NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion. In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: August 12, 2025
S25Y1147. IN THE MATTER OF KATHLEEN STRANG.
PER CURIAM.
This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the report and
recommendation of Special Master LaRae D. Moore, who
recommends that Kathleen Strang (State Bar No. 675018) be
disbarred for her conduct in connection with four client matters.
Strang is currently suspended pursuant to an interim order entered
by this Court after she failed to provide a response to the State Bar’s
Notice of Investigation underlying this matter. See In the Matter of
Strang, Case No. S24Y0064 (Aug. 24, 2023). The Special Master
concluded that, based on Strang’s admissions by virtue of her
default, Strang, who has been a member of the State Bar since 1996, violated Rules 1.2(a),1 1.3,2 1.4(a)3 and (b)4, 3.2,5 and 9.36 of the
Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct (“GRPC” or “Rules”) found in
Bar Rule 4-102(d) and recommended that Strang be disbarred. The
maximum sanction for a violation of Rules 1.2(a) and 1.3 is
disbarment. The maximum sanction for a violation of Rules 1.4(a)
and (b), 3.2, and 9.3 is a public reprimand. Neither party has filed
exceptions in this Court, and this matter is now ripe for the Court’s
1 Rule 1.2(a) provides, in pertinent part, that “a lawyer shall abide by a
client’s decisions concerning the scope and objectives of representation and . . . shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued.”
2 Rule 1.3 provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] lawyer shall act with
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.”
3 Rule 1.4(a) provides, in pertinent part, that a lawyer shall “reasonably
consult with the client about the means by which the client’s objectives are to be accomplished,” “keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter,” and “promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.”
4 Rule 1.4(b) provides that “[a] lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.”
5Rule 3.2 provides that “[a] lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client.”
6 Rule 9.3 provides that “[d]uring the investigation of a matter pursuant
to these Rules, the lawyer complained against shall respond to disciplinary authorities in accordance with State Bar Rules.” 2 consideration. Having reviewed the record, we agree with the
Special Master that disbarment is the appropriate sanction.
The record before us shows that on January 8, 2024, the State
Bar filed a Formal Complaint against Strang in State Disciplinary
Board Docket (“SDBD”) Nos. 7794, 7795, and 7796, charging her
with violations of Rules 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), 3.2, and 9.3. On
April 11, 2024, the State Bar filed a second Formal Complaint
against Strang in SDBD No. 7869, charging her with additional
violations of Rules 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.4(a), and 3.2. After the State Bar’s
initial attempts to personally serve Strang could not be perfected, it
served her by publication pursuant to Bar Rule 4-203.1(b)(3)(ii).
Strang failed to timely answer the Formal Complaints, and the
State Bar filed two Motions for Default, which the Special Master
granted. See Bar Rule 4-212(a). The Special Master then scheduled
an aggravation and mitigation hearing — which Strang did not
attend — and submitted her report and recommendation.
The facts, as deemed admitted by Strang’s default, show that
in SDBD No. 7794, Strang was appointed to represent a client
3 following his conviction for murder and entered an appearance on
his behalf in January 2019. The client’s motion for new trial hearing
was rescheduled multiple times. On one occasion, Strang
represented to the trial court that she needed additional time, and
on another occasion, she informed the court that she had health
issues and had gotten “backlogged.” The court ultimately held a
hearing on the motion in October 2020. Prior to this hearing, Strang
told the court that her client was concerned because he had written
Strang asking for his trial transcripts, but Strang never responded.
Strang denied receiving the correspondence, although she admitted
that she failed to send the client a copy of the brief she had filed on
his behalf. In July 2022, the court entered an order denying the
motion. Subsequently, the client filed a grievance against Strang
with the State Bar, complaining that Strang only communicated
with him at court appearances and did not adequately prepare to
represent him. Strang never responded to the grievance.
In SDBD No. 7795, Strang was appointed to represent a client
seeking to withdraw his guilty plea to charges of aggravated assault.
4 The client filed a grievance against Strang in which he alleged that
Strang had not communicated with him regarding his desire to
withdraw the plea. Strang responded to the grievance in October
2022, stating that she “ha[d] not yet been able to obtain a copy of
[his] plea transcript[,]” which she labeled as “critical” to “any
determination of the validity of [the client’s] plea.” The client
rebutted Strang’s response in November 2022 and claimed that his
transcript was filed in the clerk’s office and dated January 9, 2017.
Strang responded to the client’s rebuttal in February 2023 and
claimed that she had since been able to review the client’s transcript
and believed that his plea was “constitutionally sound.” At Strang’s
disciplinary hearing, which she did not attend, counsel for the State
Bar represented that the client’s transcript “had been filed into the
record in 2017” and that it was “unclear” as to “why [Strang] would
have had problems obtaining the trial transcript when she
responded” to her client “in 2022.” In her recommendation to disbar,
the Special Master found that Strang “admitted that she essentially
5 abandoned the case because she unilaterally determined that [the
client’s] appeal was without merit.”
In SDBD No. 7796, Strang was appointed to represent a client
who was convicted of enticing a child. During her representation,
Strang failed to communicate with the client, failed to consult with
him about his case, failed to inform him of at least one court date,
and failed to attend at least two court dates herself. She filed an
amended motion for new trial over ten months after she was
appointed to the case and failed to file certain amended or
supplemental materials that she represented to the court that she
would file thereafter. Further, Strang requested on multiple
occasions that the court grant her additional time to prepare for the
client’s case. And despite the client writing to her to inform her that
he did not want her to request any additional delays and to tell her
what grounds he wanted her to include in the supplemental brief,
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion. In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: August 12, 2025
S25Y1147. IN THE MATTER OF KATHLEEN STRANG.
PER CURIAM.
This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the report and
recommendation of Special Master LaRae D. Moore, who
recommends that Kathleen Strang (State Bar No. 675018) be
disbarred for her conduct in connection with four client matters.
Strang is currently suspended pursuant to an interim order entered
by this Court after she failed to provide a response to the State Bar’s
Notice of Investigation underlying this matter. See In the Matter of
Strang, Case No. S24Y0064 (Aug. 24, 2023). The Special Master
concluded that, based on Strang’s admissions by virtue of her
default, Strang, who has been a member of the State Bar since 1996, violated Rules 1.2(a),1 1.3,2 1.4(a)3 and (b)4, 3.2,5 and 9.36 of the
Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct (“GRPC” or “Rules”) found in
Bar Rule 4-102(d) and recommended that Strang be disbarred. The
maximum sanction for a violation of Rules 1.2(a) and 1.3 is
disbarment. The maximum sanction for a violation of Rules 1.4(a)
and (b), 3.2, and 9.3 is a public reprimand. Neither party has filed
exceptions in this Court, and this matter is now ripe for the Court’s
1 Rule 1.2(a) provides, in pertinent part, that “a lawyer shall abide by a
client’s decisions concerning the scope and objectives of representation and . . . shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued.”
2 Rule 1.3 provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] lawyer shall act with
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.”
3 Rule 1.4(a) provides, in pertinent part, that a lawyer shall “reasonably
consult with the client about the means by which the client’s objectives are to be accomplished,” “keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter,” and “promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.”
4 Rule 1.4(b) provides that “[a] lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.”
5Rule 3.2 provides that “[a] lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client.”
6 Rule 9.3 provides that “[d]uring the investigation of a matter pursuant
to these Rules, the lawyer complained against shall respond to disciplinary authorities in accordance with State Bar Rules.” 2 consideration. Having reviewed the record, we agree with the
Special Master that disbarment is the appropriate sanction.
The record before us shows that on January 8, 2024, the State
Bar filed a Formal Complaint against Strang in State Disciplinary
Board Docket (“SDBD”) Nos. 7794, 7795, and 7796, charging her
with violations of Rules 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), 3.2, and 9.3. On
April 11, 2024, the State Bar filed a second Formal Complaint
against Strang in SDBD No. 7869, charging her with additional
violations of Rules 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.4(a), and 3.2. After the State Bar’s
initial attempts to personally serve Strang could not be perfected, it
served her by publication pursuant to Bar Rule 4-203.1(b)(3)(ii).
Strang failed to timely answer the Formal Complaints, and the
State Bar filed two Motions for Default, which the Special Master
granted. See Bar Rule 4-212(a). The Special Master then scheduled
an aggravation and mitigation hearing — which Strang did not
attend — and submitted her report and recommendation.
The facts, as deemed admitted by Strang’s default, show that
in SDBD No. 7794, Strang was appointed to represent a client
3 following his conviction for murder and entered an appearance on
his behalf in January 2019. The client’s motion for new trial hearing
was rescheduled multiple times. On one occasion, Strang
represented to the trial court that she needed additional time, and
on another occasion, she informed the court that she had health
issues and had gotten “backlogged.” The court ultimately held a
hearing on the motion in October 2020. Prior to this hearing, Strang
told the court that her client was concerned because he had written
Strang asking for his trial transcripts, but Strang never responded.
Strang denied receiving the correspondence, although she admitted
that she failed to send the client a copy of the brief she had filed on
his behalf. In July 2022, the court entered an order denying the
motion. Subsequently, the client filed a grievance against Strang
with the State Bar, complaining that Strang only communicated
with him at court appearances and did not adequately prepare to
represent him. Strang never responded to the grievance.
In SDBD No. 7795, Strang was appointed to represent a client
seeking to withdraw his guilty plea to charges of aggravated assault.
4 The client filed a grievance against Strang in which he alleged that
Strang had not communicated with him regarding his desire to
withdraw the plea. Strang responded to the grievance in October
2022, stating that she “ha[d] not yet been able to obtain a copy of
[his] plea transcript[,]” which she labeled as “critical” to “any
determination of the validity of [the client’s] plea.” The client
rebutted Strang’s response in November 2022 and claimed that his
transcript was filed in the clerk’s office and dated January 9, 2017.
Strang responded to the client’s rebuttal in February 2023 and
claimed that she had since been able to review the client’s transcript
and believed that his plea was “constitutionally sound.” At Strang’s
disciplinary hearing, which she did not attend, counsel for the State
Bar represented that the client’s transcript “had been filed into the
record in 2017” and that it was “unclear” as to “why [Strang] would
have had problems obtaining the trial transcript when she
responded” to her client “in 2022.” In her recommendation to disbar,
the Special Master found that Strang “admitted that she essentially
5 abandoned the case because she unilaterally determined that [the
client’s] appeal was without merit.”
In SDBD No. 7796, Strang was appointed to represent a client
who was convicted of enticing a child. During her representation,
Strang failed to communicate with the client, failed to consult with
him about his case, failed to inform him of at least one court date,
and failed to attend at least two court dates herself. She filed an
amended motion for new trial over ten months after she was
appointed to the case and failed to file certain amended or
supplemental materials that she represented to the court that she
would file thereafter. Further, Strang requested on multiple
occasions that the court grant her additional time to prepare for the
client’s case. And despite the client writing to her to inform her that
he did not want her to request any additional delays and to tell her
what grounds he wanted her to include in the supplemental brief,
Strang did not respond to the client, continued to request additional
time, and never filed the supplemental brief. Subsequently, the
client filed a grievance against her with the State Bar. At the
6 evidentiary hearing on this disciplinary matter, which Strang failed
to attend, the Special Master noted that Strang’s response to the
client’s grievance did not address her lack of communication with
the client and, instead, she focused on the merits of his case.
In SDBD No. 7869, Strang was appointed to represent a client
in defending against three felony charges. In January 2020, she
entered an appearance on behalf of the client, and in February
2021 — over a year later — filed a waiver of arraignment and
entered a not guilty plea. It does not appear from the record that
Strang made any further filings in this case, and, in September
2021, the client filed a pro se request for a speedy trial, stating that
he had not been able to communicate with Strang. In September
2023 — over two years later — the superior court entered an order
directing the Georgia Public Defender Council to appoint a new
attorney for the client because Strang had been suspended from the
practice of law due to her failure to respond to the State Bar’s initial
Notice of Investigation. During the year in which there was no
activity in his criminal case, the client filed a grievance with the
7 State Bar, alleging that Strang failed to communicate with him and
failed to diligently pursue his case. Strang responded to the
grievance, acknowledging that she had not pushed for trial nor
visited the client in jail due to her own health conditions.
Based on this conduct, the Special Master concluded that
Strang violated Rule 1.2(a) by failing to abide by each client’s
decisions concerning the scope and objectives of
representation — which were to pursue, prepare, and present a
defense — and by failing to consult with the clients regarding the
means by which their objectives would be pursued. Strang violated
Rule 1.3 by failing to act diligently and by willfully abandoning her
clients’ cases to their detriment, as she asked for multiple
continuances, failed to attend scheduled court dates, and failed to
make timely filings. Strang violated Rule 1.4(a) by failing to consult
with her clients and failing to keep them informed about the status
of their cases. Strang violated Rule 1.4(b) by failing to explain to her
clients their cases to the extent reasonably necessary for them to
make informed decisions. Strang violated Rule 3.2 by requesting
8 continuances for no reason other than her own case backlog and by
failing to meet deadlines. Strang violated Rule 9.3 by failing to
respond to the Notice of Investigation.
In considering the appropriate level of discipline, the Special
Master considered the American Bar Association Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1992) (“ABA Standards”). In the Matter
of Morse, 266 Ga. 652 (1996). See also ABA Standard 3.0 (when
imposing a sanction, a court should consider the duty violated, the
lawyer’s mental state, the potential or actual injury caused by the
lawyer’s misconduct, and the existence of aggravating or mitigating
factors). In addressing the duties violated, the Special Master
determined that Strang violated her duty of diligence, her duty to
abide by her clients’ decisions concerning the scope and objectives of
representation, her duty to keep her clients informed about their
case, and her duty to expedite her clients’ cases consistent with their
best interests. In addressing Strang’s mental state, the Special
Master determined that Strang’s conduct was knowing, as she knew
that the objective of her representation was to defend her clients
9 against criminal charges or pursue post-conviction appeals; she
knew that she had deadlines and obligations to her clients and the
courts; and she knew that her indigent clients, whom she
represented by appointment, could not simply hire another lawyer.
Yet, despite being aware of these circumstances and duties, Strang
“knowingly failed to discharge them.” In addressing injury, the
Special Master determined that Strang’s misconduct caused serious
injury or potential serious injury to her clients, as her failure to
communicate with her incarcerated clients left them without any
knowledge of their case status and caused or could have caused
anxiety and worry and as the resolution of her clients’ cases were
delayed by months and even years. Further, the Special Master
determined that Strang’s misconduct caused injury to the
profession, as the Georgia Public Defender Council entrusted the
defense of multiple indigent clients to her and she failed to uphold
the faith the State of Georgia and the justice system placed in her.
The Special Master further determined that, in aggravation,
Strang had a pattern of misconduct, as she repeatedly failed to
10 communicate with her clients and perform work in their cases;
committed multiple offenses; refused to acknowledge the wrongful
nature of her conduct, as she never addressed her wrongdoings when
responding to the clients’ grievances; had vulnerable victims, as her
clients were incarcerated and indigent; and had substantial
experience in the practice of law. See ABA Standard 9.22(c), (d), (g),
(h), and (i). In mitigation, the Special Master determined that the
only applicable factor was the absence of a prior disciplinary record,
but noted that this was not sufficient to balance the many
aggravating factors. See ABA Standard 9.32(a).
The Special Master then concluded that based on the Rules
violated, Strang should be disbarred, noting that such a sanction is
consistent with prior cases in which an attorney has violated similar
Rule provisions. See In the Matter of Jackson, 321 Ga. 256 (2025)
(attorney in default disbarred for violations of Rules 1.2(a), 1.3, and
1.4(a) in connection with one client matter where attorney
abandoned his client’s case and had no prior disciplinary history); In
the Matter of Blain, 315 Ga. 475 (2023) (attorney in default
11 disbarred for violations of Rules 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.4, and 3.2 in connection
with one client matter where attorney had no prior disciplinary
history); In the Matter of McCrea, 314 Ga. 810 (2022) (attorney in
default disbarred for violations of Rules 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.4(a), 1.16(d),
and 9.3 in connection with two client matters where attorney had no
prior disciplinary history, abandoned his clients, and failed to
respond to the notice of investigation); In the Matter of Miller, 302
Ga. 366 (2017) (attorney in default disbarred for violations of Rules
1.2(a), 1.3, 1.4, 1.16(c), and 3.2 where attorney failed to communicate
with his client and failed to respond to the notice of investigation).
Having reviewed the record, we agree that disbarment is the
appropriate sanction, and that disbarment is consistent with prior
cases in which an attorney admitted, by virtue of default, to
violating similar provisions of the GRPC that carry disbarment as a
sanction and failed to participate in the disciplinary process.
Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that the name of Kathleen Strang
be removed from the rolls of persons authorized to practice law in
the State of Georgia. Strang is reminded of her duties pursuant to
12 Bar Rule 4-219(b).
Disbarred. All the Justices concur, except Land, J., not participating.