IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE FILED February 11, 1999
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) Cecil W. Crowson DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, ) Appellate Court Clerk ) Petitioner/Appellee, ) ) Appeal No. VS. ) 01-A-01-9711-JV-00662 ) RALONDA NYOKA WRIGHT SMITH ) White Juvenile WYLIE, CRAIG DOUGLAS WYLIE ) No. 1016 and JOHNNY SMITH, ) ) Respondent/Appellant, ) ) IN THE MATTER OF: ) Kristalena Kay Smith, D.O.B. 5/04/89 ) Justin Thomas Wylie, D.O.B. 12/06/92 ) ) Children Under Eighteen (18) Years of Age )
APPEALED FROM THE JUVENILE COURT OF WHITE COUNTY AT SPARTA, TENNESSEE
THE HONORABLE GARY W. DODSON, JUDGE
JOHN KNOX WALKUP Attorney General and Reporter
DOUGLAS EARL DIMOND Assistant Attorney General 425 Fifth Avenue, North Nashville, TN 37243-0499 Attorney for Appellee
D. MICHAEL KRESS II 8 East Bockman Way Sparta, Tennessee 38483 Attorney for Appellant Ralonda Nyoka Wright Smith Wylie
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED
BEN H. CANTRELL, PRESIDING JUDGE, M.S.
CONCUR: CAIN, J. COTTRELL, J. OPINION
The Juvenile Court of White County terminated a mother’s parental
rights to two small children. The only question in this appeal is whether the State
proved by clear and convincing evidence the statutory grounds for termination. We
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I.
Kristalena K. Smith was born on May 4, 1989 to Ralonda Wright Smith
and Johnny Smith. Justin Thomas Wylie was born out of wedlock on December 6,
1992 to Ralonda Wright Smith and Craig Douglas Wylie. Ms. Smith and Mr. Wylie
later married.
In February of 1994 Ms. Wylie took the children to a babysitter and told
the babysitter that she would return for the children by 9:00 or 10:00 p.m. By the
afternoon of the next day Ms. Wylie had not returned and she could not be reached.
She had left the name of a relative, but that person refused to become involved. The
Department of Human Services (DHS) took the children and filed a petition for
temporary custody. The petition alleged that the children had also been sexually
abused.
On February 22, 1994 the Juvenile Court of White County held a hearing
on the petition and found that the best interests of the children required removal from
the parents’ custody and that there was no less drastic alternative. Ms. Wylie was
represented at the hearing by retained counsel. There is no transcript in the record
from that hearing.
-2- In March of 1995 the children were placed with their maternal
grandmother. Ms. Wylie showed up occasionally. She lived with Mr. Wylie in
Tennessee, Texas, and Florida, but sometimes she was completely out of touch with
the children and their grandmother for long periods of time. On the occasions when
Ms. Wylie did show up, she did not take any interest in the children. The grandmother
sometimes refused to let her daughter see her children because she upset them. In
September of 1995 the grandmother asked DHS to take the children back and
expressed a hope that the children would never be returned to Ms. Wylie.
For part of the time her children were in state custody, the mother lived
with a man by the name of Cooper. Cooper’s mother testified that the children visited
with Ms. Wylie and Mr. Cooper, but that the children were neglected, not fed, and
scarcely had clothes to wear. Ms. Wylie’s sister rescued the children and took them
back to their grandparents.
Ms. Wylie would not take advantage of any of the state services offered
to help her gain parenting skills. Neither would she comply with a plan of care
developed for her and the children. She disappeared for most of one year before one
of the state workers located her in jail just three months before the final hearing in this
case. For the seven months up to the date of the final hearing, Ms. Wylie had visited
her children only six times.
Ms. Wylie testified that she was now in a stable environment, living in
subsidized housing with enough room for the children. She said she had a job caring
for an elderly person and could care for the children. Her family members, including
her mother who had had such reservations about the children ever being returned to
Ms. Wylie, testified that she had changed, that she was divorcing Mr. Wylie, and that
she could provide a home for the children.
-3- At the end of the hearing the juvenile judge found clear and convincing
proof of the grounds for termination, but he deferred for sixty days a decision on
whether termination would be in the children’s best interests. After a hearing on
September 23, 1997 the juvenile judge entered another order containing the following
findings and conclusions:
The Court further finds upon clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the children to terminate parental rights; that the conditions that led to the children’s removal still exist or other conditions exist which would in all probability subject the children to further neglect or abuse if returned home; there is little likelihood that these conditions will be remedied at an early date so that the children could be returned to the Defendants in the near future; that the continuation of the parent/child relationship greatly diminishes the children’s chances of early integration into a stable and permanent home.
II.
Parents have a fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of
their children. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573
(Tenn. 1993). That right, however, may be surrendered by parents who engage in
acts that pose a threat of substantial harm to the children. Nale v. Robertson, 871
S.W.2d 674 (Tenn. 1994). The legislature has drawn some guidelines to balance the
parental rights against the state’s interest in preventing harm to the children. Under
the statutory scheme a court may take a dependent and neglected child out of the
parent(s)’ custody to protect the “physical, mental, and moral welfare of the child.”
Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-130(a). In appropriate cases, the state then provides a range
of services to the parents and the children to try to reunite the family. Tenn. Code
Ann. § 37-2-403. When all else fails, the court may permanently terminate a parent’s
parental rights.
The procedure for termination has been described in some detail by the
legislature in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113. The parts relevant to this case are:
-4- (c) Termination of parental or guardianship rights must be based upon:
(1) A finding by the court by clear and convincing evidence that the grounds for termination of parental or guardianship rights have been established; and
(2) That the termination of the parent’s or guardian’s rights is in the best interests of the child.
* * *
(g) Termination of parental or guardianship rights may be based upon any of the following grounds:
(2) There has been substantial noncompliance by the parent or guardian with the statement of responsibilities in a permanency plan or a plan of care pursuant to the provisions of title 37, chapter 2, part 4;
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE FILED February 11, 1999
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) Cecil W. Crowson DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, ) Appellate Court Clerk ) Petitioner/Appellee, ) ) Appeal No. VS. ) 01-A-01-9711-JV-00662 ) RALONDA NYOKA WRIGHT SMITH ) White Juvenile WYLIE, CRAIG DOUGLAS WYLIE ) No. 1016 and JOHNNY SMITH, ) ) Respondent/Appellant, ) ) IN THE MATTER OF: ) Kristalena Kay Smith, D.O.B. 5/04/89 ) Justin Thomas Wylie, D.O.B. 12/06/92 ) ) Children Under Eighteen (18) Years of Age )
APPEALED FROM THE JUVENILE COURT OF WHITE COUNTY AT SPARTA, TENNESSEE
THE HONORABLE GARY W. DODSON, JUDGE
JOHN KNOX WALKUP Attorney General and Reporter
DOUGLAS EARL DIMOND Assistant Attorney General 425 Fifth Avenue, North Nashville, TN 37243-0499 Attorney for Appellee
D. MICHAEL KRESS II 8 East Bockman Way Sparta, Tennessee 38483 Attorney for Appellant Ralonda Nyoka Wright Smith Wylie
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED
BEN H. CANTRELL, PRESIDING JUDGE, M.S.
CONCUR: CAIN, J. COTTRELL, J. OPINION
The Juvenile Court of White County terminated a mother’s parental
rights to two small children. The only question in this appeal is whether the State
proved by clear and convincing evidence the statutory grounds for termination. We
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I.
Kristalena K. Smith was born on May 4, 1989 to Ralonda Wright Smith
and Johnny Smith. Justin Thomas Wylie was born out of wedlock on December 6,
1992 to Ralonda Wright Smith and Craig Douglas Wylie. Ms. Smith and Mr. Wylie
later married.
In February of 1994 Ms. Wylie took the children to a babysitter and told
the babysitter that she would return for the children by 9:00 or 10:00 p.m. By the
afternoon of the next day Ms. Wylie had not returned and she could not be reached.
She had left the name of a relative, but that person refused to become involved. The
Department of Human Services (DHS) took the children and filed a petition for
temporary custody. The petition alleged that the children had also been sexually
abused.
On February 22, 1994 the Juvenile Court of White County held a hearing
on the petition and found that the best interests of the children required removal from
the parents’ custody and that there was no less drastic alternative. Ms. Wylie was
represented at the hearing by retained counsel. There is no transcript in the record
from that hearing.
-2- In March of 1995 the children were placed with their maternal
grandmother. Ms. Wylie showed up occasionally. She lived with Mr. Wylie in
Tennessee, Texas, and Florida, but sometimes she was completely out of touch with
the children and their grandmother for long periods of time. On the occasions when
Ms. Wylie did show up, she did not take any interest in the children. The grandmother
sometimes refused to let her daughter see her children because she upset them. In
September of 1995 the grandmother asked DHS to take the children back and
expressed a hope that the children would never be returned to Ms. Wylie.
For part of the time her children were in state custody, the mother lived
with a man by the name of Cooper. Cooper’s mother testified that the children visited
with Ms. Wylie and Mr. Cooper, but that the children were neglected, not fed, and
scarcely had clothes to wear. Ms. Wylie’s sister rescued the children and took them
back to their grandparents.
Ms. Wylie would not take advantage of any of the state services offered
to help her gain parenting skills. Neither would she comply with a plan of care
developed for her and the children. She disappeared for most of one year before one
of the state workers located her in jail just three months before the final hearing in this
case. For the seven months up to the date of the final hearing, Ms. Wylie had visited
her children only six times.
Ms. Wylie testified that she was now in a stable environment, living in
subsidized housing with enough room for the children. She said she had a job caring
for an elderly person and could care for the children. Her family members, including
her mother who had had such reservations about the children ever being returned to
Ms. Wylie, testified that she had changed, that she was divorcing Mr. Wylie, and that
she could provide a home for the children.
-3- At the end of the hearing the juvenile judge found clear and convincing
proof of the grounds for termination, but he deferred for sixty days a decision on
whether termination would be in the children’s best interests. After a hearing on
September 23, 1997 the juvenile judge entered another order containing the following
findings and conclusions:
The Court further finds upon clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the children to terminate parental rights; that the conditions that led to the children’s removal still exist or other conditions exist which would in all probability subject the children to further neglect or abuse if returned home; there is little likelihood that these conditions will be remedied at an early date so that the children could be returned to the Defendants in the near future; that the continuation of the parent/child relationship greatly diminishes the children’s chances of early integration into a stable and permanent home.
II.
Parents have a fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of
their children. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573
(Tenn. 1993). That right, however, may be surrendered by parents who engage in
acts that pose a threat of substantial harm to the children. Nale v. Robertson, 871
S.W.2d 674 (Tenn. 1994). The legislature has drawn some guidelines to balance the
parental rights against the state’s interest in preventing harm to the children. Under
the statutory scheme a court may take a dependent and neglected child out of the
parent(s)’ custody to protect the “physical, mental, and moral welfare of the child.”
Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-130(a). In appropriate cases, the state then provides a range
of services to the parents and the children to try to reunite the family. Tenn. Code
Ann. § 37-2-403. When all else fails, the court may permanently terminate a parent’s
parental rights.
The procedure for termination has been described in some detail by the
legislature in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113. The parts relevant to this case are:
-4- (c) Termination of parental or guardianship rights must be based upon:
(1) A finding by the court by clear and convincing evidence that the grounds for termination of parental or guardianship rights have been established; and
(2) That the termination of the parent’s or guardian’s rights is in the best interests of the child.
* * *
(g) Termination of parental or guardianship rights may be based upon any of the following grounds:
(2) There has been substantial noncompliance by the parent or guardian with the statement of responsibilities in a permanency plan or a plan of care pursuant to the provisions of title 37, chapter 2, part 4;
(3)(A) The child has been removed from the home of the parent or guardian by order of a court for a period of six (6) months and:
(i) The conditions which led to the child’s removal or other conditions which in all reasonable probability would cause the child to be subjected to further abuse or neglect and which, therefore, prevent the child’s return to the care of the parent(s) or guardian(s), still persist;
(ii) There is little likelihood that these conditions will be remedied at an early date so that the child can be returned to the parent(s) or guardian(s) in the near future; and
(iii) The continuation of the parent or guardian and child relationship greatly diminishes the child’s chances of early integration into a stable and permanent home.
-5- The juvenile judge’s findings and conclusions track the statutory
requirements. After reviewing the transcript of the July 29, 1997 hearing, we concur
with the juvenile judge. The record shows that for more than three years Ms. Wylie
showed a remarkable lack of concern for her children. She utterly failed to comply
with her plan of care. For long periods of time she was out of touch with the state
workers who were supposed to monitor her progress. She continued to live with the
person suspected of abusing her infant son. Three months before the July 29, 1997
hearing she was in jail on a contempt of court charge for failing to comply with the
court’s order in a DUI conviction.
The failure to terminate parental rights would prolong the delay in finding
a stable home for the children.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed and the case is remanded to
the Juvenile Court of White County for any further proceedings necessary. Tax the
costs on appeal to the appellant.
_____________________________ BEN H. CANTRELL, PRESIDING JUDGE, M.S.
CONCUR:
_____________________________ WILLIAM B. CAIN, JUDGE
_____________________________ PATRICIA J. COTTRELL, JUDGE
-6-