In the Matter of Paul Clarendon Ballou

773 S.E.2d 586, 412 S.C. 623, 2015 S.C. LEXIS 219
CourtSupreme Court of South Carolina
DecidedJune 24, 2015
DocketAppellate Case 2015-000959; 27535
StatusPublished

This text of 773 S.E.2d 586 (In the Matter of Paul Clarendon Ballou) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In the Matter of Paul Clarendon Ballou, 773 S.E.2d 586, 412 S.C. 623, 2015 S.C. LEXIS 219 (S.C. 2015).

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

In this attorney disciplinary matter, respondent and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) have entered into an Agreement for Discipline by Consent (Agreement) pursuant to Rule 21 of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement (RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules (SCACR). In the Agreement, respondent admits misconduct and consents to the imposition of a definite suspension ranging from nine (9) months to three (3) years or disbarment. He requests that any suspension or disbarment *624 be imposed retroactively to May 28, 2013, the date of his interim suspension. In the Matter of Ballou, 403 S.C. 138, 742 S.E.2d 868 (2013). In addition, respondent agrees to pay the costs incurred in the investigation and prosecution of this matter by ODC and the Commission on Lawyer Conduct (the Commission) within thirty (30) days of the imposition of discipline and to complete the Legal Ethics and Practice Program Ethics School and Trust Account School prior to reinstatement. Further, within sixty (60) days of the imposition of discipline, respondent agrees to enter into a restitution agreement with the Commission to repay clients and third parties harmed as a result of his misconduct. We accept the Agreement and disbar respondent from the practice of law in this state retroactively to the date of his interim suspension, and, further, impose the conditions as set forth hereafter in this opinion. The facts, as set forth in the Agreement, are as follows.

Facts

Matter I

Respondent represented Complainant A and his wife in a personal injury case. Subsequent to mediation, Client A became dissatisfied with respondent’s representation, terminated respondent’s services, and demanded his file. Respondent prepared a handwritten release for Complainant A’s signature discharging respondent from representation. The release also stated respondent had incurred $313.05 in expenses, the defendant had offered to settle the case for $23,000, and that respondent asserted an attorneys’ fee lien in the amount of 25% or $5,750 payable out of any settlement of the case along with costs. Complainant A signed the document and added the following notation: “With reservations and after Disciplinary Counsel Review Board.”

Complainant A and his wife later settled the case with the defendant insurance company. The insurance company sent a check to respondent in the amount of $5,750 payable to the order of respondent’s firm, Complainant A, and Complainant A’s wife. Respondent endorsed the check, signing the names of Complainant A and his wife without their consent. Respondent then deposited the check into his operating account.

*625 Matter II

Respondent’s firm represented Complainant B on criminal charges arising out of her employment; the employer alleged Complainant B had stolen funds from the employer. On November 17, 2006, the criminal charges were dismissed with leave to re-indict by the solicitor’s office.

After the employer’s insurance company covered the stolen funds, it attempted to recover the amount it paid to the employer from Complainant B. Some of the efforts to recover the funds were allegedly made by a recovery management company.

Thereafter, respondent represented Complainant B in a civil suit for damages allegedly suffered by Complainant B as a result of the collections efforts taken by or on behalf of the insurance company. Initially, respondent filed suit in state court in March of 2007. On May 27, 2008, respondent filed for a voluntary non-suit pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1), SCRCP, because the complaint had not been served.

In July 2008, respondent filed suit in state court. On August 25, 2008, the case was removed to federal court. On June 8, 2009, defendant Recovery Management Company moved to dismiss the suit for lack of jurisdiction. On July 7, 2009, the court granted the motion to dismiss due to respondent’s failure to respond. The court noted respondent had called the court on June 25 or 26, 2009 requesting an extension of time and was advised that an extension would be granted if respondent filed the motion by June 29, 2009. The court did not receive the motion despite a follow-up call from the court shortly after the June 29, 2009, deadline. Respondent did not notify Complainant B of this development.

On December 18, 2009, the defendant insurance company filed a motion for summary judgment. On January 19, 2010, respondent filed a response to the motion. On January 29, 2010, the court ordered respondent to show cause why the response should not be stricken for failure to cure a signatory deficiency. The court’s order noted that the Clerk of Court had drawn the deficiency to respondent’s attention three times and respondent had ignored the requests to cure. Ultimately, respondent acknowledged and corrected his filing deficiency and assured the court that he would avoid future difficulties *626 by obtaining additional training in the e-filing procedures used by the court. As a result, the court did not strike the response.

On February 8, 2010, the trial court issued its order granting summary judgment to the defendant insurance company finding that Complainant B had not filed her suit within the statute of limitations and the record lacked sufficient evidence to support the claims. Respondent was unaware of the order as he did not monitor his e-mail account properly. Respondent failed to timely inform Complainant B of the order granting summary judgement and failed to preserve Complainant B’s appellate rights. Respondent made a unilateral decision not to pursue the case as respondent believed that this was in Complainant B’s best interest.

Matter III

Respondent represented Complainant C in a personal injury matter. Respondent received a settlement of $101,000 in the case. Respondent deposited the entire settlement amount into his operating account. Pursuant to the written fee agreement, respondent should have received $33,683.00 (1/3%) as attorneys’ fees. Out of the $101,000 settlement, respondent disbursed $55,000 to the client and kept the remaining fees in his operating account. There was no written agreement between respondent and Complainant C regarding the withholding of any funds beyond the initial one third stated in the fee agreement. Respondent failed to safeguard the additional fees in his trust account.

On March 6, 2013, a subpoena for respondent’s trust account records was issued and mailed to the address of record shown in the Attorney Information System. The subpoena was returned “unclaimed” to ODC. A subpoena dated April 17, 2013, was served by a South Carolina Law Enforcement Division agent on respondent on the same day. The subpoena again requested respondent’s trust account records by May 14, 2013. Respondent advised ODC he did not have the trust account records demanded by the subpoena.

Respondent admits he does not maintain a client trust account. He further admits that he deposited and disbursed client settlement funds into and out of his operating account. *627

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Related

In the Matter of Treacy
290 S.E.2d 240 (Supreme Court of South Carolina, 1982)
In re Ballou
742 S.E.2d 868 (Supreme Court of South Carolina, 2013)

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Bluebook (online)
773 S.E.2d 586, 412 S.C. 623, 2015 S.C. LEXIS 219, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-the-matter-of-paul-clarendon-ballou-sc-2015.