RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2546-24
IN THE MATTER OF REGISTRANT P.H.O. 1 _____________________
Submitted April 20, 2026 – Decided July 16, 2026
Before Judges Sabatino and Natali.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. ML-1004.
Benedict Altman and Nettl, LLC, attorneys for appellant P.H.O. (Philip Nettl, on the brief).
Linda Estremera, Middlesex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent State of New Jersey (David M. Liston, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel; Brian D. Gillet, Legal Assistant, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Registrant P.H.O. appeals from an April 8, 2025 order re-classifying him
from a Tier II (moderate risk) to a Tier III (high risk) sex offender pursuant to
1 We use initials because records relating to the child victims of sexual assault or abuse are excluded from public access under Rule 1:38-3(c)(9). the registration and community notification provisions of Megan's Law,
N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -23. Specifically, he contests the court's findings related to
two factors under the Registrant Risk Assessment Scale (RRAS) -- factor one,
degree of force and factor two, degree of contact. He maintains the State failed
to clearly and convincingly establish the upward adjustment of his tier.
Registrant has an extensive history of sexual offenses dating back to the
1980s, including multiple convictions for endangering the welfare of a child,
lewdness, and criminal sexual contact, as well as repeated violations of
Community Supervision for Life (CSL) and Parole Supervision for Life (PSL).
Before the events and charges that give rise to this appeal, registrant had an
RRAS score of 66, was classified as a Tier II offender, and accordingly subject
to internet registration and 90-day reporting requirements.
In December 2021, registrant met the then fifteen-year-old female victim,
H.N., at a Dunkin Donuts. She told the police she accepted a ride from him,
after which he brought her to his home and sexually assaulted her. She alleged
that registrant touched her vagina and breasts under her clothing, penetrated her
vagina with his penis, and forced her to perform oral sex on him. She was able
to call 911 from the registrant's bathroom after which the police responded to
the scene and arrested registrant.
A-2546-24 2 Registrant was later indicted and charged with second-degree kidnapping,
N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(b)(1), sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2, criminal sexual
contact, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(b), and endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A.
2C:24-4(a)(1). He pled guilty to the endangering charge and to a violation of
CSL. In exchange, the State sought a three-year custodial sentence, concurrent
to an 18-month term for the CSL violation and agreed to dismiss the remaining
charges. Defendant pled guilty to the endangering charge and provided a factual
basis in which he admitted to touching the victim's breast. He was sentenced in
accordance to the plea agreement and has since completed his custodial sentence
and was released.
Based on the facts of the 2021 offense, registrant's guilty plea and his
criminal history, the State provided registrant with notice of a hearing to
increase his tier classification to Tier III. The State supported its application
with a RRAS score of 93, which it later reduced to 86.
Prior to the tier classification hearing, both the State and the registrant
submitted extensive documentary evidence and written arguments for the court's
consideration. The State's submissions included the proposed RRAS which
supported a Tier III classification and notification, with internet notification and
90-day registration. The RRAS was accompanied by supporting documentation,
A-2546-24 3 including police reports, victim statements, forensic nurse reports, and
Presentence Investigation Reports (PSIs) from Ocean, Monmouth, Essex, and
Middlesex counties. These PSIs detailed the registrant's prior offenses, the
circumstances of the 2021 offense, and his criminal history. The State also
submitted the statements of the victim, H.N., to law enforcement and to the
forensic nurse, which consistently described registrant's use of force and
penetration.
As noted, defendant objected to the proposed tiering and focused his
challenges on RRAS static factors, one, degree of force, and two, degree of
contact. In support, he submitted DNA laboratory reports and argued that DNA
testing of the victim's underwear found semen and male DNA, but excluded the
registrant as the source, undermining her claim of sexual intercourse. Registrant
also submitted a prior 2021 RRAS that he maintained established lower scores
for force and contact. Further, the registrant provided evidence from H.N.'s ride
share records and phone data, which contradicted her account of her movements
before arriving at registrant's home which he maintained impeached her
credibility.
Finally, registrant submitted an expert report of Dr. Zachary Yeoman,
Ph.D., a licensed psychologist. Dr. Yeoman reviewed registrant's criminal
A-2546-24 4 history, treatment records, and the circumstances of the most recent offense.
Although Dr. Yeoman expressed partial disagreement with the State's scoring of
certain dynamic factors, he concluded that his overall risk level remained within
the Tier III range having "scored him on the RRAS and gave him 76 points (tier
3 range)."
With respect to the degree of force factor, registrant stressed the State's
only evidence was the victim's uncorroborated statements. He further
maintained that he pled guilty to only the endangering charge which does not
require proof of force as an element of the offense. Registrant also contended
the victim's credibility was in serious question based on what he characterizes
as numerous inconsistencies and false statements made to the police regarding
her location and travel prior to the incident at his home. On this point, registrant
pointed to the submitted ride share records and other evidence that contradicted
her account that she took a train to New York and was picked up by police and
also failed to provide material information regarding another individual she met
before she interacted with the registrant. He argued that he did not exercise a
degree of force because H.N.'s physical examination lacked any physical or
forensic evidence which indicated that she sustained injuries.
A-2546-24 5 Registrant made similar claims regarding the degree of contact factor,
specifically maintaining the State failed to introduce evidence that his acts
involved penetration. Again, he maintains the only proof of either vaginal or
oral penetration was the victim's uncorroborated statements which he contended
were unreliable. He stressed that the submitted DNA results of her
undergarments found semen and male DNA but excluded him as a source which
supports his claim he did not engage in intercourse with her. Finally, he argues
his plea only admitted to touching the victim's breast which does not involve a
penetrative act.
As a result of these deficient proofs, registrant argued the RRAS should
be modified to reflect contact scored as five points rather than characterized as
penetration which was ascribed fifteen points, and that the force scoring should
be zero. Finally, registrant maintained he was self-employed and should not be
scored as unemployed, but conceded that a modification of his employment
status would not alter his tier assuming the other factors remained unchanged.
In response, the State maintained that the revised RRAS score correctly
reflected registrant's Tier III risk based on the record, including the 2021 offense
and his significant criminal history. In support, it noted that the victim's
statements to the police and her statement to the forensic nurse consistently
A-2546-24 6 reported defendant's use of force and penetration during the assault.
Specifically, it relied on her account that registrant forced her onto a mattress,
penetrated her vaginally, and forced her to perform oral sex. She also told the
nurse he was "threatening me while he was on top of me and I was scared and
crying." That conduct constituted, according to the State, a "moderate" degree
of force at a minimum under the RRAS manual, and the evidence of both vaginal
and oral penetration more than justified a "high risk" score for degree of contact.
The State also stressed under In re Registrant C.J., 474 N.J. Super. 97
(App. Div. 2022), the court was free to consider the facts underlying the charges
as contained in the record and produced in discovery notwithstanding that
registrant pled guilty only to an endangering charge conditioned upon those facts
having been established by clear and convincing evidence to satisfy the less
demanding standard of proof in Megan's law tiering. It maintained the material
evidence in the record, specifically that the victim's statements were not
materially contradicted and the fact that there was no DNA evidence did not
prevent the court from making a finding that registrant used force or penetrated
the victim as such evidence does not exist in every case, as registrant's counsel
conceded. In addition, the State pointed out that registrant's own expert, Dr.
Yeoman, scored him as a 76, which was within the Tier III range.
A-2546-24 7 The court held a non-testimonial hearing and after considering the parties'
submissions and oral arguments, entered the April 8th, 2025 order that granted
the State's application to reclassify registrant as a Tier III offender with a high
level of risk of re-offense, "based upon the final Registrant Risk Assessment
Scale (RRAS) score of 86." The court specifically noted its findings were based
on clear and convincing evidence, and upon a full review of each factor of the
RRAS, all documents provided to the court and the registrant "including but not
limited to the RRAS, court documents, offense reports, and psychiatric or
psychological evaluations . . . ." The court also affirmed the scope and manner
of notification after again finding by clear and convincing evidence that the Tier
III scope and manner of notification "shall occur within an approximate radius
of .5 mile of [r]egistrant's residence and .5 mile of the registrant's place of
employment and shall be made to those schools, day care centers and other
community organizations set forth on the attached list."
During the hearing, the court considered and rejected all of registrant's
arguments. It first acknowledged that the "big issue here is the force issue," and
specifically whether the State clearly and convincingly established that his
conduct warranted a moderate score for force and a high score for contact. The
court rejected registrant's credibility-based challenges and found based on the
A-2546-24 8 record, including the "PSIs and nature of the complaint" that the victim "was
very clear about what she was alleging," and noted she stated registrant vaginally
penetrated her and forced her to perform. It also recognized the lack of forensic
evidence but found the State was permitted to credit her statements when
assessing registrant's risk.
The court specifically addressed and rejected registrant's arguments
regarding the lack of corroborating forensic evidence and purported
inconsistencies in H.N.'s account. It noted that the absence of physical evidence
was not dispositive on its force or contact findings, as corroboration beyond a
credible victim statement was not required. On this point, the court relied on In
re Registrant C.J. for the proposition that the State is permitted to rely on the
underlying facts of the offense, even if they do not result in a conviction,
provided those facts are established by clear and convincing evidence .
As to the force factor, the court rejected registrant's arguments and
explained in light of the victim's allegations, the State appropriately considered
the pre-indictment discovery "to make the assessments . . . with regards to
scoring" and found no error in characterizing registrant as a moderate offender,
noting "he could have been scored a much higher risk."
A-2546-24 9 The court similarly rejected registrant's challenges regarding the degree
of contact factor. It explained that the record fully supported the RRAS scoring
and found irrelevant that defendant pled to lesser charges as the considerations
surrounding an individual's decision to plead guilty are distinctly different than
the facts supporting the RRAS score, which consider the credible facts as found
by the court.
The court found no error in the RRAS scoring as the facts fully supported
a moderate risk for force and high risk for degree of contact, again relying on
the victim's statements that registrant assaulted her and forced her to engage in
penetrative acts. The court also took into consideration registrant's history of
sexual offenses and his violations of his CSL and PSL obligations. The court
specifically noted that during his plea allocution he admitted to touching the
victim's breast which based on her age and circumstances was indisputably a
non-consensual act. As the court explained "even touching her breast required
some level of force because this most certainly was not a touching that was
consented to." Finally, the court left open the possibility of a further
modification if additional evidence was presented regarding defendant's
employment status but noted based on the current record it did not appear that it
would affect registrant's Tier III classification. Both the trial and our court
A-2546-24 10 denied his request for stay of the Tier III notification requirement pending
appeal.
Before us, registrant largely reprises his arguments made before the court
and claims it committed legal error by deferring unreasonably to the RRAS score
and failing to make detailed and independent findings of fact regarding the
State's proofs and whether it established critical facts by clear and convincing
evidence. Further to this point, registrant argues the court failed to address the
significant credibility issues regarding the victim's statements to the police
without making independent factual findings supported by clear and convincing
evidence. He contends the evidence supported a modification of the RRAS to
reflect zero points for force and five points for contact, which would have
resulted in a Tier II classification. We disagree with all of these arguments.
"We review a trial court's conclusions regarding a Megan's Law
registrant's tier designation and scope of community notification for an abuse of
discretion." In re Registrant B.B., 472 N.J. Super. 612, 619 (App. Div.
2022) (citing In re Registrant A.I., 303 N.J. Super. 105, 114 (App. Div. 1997)).
"[A]n abuse of discretion arises when a decision is made without a rational
explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an
impermissible basis." Id. at 619-20 (alteration in original) (quoting State v.
A-2546-24 11 R.Y., 242 N.J. 48, 65 (2020)). "The trial court's findings will be upheld so long
as they are supported by sufficient evidence in the record . . . ." In re Registrant
M.L., 479 N.J. Super. 433, 449 (App. Div. 2024). However, "[a] trial court's
interpretation of the law and the . . . consequences that flow from established
facts are not entitled to any special deference." Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp.
Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).
The "hearing process . . . is not governed by the [R]ules of [E]vidence." In
re Registrant C.A., 146 N.J. 71, 83 (1996). When calculating a registrant's score
on the RRAS, "the State is free to rely on hearsay statements to support its
assertions and does not need to base its calculations surrounding the underlying
offense solely on the facts of conviction." In re Registrant G.B., 147 N.J. 62,
79 (1996) (citing C.A., 146 N.J. at 88-93). The court may consider "all reliable
information" including "[s]exual offenses, not the subject of a conviction" and
supported by admissions, police reports, and psychiatric reports. In re
Registrant J.W., 410 N.J. Super. 125, 130-31 (App. Div. 2009).
Megan's Law is intended "to protect the community from the dangers of
recidivism by sexual offenders." C.A., 146 N.J. at 80 (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:7-
1(a)). In fact, "[t]he expressed purposes of the registration and notification
procedures [under Megan's Law] are 'public safety' and 'preventing and
A-2546-24 12 promptly resolving incidents involving sexual abuse and missing persons. '" In
re Registrant A.A., 461 N.J. Super. 385, 394 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting N.J.S.A.
2C:7-1). "The law is remedial and not intended to be
punitive." Ibid. (citing Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 12-13 (1995)).
The extent of community notification chiefly results from a registrant's
designation as a Tier I (low), Tier II (moderate), or Tier III (high)
offender. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8(a), (c)(1) to (3). Tier designations reflect a
registrant's risk of re-offense. A.A., 461 N.J. Super. at 402. If the risk of re-
offense is deemed low, only law enforcement agencies likely to encounter the
registrant are notified. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8(c)(1). If the risk of re-offense is
considered moderate, schools and community organizations in the community
also must be notified. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8(c)(2). But if the risk of re-offense is
high, members of the public likely to encounter the registrant likewise must be
notified. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8(c)(3).
Given the need for uniformity, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8(a) authorized the
Attorney General to create guidelines and procedures to evaluate a registrant's
risk of re-offense. See Attorney General Guidelines for Law Enforcement for
the Implementation of Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification
Laws (Guidelines) (rev'd Feb. 2007). The RRAS was developed for the State's
A-2546-24 13 use to establish a registrant's tier classification and manner of notification. In
re Registrant T.T., 188 N.J. 321, 328 (2006) (citing C.A., 146 N.J. at 110).
The Megan's Law "[t]ier designations reflect a registrant's risk of re-
offense, as determined by a judge assessing various information, including
thirteen factors referenced in the RRAS." In re Registrant C.J., 474 N.J. Super.
at 106 (citing A.A., 461 N.J. Super. at 402). "Although it is not scientific
evidence, the [RRAS] is a 'reliable and useful tool that the State can use to
establish its prima facie case concerning a registrant's tier classification and
manner of notification.'" M.L., 479 N.J. Super. at 443 (quoting C.A., 146 N.J.
at 110).
"While a tier classification made on the basis of the [RRAS] should be
afforded deference, it is not absolute; a Megan's Law judge must conduct an
independent review of the merits of the case and not rely solely on the [RRAS]
score." Ibid. (citing C.A., 146 N.J. at 108-09). The State ultimately bears the
burden of proving "by clear and convincing evidence both the registrant's level
of risk to the community and the scope of notification necessary to protect the
community." Ibid. (citing In re Registrant R.F., 317 N.J. Super. 379, 383-84
(App. Div. 1998)). The evidence "must be 'so clear, direct and weighty and
convincing as to enable . . . a judge . . . to come to a clear conviction, without
A-2546-24 14 hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.'" In re Registrant J.G., 169
N.J. 304, 331 (2001) (quoting R.F., 317 N.J. Super. at 384).
The RRAS contains four categories: seriousness of the offense; offense
history; personal characteristics; and community support. State v. C.W., 449
N.J. Super. 231, 260 (App. Div. 2017) (citing In re Registrant V.L., 441 N.J.
Super. 425, 429 (App. Div. 2015)). Within those categories is a non-exhaustive
list of thirteen risk assessment criteria related to re-offense. C.A., 146 N.J. at
82.
"The first two categories, '[s]eriousness of [o]ffense' and '[o]ffense
[h]istory,' are considered static categories because they relate to the registrant's
prior criminal conduct." Id. at 103. The next two categories, "[c]haracteristics
of '[o]ffender' and '[c]ommunity [s]upport' are considered to be dynamic
categories, because they are evidenced by current conditions." Ibid. The "static
factors" relate to past criminal conduct and weigh more heavily under the RRAS
than the dynamic factors. In re Registrant J.M., 167 N.J. 490, 500 (2001).
The "[s]eriousness of [o]ffense" category takes into account: (1) degree of
force; (2) degree of contact; and (3) age of the victim(s). C.A., 146 N.J. at 103.
The "[o]ffense [h]istory" category covers: (4) victim selection; (5) number of
offenses/victims; (6) duration of offensive behavior; (7) length of time since last
A-2546-24 15 offense; and (8) any history of anti-social acts. Ibid. The "[c]haracteristics of
[o]ffender" category accounts for the registrant's: (9) response to treatment and
(10) substance abuse. Id. at 103-04. The final category, "[c]ommunity
[s]upport" considers a registrant's: (11) therapeutic support; (12) residential
support; and (13) employment/educational stability. Id. at 104.
"Each factor is assigned a risk level of low (0), moderate (1), or high (3),
and '[t]he total for all levels within a category provides a score that is then
weighted based on the particular category.'" A.A., 461 N.J. Super. at
402 (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting C.A., 146 N.J. at 104).
"An RRAS score [totaling] 0 to 36 is low risk; 37 to 73 moderate risk; and 74 or
more, high risk." T.T., 188 N.J. at 329 (citing Guidelines 4).
Atypical cases in which the RRAS score is rendered suspect due to unique
facts require an adjustment of the level of community notification indicated; this
situation is commonly referred to as falling outside the “heartland” of Megan's
Law cases. G.B., 147 N.J. at 82. "[T]he State may, in limited circumstances,
request notification more expansive than indicated by a registrant's confirmed
[RRAS] score." M.L., 479 N.J. Super. at 449. Such a request may only be made
"in the 'unusual case where relevant, material, and reliable facts exist for which
the [RRAS] does not account, or does not adequately account . . . . Those facts
A-2546-24 16 must be sufficiently unusual to establish that a particular registrant's case falls
outside the 'heartland' of cases.'" Ibid. (omission in original) (quoting G.B., 147
N.J. at 82).
"In challenging a tier determination, a registrant may argue that (1) the
RRAS score was erroneously calculated, (2) the case falls outside the 'heartland'
of Megan's Law cases, or (3) the extent of community notification required is
excessive due to ‘unique’ aspects of the registrant's case." In re Registrant J.G.,
463 N.J. Super. 263, 275 (App. Div. 2020) (quoting T.T., 188 N.J. at 330).
Having considered the arguments on appeal against these principles, we
are satisfied the trial court did not abuse its discretion as its decision that the
State clearly and convincingly established the need to classify registrant as a
Tier III classification was fully supported by the record, which included, as
noted, the victim's statements, the forensic nurse's report, her 911 call, and the
police reports. To the extent registrant maintains the court in its oral decision
failed to make necessary factual findings, we first note that we review orders,
not opinions, see Do-Wop Corp. v. City of Rahway, 168 N.J. 191, 199 (2001),
and on this point conclude the April 8, 2025 order explicitly made the necessary
and required clear and convincing findings. We also reject any contention that
A-2546-24 17 the court gave undue weight to the RRAS scores. The court's findings as
expressed in its order are fully supported by the record, as noted.
We also disagree with registrant's arguments to the extent he maintains
the court did not consider his credibility-based arguments regarding the victim's
alleged intoxicated state and her inconsistencies related to her travel,
companions, and ride share use before she was taken to registrant's home. As
to the critical facts that supported the force and contact scoring, the court
correctly noted that the fifteen-year-old victim's statements were consistent
across multiple settings. We are satisfied her account of being forced to engage
in vaginal and oral penetration was supported by the record and sufficient to
meet the clear and convincing evidence standard required for Megan 's Law
tiering and accordingly find no support to conclude the court misapplied its
discretion or to otherwise disturb its findings.
The court also explained that a Tier III classification and notification were
appropriate in light of the registrant's history and the facts of the most recent
offense, again relying on the documentary evidence in the record including the
consistent statements of the victim, as reflected in the police reports, forensic
nurse's report, and 911 call. Clearly the court rejected registrant's arguments
that any inconsistencies in the victim's pre-assault travels were overcome by her
A-2546-24 18 other consistent statements even in the absence of physical or forensic
corroboration. The court also, as permitted by In re Registrant C.J., considered
the facts of the 2021 offense, even those that did not result in a conviction.
Further, as the court found, and as defendant admitted during his plea colloquy,
he touched the victim's breast, which, given the context and the victim's age,
was a non-consensual act and indicative of the risk posed by him.
In sum, the court conducted an independent review of the record and
affirmed the State's Tier III high risk of re-offense. Under the totality of the
circumstances, the court ultimately found that the State clearly and convincingly
met its burden of proof. We have no cause to disturb that result.
Affirmed.
A-2546-24 19