a penalty of removal from

employment effective February 26, 2021.

Dooley appealed the FNDA, disputing only the penalty imposed. His

appeal was transmitted to the Office of Administrative Law for adjudication. A

two-day hearing began on February 7, 2023 and concluded on May 31, 2023.

At the hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) heard testimony from Dr.

Gary Glass, who was qualified as an expert in forensic psychiatry. Dr. Glass

diagnosed Dooley as suffering from substance use, generalized anxiety, and

major depressive disorders, and attributed his DUI convictions to "alcohol use

disorder." He opined that the absence of discipline or evaluation by the DOC

following his first two DUI convictions caused Dooley to assume a "pre-

determined style of denial," leading him "to minimize . . . responsibility" for his

actions.

Michelle Husted, Dooley's girlfriend, testified that they began dating in

the summer of 2018. She testified Dooley had sought treatment and achieved

sobriety after his third DUI conviction. On cross-examination, Husted

A-1567-23 4 confirmed that on the night of his arrest for the third DUI, she and Dooley had

been drinking at her house and that she had "made him leave" after they argued.

Notwithstanding that event, she asserted confidence in her ability to support

Dooley's efforts to maintain sobriety and his ability to serve as a correctional

officer.

Dooley himself testified about his disciplinary history, substance-use

problems, and DUI offenses. He confirmed the absence of discipline following

his first two DUIs. After the third DUI, he sought medical help and participated

in an inpatient program. He claimed his substance issues did not interfere with

his job as evidenced by the lack of disciplinary history for on duty substance -

related offenses. On cross-examination, Dooley confirmed he was no longer

attending Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings because he did not identify

with the religious aspects of the organization. Instead, he had been watching

videos and reading materials related to recovery from substance abuse. He

conceded that departmental policies and procedures permit removal for a single

DUI offense and require all correctional officers to follow the rules and

regulations twenty-four hours a day.

The DOC called Major Brian Labonne. Major Labonne testified to his

responsibilities associated with implementing departmental policies. He stated

A-1567-23 5 that Dooley's multiple DUIs constituted improper demeanor and contravened

public trust in violation of departmental rules and regulations. He also testified

that correctional officers are held to the higher standard expected of all law

enforcement officers, "both on duty and off duty." Included in this higher

standard of conduct is an expectation to cooperate with fellow law enforcement

officers. Major Labonne cited his experience and knowledge of the

administrative charges and opined removal of Dooley to be an appropriate

sanction for a third DUI offense. He confirmed that, as stipulated by the parties,

a correctional officer is required to possess a valid driver's license, regardless of

seniority or the frequency of his driving responsibilities.

On cross-examination, Major Labonne confirmed the absence of any

documents indicating Dooley had undergone a fitness-for-duty evaluation or

been disciplined following his first two DUIs. He conceded some correctional

officers had remained employed notwithstanding DUI convictions and the loss

of driver's licenses.

In considering the appropriate discipline, the ALJ authored a thirty-nine

page "summary decision" issued on December 8, 2023. The ALJ noted

numerous mitigating factors, including the remoteness of the two earlier DUI

convictions, the length of Dooley's service, his voluntary participation in a

A-1567-23 6 treatment program, expression of remorse, that "his drinking occurred . . . off-

duty and did not adversely affect his job performance[,]" and that the third DUI

constituted Dooley's first major discipline. The ALJ found aggravating factors

consisting of the nature of Dooley's offenses; namely, the DUI and refusal to

comply with law enforcement by submitting to a breathalyzer. After finding

"the mitigating factors and aggravating [to be] either in equipoise, at worst, or

the mitigating factors [to] outweigh the aggravating factors," the ALJ

determined the penalty of removal inappropriate. Instead, the judge concluded

a penalty of six-months' unpaid suspension to be appropriate, conditioning

suspension on a satisfactory fitness-for-duty evaluation and regular participation

in AA and therapy, as well as other requisites to be ordered by a DOC-selected

psychiatrist or psychologist.

The DOC submitted exceptions to the ALJ's decision, and Dooley

submitted a reply. In a January 17, 2024 final administrative action, the CSC

issued a final decision adopting the ALJ's findings of facts and conclusions of

law but declining to adopt the recommendation to modify the removal to a six-

month suspension. Rather, the CSC upheld the removal.

Among other findings, the CSC rejected the ALJ's distinction between on-

duty and off-duty offenses. The CSC determined Dooley's off-duty status when

A-1567-23 7 the DUIs took place did not "lessen[] the severity of the offense[s]." Moreover,

the CSC found Dooley's participation in alcohol and mental health treatment to

be inconsistent both before and after his removal from employment. Finally,

the CSC noted that the egregiousness of the act, especially for a senior

correctional officer, warranted removal, notwithstanding the principles of

progressive discipline.

On appeal, Dooley contends the CSC's decision was arbitrary and

capricious in that it failed to apply the concept of progressive discipline, failed

to provide him with accommodation for his disability, and placed undue weight

on his status as a law enforcement officer.

II.

Our review of agency action is necessarily limited. We will not disturb

an agency's decision unless the court finds it to be "arbitrary, capricious, or

unreasonable, or [] not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record

as a whole." In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011) (alteration in original)

(quoting Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980)); see also

Karins v. Atl. City, 152 N.J. 532, 540 (1998). We do not substitute our judgment

for the agency's. In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 483 (2007). "[Where] substantial

credible evidence supports an agency's conclusion, a court may not substitute its

A-1567-23 8 own judgment for the agency's even though the court might have reached a

different result." Greenwood v. State Police Training Ctr., 127 N.J. 500, 513

(1992). This deferential review applies to disciplinary actions. In re Herrmann,

192 N.J. 19, 28 (2007).

In employee disciplinary proceedings, the agency need only "prove [its]

case by a preponderance of the credible evidence." Atkinson v. Parsekian, 37

N.J. 143, 149 (1962). Additionally, a presumption of reasonableness attaches

to the actions of administrative agencies. Newark v. Nat. Res. Council in Dep't

of Env't Prot., 82 N.J. 530, 539-40 (1980). We defer to the expertise of agencies

where substantial evidence supports the agency's determination. Stallworth, 208

N.J. at 194.

"An employee may be subject to discipline" for "[c]onduct unbecoming a

public employee." N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(6). "Conduct unbecoming" refers to

"any conduct which adversely affects the morale or efficiency of the bureau . . .

[or] which has a tendency to destroy public respect for municipal employees and

confidence in the operation of municipal services." Karins, 152 N.J. at 554

(alteration in original) (quoting In re Emmons, 63 N.J. Super. 136, 140 (App.

Div. 1960)).

We examine Dooley's arguments against these well-established standards.

A-1567-23 9 Progressive Discipline

To ensure "proportionality and uniformity in the rendering of discipline

of public employees[,]" our Supreme Court endorsed the principles of

progressive discipline. Stallworth, 208 N.J. at 195. Those principles predicate

the severity of punishment on the seriousness of the offense committed and the

employee's disciplinary record. Id. at 195-96. "The number and remoteness or

timing of the offenses and their comparative seriousness, together with an

analysis of the present conduct, must inform the evaluation of the appropriate

penalty." Id. at 199.

In instances where an employee "engag[ed] in conduct that is unbecoming

to the position[,]" our Court has upheld an employee's termination regardless of

disciplinary record. Herrmann, 192 N.J. at 34. Pertinently, dismissal of an

officer with an unblemished record "for [a violation] that went to the heart of

the officer's ability to be trusted to function appropriately in his position" does

not contravene the principles of progressive discipline. Id. at 35 (citing Cosme

v. Bureau E. Newark Twp. Comm., 304 N.J. Super. 191, 206 (App. Div. 1997)).

That is so because "the theory of progressive discipline [is not] a fixed and

immutable rule to be followed without question." Carter, 191 N.J. at 484.

Rather, "some disciplinary infractions are so serious that removal is appropriate

A-1567-23 10 notwithstanding a largely unblemished prior record." Ibid.

Again, Dooley does not dispute the charges against him, only the penalty.

He maintains the penalty of removal contravenes the principle of progressive

discipline because the CSC disregarded the temporal remoteness of the first two

DUI offenses, which occurred approximately fifteen years before the third DUI.

The DOC maintains that notwithstanding the remoteness of the prior offenses,

the quantity and egregiousness of Dooley's offenses warrant the penalty of

removal.

In its final administrative action, the CSC elaborated on its reasoning in

support of the DOC's determination:

In determining the propriety of the penalty, several factors must be considered, including the nature of the [Dooley's] offense, the concept of progressive discipline, and the employee's prior record. . . . However, it is well established that where the underlying conduct is of an egregious nature, the imposition of a penalty up to and including removal is appropriate, regardless of an individual's disciplinary history. . . . Even when a law enforcement officer does not possess a prior disciplinary record after many unblemished years of employment, the seriousness of an offense may nevertheless warrant the penalty of removal where it is likely to undermine the public trust. In this regard, the Commission emphasizes that a law enforcement officer, such as a [SCPO], is held to a higher standard than a civilian public employee.

[(Citations omitted).]

A-1567-23 11 The DOC's assessment is consistent with the law. The conduct at issue

was particularly egregious. As a senior correctional officer with approximately

nineteen years of experience, Dooley was "a special kind of public

employee . . . . He represents law and order to the citizenry and must present an

image of personal integrity and dependability in order to have the respect of the

public." Moorestown v. Armstrong, 89 N.J. Super. 560, 566 (App. Div. 1965).

The CSC did not err in concluding his multiple convictions for DUI and refusal

to cooperate with law enforcement had the capacity to undermine public trust

and run contrary to the higher standard to which senior correctional police

officers are held. See Bowden, 268 N.J. Super. at 305-06 ("The need for proper

control over the conduct of inmates in a correctional facility and the part played

by proper relationships between those who are required to maintain order

and enforce discipline and the inmates cannot be doubted."). In view of this

precedent, the CSC's decision to uphold the penalty of removal does not

contravene the principle of progressive discipline.

Accommodation and Employment Status

Dooley relies on the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD),

N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -50 and N.J.A.C. 13:13-2.5(b) and maintains the CSC's

decision was arbitrary and capricious because it did not provide Dooley with

A-1567-23 12 "the reasonable accommodation of . . . confronting and treating his addiction."

Dooley makes that argument even though the record is devoid of any evidence

he requested an accommodation after his first, second, or even third DUI. The

CSC counters that Dooley's removal was not based on any purported disability

but rather on his misconduct. It notes that discrimination against an individual

with a disability is prohibited, "unless the nature and the extent of the handicap

reasonably precludes the performance of the particular employment ," quoting

N.J.S.A. 10:5-4.1. Further, the CSC contends the LAD does not prevent the

removal of employees who are unable to adequately perform their duties, citing

Clowes, 109 N.J. at 590-91.

Generally, "[a]n employer must make a reasonable accommodation to the

limitations of an employee or applicant who is a person with a disability, unless

the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue

hardship on the operation of its business." N.J.A.C. 13:13-2.5(b). Further, an

employer need not provide a reasonable accommodation where: (1) the

individual's disability "precludes the performance of the essential functions of

the particular employment even with reasonable accommodation," or (2) "the

employment of that individual in a particular position would be hazardous to the

safety or health" of the individual or others. N.J.A.C. 13:13-2.8(a). "Nothing

A-1567-23 13 in the LAD protects employees from termination if they are not performing the

essential functions of the employer's legitimate expectations." Domurat v. Ciba

Specialty Chems. Corp., 353 N.J. Super. 74, 92 (App. Div. 2002). We perceive

nothing arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable about the CSC's determination

that Dooley's multiple DUIs had the capacity to undermine the public interest

and were not in line with the higher standard of conduct for correctional officers.

Finally, Dooley contends the CSC placed "undue weight" on Dooley's

status as a correctional officer. As the CSC accurately noted, this court has long

held that a correctional officer, even one with "personal problems," is held to a

higher standard than a civilian public employee. Armstrong, 89 N.J. Super. at

566. Dooley's contention that the CSC did not properly consider or weigh

relevant factors pertaining to his disability or status is without merit.

Agency Findings and Decision

Where an agency rejects or modifies an ALJ's findings of fact unrelated

to issues of witness credibility, N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c) provides that "the agency

head shall state with particularity the reasons for rejecting the findings and shall

make new or modified findings supported by sufficient, competent, and credible

evidence in the record."

The record establishes that the CSC stated with particularity its reasons

A-1567-23 14 for rejecting the ALJ's recommendation for a penalty and made findings

supported by sufficient credible evidence, including: (1) egregiousness of the

DUI offense and refusal to submit to a breathalyzer; (2) Dooley's heightened

duty as a correctional officer to maintain an image of personal integrity; and (3)

Dooley's inconsistent and insufficient rehabilitative efforts.

In sum, there was nothing arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable in the

CSC's decision to uphold the DOC's removal of Dooley. The agency's

conclusions were supported legally and by substantial evidence in the record.

Affirmed.

A-1567-23 15