In the Matter of Marriage of Sherry Ann Kreiling and Derrie James Kreiling and in the Interest of K.M.K.and Q.K.K., Children v. the State of Texas

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-26-00125-CV

IN THE MATTER OF MARRIAGE OF SHERRY ANN KREILING AND DERRIE JAMES KREILING AND IN THE INTEREST OF K.M.K.AND Q.K.K., CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 97th District Court Clay County, Texas 1

Trial Court No. 2021-0103C-CV, Honorable Trish C. Byars, Presiding

August 28, 2026

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before PARKER, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

Proceeding pro se, appellant Sherry Ann Kreiling appeals the trial court’s final decree of divorce, which ended her marriage with appellee Derrie James Kreiling. 2 Sherry raises four issues challenging the trial court’s decree. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

1 This cause was originally filed in the Second Court of Appeals and was transferred to this Court

by a docket-equalization order of the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 73.001. In the event of any conflict, we apply the transferor court’s case law. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.

2 No appellee’s brief was filed.

BACKGROUND

Sherry 3 and Derrie married in 2001 and had two children. In May of 2021, Sherry filed her petition for divorce. Derrie filed a counter-petition. When the case was called to trial on June 3, 2025, the parties announced that they had mostly settled their divorce. 4 The agreement was read into the record, and each party confirmed their agreement. However, three issues remained unresolved: the imposition of a geographic restriction, attorney’s fees, and spousal maintenance. After the parties presented evidence on the contested issues, the trial court stated that:

it “will grant the divorce on the basis that the marriage has become insupportable because of conflict or discord of personalities”;

it “will approve and find it’s in the best interest of the children what the parties’ agreement was in regards to the children, with one additional thing.

The court is going to order that the children participate in counseling with [Derrie] with Charlotte Marsh . . . ”;

it “will approve all the agreements that the parties have agreed to in regard to the children”;

it “will approve and find that it was a fair and equitable property division that the parties have agreed to”;

it “will award [Sherry’s attorney] $3,500 in attorney’s fees . . .”;

“. . . there will be a geographic restriction in place for Clay and contiguous counties. The court finds that to be in the best interest of the children”; and

“ . . . in regards to spousal support, the court is going to deny that request.”

The trial judge instructed Sherry’s attorney to “prepare the orders.”

3 Because they share the same surname, we will refer to the parties by their first names.

4 Sherry and Derrie were represented by counsel at the final trial. After the hearing on the motion to enter, Sherry’s counsel withdrew, and she proceeded pro se.

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In October, Sherry’s attorney filed a notice of hearing on motion to enter the final decree of divorce. On November 7, Sherry, proceeding pro se, filed her objections to entry of the decree. 5 At a hearing, the trial court addressed Sherry’s objections:

[I]t does look like you are asking for additional things or maybe didn’t agree with the court’s ruling. And I’m gonna—your attorney essentially on here advised you a—a different avenue to bring those issues. For the record, today we’re here just for the Motion to Enter, and the Court’s hands are tied as to what the court can do, and it is simply to clarify anything that wasn’t clear on the date of [the final hearing]. And so the court will approve—so I can’t hear any new additional evidence, like, as far as the family violence or—or anything in regards to that that happened. That indictment was after the final decree of divorce so that isn’t anything that I can address.

The trial judge signed the decree on November 12. Sherry filed a motion for new trial which was overruled by operation of law. Sherry timely filed this appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In each of her four appellate issues, Sherry argues that the trial court abused its discretion in taking a specific action. Most of the appealable issues in a family case are evaluated against an abuse of discretion standard. See In re Marriage of Featherston, 675 S.W.3d 330, 333 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2023, no pet.). “A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily or unreasonably, without reference to guiding rules or principles.” Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 74, 78 (Tex. 2011). In determining conservatorship

5 In her objections to entry of the decree, Sherry alleged that, on June 12, 2025, nine days after the

final hearing, Derrie was indicted and this indictment “constitutes credible evidence of family violence.” Sherry alleged that she attached a copy of the indictment as “Exhibit B,” but there are no exhibits attached to her objections.

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and possession issues, the best interest of the child shall always be the primary consideration. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 153.002. 6

Issue One

In her first issue, Sherry contends that the divorce decree “cannot be sustained as an agreed judgment because the record does not establish clear, complete, and continuing consent to the material terms included in the decree.” She asserts that she revoked her consent before the trial court rendered judgment. Disposition of Sherry’s issue turns on whether the trial court “rendered” a final judgment before it signed the decree of divorce.

Whether a particular action constitutes a rendition of judgment is a question of fact.

In re Marriage of Joyner, 196 S.W.3d 883, 887 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, pet. denied); Blackburn v. Blackburn, No. 02-12-00369-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 4693, at *16 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth, May 7, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.). In determining whether an oral statement by the trial court constitutes a rendition of judgment, we look to the words used by the trial court. Joyner, 196 S.W.3d at 887─88. “Evidence beyond the words of the trial court at the time of the alleged judgment, such as later statements and writings by the court, is not controlling, but such evidence may be considered in ascertaining whether the trial court intended to render judgment at the time of the alleged oral rendition.” Blackburn, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 4693, at *16.

6 Further references to the Texas Family Code will be to “section __” or § __.”

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At the conclusion of the June 3 trial, the judge stated, “the court will grant the divorce,” “will approve all the agreements that the parties have agreed to in regard to the children,” and “will approve and find that it was a fair and equitable property division that the parties have agreed to.” Then, the judge announced her ruling on the contested issues, followed by a question to Sherry’s attorney, “Is there anything that the court has left off?” The judge instructed Sherry’s attorney to “prepare the orders.” The trial court’s statements in this case, when viewed in the context in which they were made, indicate a present intent to render a full, final, and complete judgment. See Sargent v. Sargent, No. 02-24-00470-CV, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 7240, at 8─9 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 11, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.); Blackburn, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 4693, at *18. Moreover, at the hearing on the motion to enforce, the statements by the trial court indicate its intent to render judgment on June 3, when the judge explained her “hands are tied,” she “can’t hear any new additional evidence,” and “that indictment was after the final decree of divorce so that isn’t anything that I can address.” We conclude that the trial court rendered judgment on June 3 prior to Sherry’s attempt to revoke consent and that any attempt to revoke consent was consequently untimely. Sargent, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 7240, at *24. We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court and overrule her first issue.

Issue Two

In her second issue, Sherry contends that “the decree cannot be sustained as a contested judgment because it does not conform to the live pleadings, the case proved, or a clear rendition, in violation of Rule 301.” According to Sherry, this is so because her amended petition sought sole managing conservatorship, supervised possession,

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pleaded family-violence concerns, requested a disproportionate division, and pleaded fraud on the community and reconstitution of the community estate.

In this case, Sherry testified at the final hearing that she and Derrie had reached an agreement on custody, standard possession, child support, and property division. She did not revoke that agreement during the hearing or assert any objection in the trial court to the terms described at the hearing respecting those matters. 7 She has not alleged fraud, collusion, or misrepresentation. A party cannot attack a judgment that the party approved or induced absent an allegation and proof of fraud, collusion, or misrepresentation. Algaissi v. Qamer, No. 02-25-00212-CV, 2026 Tex. App. LEXIS 4789, at *10─11 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 21, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.) (applying invited- error doctrine to party’s complaint on appeal); Norman v. Norman, No. 05-23-00831-CV, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 4038, at *6─7 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 5, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) (complaint on appeal fails when parties reach agreement about property settlement and trial court does not determine parties’ marital property settlement). Sherry has not identified any abuse of discretion concerning any material provision of the decree. Consequently, we overrule issue two.

Issue Three

In her third issue, Sherry contends the conservatorship provisions should be reversed because the trial court “appointed Joint Managing Conservators without applying Texas Family Code § 153.004 to the family-violence and child-safety record.” In

7 There was no agreement on a geographical restriction, attorney’s fees, or spousal maintenance.

These issues were tried to the court.

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support of this issue, she points to her amended petition seeking sole managing conservatorship and supervised access if possession were ordered.

A trial court may appoint a sole managing conservator or joint managing conservators. § 153.005(a). There is a rebuttable presumption that the appointment of the child’s parents as joint managing conservators is in the child’s best interest. § 153.131(b). However, a finding of a history of family violence involving the child’s parents removes this presumption. Id. “Family violence” includes an act by a family or household member against another family or household member “that is intended to result in physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or sexual assault or that is a threat that reasonably places the member in fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or sexual assault, but does not include defensive measures to protect oneself[.]” § 71.004(1).

To determine whether a person may be appointed as the sole managing conservator or as a joint managing conservator,

the court shall consider evidence of the intentional use of abusive physical force, or evidence of sexual abuse, by a party directed against the party’s spouse, a parent of the child, or any person younger than 18 years of age committed within a two-year period preceding the filing of the suit or during the pendency of the suit.

§ 153.004(a). The court may not appoint joint managing conservators

if credible evidence is presented of a history or pattern of past or present child neglect, or physical or sexual abuse by one parent directed against the other parent, a spouse, or a child[.]

§ 153.004(b). A single incident of physical abuse proven is not automatically a history of physical abuse. See C.C. v. L.C., No. 02-18-00425-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 5615, at *31 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 3, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.). Rather, “the statute leaves

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it to the trial court’s broad discretion to decide whether the act reaches the threshold of being a history.” Id.

As we discussed in issue two, Sherry and Derrie announced their agreement to joint managing conservatorship of the children along with a standard possession order. Consequently, she cannot complain of errors which she has invited. Algaissi, 2026 Tex. App. LEXIS 4789, at *11; Ghan v. Ghan, No. 14-96-00615-CV; 1998 Tex. App. LEXIS 3931, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 25, 1998, no pet.). But even assuming we reviewed the conservatorship and possession issues, Sherry cannot show, on this record, that the trial court abused its discretion. There was very little testimony concerning the children’s issues. The trial court heard evidence that as of the time of trial, the children were ages sixteen and thirteen; Derrie had not had contact with the children since he was arrested in September of 2024 for “assault of a minor”; an emergency protective order was in effect for 32 days; no bond conditions prohibited his contact with the children; and Derrie had not been indicted. Even if the trial court considered this evidence, it had the discretion to determine that the incident did not constitute credible evidence of a history or pattern of abuse. See C.L.W. v. R.V.W., No. 01-21-00283-CV, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 6020, at *26 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 10, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (stating trial court has discretion to determine whether evidence demonstrates “a history or pattern of physical abuse that disqualified [parent] from being a joint managing conservator”); C.C., 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 5615, at *43 (“[A] single act, even if its occurrence is undisputed, does not necessarily mandate a finding that a history of abuse exists.”); Jackson v. Jackson, No. 05-01-01719-CV, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 8051, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 13, 2002, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding

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trial court had discretion to determine uncontroverted evidence father “pushed or shoved” mother several times was not credible evidence of history or pattern of abuse). We overrule issue three.

Issue Four

In her fourth issue, Sherry argues that the property division should be reversed “because the trial court proceeded while financial discovery remained compelled, incomplete, and sanctioned.”

The record shows that Sherry obtained an order compelling discovery on April 9, 2025. 8 However, Sherry announced ready on the day of trial and failed to bring to the court’s attention that discovery was still outstanding. Moreover, she failed to request a continuation of the final trial setting. Consequently, Sherry has not preserved this issue for appeal. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); see Remington Arms Co. v. Caldwell, 850 S.W.2d 167, 170 (Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding) (discovery disputes waived by failing to object before trial). We overrule issue four.

CONCLUSION

Having overruled each of Sherry’s issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Judy C. Parker

Chief Justice

8 In this order, Derrie was ordered to produce specified documents by 5:00 p.m. on April 9, 2025, and to pay sanctions of $1,500.