In the Matter of Registrant D.F.

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: July 16, 2025
• Docket: A-2571-23
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2571-23

IN THE MATTER OF REGISTRANT D.F. ___________________

Argued April 30, 2025 – Decided July 16, 2025

Before Judges Sumners and Susswein.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County, Docket No. ML-13-09-0070.

Michael Ross Noveck, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant D.F. (Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney; Michael Ross Noveck, of counsel and on the briefs).

Angela Kristine Halverson, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent State of New Jersey (Esther Suarez, Hudson County Prosecutor, attorney; Angela Kristine Halverson, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM Megan's Law 1 Registrant D.F.2 appeals from a March 15, 2024 Law

Division order classifying him as a Tier Two offender. Defendant pled guilty

to armed robbery and kidnapping of two adults and a two-year old child. Those

crimes were committed in 1999. The Megan's Law registration requirement

applies to certain persons who have been convicted of a "sex offense" which

includes "kidnapping . . . if the victim is a minor and the offender is not the

parent of the victim." N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2.

While D.F. acknowledges that he was convicted of the Megan's Law form

of kidnapping, he argues applying Megan's Law registration and tiering

requirements to him violates his right to substantive due process under Article

I, Paragraph I of the New Jersey Constitution because his offense did not involve

sexual acts perpetrated against the child. He also reasons the child victim had

not been "target[ed]" but rather was in the "wrong place at the wrong time" by

merely being present at the time of the armed robbery. D.F. asserts that

1 Megan's Law is a collection of statutes governing the registration of certain predatory offenders, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to - 5, and community notification requirements for certain offenders, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-6 to - 11. See In re Registrant J.G., 169 N.J. 304, 309 (2001). 2 We use initials to preserve the confidentiality of records related to child victims of sexual assault or abuse. R. 1:38-3(c)(9).

A-2571-23 2 requiring him to register as a sex offender in these circumstances lacks a rational

basis. In the alternative, he argues that the Registrant Risk Assessment Scale

(RRAS) that is used to guide the tiering classification process is not designed to

address non-sexual kidnapping cases like this one. Aside from his as-applied

constitutional challenge, D.F. asks us to reclassify him as a Tier One offender,

or, in the alternative, to allow him to provide a psychosocial evaluation to

augment the RRAS score.

It is well-settled that appellate courts should "strive to avoid reaching

constitutional questions unless required to do so." Comm. to Recall Robert

Menendez From the Off. of U.S. Senator v. Wells, 204 N.J. 79, 95 (2010). See

also Randolph Town Ctr., L.P. v. Cnty. of Morris, 186 N.J. 78, 80 (2006)

("Courts should not reach a constitutional question unless its resolution is

imperative to the disposition of litigation."). In the unusual circumstances

presented in this case, we see no need to reach D.F.'s substantive due process

argument and instead remand the matter to allow him to present a psychosocial

evaluation to supplement the RRAS score that was used in determining whether

he should be classified as a Tier One or Tier Two offender.

We presume the parties are familiar with the pertinent facts and therefore

there is no need in this opinion to detail them. As we have noted, the Megan's

A-2571-23 3 Law notification requirement clearly applies to persons convicted of kidnapping

a child if the defendant is not the parent of the minor kidnapping victim,

regardless of whether the defendant sexually assaulted the child. As we recently

noted in State v. C.C.W., "[w]hen the Legislature chooses to define a term used

throughout a statute, that definition takes precedence over the common and

ordinary meaning of that term. Thus, to the extent a statutory definition is either

broader or narrower than a term's common understanding, the statutory

definitional language governs." ___ N.J. Super. ___, ___ (App. Div. 2025). We

also stress that nothing in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(b)(2)'s text requires that the victim

have been "targeted," as defendant now contends. It is sufficient that D.F. was

duly convicted of kidnapping someone else's child.

The gravamen of defendant's argument is that his criminal conduct falls

outside the heartland of Megan's Law. We are not persuaded that matters for

purposes of complying with the law's strict registration requirements. While

Megan's Law is commonly associated with sexual predation of children, the

plain language of the statute makes clear that kidnapping a child requires

registration and tiering notwithstanding the defendant does not commit an act of

sexual penetration or contact. We decline to disregard the literal terms of the

statue. See State v. J.V., 242 N.J. 432, 442-43 (2020) ("To determine the

A-2571-23 4 Legislature's intent, we look to the statute's language and give those terms their

plain and ordinary meaning . . . because 'the best indicator of that intent is the

plain language chosen by the Legislature[.]'" (quoting Johnson v. Roselle EZ

Quick LLC, 226 N.J. 370 386 (2016))).

Our focus thus turns from the text of the statute to the RRAS System

developed to inform tiering decisions. See In re C.A., 146 N.J. 71 (1996)

(upholding the RRAS). Much of the social science that undergirds the RRAS

system was based on studies of sex offenders. Id. at 105-06. In the present

circumstances, we believe a trial court performing tiering analysis would benefit

from an individualized professional assessment of the risk that D.F. would

reoffend. We note the State is correct when it argues that D.F. "had four months

to obtain an expert prior to the oral argument on his Heartland argument, but

chose not to request time to do so until the court forecasted its decision to reject

his argument." However, the State's appeal brief does not respond to D.F.'s

argument that the RRAS was not designed to deal with this situation. We

therefore accept D.F.'s alternate argument and remand the matter to provide him

an opportunity to submit a psychosocial evaluation to be considered by the trial

court on reconsideration as part of the totality of circumstances relevant to the

tiering decision.

A-2571-23 5 We offer no opinion on whether D.F. should be classified as a Tier One

or Tier Two offender. We add that while we do not reach D.F.'s substantive due

process argument, consideration of any such individualized professional

assessment of the risk that D.F. poses to the community may have a bearing on

the merits of any as-applied constitutional challenge he may raise.

Remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We instruct the

parties to provide the trial court with their appellate submissions. We do not

retain jurisdiction.

A-2571-23 6