in the Matter of Q.P.O.
Opinion
In The
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-20-00010-CV
IN THE MATTER OF Q.P.O.
On Appeal from the County Court at Law Bowie County, Texas
Trial Court No. 17JV0007-CCL
Before Morriss, C.J., Burgess and Stevens, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Morriss
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In 2017, Q.P.O. pled guilty to and was adjudicated by the trial court for delinquent conduct after he perpetrated two aggravated robberies when he was sixteen years old. The trial court committed Q.P.O. to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department (TJJD) for a determinate sentence of thirty-five years. In 2019, although Q.P.O. had made admirable efforts to do the right things during most of his time with TJJD, the trial court transferred Q.P.O.’s case to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice Correctional Institutions Division (TDCJ-CID) so he could serve the remainder of his sentence. In his sole point of error on appeal, Q.P.O. argues that the trial court abused its discretion in transferring him to TDCJ-CID. Because we find evidence supporting the trial court’s ruling, we affirm the trial court’s transfer order. (1) Standard of Review “Where a juvenile has been adjudicated and committed to TJJD and subsequently is transferred to TDCJ-CID, we review the trial court’s order for an abuse of discretion.” In re M.C., 502 S.W.3d 852, 854 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2016, pet. denied) (citing In re T.D.H., 971 S.W.2d 606, 610 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1998, no pet.)). “In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, we review the entire record to determine if the trial court acted arbitrarily, unreasonably, or without reference to any guiding principles or rules.” Id. (quoting In re A.C., No. 10-14-00364-CV, 2015 WL 6437696, at *1 (Tex. App.—Waco Oct. 22, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.)). “The trial court’s decision will be upheld if the record contains some evidence to support it.” Id. (citing In re N.K.M., 387 S.W.3d 859, 864 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, no pet.)).
Under the Texas Human Resources Code, a juvenile serving a determinate sentence for a first-degree felony “must serve at least three years of the meted sentence in TJJD” unless the juvenile court approves a release at the transfer hearing. Id. at 855 (citing TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 245.051(c)(2)). At the time of the transfer hearing, held on the day before his nineteenth birthday, Q.P.O. was five months short of the three years. “Once a juvenile attains the age of nineteen, the TJJD loses control over that juvenile.” Id. (citing TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 245.151(e)). “Because of the determinate sentence, the trial court could either release Q.P.O. to parole under TDCJ-CID’s supervision or transfer him to TDCJ-CID for continued confinement.” Id. “[A] transfer/release hearing conducted under Section 54.11 is a ‘second chance hearing’ that gives juveniles—who have previously been sentenced to a determinate number of years—a second chance to persuade the court that they should not be imprisoned.” In re A.V., No. 11-18- 00135-CV, 2020 WL 2836432, at *2 (Tex. App.—Eastland May 29, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting In re D.L., 198 S.W.3d 228, 230 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, pet. denied)).
In deciding whether to transfer a juvenile to TDCJ-CID,
the court may consider the experiences and character of the person before and after commitment to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department or post-adjudication secure correctional facility, the nature of the penal offense that the person was found to have committed and the manner in which the offense was committed, the abilities of the person to contribute to society, the protection of the victim of the offense or any member of the victim’s family, the recommendations of the Texas Juvenile Justice Department, county juvenile board, local juvenile probation department, and prosecuting attorney, the best interests of the person, and any other factor relevant to the issue to be decided.
M.C., 502 S.W.3d at 856–57 (quoting TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.11(k) (Supp.)). “Within its discretion, the trial court may assign different weights to the factors it considers, and the court
need not consider every factor.” In re H.C., No. 02-15-00149-CV, 2016 WL 354297, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 28, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.). (2) Evidence at the Transfer Hearing a. Evidence against Q.P.O.
At the second-chance hearing, there was evidence supporting the trial court’s decision.
John Bunch testified that Q.P.O. robbed him at gunpoint while he was parked in his car outside of his home. Bunch, who was forty-seven-years-old, said that he had been “a nervous wreck . . . since [Q.P.O.] had a revolver a few inches from [his] face, [while] screaming at [him].” Bunch explained the fear he had for his life and the impact of Q.P.O.’s actions on him. Bunch asked that, since Q.P.O. knew where Bunch lived, he should remain in custody. The victim of Q.P.O.’s other aggravated robbery did not testify because, according to the State, she did not wish to relive the experience.
The State admitted into evidence a psychological evaluation that was conducted by Toney Charles in 2017. According to Charles, Q.P.O. was first arrested in 2014 for stealing a hat from Target; had arrests for furnishing a weapon to a minor, loitering, and breaking and entering; had been caught with marihuana at school; and was previously released from a six-month substance abuse treatment program in 2016. In addition to the aggravated robberies, Q.P.O. had “[ac]companying charges [for] . . . possession of marijuana, less than 2 ounces,” and admitted that he used marihuana “every day, like all the time,” smoked tobacco, drank alcohol, took ecstasy, and abused prescription medications. When asked about his drug use, Q.P.O. said, “I ain’t never said I’m gonna stop smoking weed,” and admitted he used marihuana on the
afternoon of his release from the 2016 substance abuse treatment program. At the time of the evaluation, he was homeless and not enrolled in school. Charles concluded that Q.P.O. appeared to have “impulsive propensity[] and delinquent predisposition.”
Alana Bennett, the TJJD court liaison, testified that Q.P.O. had thirty-nine write-ups while confined in TJJD. Of the thirty-nine incidents on Q.P.O.’s TJJD record, twenty-nine resulted in referrals to the Regulation and Safety Unit,” and he had “three major rule violations,” including “masturbation in open/obvious way and exposure” and “assault-unauthorized physical contact with staff.” While there were no active criminal investigations against him, Q.P.O. was suspected by the Office of Inspector General as being a member of the “Money Organization Business,” and Q.P.O. admitted to gang involvement during his intake interview into TJJD. Leggett testified, and the evidence showed, that Q.P.O. functioned well in a structured setting.
b. Evidence favoring Q.P.O.
On the other hand, strong evidence was presented in favor of Q.P.O. Before this confinement, Q.P.O. had no prior history with TJJD. Bennett explained the thirty-nine write-ups of Q.P.O. during his early months of confinement at TJJD, saying that it was not unusual to see many write-ups during the first six months because it was an “adjustment period.” Bennett testified that most of Q.P.O.’s write-ups occurred during his adjustment period, that Q.P.O. occasionally self-reported incidents requiring write-ups, and that the number of reports were “on the low end of referrals.” She also explained that TJJD had five stages of improvement and that Q.P.O. had ascended to the highest level, which showed that he was applying skills he learned in TJJD programs and was preparing for reentry into the community. As a result of his behavior,
Q.P.O. had earned the privilege of playing football outside of TJJD and completed fifteen hours of college credit. Bennett recommended Q.P.O. for parole, as did Q.P.O.’s dorm supervisor, individual case manager, psychologist, and TJJD’s executive director.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
in the Matter of Q.P.O. (in the Matter of Q.P.O.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.