Opinion issued January 22, 2026
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-25-00622-CV ——————————— IN THE MATTER OF L.G.
On Appeal from the 313th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2024-02077J
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The juvenile court waived its jurisdiction over L.G., a minor, and transferred
him to the criminal district court to be tried as an adult for capital murder. L.G.
argues that the juvenile court erred in doing so. We affirm.
Background
This case arises from the murder of a homeowner in her backyard. The
decedent was stabbed over 25 times, and her son found her body in a backyard shed. L.G.’s house was adjacent to the decedent’s home. The decedent’s and
L.G.’s DNA were found on his shoes, gloves, and knife. L.G. was 15 years old at
the time of the murder.
After an investigation, L.G. was arrested and charged with capital murder.
The State moved that the juvenile court waive its jurisdiction and transfer L.G. to
the criminal district court to stand trial as an adult. L.G. was 16 years old at the
time of the transfer hearing. At the hearing, the juvenile court received
documentary evidence and heard testimony from a law enforcement officer who
investigated the murder and a psychologist who examined L.G.
A. Law Enforcement Testimony
The law enforcement officer testified that on the day of the murder,
authorities responded to a 911 call from a neighbor. The neighbor reported finding
a bloody knife and gloves in his backyard. Shortly after he got off the phone with
911 but before officers had responded, the neighbor witnessed L.G. running across
his lawn. The neighbor went upstairs for a better view, and he saw L.G. run back
into his own yard. When the neighbor went back outside, the knife and gloves were
gone. The neighbor told law enforcement what had happened when they arrived
about an hour later.
The law enforcement officer went to L.G.’s residence to speak with L.G.
L.G. told the officer that he had been outside doing chores, flipping a knife, and the
2 knife fell over into the neighbor’s yard. He said that he jumped the fence to
retrieve it. Law enforcement collected the knife as well as L.G.’s sandals, clothing,
gloves, and cell phone. DNA analysis revealed that the items had both L.G.’s and
the decedent’s DNA on them.
L.G. was arrested and later confessed to the murder. L.G. told law
enforcement that he was in his backyard cutting weeds when he looked over the
fence line and saw the decedent in her hot tub with her back facing outwards. He
said she looked vulnerable and helpless. He jumped a fence, ran across another
neighbor’s yard, exited a side gate, and entered the decedent’s backyard through a
side gate. He took off his shoes to avoid getting blood on them. He ran up to the
decedent and began to stab her. At some point in the altercation, she got out of the
hot tub. L.G. told investigators he continued to stab her about six or seven times in
the chest. She tried to run away, and he pursued her around the patio and into her
house. He was able to pull her back out of her house onto the patio.
When she succumbed to her injuries, L.G. attempted to conceal her body. He
dragged her off the patio, through the grass, and into a shed. He removed rocks
keeping the shed doors closed, opened the shed, and pulled her inside. He then
closed the shed and replaced the rocks where he had found them. He covered blood
in the house with rugs and attempted to prevent the decedent’s cell phone from
working by covering it in tinfoil. L.G. tried to remove blood from the knife by
3 stabbing it into the ground several times. He then threw away the gloves he was
wearing in his trash can. Law enforcement recovered them when speaking to L.G.
The law enforcement officer also testified that he had spoken with the
decedent’s son at the request of the prosecutor. The son relayed that in a prior
hearing, when L.G. was allowed to hug his mother, he did so while looking
directly at the decedent’s son and smirking. The law enforcement officer testified
that the decedent’s son said that it really upset him because the probable cause
statement, describing what had happened to his mother, had just been read in court.
B. Psychiatric Evaluation
A psychologist from the Harris Center for Mental Health and the Harris
County Juvenile Forensic Unit testified regarding her evaluation of L.G. She
testified that she supervised the evaluation which was conducted by a doctoral
intern. Throughout the evaluation, L.G. showed the ability to concentrate and focus
and his thought process was logical and coherent. She testified that on the advice
of his counsel, L.G. did not answer questions related to homicidal thoughts or
ideations, which are used to assess risk of dangerousness or the presence of mental
health disorders, but he had given indications to detectives that he had experienced
homicidal thoughts for months prior to the murder. He also stated that when he was
about 10, he was obsessed with burning paper.
4 Prior to the incident, L.G. reported having a small group of friends. He was
in the gifted and talented program at his high school. He had no history of physical
or mental health issues. He had no previous encounters with the juvenile justice
system. The psychologist described L.G.’s behavior since entering the juvenile
detention center. He had received various minor infractions, such as horseplaying,
not following staff instructions, and possessing a contraband pen in his room.
The psychologist conducted an IQ test. L.G. scored 117, which falls in the
high-average range. His “personality assessment inventory” indicated that he had
low interest in treatment and low motivation. As far as his results of “Risk-
Sophistication-Treatment Inventory,” when including the murder, he scored in the
middle offender range for risk of dangerousness. He was in the high range for
sophistication and maturity. He knew the difference between right and wrong and
had a basic understanding of the law. The psychologist opined that L.G. had
difficulty understanding how his actions affected others.
The psychologist testified that normally as time goes on, a youth
acknowledges the impact of his choices more and shows more empathy toward the
victim. The psychologist questioned L.G.’s level of empathy, as evidenced by the
fact that after the murder he went home and resumed his normal routine, attending
a family party that night. She said empathy is crucial for avoiding repeated harmful
behavior because it helps youth understand the impact of their actions. She testified
5 that normally she would expect more empathy or acknowledgement of impact than
the levels L.G. displayed. The psychologist testified that L.G.’s ability to mask
how he was feeling and keep his anger concealed gave her concern for risk of
future dangerousness.
The court entered an order finding that the seriousness of the alleged crime
and L.G.’s conduct during it and L.G.’s background required that he be transferred
to the criminal district court for prosecution as an adult. L.G. appeals the juvenile
court’s order waiving its jurisdiction and transferring him. See TEX. FAM. CODE
§ 56.01.
Juvenile Court’s Waiver of Jurisdiction
L.G.
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Opinion issued January 22, 2026
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-25-00622-CV ——————————— IN THE MATTER OF L.G.
On Appeal from the 313th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2024-02077J
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The juvenile court waived its jurisdiction over L.G., a minor, and transferred
him to the criminal district court to be tried as an adult for capital murder. L.G.
argues that the juvenile court erred in doing so. We affirm.
Background
This case arises from the murder of a homeowner in her backyard. The
decedent was stabbed over 25 times, and her son found her body in a backyard shed. L.G.’s house was adjacent to the decedent’s home. The decedent’s and
L.G.’s DNA were found on his shoes, gloves, and knife. L.G. was 15 years old at
the time of the murder.
After an investigation, L.G. was arrested and charged with capital murder.
The State moved that the juvenile court waive its jurisdiction and transfer L.G. to
the criminal district court to stand trial as an adult. L.G. was 16 years old at the
time of the transfer hearing. At the hearing, the juvenile court received
documentary evidence and heard testimony from a law enforcement officer who
investigated the murder and a psychologist who examined L.G.
A. Law Enforcement Testimony
The law enforcement officer testified that on the day of the murder,
authorities responded to a 911 call from a neighbor. The neighbor reported finding
a bloody knife and gloves in his backyard. Shortly after he got off the phone with
911 but before officers had responded, the neighbor witnessed L.G. running across
his lawn. The neighbor went upstairs for a better view, and he saw L.G. run back
into his own yard. When the neighbor went back outside, the knife and gloves were
gone. The neighbor told law enforcement what had happened when they arrived
about an hour later.
The law enforcement officer went to L.G.’s residence to speak with L.G.
L.G. told the officer that he had been outside doing chores, flipping a knife, and the
2 knife fell over into the neighbor’s yard. He said that he jumped the fence to
retrieve it. Law enforcement collected the knife as well as L.G.’s sandals, clothing,
gloves, and cell phone. DNA analysis revealed that the items had both L.G.’s and
the decedent’s DNA on them.
L.G. was arrested and later confessed to the murder. L.G. told law
enforcement that he was in his backyard cutting weeds when he looked over the
fence line and saw the decedent in her hot tub with her back facing outwards. He
said she looked vulnerable and helpless. He jumped a fence, ran across another
neighbor’s yard, exited a side gate, and entered the decedent’s backyard through a
side gate. He took off his shoes to avoid getting blood on them. He ran up to the
decedent and began to stab her. At some point in the altercation, she got out of the
hot tub. L.G. told investigators he continued to stab her about six or seven times in
the chest. She tried to run away, and he pursued her around the patio and into her
house. He was able to pull her back out of her house onto the patio.
When she succumbed to her injuries, L.G. attempted to conceal her body. He
dragged her off the patio, through the grass, and into a shed. He removed rocks
keeping the shed doors closed, opened the shed, and pulled her inside. He then
closed the shed and replaced the rocks where he had found them. He covered blood
in the house with rugs and attempted to prevent the decedent’s cell phone from
working by covering it in tinfoil. L.G. tried to remove blood from the knife by
3 stabbing it into the ground several times. He then threw away the gloves he was
wearing in his trash can. Law enforcement recovered them when speaking to L.G.
The law enforcement officer also testified that he had spoken with the
decedent’s son at the request of the prosecutor. The son relayed that in a prior
hearing, when L.G. was allowed to hug his mother, he did so while looking
directly at the decedent’s son and smirking. The law enforcement officer testified
that the decedent’s son said that it really upset him because the probable cause
statement, describing what had happened to his mother, had just been read in court.
B. Psychiatric Evaluation
A psychologist from the Harris Center for Mental Health and the Harris
County Juvenile Forensic Unit testified regarding her evaluation of L.G. She
testified that she supervised the evaluation which was conducted by a doctoral
intern. Throughout the evaluation, L.G. showed the ability to concentrate and focus
and his thought process was logical and coherent. She testified that on the advice
of his counsel, L.G. did not answer questions related to homicidal thoughts or
ideations, which are used to assess risk of dangerousness or the presence of mental
health disorders, but he had given indications to detectives that he had experienced
homicidal thoughts for months prior to the murder. He also stated that when he was
about 10, he was obsessed with burning paper.
4 Prior to the incident, L.G. reported having a small group of friends. He was
in the gifted and talented program at his high school. He had no history of physical
or mental health issues. He had no previous encounters with the juvenile justice
system. The psychologist described L.G.’s behavior since entering the juvenile
detention center. He had received various minor infractions, such as horseplaying,
not following staff instructions, and possessing a contraband pen in his room.
The psychologist conducted an IQ test. L.G. scored 117, which falls in the
high-average range. His “personality assessment inventory” indicated that he had
low interest in treatment and low motivation. As far as his results of “Risk-
Sophistication-Treatment Inventory,” when including the murder, he scored in the
middle offender range for risk of dangerousness. He was in the high range for
sophistication and maturity. He knew the difference between right and wrong and
had a basic understanding of the law. The psychologist opined that L.G. had
difficulty understanding how his actions affected others.
The psychologist testified that normally as time goes on, a youth
acknowledges the impact of his choices more and shows more empathy toward the
victim. The psychologist questioned L.G.’s level of empathy, as evidenced by the
fact that after the murder he went home and resumed his normal routine, attending
a family party that night. She said empathy is crucial for avoiding repeated harmful
behavior because it helps youth understand the impact of their actions. She testified
5 that normally she would expect more empathy or acknowledgement of impact than
the levels L.G. displayed. The psychologist testified that L.G.’s ability to mask
how he was feeling and keep his anger concealed gave her concern for risk of
future dangerousness.
The court entered an order finding that the seriousness of the alleged crime
and L.G.’s conduct during it and L.G.’s background required that he be transferred
to the criminal district court for prosecution as an adult. L.G. appeals the juvenile
court’s order waiving its jurisdiction and transferring him. See TEX. FAM. CODE
§ 56.01.
Juvenile Court’s Waiver of Jurisdiction
L.G. contends that the juvenile court’s decision to waive its jurisdiction and
transfer him to the criminal district court to be tried as an adult must be reversed
because the evidence is factually insufficient to sustain the juvenile court’s stated
findings supporting its order to transfer him to the criminal district court.
A. Criteria for waiver of juvenile jurisdiction
Children ordinarily are not subject to criminal proceedings like adults.
Instead, juvenile courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving
what otherwise would be criminal conduct by children 10 years of age or older and
under 17 years of age. TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 51.02(2)(a), 51.03(a)(1), 51.04(a). If a
juvenile court determines that certain conditions are met after an evidentiary
6 hearing, it may waive its jurisdiction and transfer a child to the district court for
criminal proceedings. Id. § 54.02(a), (c). The State initiates this process by
requesting a hearing and providing notice.
To transfer a child who is alleged to have committed a felony of the first
degree, like capital murder, to the criminal district court, a juvenile court must find
that (1) the child was 14 or older at the time of the alleged offense; (2) there is
probable cause to believe the child committed the offense; and (3) the seriousness
of the alleged offense or the background of the child requires criminal rather than
juvenile proceedings. Id. § 54.02(a).
The State has the burden to persuade the juvenile court by a preponderance
of the evidence that the welfare of the community requires transfer of jurisdiction
for criminal proceedings, either because of the seriousness of the offense alleged or
the background of the child or both. Bell v. State, 649 S.W.3d 867, 886 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] pet. ref’d). In deciding whether the preponderance of
the evidence satisfies this last requirement, the juvenile court must consider four
non-exclusive factors:
(1) whether the alleged offense was against person or property, with greater weight in favor of transfer given to offenses against the person;
(2) the sophistication and maturity of the child;
(3) the record and previous history of the child; and
7 (4) the prospect of adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of the rehabilitation of the child by use of procedures, services, and facilities currently available to the juvenile court.
Id. § 54.02(f).
All four of the 54.02(f) criteria need not weigh in favor of transfer for a
juvenile court to waive its jurisdiction. In re S.G.R., 496 S.W.3d 235, 239 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.). Any combination of these criteria may
suffice. Id. Not every factor need weigh in favor of transfer to the criminal district
court. Bell, 649 S.W.3d at 886. If it decides to waive its jurisdiction based on its
consideration of these factors, the juvenile court must enter a written order in
which it states specifically its reasons for waiver and its findings. TEX. FAM. CODE
§ 54.02(h).
B. Standard of Review
We review a juvenile court decision to waive its exclusive original
jurisdiction and transfer a case to the criminal district court using two steps. First,
we review the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence relating to the juvenile
court’s specific findings of fact regarding the four factors stated in section 54.02(f).
S.G.R., 496 S.W.3d at 239. When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence,
we credit the proof favorable to the findings and disregard contrary proof unless a
reasonable factfinder could not reject it. Id. If there is more than a scintilla of
evidence supporting a finding, then the proof is legally sufficient. Id. When
8 reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we consider all the proof
presented to determine if the juvenile court’s findings are so against the great
weight and preponderance of the proof as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Id. Our
review of the sufficiency of the evidence supporting waiver is limited to the facts
the juvenile court expressly relied on in its transfer order. Id.
If the findings of the juvenile court are supported by legally and factually
sufficient proof, then we review the ultimate waiver decision under an abuse of
discretion standard. S.G.R., 496 S.W.3d at 239. As with any decision that lies
within the discretion of the trial court, the salient question is not whether we might
have decided the issue differently. Id. Instead, we consider in light of our review of
the sufficiency of the evidence whether the juvenile court’s decision represents a
principled application of the section 54.02(f) factors or was arbitrary or made
without reference to the statutory criteria for waiver. Id. So long as the juvenile
court correctly applies these criteria and complies with the requirement to
specifically state its supporting findings, its waiver decision will pass muster under
our standard of review. Id.
C. Analysis
The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by waiving its jurisdiction.
L.G. stipulated to his date of birth and confessed to his participation in the
murder. TEX. FAM. CODE § 54.02(a)(1)–(2). He was fifteen years old at the time.
9 Thus, the dispositive issue before the juvenile court was whether the seriousness of
the offense or L.G.’s background required criminal proceedings instead of juvenile
proceedings. See id. § 54.02(a)(3). L.G. does not contest that the evidence was
legally sufficient to support the juvenile court’s findings. He argues instead that the
evidence was factually insufficient to find that the section 54.02(f) factors weighed
in favor of transfer.
The juvenile court’s order states that the court based its findings on its
“observations at the hearing, the clerk’s record, the diagnostic studies, the social
evaluations, the circumstances of the child and the offense, and all the evidence
presented at the hearing.” After noting that it had considered the section 54.02(f)
factors, the court found there was probable cause to believe that L.G. committed
capital murder. The court further found that the welfare of the community requires
criminal proceedings due to “the seriousness of the alleged” capital murder and
“this juvenile respondent’s conduct during it.” Finally, the court noted “the
background of the juvenile respondent necessitates transfer to criminal district
court for the welfare of the community.”
The juvenile court found that, as an offense against the person, capital
murder favored waiver of its jurisdiction, and L.G. does not contest this finding.
See TEX. FAM. CODE § 54.02(f)(1). He instead argues that waiver is not appropriate
merely because the offense was a serious one committed against a person, and that
10 the trial court did not properly consider that L.G. had no prior history of violence
or substance abuse disorders.
It is not “merely the category of crime” or its consequence that are serious;
the circumstances of the crime are significant as well. See In re. J.B., No. 01-24-
00644-CV, 2025 WL 409407, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 6, 2025,
no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding capital murder involving pistol whipped victim who
was shot in the back while he lay prone and helpless was gratuitous crime
exhibiting malice and callous disregard for human life); S.G.R., 496 S.W.3d at 243
(indicating that when the crime is sufficiently brutal and malevolent, nature of the
crime alone may support waiver of juvenile jurisdiction).
At the hearing, the law enforcement officer described a gruesome murder
scene. See In re Z.M., No. 02-21-00213-CV, 2021 WL 4898851, at *5 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Oct. 21, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (nature and seriousness of
alleged offense, alone, may justify juvenile court’s waiver of jurisdiction
“notwithstanding other section 54.02(f) factors, so long as the offense: (1) is
substantiated by evidence at the transfer hearing, and (2) is of sufficiently
egregious character”). He testified that the decedent suffered 7 or 8 stab wounds to
her chest and was stabbed by L.G. at least 25 times. He found blood around the hot
tub, on the patio, and inside the house. The decedent had defensive wounds to her
hands indicating a struggle. L.G. told the officer that he saw the decedent in her hot
11 tub, and she looked “vulnerable” and “helpless.” L.G. jumped the fence,
approached her from behind, and began to stab her. L.G. told law enforcement that
the decedent fought back and went into her house, but he followed her and was
able to bring her back on the patio. The law enforcement officer testified that L.G.
told him that once the decedent died, he dragged her to the shed.
As to L.G.’s sophistication and maturity, the psychiatric evaluation, admitted
into evidence at the transfer hearing, and testimony from the psychiatrist indicated
that L.G. demonstrated understanding of the court proceedings and had a high
average range IQ. L.G. had been enrolled in his high school’s gifted and talented
program before the incident. The record reflects that L.G. understood the legal
process. See In re K.J., 493 S.W.3d 140, 151 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2016, no pet.) (stating whether juvenile can assist attorney in his defense is a
relevant consideration when assessing juvenile’s maturity and sophistication).
Moreover, L.G.’s efforts to conceal the crime showed his sophistication and
maturity. See In re K.M., No. 01-20-00121-CV, 2020 WL 4210493, at *11 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 23, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (evidence that
juvenile attempted to conceal participation in crime was fact supporting
sophistication and maturity). L.G. removed his shoes before the attack so they
would not get blood on them. He moved the rocks keeping the shed door closed,
dragged the decedent’s body inside, closed the shed, and replaced the rocks. He
12 covered the blood inside the residence, and he stabbed the knife used in the murder
into the ground several times to try to conceal the blood. He also wore gloves
during the commission of the crime and attempted to prevent the decedent’s phone
from working properly by covering it in tinfoil. L.G. returned home after the
murder and attended a family party that evening.
As to the third factor, it is undisputed that L.G. has not been involved in the
juvenile justice system and had only minor infractions while detained, but that does
not prevent the juvenile court from deciding that the evidence still weighs in favor
of transfer. The juvenile court is “free to decide to transfer [a] case due to the
seriousness of the crime, even if the background of the child suggests the
opposite.” Bell, 649 S.W.3d at 899 (quoting C.M. v. State, 884 S.W.2d 562, 564
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 1994, no pet.)).
As to prospects of adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of
rehabilitation in the juvenile system, the psychologist testified that L.G. had little
appreciation of the impact of the crime on others. She testified that she had
concerns for L.G.’s future dangerousness, given his lack of empathy and ability to
mask his feelings. She pointed to the fact that he committed the murder and then
returned to his family home to attend a party that evening and the fact that as time
passed, she would have expected him to have more understanding of the impact of
his actions and to develop more empathy. While L.G. argues that the juvenile court
13 should have given greater weight to the programs for rehabilitation that exist in the
juvenile justice system, the court could have reasonably concluded that L.G.’s
attitude about crime made him a less likely candidate for rehabilitation.
We hold that the juvenile court’s findings are supported by factually
sufficient evidence. The juvenile court’s findings are not so contrary to the great
weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust.
Because the court’s ultimate waiver decision was made with reference to guiding
rules and principles, we conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion
when it waived its jurisdiction and transferred L.G.’s case to the criminal district
court.
We overrule L.G.’s issue on appeal.
Conclusion
We affirm the juvenile court’s transfer order.
Susanna Dokupil Justice
Panel consists of Justices Guerra, Caughey, and Dokupil.