In the Matter of Registrant J.W.

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: April 23, 2025
• Docket: A-2938-23
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2938-23

IN THE MATTER OF REGISTRANT J.W. ___________________

Submitted April 8, 2025 – Decided April 23, 2025

Before Judges Chase and Vanek.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Ocean County, Docket No. ML-07-15-0033.

Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant J.W. (Michael T. Denny, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

Bradley D. Billhimer, Ocean County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent State of New Jersey (Natalie Pouch, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Registrant J.W. 1 appeals from a trial court order denying his motion for a

downward departure from his Tier Three high risk offender classification under

1 We use initials to preserve the confidentiality of these proceedings. R. 1:38- 3(c)(9). the "heartland" exception to Megan's Law, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -23. Based on

our thorough review and application of prevailing law, we affirm substantially

for the reasons set forth by the trial court in its comprehensive written decision.

I.

We incorporate the facts set forth in our prior opinion In re J.W., No. A-

4241-05 (In re J.W. I) (App. Div. Mar. 11, 2008) (slip op. at 2-4), and recount

only salient facts for context of our decision.

In 2003, J.W. was adjudicated delinquent of first-degree aggravated

sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(1), for offenses he committed while he was

a juvenile, between the ages of ten to sixteen. The conduct underlying the

conviction involved the sexual assaults of three minor victims: J.W.'s seven-

year-old female cousin; a female friend of his cousin; and a female friend of

J.W.'s sister. In re J.W. I details the heinous nature of the assaults which began

with touching, and escalated to digital penetration, intercourse, and eventually,

penetration of the victims with various objects. The assaults became

increasingly violent, and J.W. utilized threats to dissuade the victims from

reporting.

J.W. was sentenced to serve two years of incarceration and required to

comply with Megan's Law under N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(b)(2). He was released from

A-2938-23 2 the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center in Avenel, New Jersey in 2007 and

was classified as a Tier Three offender. We affirmed the classification on

appeal. See In re J.W. I.

In 2014, J.W., then thirty-two, was arrested for the sexual assault of his

girlfriend's sixteen-year-old daughter. He pleaded guilty to one count of third-

degree endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1), and was

sentenced to three years' incarceration and parole supervision for life (PSL),

N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4. On the same date, he was concurrently sentenced for failing

to comply with Megan's Law registration requirements, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(d).

Following J.W.'s release from incarceration, he was classified under the

Registrant Risk Assessment Score (RRAS) to account for the new conviction.

After a hearing, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence

supported an RRAS score of ninety-three and classified J.W. as a Tier Three

high risk offender. J.W. was also deemed a Tier Three high risk offender in

three subsequent orders, with the most recent 2022 order memorializing the

RRAS score of eighty-one.

Two years later, J.W. moved for a reduction in his classification from Tier

Three to Tier Two. The trial court held oral argument on the motion, denying

the application in a comprehensive written opinion.

A-2938-23 3 In denying J.W.'s motion, the trial court determined there was no showing

that J.W.'s offense-free seven years in the community would render him "outside

the heartland" of Megan's Law cases because he reoffended. The court observed

J.W.'s history of re-offending outweighs "the time [J.W.] has spent offense[-

]free in the community as evidence of a lowered level of risk." The court found

"[t]he time [J.W.] was offense[-]free in the community after the first offense did

not prevent his conduct leading to the second offense. [J.W.'s] time offense[-

]free in the community, [therefore] cannot be said to lower his risk to the point

wherein Tier [Two] classification would be more appropriate."

The trial court found J.W.'s "lack of remorse or responsibility . . . deeply

concerning." The court also observed contradictions between J.W.'s completion

of therapy letter from Sharii Battle, MA, of Rutgers University Behavioral

Health Care, and the psychosexual evaluation and actuarial risk assessment from

Dr. James R. Reynolds, a licensed psychologist. Battle's letter stated J.W.

"accepted full responsibility for his actions during the course of his offense and

ha[d] a better understand[ing] of what is appropriate behavior," while Reynolds'

report showed J.W. disavowed responsibility. J.W. maintained "he did not

commit a sexual offense in either matter" and "only took the first agreement

A-2938-23 4 because [he] was told [his] records would be sealed, and [he] wouldn't have to

register. [He] took the second plea because [his] father was on his deathbed."

The trial court determined J.W. was "dishonest with Ms. Battle and faked

taking responsibility for his offenses" or alternatively, "first genuinely took

responsibility when meeting with Ms. Battle and then changed his mind deciding

he did not commit the offenses at a later date." The court found either

explanation concerning, reasoning "[J.W.'s] drastic position change is enough to

call into question the reliability of Ms. Battle's opinion, as well as any belief . .

. the sex-offender treatment had any positive impact on [J.W.'s] risk level."

The trial court declined to afford less weight to J.W.'s juvenile offenses

because J.W. continued to offend after he was over the age of fourteen and then

he offended again once released as an adult. The court reasoned "it would be

absurd" to find J.W.'s "actions as a juvenile are properly attributed to the

inability of juveniles to understand their actions."

Furthermore, the trial court determined Reynolds' report to be

unpersuasive and not credible based on other material inconsistencies. In

Reynolds' report, he stated,

[J.W.] reportedly has never viewed images of child sexual abuse/exploitation materials . . . or deviant forms of pornography, such as bestiality or of sexual violence.

A-2938-23 5 [J.W.] added that "it's been a while since I've seen any of that. Probably, over a year now."

The trial court explained Reynolds' report failed to address the inconsistent

statements related to J.W.'s reported viewing of pornography and failed "to

properly address . . . the impact that [J.W.'s] status as an individual who has

reoffended after being released has on his risk level, as well as the effects of his

sexual sadism and diagnoses of sexual paraphilic disorder."

Thus, the trial court determined J.W. had "not demonstrated by

preponderance of the evidence that his is the 'unusual case where relevant,

material, and reliable facts exist for which the [RRAS] [s]cale does not account,

or does not adequately account,' such that [the] [c]ourt should over ride the

RRAS score."

On appeal, J.W. raises a single point for our consideration:

THE HEARING COURT SHOULD HAVE DEPARTED FROM THE STANDARD TIER [THREE] MEGAN'S LAW NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS AND ORDERED THAT J.W. BE SUBJECT TO THE TIER [TWO] REQUIREMENTS INSTEAD.

Our analysis follows.

A-2938-23 6 II.

"We review a trial court's conclusions regarding a Megan's Law

registrant's tier designation and scope of community notification for an abuse of

discretion." In re B.B., 472 N.J. Super. 612, 619 (App. Div. 2022). "[A]n abuse

of discretion 'arises when a decision is made without a rational explanation,

inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible

basis.'" State v. R.Y., 242 N.J. 48, 65 (2020) (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cnty.

Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)). "A trial court's interpretation of the law

and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to

any special deference." Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan,

140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).

The purpose of Megan's Law is "to protect the community from the

dangers of recidivism by sexual offenders." In re C.A., 146 N.J. 71, 80 (1996)

(citing N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1(a)). "The expressed purposes of the registration and

notification procedures [under Megan's Law] are 'public safety' and 'preventing

and promptly resolving incidents involving sexual abuse and missing persons.'"

In re A.A., 461 N.J. Super. 385, 394 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:7-

1). "The law is remedial and not intended to be punitive." Ibid. (citing Doe v.

Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 12-13 (1995)).

A-2938-23 7 Megan's Law "[t]ier designations reflect a registrant's risk of re-offense,

as determined by a judge assessing various information, including thirteen

factors referenced in the RRAS." In re C.J., 474 N.J. Super. 97, 106 (App. Div.

2022) (citing A.A., 461 N.J. Super. at 402). The RRAS was developed for the

State's use "to establish its prima facie case concerning a registrant's tier

classification and manner of notification." In re T.T., 188 N.J. 321, 328 (2006)

(quoting C.A., 146 N.J. at 110). The RRAS "is presumptively accurate and is

to be afforded substantial weight—indeed it will even have binding effect—

unless and until a registrant 'presents subjective criteria that would support a

court not relying on the tier classification recommended by the [s]cale.'" In re

G.B., 147 N.J. 62, 81 (1996) (quoting C.A., 146 N.J. at 109).

While "registrants cannot argue that the RRAS as a scale is unreliable,"

the RRAS "is not immune to specific challenges as applied to a particular

registrant." In re J.G., 463 N.J. Super. 263, 274-76 (App. Div. 2020) (citing

G.B., 147 N.J. at 82-84). However, an RRAS score will have a "binding effect[,]

unless and until a registrant 'presents subjective criteria that would support a

court not relying on the tier classification recommended by the [RRAS].'" Id. at

276 (quoting G.B., 147 N.J. at 81).

A-2938-23 8 In challenging a tier determination, a registrant may argue, among other

points, that "the case falls outside the 'heartland' of Megan's Law cases . . . ."

Id. at 275 (quoting T.T., 188 N.J. at 330). While "few cases . . . involve facts

that render the [RRAS] score suspect," the exception exists to allow judges to

override RRAS scores in "unusual case[s] where relevant, material, and reliable

facts exist for which the [RRAS] does not account, or does not adequately

account . . . ." G.B., 147 N.J. at 82.

Because Megan's Law was enacted "to enable society 'to protect itself

from sexual predators,'" a court which finds a registrant is not "the type of sexual

offender contemplated by the community notification provisions of Megan's

Law" may therefore effectuate a downward departure in the registrant's tier

classification. In re E.I., 300 N.J. Super. 519, 525 (App. Div. 1997) (quoting

Doe, 142 N.J. at 109). Should an expert testify to "unique aspects of a

registrant's offense or character that render the [RRAS] score suspect," the court

may conclude "the [RRAS] does not adequately represent the risk of recidivism

for that particular registrant and . . . the scope of notification should be more

limited than that indicated by the registrant's [RRAS] score and attendant tier

classification." G.B., 147 N.J. at 69 (alterations in original).

A-2938-23 9 In addressing a registrant's classification, a court is free to consider

reliable evidence besides the RRAS score, even if such evidence would not be

otherwise admissible, because the "hearing process . . . is not governed by the

[R]ules of [E]vidence." C.A., 146 N.J. at 83. "Judicial determinations regarding

tier classification and community notification are within the court's discretion

and based on all the available evidence, not simply the 'numerical calculation

provided by the [RRAS].'" A.A., 461 N.J. Super. at 402 (second alteration in

original) (quoting G.B., 147 N.J. at 78-79). The trial court may consider any

credible information available which may include, but is not limited to,

psychological or psychiatric reports. In re C.A., 285 N.J. Super. 343, 348 (App.

Div. 1995) (internal citation omitted).

Here, J.W. proffered Battle's letter acknowledging his completion of

sexual offender treatment and Reynolds' psychosexual evaluation and actuarial

risk assessment report concluding J.W.'s risk to reoffend was lower than what

was reflected by his RRAS score, posing only an average risk for recidivism.

However, J.W. failed to present any evidence his offenses or character are

sufficiently "unique" to merit overriding his RRAS score to conclude he poses

a lower risk.

A-2938-23 10 We discern no error with the trial court's finding that J.W.'s evidence was

not credible, deferring to the trial court's credibility determinations. In its

comprehensive written decision, the trial court evaluated Battle's letter and

found the impact of J.W.'s completion of sex offender treatment on recidivism

was "questionable as a result of [J.W.'s] changing story on taking responsibility

for his offenses," and because J.W. was recently directed to return to treatment

by his parole officer.

Even if we were to discount J.W.'s failure to accept responsibility, the trial

court's additional findings that Reynolds' expert report did not credibly establish

J.W. presents a lower risk are substantiated in the record, alone warranting

denial. Reynolds stated:

[J.W.] is in a unique sex offender category, in that he sexually re-offended as an adult after having been previously detected, sanctioned, and treated for sexual offenses that he perpetrated as a juvenile. This is unique because global research has found that juveniles who commit sexual offenses only have a re-offense rate of approximately 5%. Additionally, [J.W.'s] juvenile sexual offenses against his cousin included acts of sexual sadism, which is an infrequent form of sexual offense. He was previously diagnosed with a sexual paraphilic disorder, as a result. That, too, rarely occurs, and sexual deviance is a known risk factor for sexual re-offending.

A-2938-23 11 Reynolds failed to connect J.W.'s re-offending as an adult and sexual deviance

with a lower Megan's Law risk level. There is no explanation as to why J.W. is

uniquely less likely to re-offend nor is there any proffered nexus between the

statistics and J.W.'s risk level. Instead, Reynolds seems to highlight a

potentially increased risk.

After fully considering the record, the trial court found J.W. failed to show

relevant, material, and reliable facts as to the unique nature of his offenses or

character for which the RRAS does not account. We conclude the trial court's

well-supported denial of J.W.'s request to reduce his Megan's Law obligations

through a change in tier classification was not an abuse of discretion and is

supported by the substantial, credible evidence in the record.

To the extent we have not specifically addressed any of the parties' legal

arguments it is because we have concluded they are of insufficient merit to

warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

Affirmed.

A-2938-23 12