In the Matter of L.M.P., a Child v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: August 31, 2023
• Docket: 07-23-00104-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-23-00104-CV

IN THE MATTER OF L.M.P., A CHILD

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2 Potter County, Texas Trial Court No. 11150-2-JV, Honorable Matthew H. Hand, Presiding

August 31, 2023 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before PARKER and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

L.M.P., a juvenile, appeals from the order modifying disposition and committing

him to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department (TJJD). We affirm.

BACKGROUND

In October of 2019, thirteen-year-old L.M.P. was adjudicated delinquent for

committing the offenses of robbery, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and

assault. The juvenile court placed him on probation in the home of his mother.

Disposition was subsequently modified several times; L.M.P. was placed at the Floyd County Parent Adolescent Center, the Youth Center of the High Plains, and again with

his mother. In February of 2023, the State filed its final motion to modify disposition

alleging four violations of the terms of his probation. L.M.P. pleaded true to all four

allegations. The State recommended commitment to TJJD, while L.M.P. sought

placement with his grandparents. The juvenile court found L.M.P. violated conditions of

his probation and committed him to TJJD for an indeterminate period of time not to exceed

the time when he shall be nineteen years old. L.M.P. brought this appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The juvenile court’s decision to modify a juvenile’s disposition to commit him to the

TJJD is discretionary and subject to review for an abuse of discretion. In re J.P., 136

S.W.3d 629, 632 (Tex. 2004). The court does not abuse its discretion if some evidence

supports its decision. In re J.M., 287 S.W.3d 481, 486 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009, no

pet.). A violation of a single condition of probation can be sufficient to modify a juvenile’s

disposition and send the juvenile to TJJD. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.05(f); In re R.L., No.

03-99-00334-CV, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 471, at *7 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 21, 2000, no

pet.).

ANALYSIS

L.M.P. raises two issues on appeal, asserting that the juvenile court abused its

discretion by improperly admitting opinion testimony and hearsay. Any error in the

admission of the objected-to evidence is reviewed under the civil harm analysis in Texas

Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.1(a). See In re D.V., 955 S.W.2d 379, 380 (Tex. App.—

San Antonio 1997, no pet.) (when State proceeds with indeterminate sentencing in

2 juvenile proceeding, we review disposition with civil harm analysis). Therefore, even if

the court abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence, we must ask whether the

admission “probably caused the rendition of an improper [order].” TEX. R. APP. P.

44.1(a)(1).

L.M.P.’s first issue arises from testimony given by the juvenile probation officer

who worked with L.M.P. He testified about L.M.P.’s dangerous behaviors, “chronic

persistency of juvenile delinquency,” additional referrals to the juvenile system, failure to

attend school, and failure to report to the probation department. The officer was then

asked if public safety would be increased if L.M.P. were committed to TJJD. L.M.P.’s

counsel objected that the question called for speculation, but the juvenile court overruled

the objection. The officer then answered the question with a “Yes.” L.M.P. argues that

the officer was not qualified to offer this opinion testimony and that its admission into

evidence was an abuse of discretion.

Even if we assume that it was error to admit this portion of the officer’s testimony,

our review of the record shows that any such error was harmless. L.M.P. had, by his own

admission, committed three serious offenses and repeatedly failed to abide by the

conditions of his probation, including by failing to report to the probation department and

failing to attend school as directed for a fifteen-month period. The evidence presented

showed that previous efforts to keep L.M.P. at home had been unsuccessful and that

L.M.P. was unlikely to accept supervision by his grandparents. Considering the record

as a whole, we conclude that the admission of the officer’s statement did not cause the

rendition of an improper order. See In re D.V., 955 S.W.2d at 380 (disregarding error that

3 did not probably cause rendition of improper judgment). Therefore, we overrule L.M.P.’s

first issue.

In his second issue, L.M.P. contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion

by improperly admitting hearsay. At the hearing, the probation officer was asked, “What

happened in [L.M.P.’s] case with the one incident he’s had since January?” Counsel for

L.M.P. raised a hearsay objection, to which the State stated, “Your Honor, the part that’s

business records – and he has obviously qualified, through the business-records

exception, the ability to talk about them.” The juvenile court overruled the objection. The

officer then briefly described an incident at the youth center during which L.M.P. had to

be restrained and then threatened that he would slap staff members when he was

released. The incident resulted in an administrative disciplinary seclusion.

Even if we were to assume, without deciding, that the juvenile court erred in

admitting the complained-of testimony, L.M.P. has not demonstrated that he has been

harmed by the alleged error. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1. As set forth above, even without

the statement about L.M.P.’s most recent incident, there was an abundance of evidence

to support the juvenile court’s findings that L.M.P. violated reasonable and lawful orders

of the court, is in need of rehabilitation, and that commitment to TJJD is appropriate.

Thus, any error in admitting this testimony does not constitute reversible error. See In re

A.W., 661 S.W.3d 547, 552 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2023, pet. denied)

(erroneous admission of evidence warrants reversal only if error probably caused

rendition of improper judgment). We overrule L.M.P.’s second issue.

4 CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the juvenile court.

Judy C. Parker Justice